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ABSTRACT:
This doctoral thesis looks at Labour politics and society in South Yorkshire between the start of the Second 
World War in September 1939 and the fall from office of the Attlee Labour Government in October 1951. 
While it accepts the predominating effects of national and international factors in providing challenges which 
Labour councils and local Labour Parties had to find solutions to - such as the effects of the Sheffield Blitz 
in 1940 and the need to re-plan Sheffield and the maintaining of the organisational existence of Labour 
Parties during the Second World War - it nevertheless examines those ‘micro-historical’ factors which made 
for the local diversity of the party in South Yorkshire. It tries to create a holistic and rounded portrait of the 
local Labour movement based mainly on fragmentary archival and newspaper evidence and examines current 
historical debates for local relevance such as whether a post-war consensus actually existed, whether popular 
political attitudes were radical or conservative and, whether such popular attitudes favoured or dis-favoured 
Labour. It also looks at Marxist debates over the concept of ‘Labourism’ and whether Labour was narrowly 
culturally determined or whether other factors were equally important. Chapter One introduces the thesis. 
Chapter Two examines the fears over the post-war industrial future of Sheffield which took place during the 
Second World War within the City Council and between it and organisations like the trade unions and the 
Chamber of Commerce. It also looks at City Council debates over the proposed post-war regionalisation of 
local government and how that was prevented by a united council. This shows that the centralising 
tendencies of the London government could be resisted by the peripheries and that such tendencies were not 
inevitable. Chapter Three examines town planning in Sheffield during the Second World War after the Blitz 
in December 1940 provided an opportunity to create a more modem, better planned and less ugly city. The 
planning process is examined and the secrecy of the City Council noted at a time when the country was 
fighting to defend an open and democratic society from the Nazis. Chapter Three also looks at the wartime 
context of the acute post-war housing crisis. Chapter Four looks at the wartime Labour Party in South 
Yorkshire, its ebb in membership prior to 1942 and its resurgence after that date ending with an examination 
of the 1945 General Election in Sheffield. Chapter Five looks at local government between 1945 and 1951, 
examining the factors which prevented the reform of the local structure of local government, the effect on 
Sheffield and Rotherham Councils of the nationalisation of electricity, gas and local authority hospitals, and 
the attempts to implement the Butler Education Act of 1944 in South Yorkshire. Chapter Six looks at the 
attempts to implement the 1945 Collie town plan for Sheffield and the reasons for the lack of progress as well 
as at the contrasting housing records of Sheffield and Rotherham Councils. It attempts to account for the 
latter’s better record when compared with the former. Chapter Seven looks the ideology and cultural 
determinants of the Labour Party in South Yorkshire between 1945 and 1951. It also examines Labour 
organisation noting the essential role of women as unpaid voluntary labour and contrasting it with their 
limited entry to local political office. Finally it looks at and comments on the municipal and general election 
results in Sheffield of the Labour Party between 1945 and 1951. Chapter Eight provides a conclusion.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 - LABOUR HISTORIOGRAPHY IN SOUTH YORKSHIRE
The main focus of this thesis is on the Sheffield and Rotherham County Borough Councils though I also 
include some material on the County Boroughs of Doncaster and Barnsley and the lesser district councils 
which came under the umbrella o f the West Riding County Council. As the title of my thesis suggests it 
aspires to be a regional history of Labour politics and society within South Yorkshire between the 
outbreak of war in September 1939 and the ejection of Labour from national political office in October 
1951. During this period there were Labour County Borough Councils in Sheffield, Rotherham and 
Barnsley and in Doncaster from November 1945. Between 1939 and 1945 only three parliamentary 
seats in the region out of thirteen were held by the opponents of Labour and this fell to two between 1945 
and 1951. Labour politics was politics in the southern West Riding. South Yorkshire as an 
administrative entity is of recent origin and was created within its present borders - the borders of this 
study - in 1974 by local government reorganisation but it is significant that in the immediate post-war 
period the creation of a ‘York South’ county was briefly envisaged. However, it would look strange to 
the inhabitants of present day South Yorkshire as Sheffield was not included within its borders though 
Rotherham, Barnsley and Doncaster were. ‘South Yorkshire’ as a concept has a longer histoiy of usage 
though arguably it was the Industrial Revolution that created the idea. The Reverend Joseph Hunter, the 
first real historian of South Yorkshire, for example, had published South Yorkshire: The History and 
Topography of the Deanery of Doncaster in the Diocese and County of York in the early nineteenth 
century while in 1862 a pamphlet entitled Rotherham College. Its Retention Advocated commented: 
‘There are many things they have not in common with the group of towns more especially designated the 
“West Riding”, and in this matter of taking their time-honoured and valuable College some forty miles 
northward, they must ask to be allowed to prefer it being regarded as a South Yorkshire Institution.’*
The rise of Labour as a movement in South Yorkshire from the late nineteenth century was also 
historically distinct from that of the textile districts of the West Riding. In the latter the Independent 
Labour Party was much stronger before 1914 than it ever was in South Yorkshire.2 This is in spite o f the 
fact that Labour historians like Eric Hobsbawm have argued that an increasingly homogeneous common 
working class way of life, which in turn produced increasing support for a class party of Labour, came 
into being between the 1880s and 1914.3 South Yorkshire’s Labour movement was marked by the 
region’s division into two very different occupational worlds - the world o f ‘King Coal’ with its 
‘archetypal proletarians’, the militant miners, and the world of ‘King Steel’ inhabited by the equally 
highly-unionised but less militant steel-workers and engineers. Both were different worlds to an extent 
that is not fully emphasised in this thesis which looks at the congested urban areas rather than at the pit 
communities, some of which were sited in isolated rural locations. South Yorkshire, despite its dirty 
urban industrial image, still has many areas of unspoilt natural charm even today about which people 
from outside the county are generally ignorant. In the 1940s there was still an almost feudal respect for 
the Earls Fit2william in the environs of Rotherham. Before 1947 they owned local mines and afterwards
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they continued to own much land in southern Yorkshire as did the Duke of Norfolk.
South Yorkshire can be compared profitably with South Wales. Though the latter was also equally 
dependent on coal and iron and steel, it was less economically diversified than southern Yorkshire, if that 
is possible, and less rich (Sheffield’s West End, for example, has always been affluent). Thus, it was 
even more depressed during the inter-war slump. It saw even greater proportionate unemployment in its 
labour force and much more political and industrial militancy. There were no ‘little Moscows’ like 
Mardy in South Yorkshire run by the Communist Party. The latter were never the electoral threat they, 
at least potentially, posed in South Wales up to 1951. The balance of anti-capitalist forces was also 
different. This was true politically and industrially. In the Rhondda valleys in the 1940s the Tories and 
Liberals’ political presence was irrelevant at best while in South Yorkshire the former held parliamentary 
seats and their Municipal Progressive auxiliaries in Sheffield formed a creditable opposition, with 
strongholds among the city’s council wards that Labour were unable to take. In South Wales and the 
Nottinghamshire coalfield there had been bitter struggles after 1926 between the Miners’ Federation of 
Great Britain and the company unions, for example, over who would organise the miners. This did not 
occur in South Yorkshire. Nationality is a glaring difference between the two areas though the people of 
the North of England and of Yorkshire in particular were also considered to be markedly different in 
character from those of London and the Home Counties and had been since the Middle Ages when the 
North was the more backward area. Stefan Berger has recently compared the local Labour movement 
and working class culture in South Wales with that of the Ruhr Coalfields in Germany. Similar 
comparisons could be made between the Ruhr and South Yorkshire. In the Ruhr, society was divided on 
ethnic and religious lines (as it was in Liverpool, Glasgow or Belfast in Britain) which produced 
heterogeneous working class cultures. This long impeded the progress o f a united political Labour 
movement which, led by the German Social Democrats, only eventually made progress there in the 
1950s. The Ruhr like South Yorkshire was based on coal and steel though it did not suffer as badly as 
the latter in the Slump. Berger contrasts it with the homogeneous working-class culture o f South Wales 
which saw the dominance of one working-class party - Labour - considerably earlier.4
Recent work on West Ham,5 Coventry,6 Preston7 and the Rhondda8 have emphasised the potential 
diversity of histories of the development of the Labour Party in Britain in the twentieth century and 
reflect an overdue interest in politics ‘Beyond Westminster’. Too little attention before the 1980s was 
paid to such diverse twentieth centuiy histories in contrast to the tradition o f study of the history of local 
nineteenth century working class politics that goes back to Engels9 and which was boosted in modem 
times by the publication of Asa Briggs’ Chartist Studies in 1959. The latter stated categorically that ‘A 
study of Chartism must begin with a proper appreciation of regional and local diversity.’ The lack of 
attention paid to Labour’s regional and local diversity has been attributed to the fact that its rise from 
1900 was seen to be bound up with national class-based politics in contrast to the local status-based 
politics of the nineteenth century.10 However, in the same year as Briggs’ book, Sidney Pollard 
published his history of labour in Sheffield, which did refer to the politics o f the Labour Party in the city
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up to the outbreak of the Second World War, but, though an important and pioneering work, it was not 
widely emulated.
Pollard’s study can be criticized for sketching the history of actual Sheffield Labour politics in the inter­
war period in too short a span of pages and for the emphasis the book placed on structural factors such as 
industrial organisation and economic forces in explaining why the politics o f the city took the shape it
did. But he was after all later to become Professor of Economic History at Sheffield University rather 
than having academic tenure in political science or Labour Party history. While an account of working- 
class culture in Sheffield was given some space11 it did not possess the narrow and deterministic 
explanatory role that some historians like Neville Kirk argue is present in the thesis presented by Eric 
Hobsbawm to explain the rise of Labour.12 Socialism was seen to be a consequence of the introduction 
of large-scale heavy industry, often employing unskilled workers, with alienation resulting between the 
employed and their masters.13 This was an explanation derived from classical Marxism.14 Today 
contingency, working class culture and political discourse are all given greater explanatory roles in the 
development of the Labour Party, reflecting changed intellectual fashions. His book was much more 
concerned with broad structural economic forces than the contributions of particular individuals. Pollard 
was, nevertheless, a sophisticated historical practitioner and not a ‘vulgar Marxist’. ‘Class’ was central 
to his interpretation, and not simply as objective social description, for class consciousness was, he 
believed, a reality. His history was in a way an early example of the ‘total history’ of a locality. Before 
his death in 1998 he contributed an essay on ‘Labour’ to the second ‘Society’ volume of the celebratory 
history of the city of Sheffield that appeared in 1993. That history celebrated the 150 years since 
Sheffield’s municipal incorporation in 1843 and the centenary of Sheffield’s city-status, which was 
proclaimed in 1893.15 Pollard’s essay summarised the contents and conclusions of his earlier book, 
while extending his treatment of the city’s labour history up to the present day. In 1958 he had also 
helped co-author a volume celebrating the first century of existence of the Sheffield Trades and Labour 
Council.16 Much later in 1976 he co-edited with Colin Holmes (and wrote the introduction for) a 
collection of essays on local economic and social history published by the newly created South Yorkshire 
County Council. The subjects of these essays while providing some background to later South Yorkshire 
labour history do not go beyond 1914.17
Pollard’s 1959 history influenced William Hampton’s book on Sheffield’s post-war politics (published in 
1970) which also accepted the role of worker alienation in the rise of Socialism in Sheffield.18 
Hampton’s book is a work of political science rather than history but it is important for the ‘model’ it 
provides of the typical ‘Old Labour’ Council during the ‘golden age’ before 1973. As research it is very 
much a product of the politics of the period of Harold Wilson’s 1964-70 Labour government with the 
book providing empirical justification for Labour’s renewed interest in the viability of regional 
government and the national economic planning it would allow.19 This was against the reiterated claim 
of local councillors in the 1960s (though not Sheffield City Council this time - in contrast to its position 
in the 1940s)20 that regional government was a threat to local communities because it was too big and
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remote from citizens’ lives thus creating ‘a dictatorial vacuum in which local spirit and initiative would
die.’21 He argued that while the public could be mobilized against change to the existing system by 
romantic appeals to ‘a golden age of village Hampdens defending their rights’,22 they were already 
unenthusiastic and apathetic about the existing system as it stood, as shown by low municipal election 
polls23 and the inability of local political parties to find suitable candidates for such elections.24 The 
research was also undertaken against the backdrop of Labour briefly losing control of the City Council 
and of the alleged consciousness this created among city councillors of a need for a change in the way 
they related to the public given the political apathy which contributed to the crisis in the city.25 Hampton 
wanted ‘neighbourhood councils’ formed below the ward level to foster greater participation on the lines 
proposed by the Skeffington Committee in 1969 so as to provide better information so better decisions 
could be made by the politicians.26 Hampton’s estimation of the limits o f popular civic consciousness 
due to the greater social attachments of working people to their neighbourhoods27 has influenced the 
arguments of my thesis. Similarly, his view, that the way councils actually operated and were organised 
affected the manifestation o f civic spirit for the worse, has also influenced this thesis. The fact that on a 
single day councillors could be elected by a small minority o f the electorate who then had no further 
direct control over their actions was not an advertisement for participatory democracy and could allow 
the taking o f extreme ideological positions when Labour councillors made political decisions. The 
position was no different in the 1940s. In fact that period saw perhaps the peak of Labour confidence in 
the system in Sheffield, despite Fielding’s view that the anti-party popular mood he saw existing during 
the Second World War represented a lack of confidence in the representative nature o f representative 
democracy.28 There was little indication of any desire by Labour politicians locally at that time to 
initiate a popular debate on the voting system in local elections or to increase participation in the actual 
process o f town planning, for example, on the lines later proposed by Skeffington.29 In fact Chapter 
Three of this thesis which tries to answer the question of how far Sheffield City Council was willing to 
involve ordinary citizens in reconstruction planning provides evidence of the caution and ingrained 
secrecy of the former. This contrasts unfavourably with the view taken by city councils in Coventry or 
Bristol that local interests should be intimately involved at every stage. Hampton also believed social 
surveys should be widely used, for example, but little on those lines was done in Sheffield in the 1940s.
It is reasonable to assume that the confidence of the Labour Council in going its own way without 
considerable formal consultation was due to the greater security of its political position than was the 
case, for example, in Coventry.
Hampton’s book also influenced Dave Backwith’s 1995 doctoral thesis on ‘The Death of Municipal 
Socialism’. This analysed the relationship between the growth of council housing into a major tenure 
and the rise of the Labour Party between the two world wars. Backwith accepted Hampton’s view of the 
nature of the post-Second World War Labour Council in Sheffield and described the post-war period as 
the ‘ebb tide of municipal socialism’.30 General needs council housing was a policy that had specifically 
originated with the Labour movement. Case studies o f Sheffield and Bristol between 1919 and 1939 
showed the influence of contrasting local factors on housing reform. Backwith saw inter-war Sheffield
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as the exemplar o f ‘municipal socialism’ and related the evolution of Labour’s housing policy in both 
cities to the changing social bases of working-class politics, chiefly the shift from a trade union, 
industrial base to one based on working-class neighbourhoods. Gender relations were central because 
women’s organisation was vital to the consolidation of Labour support on the new housing estates. But, 
while Backwith regards municipal socialism as founded on the provision of housing, which was the 
foremost council service, he argues that it operated through an ideology which fostered a ‘dependency 
culture’ on the housing estates. Tenants did not make the decisions that directly affected them - that was 
done by a paternalistic council and as a result there was often alienation. And though changes occurred 
in the 1980s, Backwith argued that there was still suspicion between the Housing Department and tenants 
organisations.31 My thesis looks in detail at the period immediately following that covered by Backwith 
and attempts to discover whether his views and criticisms of housing policy are valid in an altered 
situation of huge waiting lists and an inadequate supply of housing. It examines the expedients used to 
speed up house production and, in comparing Sheffield with neighbouring Rotherham, argues there was a 
qualitative difference in efficiency of production between the two despite both being majority Labour 
Councils.
Two local studies that have influenced my thesis are Andrew Thorpe’s 1993 essay on Sheffield’s 
consolidation as a Labour stronghold between 1926 and 195132 and David Stevenson’s recent doctoral 
thesis on the Sheffield Peace Movement between 1934 and 1940.33 Thorpe’s study covers the same 
period as my thesis, but I have been able to use a wider range of local sources, and have been able to 
cover certain topics in considerably greater detail. Thorpe’s essay is at an opposite pole from that of 
Pollard who mainly concentrated on structural factors in his description of the rise o f Labour up to 1939. 
Thorpe concentrates on shorter-term political factors in his account of the consolidation of Labour’s 
power and though structural factors cannot be ruled out they do not automatically affect the political 
development of the Labour Party. Events have a greater role, as do individuals. Class is not the sole 
explanation of developments even though it is still important as Sheffield was overwhelmingly a 
working-class industrial city. The objective conditions for Labour in Sheffield were veiy favourable 
given the strong trade union and co-operative movements but Labour also created a coalition o f local 
political support through the votes of clients like the council house tenants and the enlarged workforce 
that the City Council employed. As Labour was the largest owner of rented property in the city, council 
house tenants were a dependable source of votes, but the Council also created a large direct labour 
department to build and repair houses and schools. The employees of the direct labour department, plus 
the staffs of the electricity and transport undertakings, could be counted on to vote Labour (at least until 
nationalisation by the Attlee Government after 1945). Labour proved a much more responsible steward 
of the city’s affairs than its opponents had been. The Municipal Progressive leader, Alderman Jackson, 
could bluster about socialist mal-administration but little was actually wrong with the decisions that 
Labour took.34
Stevenson’s thesis attempted to question the received view of the national peace movement in the 1930s
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by looking at the histoiy of Sheffield. While foreign policy was a national issue and the population was 
informed by an increasingly national media, local factors had a crucial role in the movement’s 
development.35 Stevenson attempted to produce a holistic study of the local peace movement so the 
scope of his study went well beyond the Labour Party.36 Following Martin Ceadel37 he differentiated 
between the pacifist and pacificist wings of the local peace movement.38 The latter section included the 
majority of the Labour Party. By 1940 they had adopted a more ‘realist’ view of ‘collective security’ 
and had dropped the ‘utopian’ view of it they had formerly held.39 Despite this, the Labour Party in 
Sheffield up to 1940 was often at odds with the national leadership. The evolution o f the party’s peace 
policy on the above lines was slow and confused due to the cumbersome nature o f the party structure in 
Sheffield.40 The Trades and Labour Council was willing to allow the expression of the opinions of both 
dissidents and supporters of Transport House and to see opponents of the national leadership take senior 
positions on the Trade Council Executive 41 Stevenson ends his thesis with the reorganisation o f the 
Trades Council in 1940 to expel Communist elements within its leadership (including the Trade Council 
president), who believed the Second World War to be an ‘imperialist war’, and who attempted to further 
Soviet propaganda and to encourage peace overtures to the Germans.42 I also mention the reorganisation 
and briefly sketch how Labour’s pacificism further developed inside South Yorkshire during a ‘total war’ 
and beyond, when the possible threat of an atomic war with Soviet Russia led to a Communist-inspired 
peace movement seeking to overturn the West’s nuclear advantage. This got the support of at least one 
surviving locally prominent member of the old pre-war pacifist minority in the Labour Party who wanted 
atomic weapons outlawed.
The list of studies of Sheffield’s political histoiy that have had an influence on my thesis must end with 
Paul Allender’s recent book which uses a case study of Sheffield between 1973 and 1998 in order to 
provide empirical verification of his views about the shortcomings of the principles and practices under 
which the Labour Party has always acted.43 Allender derived his primary evidence from taped interviews 
with a range of local Labour figures including David Blunkett. Labour failed to live up to its own 
professed aspirations to defend working class interests and to restore the economy of Sheffield, because 
the Sheffield Labour movement was bankrupt in ideas and ability. It was not a real socialist party 
seeking comprehensive ideologically-based solutions to problems, but a party which sought short-term 
pragmatic answers to appease the voters. This ultimately led Labour in Sheffield to rely on the loyalties 
of local capitalists to bail it out, rather than seek its own socialist solution to unemployment and the need 
to diversify and rebuild a shattered local economy after the decline of coal and steel. Within the Labour 
Party nationally the individual members were constantly betrayed by opportunist leaders who 
concentrated power within the movement in their own hands through excessive bureaucracy and a lack of 
commitment to real inner party democracy. The party’s policy-making process was confused and 
confusing to members. The claim of the leadership that Labour was a party o f the national interest was 
patently untrue because it was inextricably linked to the trade unions which meant its real interests lay 
with a sectional interest. Finally, Labour was marked by a culture of defeatism, because it always 
followed, instead of leading, the electorate. Allender claims that Labour has been essentially the same
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phenomenon throughout its century of existence and thus his interpretation can be applied to the 1940s.44 
Certainly civic, political and business leaders were equally worried about Sheffield’s overwhelming 
dependence on steel and feared that new and existing industry would be directed to locations outside the 
city. In the event the worries expressed on this score could be discounted as Sheffield’s industry entered 
the 1950s with full order books and a demand for more workers to service that industry. Indeed until the 
late 1960s unemployment in the city was to be at a level of no more than two percent of the workforce.45 
Thus the problem of the local economy and Labour’s attitude towards it, which, according to Allender, 
was a test of the ability of the local Labour movement to live up to its own pragmatic claims could be 
postponed into a future which in the 1950s and 1960s was to appear rosy. What Allender has written is 
actually a political polemic by a disillusioned ex-Bennite46 and the theme of leadership betrayal, while 
somewhat convincing, is predictable. Allender’s case study of Sheffield does not make comparisons 
with other British or European cities and, in the absence of such comparisons, we do not know whether 
his conclusions about the industrial decline of Sheffield and the responsibility of its Labour movement 
for that decline are really characteristic of the wider Labour movement.47 The section on Sheffield is the 
only attempt he makes to ground his assertions in actual empirical research.
Rotherham in contrast with Sheffield has had relatively little academic work done on its Labour 
movement to compare with the above studies, but then it does not have two major universities located 
within its environs ! Even Doncaster has produced an MPhil thesis on its inter-war Labour Party.48 
There are signs, however, that this situation is changing. Jonathan Rose uses material on the little-known 
Rawmarsh ex-miner, writer and Workers’ Educational Association lecturer, ‘Roger Dataller’,49 and 
mentions ‘Tommy’ James,50 a rigid local Communist, who was a graduate of the Lenin School in 
Moscow, and a commissar in the International Brigade in Spain.51 James finished in 1968 a narrative 
history of the Labour movement in Rotherham that was intended to celebrate the seventy-fifth 
anniversaiy of Rotherham Trades Council.52 He had also written an autobiography,53 which, according 
to Rose, proclaimed James’ ‘invariable rightness on all issues’,54 and a history o f Rotherham Communist 
Party.55 The Labour movement history relies on the Rotherham Advertiser for its source material. As a 
‘celebratory’ history it tends to be uncritical about ‘the workers’ and selective. Alderman Caine, 
Rotherham Labour Party’s foremost member in the first half o f the twentieth century, nevertheless, wrote 
an introductory piece, ‘A Testimonial from a Pioneer’,56 to the book which shows that Labour and the 
local Communists were united in their views on the past in the late 1960s. This unity is also shown by 
local Labour responses to particular events during the Second World War. For example, Labour in 
Rotherham supported Communist affiliation to the party in 1943, and, but for Transport House, would 
have accepted a joint ‘Progressive Unity’ candidate in the 1945 general election. To these books could 
be added Jennifer Greatrex’s MA dissertation on inter-war mass unemployment in Rotherham57 and my 
MA dissertation that looks at events in the Spanish Civil War from the perspective of Labour in 
Rotherham, and, to a lesser extent, in Sheffield.58 I concluded that, due to its pragmatic, constitutional 
variety of socialism, the Labour Party locally was forced to rely on ‘moral force’ to overturn the British 
government policy of non-intervention. ‘Direct action’ was limited to raising funds for humanitarian
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relief and visits to Spain to express solidarity. Ray Heame’s short celebratory pamphlet, written for the 
Trades Council’s centenary, is largely a condensed version o f ‘Tommy’ James’ Labour Movement 
history, but brings the narrative up to 1991.59
1.2 - THE WIDER HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE 1940S
Having described the historiography of the Labour Party in South Yorkshire I now turn to the wider 
historiography o f the 1940s and look at two major topics which have relevance to my thesis. I conclude 
this Introduction with a brief synopsis of the chapters of the thesis.
1.2.1 - THE MYTH OF CONSENSUS ?
It is perhaps best to start with the controversy over whether there was an elite consensus created during 
the Second World War between the political parties and in Whitehall which created ‘the post-war 
settlement’ as Paul Addison in the classic 1975 book The Road to 1945 believed.60 Books and the 
historians that write them are products of their age and the politics that characterise it. In an essay on the 
historiography of appeasement and British national identity Patrick Finney has written that the 
‘underlying point’ of his essay was ‘to argue that historiography is never innocent; rather it is both 
shaped by broad ideological forces at work within society and has ideological implications, even if these 
are not always immediately apparent.’ According to Finney
debates [on appeasement] are still predominantly conducted solely in terms of
empirical factors, as if all that was at stake was ‘the weight of the evidence’ To
concentrate exclusively on the empirical dimension obscures the complexity of the 
constant interactions between past and present within historiography, and the degree to 
which both interpretations and ‘the evidence’ alike are subjective ideological 
constructs, created by historians as they interact with the archival record under the 
influence of present-centred factors including personal positioning (in terms of race, 
class, gender, beliefs and their pre-existing interpretations), the current protocols and 
methodologies of the discipline, and political and social context (including ideas about 
national identity).61
Rodney Lowe provides a useful brief account of the historiography of consensus in a 1990 essay. He 
notes that in the late 1970s and 1980s there was a ‘consensus on consensus’. Marxists who sought to 
emphasis the re-establishment of capitalist hegemony after the war stressed it as did the New Right who 
sought to discredit post-war policy. Members of the Social Democratic Party, the Labour Right and 
Conservative ‘Wets’ endorsed it as a period o f harmony and lessened divisions in society. Margaret 
Thatcher particularly publicised the concept as the source of a post-war decline that appeared omni­
present in the 1970s when class conflict appeared to have burst into flame once more with the end o f the
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long post-war boom and apocalyptic visions of the end of capitalism seized the imagination of the middle 
classes. The source of this failure was in the decisions of the 1940s when Britain was fighting for 
national survival.62
Correlli Barnett in 198663 extended the revisionist interpretation of the inter-war years that he began in 
197264 into the Second World War period. Stephen Brooke has described the book Barnett wrote in 
1986 as the ‘thuggish younger brother to The Road to 1945’ since it accepts the consensus thesis but 
looks at it from a much bleaker perspective.65 The ‘moralising internationalists’ of the earliest 1972 
book, who fatally weakened Britain through their failure to understand the needs of grand strategy, are 
the same people as the ‘New Jerusalemists’ who forced a disastrous post-war consensus on the British 
people with their attempts to foist peace aims on the wartime Churchill coalition. He continued his 
historical analysis o f how and why contemporary Britain has lost world power and status in 199566 with a 
book which covered the period between 1945 and 1950. More recently, in 2001 he wrote a book67 which 
examined the period between the Korean War and the Suez crisis in 1956. All these books - ‘The Pride 
and the Fall Sequence’ - are highly judgmental and controversial polemics. The two middle books were 
apparently almost required reading for Conservative ministers of the Thatcher and Major era.68 Barnett 
recently said that he believed that a chapter of the last book had influenced New Labour’s Estelle Morris 
in the approach she took to education policy.69
Historians have attempted to look in detail at the validity of Barnett’s views about the 1940s. Nick 
Tiratsoo70 and Junichi Hasegawa71 have tested his ideas about the pervasiveness o f ‘New Jerusalemist’ 
thinking in the sphere of town planning and have examined his contention that housing as a priority was 
placed well ahead of the needs of industrial reconstruction by the parties in the wartime coalition 
government as they sought short-term electoral advantage thus imperiling future economic prosperity.72 
They argue, however, that these conclusions are ill-founded. Barnett, originally a military historian, has 
been dismissed by Paul Addison as probably the only British historian ‘whose creed was Bismarckian 
nationalism’.73 Barnett believes that a state dedicated to the ruthless pursuit o f national competitiveness 
in a Darwinian world, as the German state was, is the model that Britain should have followed 
throughout the twentieth century.74 As the reference to Estelle Morris shows, his main political 
achievement has been to influence a revolution in education policy, which has had the aim less of 
creating the rounded individuals that the old liberal education aimed at than in making them fit for the 
needs of the workplace.
The consensus notion that underlay Addison and Barnett came, however, to be questioned by the rising 
generation of younger historians in the 1980s and 1990s. According to Kevin Jeffeiys
the war had not initiated a process of convergence between the political parties on 
domestic policy. Part of the problem in this context rests on a definition of 
‘consensus’. The fact that both parties operated within the same political framework
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made a certain level of agreement inevitable, and the war had clearly brought social 
reform to the forefront of politics in such a way that it could not be ignored by any
post-war government [But] apart from the recognition that particular issues would
have to be tackled, the parties were in many ways as far apart on social issues as they 
had been before 1939.75
Stephen Brooke in his book on the Labour Party during the Second World War would agree with 
Jefferys’ analysis, arguing that Labour developed distinct policies of its own that were ‘a far cry from 
consensus’.76 Jose Harris claims that ‘national consensus was an artificially manufactured myth’, while 
‘To speak of consensus’ with regard to the 1947 National Assistance Act created by the Attlee 
government is ‘profoundly misleading’, according to Deacon and Bradshaw. S. E. Finer and Samuel 
Beer have also seen - in sharp contradiction to Margaret Thatcher’s views - adversarial not consensus 
politics as being at the root of the post-war decline of Britain.77 Ben Pimlott argues that ‘consensus’ is 
one of those words that ‘linger, become universally absorbed, and gain a permanent niche in our 
vocabulary - shaping and perhaps distorting the way in which we view the world.’78 ‘Consensus’ had, 
indeed, according to Pimlott, distorted historians’ views of the wartime and post-war period. It was ‘a 
mirage, an illusion which rapidly fades the closer one gets to it’.79 And he believed it would ultimately 
end up in ‘the dustbin of historiography’.80 According to Pimlott, ‘Distance makes it possible to look 
beyond the emotion and the invective, and see prevailing attitudes which, because shared and 
uncontentious, do not hit the headlines and may not even be noticed at the time. But this is not to say 
that the visible differences - some of which are harsh and desperate - are not real.’81 In recognition of 
Pimlott’s 1988 essay which started the questioning o f ‘consensus’, an anthology of essays was published 
in 1996 entitled The Myth of Consensus. Contributions like that of Harriet Jones, who showed the 
distinctiveness o f Conservative political thought in the 1940s, as compared with that of Labour, based as 
the former was on a defence of inequality,82 make this revisionism sometimes seem almost a new 
orthodoxy but it has had it share of critics who continue to accept the validity of the idea of consensus, 
for example, Rodney Lowe and Paul Addison.83 They concede that ‘consensus’ should be used with 
greater precision which has often not been the case. But Lowe, for instance, argues it was
not a mirage in the 1940s. However, its nature was constantly evolving and it had
distinct limitations The rejection, at all levels o f society, of interwar fatalism was
the prelude to an agreed series of fundamental reforms in each of the core areas of 
welfare policy . . .  These reforms marked such an historic shift in the state’s 
responsibilities that they required the coining of a new term: the welfare state.84
Lowe’s thesis seems to me to provide an acceptable via media between unqualified acceptance of 
consensus and dismissing it altogether and this is the view I adopt in the thesis.
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1.2.2 - APATHY HISTORY ?
As well as creating an Attlee Consensus, the Second World War, according to Paul Addison, had 
produced a shift to the left in popular attitudes by at least the autumn of 1942. It may have been further 
to the left then than it was in 1945 when the radicalisation of the British people won Labour the general 
election. Addison accepted that some people never change their opinions and some have no opinions to 
change but he nevertheless believed that the relative weight of the evidence from by-election results and 
the evidence collected by government agencies proved radicalisation had taken place.85 This view and 
the view that Labour’s programme was broadly accepted as well as supported by British public opinion 
between 1945 and 1951 has been called into question by the same generation of historians who also 
contest Addison’s elite consensus thesis.
The Second World War is now seen to have been in a variety of areas, including female employment, the 
evacuation of schoolchildren and pregnant women, and armed forces education, much less radicalising in 
its impact on British society than was claimed by many left-wing commentators during and immediately 
after the war. The academic reappraisal began in a collection of essays edited by Harold L. Smith in 
198686 and was continued in essays edited by Nick Tiratsoo in 199187 and in a book by Steven Fielding, 
Peter Thompson, and Tiratsoo on the Labour Party and popular politics in the 1940s.88 These volumes 
argue that there was no straightforward popular radicalising trend leading to the 1945 election result. 
Fielding in a 1992 essay on ‘The meaning of the 1945 General Election’ claimed that,
Instead of promoting pro-Labour sentiment it seems that the conflict left many 
members of the public disengaged from the political process and cynical about the 
motives of all politicians. As a consequence, rather than have Labour hold office by 
itself the generally favoured outcome appears to have been the formation of a 
progressive coalition committed to the implementation o f the Beveridge report.
However, in reality, electors who did not want to see the return of a Conservative 
government had no choice but to vote ‘straight Left’.89
Fielding returned to this analysis in 1995, assessing the significance of the ‘Movement away from Party’ 
during the war and arguing that it was because the Conservatives were seen to oppose the Beveridge 
Report and other post-war reforms that they were popularly viewed as operating in a ‘party’ spirit thus 
losing them the 1945 election.90 An essay by Mason and Thompson on ‘The Political Mood in Wartime 
Britain’91 in 1991 had emphasised the apathy and conservatism of the wartime public which analysis was 
continued by Fielding in ‘Don’t Know and Don’t Care: Popular Political Attitudes in Labour’s Britain, 
1945-51’92 and in the book he co-authored with Nick Tiratsoo and Peter Thompson. Nick Tiratsoo in his 
study of reconstruction in Coventry claimed that the local Labour Party was constrained by ‘the fact that 
postwar Coventry remained very much more conservative - indeed, Conservative - than had seemed 
likely in 1945’.93
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These views are diametrically opposed to those of more Marxisant historians who see the Attlee 
government as, according to Raymond Williams, ‘an objectively quite reactionary government’ and 
regard it as having produced in the British people such disgust at the bleakly authoritarian and 
bureaucratic ethos it introduced that they summarily dismissed it from power in 1951.94 Ralph Miliband 
argues that the popular radicalism of the Second World War of which Labour was the beneficiary in 
1945 was not ‘for the most part, a formed socialist ideology, let alone a revolutionary one.’95 Similarly 
John Saville while admitting that the war ‘radicalised many sections of the British people’ at the same 
time admits that ‘Britain was a deeply conservative society, a generalisation which certainly includes 
much of the working class, whatever their political affiliation’.96 In contrast to the alleged picture of 
Labour’s bureaucratic authoritarianism there is a counter-veiling tendency among such historians to 
present the Communist Party up to at least 1947 as wanting to foster ideas of participatory democracy 
and an active citizenry. Such is James Hinton’s view presented in both articles97 and a book.98 
Unfortunately the Labour Party refused to implement the industrial democracy and other measures of 
participation supposedly beloved of the communists thus suppressing an important element of an 
alternative social order to capitalism. In opposition to these perspectives, Steven Fielding considers 
British communism to be ‘interesting but irrelevant’. It never had the importance or influence in Britain 
that Communist historians give it and, as Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo argue, Labour went out of its 
way to encourage participation and to ‘build community’ but its wishes were frustrated by the 
electorate.99
Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of the latter’s case is their implicit dismissal o f the role of Labour 
activists. Steven Fielding has dismissed them and the branch culture they created in the 1950s and 1960s 
as obstacles to greater participation.100 As John Marriott points out, they dismiss oral history in England 
Arise as untrustworthy101 which means they do not accept activists own testimony about their role within 
local communities, so convincingly set out in the book edited by Dan Weinbren, which surely helped 
build community spirit.102 Hinton, who memorably terms Fielding and his co-authors the ‘Apathy 
School’, argues that activists did not have ‘a flawed perception of the electorate’. On the contrary, they 
understood it only too well but this did not make them give up the whole enterprise out o f despair as 
would be the logical conclusion of accepting Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo’s evidence.103 In a 
review of Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo’s book on the Labour Party in the 1940s, David Morgan, for 
example, criticised them for their ‘populist tone, berating an enlightened and politically engaged elite for 
“misconstruing” the public mood,. . .  [it is] simply arrogance masquerading as analysis.’ He conceded, 
however, that popular conservatism might explain the Toiy hegemony of the 1950s but that what they 
‘completely left out of the equation’ was ‘the virulent and highly orchestrated anti-communism which 
certainly had a massive effect on popular opinion and is still to be adequately researched.’104 Marriott 
notes the resonance of the general issues raised by the book
with the Blair agenda. Implicit in its arguments - and in spite o f . . .  much evidence . . .
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[that] points to an attenuated popular radicalization during the war - is the view that the 
‘traditional’ working class was not homogeneous, even a t . . .  the culmination of the 
‘long march o f British labour’. The party could never rely o n . . .  [its] unquestioning 
allegiance.. . ,  in part because its [the party’s] ethical socialism evinced little support.
The brand of co-operation and reconciliation, classlessness and consensus simply 
failed to engage with the realities o f class inequalities and antagonisms. Few . . .  now .
. .  dispute the lack of homogeneity [M]ore contentious is the question of
allegiance. This, and the new Labour Party’s ability to learn from the lessons of the 
postwar period, remain to be answered.105
Fielding, Thompson, and Tiratsoo argued that
the state-centred and bureaucratic outcome of Labour’s period in office [between 1945
and 1951] was not intended. Labour’s vision of socialism was inimical to it Thus,
if guilt for the subsequent character of the years of ‘consensus’ is to be apportioned, 
then Labour should not be alone in the dock. The Party might, in fact, find itself in the 
role of the prosecuting counsel.106
Paul Allender, however, would disagree with this view as we have seen. My thesis seeks to come to 
some conclusion on the matter through looking at town planning and council housing in Sheffield and 
planners and councillors views about the participation of the public in re-planning the city and their 
ability to create community spirit on the council housing estates. Fielding, Thompson, and Tiratsoo’s 
book clearly set out the view (one that Nick Tiratsoo107 has developed further in other articles) that the 
planners and local councillors did want to create a sense of citizenship in their communities by involving 
the public in planning. Rather than being arrogant dictators, the planners were mild reformers who 
wanted to work as much in harmony with the public’s needs and desires as they found possible.108 In a 
similar vein David Matless has described the links between planners, the attempt to create an active 
citizemy and the preservation of the British landscape in the 1940s. He argues that this ‘recreational 
citizenship’ ‘played a key role in the articulation o f Britishness within the social-democratic political 
culture of the 1940s’,109 that it deferred to the expertise and authority of planners, and that, as yet, it saw 
no conflict of interest with them. That waited for what Lionel Esher calls the ‘moral revolution’ o f the 
1960s.110
1.3 - SYNOPSIS OF THESIS
The first three major Chapters of the thesis cover the period of the Second World War from September 
1939 to the July 1945 General Election while the following three cover the period between then and 
October 1951 when Labour was finally defeated by Churchill’s Conservatives. Chapter Two examines 
the wartime debate over the post-war industrial future of Sheffield within the City Council and between it
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and concerned organisations like the local trades unions and the Chamber of Commerce. It also looks at 
City Council debates over Labour’s proposal discussed at the 1943 Annual Conference to introduce the 
regionalisation of local government and how that was resisted by a united council with a vested interest 
in preserving its existing powers. The episode shows that the centralising tendencies o f Whitehall could 
be resisted and that such tendencies were not inevitable. Chapter Three examines the process o f town 
planning in Sheffield from the 1930s until 1945 and the Town Planning Exhibition held to publicise the 
Collie Plan. December 1940 and the Sheffield Blitz apparently gave the opportunity to build a more 
modem, better planned and less ugly city but government procrastination over providing the necessary 
funding and approval to buy land meant progress was slow before the war’s end in re-building Sheffield. 
This was not helped by the secrecy of the City Council at a time when the country was fighting to defend 
an allegedly open and democratic society against the Nazis. Participation in town planning was 
restricted to the Town Planning Committee and its technical officers. The Chapter also looks at the 
wartime context of the acute post-war housing crisis. Chapter Four looks at the wartime Labour Party in 
South Yorkshire with illustrations from Sheffield, Rotherham and Doncaster. It looks at the period of the 
ebb of Labour Party activity and individual membership due to wartime disruption up to 1942 and the 
resurgence afterwards as plans were made for post-war reconstruction. Finally, it looks at the 1945 
General Election in Sheffield. Chapter Five looks at Labour local government between 1945 and 1951. 
It examines the factors, including the lack of consensus between the various levels of local government, 
which prevented the reform of the local structure o f local government, including the creation o f a York 
South County Council. It also examines the effect on local government of electricity, gas and local 
authority hospital nationalisation and the attempts to implement the Butler Education Act of 1944 in 
South Yorkshire given austerity conditions. Chapter Six examines the reasons why the ‘New Jerusalem’ 
in terms of a re-built modem Sheffield failed to be advanced despite the 1945 Collie Plan, and the 
housing records of both Sheffield and Rotherham County Borough Councils up to 1951, explaining why, 
despite being close neighbours, they were relatively so different in the progress they made in building 
council houses. Chapter Seven looks at the Labour Party locally between 1945 and 1951, examining its 
ideology and whether it was culturally determined by a homogeneous working-class way of life. It 
describes local Labour organisation and the vital role played by women as unpaid voluntary labour in 
contrast with their limited entry to local political office. Finally, it investigates Labour’s electoral 
success in municipal and general elections in Sheffield up to 1951. Chapter Eight provides a conclusion.
This thesis is dedicated to my late father who between 1958 and his death in 1967 served as a Labour 
councillor on the Swinton Urban District Council, a local authority swallowed up in the Rotherham 
Metropolitan Borough in 1974. He had experienced a measure of upward social mobility since he was a 
schoolmaster at Mexborough Grammar School while his father had had to work in local steel works and 
then down the pit as a fitter. My father was of the generation which, voting for the first time, elected 
Clement Attlee’s government in 1945. He himself served in Germany during the latter stages of the 
Second World War. In some ways he illustrates Hobsbawm’s thesis that the rise of the Labour Party was 
determined by the consciousness created from experience o f ‘traditional’ working-class culture, for he
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was both a sometime Congregationalist lay preacher as well as being passionately interested in football 
which he played in the 1940s in the Army, for Selby Town and at least once for Rotherham United 
Reserves. I would have liked to include much more material on my home town of Swinton in the thesis - 
my father wrote ‘A Geographical Study’ on the Urban District for his teaching diploma in the late 1940s 
- but this has proved impossible.
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CHAPTER TWO 
INDUSTRY, MUNICIPAL LABOURISM 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM 
IN SOUTH YORKSHIRE,
1939-1945
2.1 - INTRODUCTION
Harold Laski concluded in A Grammar of Politics published in 1925 that:
[T]he main difficulty, heretofore, in local government is that it has been rare to attempt 
the evocation of a community spirit. It has meant a little, but not too much, to be a 
citizen of some city; but the power has not been there to make citizenship creative, and 
the general mass has not been related to the process of government. Its art gallery has 
been a matter for its curator and his committee; it has not been a matter for every 
citizen possessed of a love of art. Its infant death-rate has been a matter for the 
medical officer of health; he has not been allowed effectively to appeal to a civic 
conscience, alert and armed. We must strive to create a local pride in achievement and 
a local sense of shame in failure.... We need to set local authorities striving against 
each other in ceaseless rivalry, to produce in men that urgent local patriotism which 
Mr. Chesterton depicted in the Napoleon ofNotting Hill. That, I think, can be 
achieved if the local authorities are free to think out great policies and to apply them in 
freedom. And it will not be unimportant to the standards of central politics that we are 
able thus to revivify the quality of local life.1
A year later Labour having won municipal office in Sheffield, its first big city, Sheffield Forward 
proclaimed:
In our columns we prove by official figures that Sheffield can benefit by the 
elimination o f  profit-mongers and the substitution o f  Municipal enterprise based on a 
realisation o f social consciousness. Houses can be built better and cheaper by direct 
labour. Money can be obtained at a cheaper rate by the establishment of a Municipal 
Bank. Useful schemes of work at Trade Union rates of pay can be promoted.2
Municipal enterprise was once regarded as a respectable alternative means of delivery o f public goods 
and services to both national ‘statist’ solutions such as the Morrisonian public corporation and to the 
unfettered operation of private companies. The public/private collaborations that are today’s big idea for 
the provision and finance of public services and infrastructure were unknown. Great northern cities like 
Sheffield, Manchester, Leeds, Liverpool, and Bradford were suffused in the 1940s with the physical
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reminders of a golden Victorian civic past that testified to the operation of municipal enterprise in a 
multitude of ways from reservoirs to sewers and gas, electricity and transport undertakings. It is not 
surprising that the Conclusion of Sheffield Replanned (produced in 1945 as part o f the Town Planning 
Exhibition to publicise the Collie Plan for the city) harked back to great Victorian achievements while 
also emphasising those of the Second World War. Labour’s opponents in Sheffield and Rotherham were 
themselves the direct political heirs to this Victorian tradition of municipal provision - late nineteenth 
century Conservatives were its pioneers in Sheffield, while in Rotherham the Liberals began and 
extended municipal ownership. The Corporation was a ubiquitous and tangible presence in the 
consciousness of every citizen. Alan Bennett has noted how in the 1940s Leeds of his childhood the 
stamp of the Corporation’s heraldic crest emphasised this throughout the city in a variety of ways. It was 
stamped on the exercise books in which he wrote at school, for example, and on the sides of trams and in 
a hundred other ways. Representations of it were even made in floral form in municipal parks and 
gardens courtesy of the Council parks department. He believes that this generated even in the most 
insensitive child or adult citizen some civic consciousness of Leeds as an single entity.3
In spite of the physical and symbolic manifestations of a city’s civic spirit which the above provided 
evidence of, however, many historians tend to see ordinary working-class people as lacking a sense of a 
wider civic consciousness. This is because, for most members o f the working class, their family, the 
home in which they lived and the recreational activities and hobbies they undertook outside work were 
central. Work was often not intellectually demanding or emotionally fulfilling. Hence the private and 
domestic nature of working-class life. Mass-Observation which looked at life in Bolton in Lancashire in 
the late 1930s summed up the concerns of its inhabitants as being on the whole concerned ‘. . .  about 
their own homes, and their few personal dreams (security, a holiday week at orientalised Blackpool, a 
fortune in the Pools) and nothing else matters very much except the progress made by the town’s famous 
football club’.4 The same could be said of working people in Sheffield and South Yorkshire. The civic 
patriotism generated by local football clubs like Sheffield Wednesday whose fans were largely working- 
class but whose paternalistic directors were often members of the local Liberal or Conservative elite 
should not be underestimated but generally being a football supporter was a less demanding 
manifestation of civic spirit than standing as a candidate in a local election.5 A local authority like 
Sheffield covered a large geographical area. It had within it vibrant working-class communities with 
their own peculiar histoiy and character, like Attercliffe or Brightside, while the city was further 
polarised between its West and East Ends, with the inhabitants of the former tending to live off the latter. 
On the other hand, the city of Sheffield is an old town as shown by the unique local surnames o f its 
geographically very faithful residents, many unchanged since medieval times.6 Sheffield’s ethnic and 
religious make-up was remarkably stable in the 1940s and gave rise to little tension. It had been 
relatively little affected by immigration from Ireland in the nineteenth century, for example,7 or by that of 
Jews fleeing Eastern Europe at the turn of the twentieth century.8
Hampton’s empirical study of post-war Sheffield politics argued that those who had the strongest social
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attachments to local communities, which he saw as consisting of a few streets or a neighbourhood in 
which people encountered each other face-to-face very often, had also the least awareness and interest in 
the political life of the wider city. He believed that ‘geographical compactness . . . ,  the age structure of 
the electorate, the homogeneity of the population, the industrial structure of the city, and other similar 
influences’ did determine a city’s political style but that ‘they affect the degree of attachment to the 
neighbourhood only through their effect on the relationships of people to one another.’9 Elected 
representatives often saw themselves as community leaders but this was largely a myth since they had not 
been bom and perhaps did not live within the wards or constituencies they represented. They were 
usually people interested in public affairs who had sought an opportunity to represent their fellow 
citizens wherever that might conveniently be found and had been given their chance by a political party 
to whom their real loyalties were given.10 Electoral boundaries on a map did not themselves create a 
community or were perceived by people to be a community.11 Wards and parliamentary constituencies 
were representative of communities for electoral purposes but had no other function.12
Hampton’s conception of the ‘political community’ echoed that of the political theorist L. T. Hobhouse. 
He believed that it was any population ‘living under a common rule’ despite having ‘only the bare bones 
of a common life’.13 But Hampton combined this with another view that the ‘political community’ 
consisted primarily of those involved in local politics who ‘meet each other regularly, share common 
interests, and denounce public apathy towards their activities with a vehemence only matched by the 
suspicion they sometimes evidence towards those who seek to contest their authority.’14 Elected 
councillors obviously formed such a community as councillors within the council chamber whatever 
their political affiliations. They, as we shall see, proved unwilling to accept disruption of existing local 
government structures by its regionalisation because the perceptions that there was a need for reform at 
all reflected badly on their own achievements as councillors within the existing system. Moreover, they 
believed that they personally would achieve much less as members of an authority with diminished 
powers but yet would still be held accountable by Sheffielders for the actions o f their regional masters. 
The experience of wartime regional administration from Leeds sharpened these fears.
A study of Nelson in Lancashire has noted that there was a degree of formal co-operation between 
Labour and its opponents on that Council in the inter-war period which would have been unimaginable 
before World War One. The same is true of South Yorkshire in the 1930s and 1940s. Labour’s 
representatives were no longer isolated agitators causing trouble for local elites by stirring up the masses 
but were full members of the ‘political community’ accepting the rules and norms of behaviour of that 
community. They were more concerned to appear ‘respectable’ and responsible. The anti-socialist 
coalition in Nelson also offered little ideological challenge to Labour. The anti-socialists attacked 
Labour’s municipal representatives’ personal experience and competence but never the basic issue o f the 
role of the municipality in politics. They offered themselves as ‘administrators’ and not as ‘politicians’. 
They attacked ‘socialist extravagance and maladministration’ rather than socialism itself. Lack of 
business expertise was seen as Labour’s chief failing.15 Similar opinions were present among anti-
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socialists on County Borough Councils in South Yorkshire.
The 1940s Liberal and Conservative ideal o f a ‘property-owning democracy’ appealed to an idea of 
‘community’ but it was a right-wing concept of ‘community’. It was ideally one of middle-class people 
with a little capital (they owned their own shop or home) who lived in suburbs like those expanding in 
the West End of Sheffield in the 1930s or else they formed part of the Conservative ‘shopocracy’ that 
controlled many councils in English rural towns at this time. The archetype o f the latter was Mrs 
Thatcher’s famous father, Alderman Roberts of Grantham. He provided her with a set of nineteenth 
century values that put the consumer (and especially the house-wife) first rather than the producer 
organised in a trade union.16 Sometimes in contradiction to this was an earlier nostalgic specifically Tory 
vision of a paternalist, unequal and aristocratic social order where everyone knew their place and which 
was located in the timeless southern English countryside that epitomised Englishness.
This vision was articulated most successfully by Stanley Baldwin. He, however, for all his success in 
doing so, was not a representative of the authentically existing countryman of the inter-war period but a 
rural romantic. His father’s iron foundry was a typical small Victorian family firm and Baldwin felt a 
close empathy with the employees whom he knew well in a paternalistic way. Having deep religious 
convictions he saw considerateness as ‘the central English virtue’ and refused to descend to intemperate 
insults against his opponents in the heat of political controversy. Hating conflict, he believed that the 
British people had to be educated to have limited expectations of government. He saw mass urban 
democracy as a potentially dangerous innovation that threatened an English civilisation based on private 
property since possession of the vote was no longer a guarantee of civic responsibility. That civilisation 
in its classic form was rural and not urban, despite the fact that urban-living was now the norm for most 
of the population as well as the mainstay of support for Labour. It is ironic that he extolled an eternal 
cross-class ‘community’ that supposedly existed in the English countryside yet under his premierships 
the pace of change in the countryside vastly accelerated destroying that order forever.17 Baldwin 
criticised Labour as being an instrument of sectional trade union interests and for having an attachment 
to ‘foreign’ socialist theories abhorrent to the sound conservative instincts o f the ordinary Englishman 
because based on class conflict. He stressed that workers and employers had a mutual interest in the 
smooth and profitable running of their firms.18 Conservatives like Baldwin defended workers’ freedoms 
not to join unions or to pay into union funds which supported Labour. They attacked the political 
ambitions of socialist trade union leaders as illegitimate to their members real needs. Tory small 
businessmen also often opposed their employees joining unions or visibly supporting Labour because it 
could force up their overheads; their profits were often small and dependent on the sacrifice o f their own 
consumption.
Socialism in Sheffield took root in large-scale heavy industry.19 Trade unionists found it easier to 
organise steelworkers and foundrymen because the thousands of often unskilled workers employed by 
the steel firms were unlikely to have close personal relationships with their employers and were thus less
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prone to direct influence. They tended to vote Labour in consequence and to stand as Labour 
candidates.20 However, in ‘light trades’, like cutlery manufacture, the Tittle mester’ employed only a few 
extra workers and was often almost indistinguishable ffojn them socially. Cutlery was a ‘sweated’ trade 
though highly skilled, competition for work was stiff and not unremunerative. An outworker might work 
at one and the same time for several manufacturers. He was only nominally independent of any single 
one. A personal relationship with them was necessary to get work but also meant each outworker was in 
competition with every other one and could be played off against each other. It was a long time before 
there was a united cutlery union.21 Cutlery trades unionists retained Liberal sympathies in Sheffield even 
into the 1930s.22 This does not mean they were not ‘radical’ despite the view often expressed that large- 
scale industry always created radical movements. Andrew Thorpe describes this latter view as not always 
correct - such ‘industry in Reading between the wars did not produce particularly vibrant Labour 
politics’, for example.23
Labour, pace Baldwin, never presented itself to the voters as merely a party representing a sectional 
interest whether of the unions or of the working class. It saw its rule as being in the interests of the 
‘community’ as a whole whether at a local or national level. It tried to bolster both local civic 
consciousness and a particular conception of Britishness that reflected its own traditions and world-view. 
Attlee during the 1945 General Election stated that:
Forty years ago the Labour Party might with some justice have been called a class 
Party, representing almost exclusively the wage earners. It is still based on organised 
labour but has steadily become more and more inclusive ... The Labour Party is, in 
fact, the one Party which most nearly reflects in its representation and composition all 
the main streams which flow into the great river of our national life ... Our appeal to 
you, therefore, is not narrow or sectional... We have to plan the broad lines of our 
national life so that all may have the duty and the opportunity of rendering service to 
the nation, eveiyone in his or her sphere, and that all may help to create and share in an 
increasing material prosperity free from the fear of want.24
In South Yorkshire Labour had less of a problem in representing what it might suppose to be the interests 
of the mass of the population should they only know them. Superficially it appeared that it need not 
make strenuous efforts to appeal to middle-class voters as the big cities of the southern West Riding were 
overwhelmingly working-class in composition. A preponderant part of that class in the four County 
Boroughs - as the 1951 Census showed - were skilled working class which formed the politically active 
backbone of the organised Labour movements.25 Many of the poor and the ‘rough’ working class, 
however, voted Tory even in 1945. Labour and the Progressives in Sheffield both saw themselves as 
embodying the interests of the ‘community’, yet this is a vague if always positive concept and some 
citizen was always bound to feel upset by a particular council decision or felt unwilling to forego their 
self-interest in the interests of this nebulous wider ‘community’. In Sheffield Labour appealed beyond
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the working classes for support because the middle classes, like the working classes, were not evenly 
spread but were especially strong in particular wards and constituencies.
It was also, however, in the interests of some middle-class people to give Labour support since the party 
directly helped the employment opportunities of public sector professionals (which is not to discount the 
latter’s idealism). Labour was the party of public sector expansion locally and nationally through its 
support for public ownership. The South Yorkshire County Borough Councils had been keen to extend 
municipal ownership. Perkin has described World War Two as producing a revolution of expectations 
among the working classes as the state was forced to expand. This consolidated the triumph of what he 
terms ‘the professional ideal’ in post-war society over ‘the entrepreneurial ideal’ that characterised 
Victorian middle-class society and over the egalitarian ideals of the working classes. According to him: 
‘[T]he entrepreneur proved himself by competition in the market, the professional by persuading the rest 
of society and ultimately the state that his service was vitally important and therefore worthy of 
guaranteed reward. The first called for as little state interference as possible; the second looked to the 
state as the ultimate guarantee of professional status.’26 Labour in Sheffield could call on the support of 
middle class professionals like R. W. Allott, an unsuccessful candidate in Hallam Ward, a Progressive 
stronghold, in 1945, who asserted that:
As a result of the War, there has been a great awakening of the SOCIAL 
CONSCIENCE of our people and it is no longer enough to say that Municipal matters 
are no concern of mine, so long as I am living in comfort. There is now a wider vision 
of our duty to our neighbour and it is in the Municipal Election that we have our 
nearest opportunity of showing that we do care how the other half of the City lives. It 
is our DUTY to concern ourselves with Civic affairs, of East end and West end alike 
and this Election is a great chance for us to do so.27
The war was generally regarded by the political Left as having produced a greater sense o f community 
spirit. By this they meant that Britons were more willing to countenance radical reform as a result of 
greater social mixing due to total war. J. B. Priestley told radio listeners that:
Now, the war, because it demands a huge collective effort, is compelling us to change 
not only our ordinary, social and economic habits, but also our habits of thought.
We’re actually changing over from the property view to the sense of community, which 
simply means that we realise we’re all in the same boat. But, and this is the point, that 
boat can serve not only as a defence against Nazi aggression but as an ark in which we 
can all finally land in a better world.28
Conservatives like Churchill were less convinced. Their view (similar to that expressed by the anti­
socialists on Nelson Borough Council in municipal politics) was that in national politics they were just
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‘administrators’ of the war machine intent on the non-political aim of victory over Hitler. Party politics 
should shut down for the duration and parties should not take advantage of the war for their own 
purposes. Thus in Sheffield in 1940 the Progressives tried to get passed a resolution that would have 
banned ‘the use of public buildings for party political purposes’ due to ‘the extreme importance of 
maintaining national unity. . .  when the free and independent existence of the State is menaced by a 
determined and ruthless enemy and whilst responsible political opinion is united in its determination to 
prosecute the war to a successful conclusion’. 29 Unfortunately despite a strong anti-party wartime 
popular mood, this was in the 1945 general election to be to the detriment of the Conservatives and their 
allies who were seen as opposing popular reforms like those envisaged in the Beveridge Report.30
Labour, according to Fielding, Thompson, and Tiratsoo did want to achieve substantial material reforms 
after the war combined with the ethical transformation of the people of Britain. This would be the 
foundation of socialism or the ‘Responsible Society’. Material reform did not go far enough. The 
people of Britain had to be turned into instinctive socialists in thought and deed. An infrastructure had to 
be created that would encourage active popular participation and citizenship, minimise helplessness and 
overcome ignorance. This was especially important given that the central state was to be expanded as 
the instrument of socialist planning and it was feared that a ‘dependency culture’ would be created that 
would discourage popular initiative and an active citizenry. Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo aver that, 
despite the commitment to nationalisation, Labour wanted to inspire what James Griffiths called ‘a real 
civic consciousness’ and to produce greater popular involvement in local government.31 This aspiration, 
they state, was made flesh after the war by the 1948 Local Government Act which considerably widened 
municipal powers.32 The problem with this analysis is that such moves threatened the power of Labour 
oligarchies in local government. The suspicion must be that for many, if not all, local party bosses their 
agreement with Griffiths’ aspiration was simply paying lip-service to a fashionable idea while they took 
steps to maintain their monopoly of power in municipalities like Sheffield.
Local councils attempted to create a more active citizenry, according to Fielding, Thompson and 
Tiratsoo, by altering the local built environment through ‘neighbourhood units’33 and through town 
planning.34 Just as town planning and architecture was allegedly used in London in 1900 to make 
Londoners conscious of themselves as imperial citizens and proud of their city as the metropolis of the 
British Empire,35 so it could be perhaps used (as Sheffield Replanned demonstrated) to make citizens of 
Sheffield proud of their city as a Socialist city through the impressive new buildings and streets that were 
envisaged. Thus they might become active supporters of Labour or, at least, willing collaborators with 
Socialism. The achievements of the Labour council from 1926 were publicised as Socialist 
achievements in municipal manifestos and attempts were made to persuade Sheffielders to think o f the 
council not as ‘the council’ but as ‘our council’. But it is arguable that, as Fielding, Thompson and 
Tiratsoo aver, the results of Labour’s efforts were mixed at best. They were let down by popular 
conservatism and apathy as much as by the machinations and black propaganda of the vested interests 
that Labour ideology attacked.36 The war was less productive of a wider community feeling than left-
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wing commentators and Labour Party members deluded themselves was the case. What there was 
largely evaporated afterwards.37 In contradiction, however, to the view that Labour as a government 
intended to create a greater civic consciousness can be set the common sense view of Mary Walton 
whose history of Sheffield and its achievements was published in the late 1940s. While noting the 
existence of the 1948 Local Government Act and the greater role of the local state in the care of children 
and the elderly, she said that this tendency was ‘much weaker’ than that towards centralization.38 It is the 
demonstrable actions of the Labour government and not its intentions which really matter in the final 
analysis. A similar view must be held of ‘Old Labour’ councils like those of Sheffield or Rotherham.
Part of the problem in creating an active citizenry was Labour’s Fabian inheritance. The question of 
‘industrial democracy’ and the devolving of power to workers in nationalised industries closely 
paralleled questions of achieving popular democratic participation in the decisions of local government 
and it was equally unpopular with those who already made decisions. Local councils partook of the 
supremacy of Parliament as the source of their delegated power. According to Dahl:
Two features of the Fabian conception of the state and government led inevitably to the 
rejection of workers’ control [or participation in the local government planning 
process]. The first was the acceptance of parliamentary supremacy as an expression of 
the majority wil l . . .  all attempts to impinge on the Supremacy of Parliament or to 
weaken Parliament as a majoritarian institution were consistently opposed by the 
Fabians . . .  To have any public official ultimately responsible to some agency other 
than Parliament [or the local council that partook of Parliament] was a denial of the 
whole meaning of the British constitution . . .  The other determining feature of the 
Fabian conception of government was an uncommon respect for the expert.39
Labour and the Fabians did not hold to theories of political and administrative pluralism. Conservative 
local authorities were not to be allowed to go their own way but were to be compelled to obey Labour at 
the centre and the needs of the programme it had been elected to implement. Similarly a Labour council 
elected by the people could not delegate authority to outside bodies. Male city councillors in Sheffield 
made a fuss when women attempted to get themselves co-opted to the Housing Sub-Committee of the 
Estates Committee in 1944 without already being elected councillors, for instance.40
Labour councillors were amateur administrators since they often had full-time jobs in industry (unless 
they were trade union officials). Thus they were from necessity dependent on the full-time middle-class 
professional experts employed by the council who arguably because they controlled the information on 
which decisions were made by councillors could skew those decisions to their own satisfaction. The 
official’s technical expertise was regarded as providing the status due to ability that in the same way the 
skilled Sheffield craftsman felt he had in the workshop through his skill gained through serving an 
apprenticeship. Both commanded their respective rent of ability in Fabian terms. Councillors who had
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only elementary education supplemented part-time by the Workers’ Educational Association or perhaps 
the National Council of Labour Colleges naturally deferred to the holder of an academic qualification 
like a degree which had vastly more prestige as a positional good in the 1940s than is the case today 
when such qualifications are spread more widely through the population. Knowledge was seen to confer 
power. It and the possession of abundant leisure had been the basis of the upper classes claim to 
monopolize power in the past. In opposition the Fabians had emphasised the control o f local government 
functions by an expert middle-class ‘intellectual aristocracy’ in the late nineteenth century. Municipal 
enterprise was seen by Fabians as a first step towards their ideal of bureaucratic state socialism rather 
than as an antidote to it as Conservatives in local government at the time believed. The politicisation of 
municipal enterprise by the Fabians was to prove the major barrier to its continued twentieth century 
expansion.41
Herbert Morrison had an influential role as the organiser of the London Labour Party and the formulator 
of the codes of conduct which determined the relationships between Labour councillors and officials. He 
pioneered an approach, described as ‘municipal labourism’,42 which was opposed to the confrontational 
direct-action tactics of ‘Poplarism’. Poplar Council led by George Lansbury in the early 1920s was a 
thorn in Morrison’s side. Labour councillors had previously had a tradition of hostility to professional 
officials - they cut their salaries with alacrity, for example, as economy measures - but Morrison 
emphasised the need for mutual trust between them if constructive achievements were to be made 
possible. He also, however, saw the need to prevent corruption by specifying that the relationship should 
be a public one but one that was at arms length in private. Both sides had their tasks and spheres o f 
responsibility and the experts should be allowed to get on with their tasks without undue interference.43 
Yet this approach did have drawbacks with regard to participation by working people in the decision­
making processes o f councils. Such people became clients who felt gratitude to individual councillors 
for what was done for them rather than feeling that it was their right to have their complaints dealt with 
satisfactorily. ‘Poplarism’, however, tried to mobilise the entire local community behind certain specific 
demands to relieve unemployed workers and their families. The forces o f financial orthodoxy and 
respectability were not to be allowed to dictate the strategy of Labour councillors if they were opposed to 
working-class needs. Morrison’s strategy, however, was aimed at enlisting the support o f the middle 
classes and dictated that they not be scared off by ignoring their needs and sensitivities. This was despite 
the fact that in the County of London Labour took power because of the middle-class flight to the 
suburbs and the resulting greater voting strength of the working classes in previously mixed inner city
44areas.
Morrison has influenced how ‘Labourism’, the thought and practice of the party, has generally been seen. 
‘Labourism’, pace Baldwin, emphasised pragmatism, dislike of theory and praised native traditions and 
institutions like the Labour Party itself or the local government system. Morrison was quoted as saying 
that ‘Socialism is what the Labour Party happens to be doing at any one time’.45 In 1954 he published 
Government and Parliament: A Survey from the Inside which characteristically expressed his ‘great love
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and admiration for British parliamentary democracy’.46 He was, as he showed during Cabinet 
discussions over the creation of the National Health Service, a champion of local representative 
democracy opposing hospital nationalization because it was an attack on the powers of a native British 
institution as much as on his own power base in London. Fielding puts forward the view that socialist 
ideology was more important in the Labour Party o f the 1940s than is commonly accepted, particularly 
by Marxists.47 Martin Francis has agreed with him in a substantial book on Labour’s political thought in 
government under Attlee 48 But ‘Labourism’ has most often been used in a pejorative sense by Marxist 
historians like Saville 49 to explain Britain’s failure to follow the trajectory predicted by Marx. This is 
despite the fact that this view is open to the criticism that it has always been counter-factual to actual 
events in the real world. Labour is attacked for opportunism and lack of theoretical rigour. Its leaders 
are attacked for betraying their followers and the masses. In addition Labour was seen in the 1940s as 
doing capitalism’s work for it by re-stabilising the capitalist economy and suppressing socialist 
alternatives. Allender, an ‘independent left’ political scientist greatly influenced by Ralph Miliband, 
characteristically argues in a case study of Sheffield Labourism between 1973 and 1998 that its Labour 
movement ‘. . .  was not equipped with the ideas and arguments that would enable it to defend the 
interests of the workers and unemployed people o f the city. It was part of a tradition that had spumed 
theory and ideology over eighty years earlier and thus was left with nowhere to turn but to local 
capitalists who were loyal to Sheffield.’50
In the light of the issues discussed above the following chapter looks at the wartime debates around the 
threat to Sheffield’s industrial future from a post-war slump and the degree o f collaboration this 
produced among Labour and Progressive City Council members. Questions of local post-war economic 
prosperity are highlighted because it was a necessary, if not sufficient, basis for the creation o f a civic 
consciousness in Sheffield. It also examines the heated discussions in 1942 and 1943 over local 
government reform based on the regional government proposals put forward by the Machinery of Local 
Government Sub-Committee o f the Central Committee on Reconstruction o f the Labour Party.
2.2 - PROTECTING SHEFFIELD’S INDUSTRIAL FUTURE
Collinge has noted that while literature on the formation of local economic strategies in Britain exists, it 
is problem centred, concerned to promote or evaluate local policies and initiatives. By contrast, the 
actual history of local government intervention to foster economic development - when this started, how 
long it continued and how it altered over long periods o f time - has received less attention. At the same 
time the theoretical significance of such intervention for Marxist local government models has not been 
adequately recognised or how it might be explained in the light of the assumptions made by those 
models. Collinge argues against the views of Marxist writers who believe that central government is 
largely responsible for maintaining capitalist production while local government is concerned with 
capitalist reproduction by helping working-class families maintain and expand the supply o f able-bodied 
and compliant labour through their consumption of welfare, housing, education and health services. He
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stresses that local government has always had an extensive role in the sphere of capitalist production 
through ownership of utility services, its role in town planning and through schemes of industrial self­
promotion and the direct fostering o f economic development.51
Collinge believes that the periodic changes in the various forms of local government intervention can be 
synchronised with long-term changes in the economy from about 1880. ‘Growth management’ strategies 
developed in line with economic cycles. They expanded in periods of prosperity and contracted in 
periods of depression. Growth promotion’ strategies, on the other hand, expanded in periods of 
depression and contracted in periods of prosperity. ‘Growth management’ strategies included provision 
of utility services and the drawing up town planning schemes which hindered individual firms from 
disrupting the environment for capital as a whole. ‘Growth promotion’ strategies included industrial 
self-promotion and economic development schemes which were used to encourage capital formation to 
defend the fiscal and political bases of local councils. Collinge sees local authorities as responding to 
economic circumstances at both a national and local level, though the specific action taken, in terms of 
both types of strategy, was constrained by the need to get central government support and initiative. 
Control over local councils’ actions increasingly came from the centre as the state system grew and 
became more integrated.52
During the 1920s municipal enterprise continued to expand as more and more authorities supplied water, 
electricity, tram, trolley bus and motor bus services. By 1937, councils supplied 65 per cent of the 
country’s electricity and 33 per cent of its gas. There was, however, after World War One increased 
opposition by private enterprise to municipal trading and to subsidising municipal enterprise from the 
rates as economic conditions deteriorated. Central government attitudes changed in the late 1920s and 
the last Private Act extending municipal trading was passed by Parliament in 1929. Central government 
also took a hand in restructuring the utilities and merging local authority companies when in 1926 the 
Central Electricity Board was set up to oversee the creation of a National Grid, and by 1934 the number 
of generating stations had fallen from 500 to 146.53 If we examine just one Sheffield municipal utility 
service, electricity generation, abundant and cheap supplies were needed by industry to enhance its 
competitiveness and thus it was an issue vital to local industrialists. But Labour’s programme in 1926 
also acknowledged the desire to see workers’ homes and the streets better lit by electricity.54 Collinge’s 
perception that local government was about capitalist production as well as about capitalist reproduction 
is thus equally true in this instance.
The Conservatives in the late nineteenth century pioneered municipal enterprise in Sheffield. This was 
because it was beneficial to manufacturing industry at the height of Victorian imperialism and facilitated 
the creation of a Tory-voting working-class. Municipal enterprise under the Conservatives, as later 
under Labour, combined the two roles of helping capitalist production and working class reproduction 
and gained them a coalition of votes from both middle and working-class citizens. Water was 
municipalised in 1888, electricity in 1898, the tramways in 1896 and the markets in 1898. Attempts
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were also made, unsuccessfully, to take gas into municipal ownership.55 The Municipal Progressives 
were thus enabled to pose as sincere defenders of Sheffield’s public utilities against a grasping Socialist 
Government after 1945. The latter would destroy a major attraction for industry of locating in Sheffield 
and thus working-class employment would not be able to expand. Until 1945 this perception was part of 
an evolving political consensus between the municipal parties over the role of municipal enterprise. The 
Progressives were as concerned as Labour to expand domestic electricity use through cheaper supplies.56 
Thus, while in 1898 there were just 694 consumers, by 1945 there were 165,300. 835 million units were 
sold with a resulting revenue of two million pounds.57 A new municipal electricity showroom was a 
feature of both new city centre plans in 193758 and 1945.59 The Labour municipal manifesto of 1945 
noted that:
TRAMS, ELECTRICITY, WATER. These Trading Department supply their services 
to the people of Sheffield at the cheapest possible rates WITHOUT PRIVATE 
PROFITS. Wartime percentage increases of price have been less by far than is the 
case with goods and services supplied by purely profit-making concerns. They are all 
thoroughly sound financially, and are about to be EXPANDED and IMPROVED to 
meet Sheffield’s growing needs.60
Labour was also optimistic in Rotherham about their undertaking’s prospects prior to nationalisation.
The Corporation under Liberal auspices had first built a power station in 1900. A new station was 
opened by the Prince of Wales in 1923. The Advertiser noted (like the Municipal Progressives in 
Sheffield) that the existence of cheap power generated locally was a prime reason why industries were 
keen to locate in Rotherham. In 1939 the station was extended to increase power generation. Another 
extension was planned for 1940-1 - but the war intervened.61 Labour’s Immediate Programme in 1937 
had called for the nationalisation of power as had For Socialism and Peace in 1934 but since 
improvements were to be made under both councils it is obvious that neither expected as a contingency 
a majority Labour government prior to the war and thus did not imagine anyone would actually carry out 
Labour’s previous manifesto pledges.
Local authority town planning powers were strengthened in the 1920s and 1930s though remaining 
focused on housing and sanitation. Generally such powers tended to be negative in their effects, 
preventing nuisances rather than encouraging good development.62 The situation in Sheffield between 
1937 and 1945 is dealt with in Chapter Three. Though new housing construction was the first priority of 
Sheffield Replanned (a priority higher than the reconstruction of the city centre) it was also noted that:
[I]t would be true to say that without steel there would be no Sheffield. There is no 
other town in the country approaching the size of Sheffield which depends so 
exclusively on one basic product. . . .  [I]t is essential to bear in mind in considering 
schemes for fine public buildings and vast housing programmes, for the need for the
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houses, shops, schools and other buildings is dependent entirely on Sheffield’s ability 
to maintain itself as an industrial city.63
In 1945 the City Engineer while preparing a comprehensive development plan for Sheffield told the 
Regional Planning Officer of the Ministry of Town and Country Planning that, ^Industry is the basis of 
all our planning; in Sheffield there is a considerable area o f land still available and suitable for industry - 
and suitable for nothing else. Thus unless a planned national dispersal of industry is contemplated we 
can easily go ahead with our industrial zoning.’64 This latter possibility, then and earlier during the war, 
was seen as a real threat to future prosperity.
The Communist Wal Hannington wrote in 1937 that:
There can be no doubt that, unless something very effective is done to grapple with this 
problem of the Distressed Areas, the present feeling of unrest against the Government 
over the question will assume still greater proportions in the political life of this 
country; it may become the main issue in domestic policy that will hasten the end of 
any Government which fails to solve it.65
The first attempts to tackle this important political question by revitalizing the economies of the 
depressed areas rather than by simply helping the young and able-bodied members o f their populations to 
migrate to more prosperous areas (which had the bad effect of robbing the depressed areas of their most 
enterprising people) had tentatively been made in 1934. This was the Special Areas Act. Southern 
Scotland, the North-East, Cumbria and South Wales were designated ‘Special Areas’. Two 
commissioners were appointed with two million pounds to spend each to help councils attract firms to 
their areas and to carry out amenity schemes. This figure had increased to seventeen million pounds by 
1938.66 One strand of policy was to set up ‘trading estates’ - areas of land on which factories had been 
built for rent to industrialists. Another was to provide funding for firms to establish factories who could 
not raise it via normal means but the total money available was inadequate. These initiatives had little 
effect. They provided, however, models for more ambitious schemes during and after the war. The 
National Government was unenthusiastic intervening for electoral reasons and to forestall more far- 
reaching intervention.67
One further step taken was to appoint a Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial 
Population under Montague-Barlow in 1937. According to Hall it ‘was directly responsible, through a 
chain reaction..., for the events that led up to the creation of the whole complex postwar planning 
machine during the years 1945-52’. It decided that the national and regional distribution of industry was 
linked to how population was concentrated and that the South-East of England had major strategic, 
economic and social disadvantages. The majority report wanted a ‘central authority’ to control industrial 
location and disperse it from congested areas like London to areas of high unemployment, thus killing
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two birds with one stone. In London, journeys to work, traffic congestion and air pollution would be 
lessened, property values would rise less swiftly and housing problems would be easier to solve. In the 
depressed areas, people would be employed and would not have to emigrate to find work. Dispersed 
industry would also be less at risk from aerial attack.68 The Report published in 1940 has been regarded 
as the first symbol of a new wartime consensus in favour of state intervention.69 The call for a ‘central 
authority’ was repeated in 1942 by the Uthwatt Committee on compensation and betterment and the 
Scott Committee on rural land use. Regional planning authorities were to oversee detailed 
implementation of decisions reached by the central authority.70 If after the war local government had 
been superseded by regional authorities, as Labour proposed in 1943, Sheffield Council would have lost 
its town planning powers to an authority covering the West Riding. The Council would have been less 
able to take steps independently to attract industry as it would need the permission of the regional 
authority to do so which would want to plan without favouring any lesser authority unduly.71
Hugh Dalton, President of the Board of Trade from February 1942, had the major role in the creation of 
the Distribution of Industry Act 1945 - the final outcome of the attempt to control industry recommended 
by Barlow. His aim was avoidance of a post-war slump. The belief that conditions after World War 
Two would repeat those after World War One was widespread but Labour was determined to prevent 
that.72 The return of the slump was also feared in Sheffield by labour leaders and industrialists. 
Unemployment had reached a peak of over 58,000 in the last one.73 Among those affected might be 
Labour city councillors themselves. In 1940 the Council had supported a resolution to find out what 
steps government proposed to take to deal with post-war unemployment. Progressive Alderman Turner 
said that:
When this war is over we shall find ourselves in the same situation as existed after the 
last war, if we are not veiy careful. At that time we had men simply turning soil over - 
just doing something to enable them to draw the dole. There were no [municipal work] 
schemes in embryo then. My suggestion is that, in view of past experience, we should 
now have properly scheduled schemes in preparation so as to find work for thousands 
of men immediately the necessity arises. The Corporation will have to bear the brunt 
of the unemployment problem and they will have to find work at once.
He called for public works schemes to be devised in advance of government sanction and financial help 
and went on to say that:
I would prefer any time that a man earned what he received than that he should have 
money for nothing. We gave thousands of pounds away for nothing after the last war.
We must contemplate building a new city, properly planned and scheduled. The ideas 
I have in mind are, perhaps, a vision at the moment, but I would advocate giving 
instructions to the City Architect to prepare details and produce a plan - in other words,
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see that the machinery is ready to receive the motive power when the demand justifies 
it. We must visualise the needs of the future. If we cannot learn from the past we are a 
poor lot.74
Hence town planning was seen as an essential part of the solution to the slump.
Post-war employment prospects would also depend on the rapidity o f ‘industrial re-conversion’ from war 
to peace in areas of heavy industry like South Yorkshire. The Board o f Trade and other departments of 
government from early in the war were under pressure to discover what the prospects of this were and 
how much employment industry would offer. Attempts were made to get an approximate picture of post­
war prospects from sources like the Nuffield College Reconstruction Survey which submitted numerous 
reports on the prospects of particular industries and industrial regions. Six reports were specially 
undertaken for the Board o f Trade on Rotherham, Darlington, Kidderminster, Stroud Valley, Hull and 
Stoke-on-Trent. However, in wartime no outside body could hope to have access to enough facts about 
key munitions industries where the re-conversion would be most important and difficult and the Board 
ultimately dispensed with the Survey and did the work itself.75 In 1943 the Town Clerk of Barnsley was 
approached by the Board for help in a survey it was producing on post-war industrial reconstruction and 
prepared data at their request on the industrial position of the County Borough.76
Dalton had led the official Labour Party investigation into the Distressed Areas in 1936/7. He was also 
influenced by observations of Soviet planning after a visit in 1932 as well as his knowledge o f miners’ 
experiences during the depression in his constituency. From spring 1943 he rallied Labour ministers on 
the Cabinet Reconstruction Committee behind a policy of control of the location o f industry and in 1944 
got inserted into the important Employment Policy White Paper a chapter on ‘The Balanced Distribution 
of Industiy and Labour’. It was stated that it would ‘be an object of Government policy to secure a 
balanced industrial development in areas which have in the past been unduly dependent on industries 
specially vulnerable to unemployment.’ Dalton then went on to set up a department within the Board o f 
Trade to give effect to the White Paper commitment and worked to get an Act of Parliament to set the 
legislative seal on the policy. The Distressed or Special Areas were given the snappier title of 
‘Development Areas’. Despite the fact that the Churchill Coalition was coming to an end, the Bill did 
get its Second Reading on 21 March 1945 and it eventually passed into law on 15 June under 
Churchill’s Caretaker Government. It was to remain the basis of regional policy until 1960. The Board 
o f Trade was allowed to build factories and houses for key workers in the Development Areas and the 
Treasury could make loans or grants to firms to locate there. Financial assistance could also be made 
available to improve transport networks and public utility services.
But it did not include Sheffield within the Bill and the fear was locally that no new industry at all would 
be allowed to locate to Sheffield.77 For example, the Town Clerk in a memo discussed by the City 
Council in 1942 stated that the policy of the central planning authority on ‘industrial development
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probably envisages the removal of existing industry to another site, possibly in another town, and the 
prohibition of the establishment o f new industry in an existing industrial area.’ Progressive Alderman 
Wilson felt sure that all in the Chamber would object to the City’s industry being moved elsewhere.78 
These fears were widely felt in other blitzed cities. When Lord Woolton visited Bristol in January 1945 
he told a questioner that blitzed industry would be encouraged to take factories in Development Areas 
and that if they preferred to stay in their existing location they could not expect to have permission to 
rebuild their factories before the acute housing shortage had been met. The Development Officer of the 
Bristol Development Board for the Advancement o f the City and Port o f Bristol wrote to inform 
Sheffield City Council of this statement. The Board felt that to build up Development Areas at the 
expense of blitzed cities was ‘a great injustice in itself, but far more so is the endeavour to turn a 
temporary misfortune into a permanent disablement.’ It called for equal priority between blitzed areas 
and Development Areas for factory building.79
These fears were present when Alderman Thraves, Labour Leader of the Council, Alderman Jackson, 
leader of the Progressives, with the agreement of the President of the Chamber o f Commerce, decided in 
November 1944 to set up a joint committee of the Council and the Chamber to ‘examine the industrial 
construction of the City of Sheffield and thereafter to make such proposals as may be considered 
necessary in order to provide the people o f Sheffield, regarded as a whole, with the fullest prospect of 
steady and fruitful employment.’ They noted that:
During the past 30 years full employment for the people of Sheffield has only been 
possible during the period when the nation has been preparing for and engaged in war.
Since 1918 the city has endured trade depression, unprecedented unemployment, and 
the misery which these conditions bring in their train. The balance o f our industries 
has not altered substantially since 1918. This being so, it is always possible that 
Sheffield may suffer in the future, as it has in the past, from its lack of industrial 
diversification. The problem, of course, is one which is shared with several other areas 
in the country. The White Paper on “Employment Policy” shows the intention o f the 
Government to steer new industries into those areas which they recognise as being out 
of balance industrially, but does the Government recognise the Sheffield problem ? It 
is most important that the attention o f the Government should be focused upon the 
needs of the city to secure new industries.80
The City’s leaders were not hostile to the ‘balanced distribution of industry’ but to its effect on Sheffield 
should the City be excluded. When the Distribution o f Industry Bill came before Parliament in 1945 the 
main worry of the Post War Reconstruction Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, for example, was 
with a clause in the Bill allowing the Treasury to give financial aid in the form of grants or loans to firms 
setting up in Development Areas. They felt that a firm which could not get capital from normal 
commercial sources like the banks or the recently announced Financial Corporations was unworthy of
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help. The Committee felt that a government department would be less a good judge of commercial risk 
than a bank. Otherwise they supported the Bill in principle.81
The belief in the essential unity of interest of local Labour and Capital (beyond that of their 
representatives within the ‘political community’ inside the council chamber) is also shown in one of the 
more interesting proposals of wartime - to create an ‘Industry House’ to house the City’s trade 
organisations, both those of the employers and the trades unions, under one roof. This was put forward 
by the Chamber of Commerce in 1941 and the idea was described as ‘an investment with the best public 
long-term security’ for the City Council. Industty would have
(1) excellent opportunity for inter-communication, (2) ready-to-hand facilities for all 
occasions such as meetings (including veiy large meetings), (3) facilities for improving 
mutual relations through more frequent contact between officials and staffs, (4) 
accommodation probably superior to that now engaged by any of the individual 
organisations, (5) a centre which would give an immediate good impression to any 
visitor to the city (the city as a whole would share in this).
It was hoped that the ‘proposed building could include, in addition to administrative offices, committee 
rooms, halls for medium and large general meetings, facilities for industrial exhibitions, an industrial 
museum, library, etc., etc..’82 This was taken sufficiently seriously that the idea appeared in Sheffield 
Replanned, though it was only given a secondary priority among the new buildings planned for the city 
centre and the idea was to be finally shelved after the war.83
This proposal does illustrate the perception among local businessmen of the trade unions respectability 
and the probability that they would want to play their part as partners in achieving post-war economic 
prosperity in local industry. The TUC General Council showed its awareness of its members potential 
role in boosting economic prosperity when in 1944 in its interim report on Post-War Reconstruction it 
saw trade unions as playing a part in the running of publicly owned industry.84 Brooke argues, however, 
that because o f the trades unions continued insistence on the sanctity of free collective bargaining with 
employers, the creation by Labour of a centrally planned economy using physical planning methods was 
fatally undermined. This forced Labour to rely on Keynesian demand management and to place the 
emphasis as a result on the budget and fiscal policy when intervening in the national economy. It caused 
the failure of its distinctive wartime socialist vision of democratic planning. A policy of fixing wages to 
direct labour into critical areas of the economy was out of the question as far as the unions were 
concerned. Encroachment on the prerogative of management to manage businesses as they wanted was 
not ultimately accepted by the unions despite qualified support for joint production committees.85 Jim 
Tomlinson, while accepting that Brooke’s argument has a long pedigree, is less convinced by it, arguing 
that under the Attlee Government wage planning was a left versus right issue rather than one between the 
government and unions. Most Labour Ministers, including those least wedded to free collective
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bargaining, feared the politicisation of wage disputes if they got involved. Trades unions gave a great 
deal of actual support to the Attlee Government in the late 1940s including a self-denying wage freeze. 
They had no desire to embarrass it and disputes only arose when they felt the government had not 
consulted them on major issues.86
Sheffield Replanned noted that it was not intended to include Sheffield as a redevelopment area under 
the Distribution of Industry Bill because ‘in the Government’s view Sheffield is not likely to suffer from 
industrial depression in the immediate post-war years.’ It was believed that, despite the growth of 
competitors, ‘the experience, skill and industry’ of Sheffield people would be able to maintain 
Sheffield’s position as a steel producer.87 There were those, however, who disagreed with this picture, 
such as Frederick Pickworth of the English Steel Corporation who wrote two articles published in the 
Telegraph in March 1945. Sheffield’s narrow dependence on steel was once more stressed as were the 
greater number of competing areas within Britain producing alloy steels. He said that:
[S]teel plants to-day require elbow room. How can a new plant be erected on the site 
of an old one [in Sheffield] without the risk o f losing the business whilst the 
reconstruction takes place, and (more important) what becomes of the workpeople 
during the period of rebuilding, a process which - under modem conditions - might 
take two years ? Many of the firms concerned [in Sheffield] have interests in other 
towns and cities, and those responsible for their management can only give preference 
to Sheffield when conditions are suitable; at the moment... they are not. This is likely 
to lead to further migration of the city’s industries and even partial transfer [of these 
industries] would have a serious effect and might lead to a gradual abandonment of 
Sheffield for certain o f its remaining products.88
Ultimately it might be asked whether Labour’s industrial location policy mattered ? Barnett argues that 
the attempt to revivify the Distressed Areas through Dalton’s Act was misguided because it was based on 
foolish ‘New Jerusalemist’ notions which emphasised the ‘social rescue’ of the areas before exports and 
was an inefficient use of vital resources after the war. He likens the Development Areas to ‘species at 
the end of their evolutionary line, unwilling and unable to adapt’, arguing that they should have been 
allowed to expire. He argues that the attempt to save jobs in them, and ‘full employment’ itself, caused 
lasting damage to the economy.89 Sheffield’s industry did not suffer the disadvantage in his eyes of 
being rescued but could Labour politicians have allowed the Distressed Areas simply to die when they 
were the bases of their power ? They had to make the effort. It was part of a pact between Labour 
leaders and their followers to improve conditions in the Labour heartlands after the bitterness of the 
inter-war years. The miners in Bishop Auckland would never have forgiven Hugh Dalton for reneging 
on that pact had he done so.
Tomlinson and Scott both argue that while regional policy in 1945-51 was successful in maintaining full
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employment, a stress on creating jobs instead of long-term growth resulted in the failure to create a 
foundation in the Development Areas for self-sustaining industrial expansion. Policy-makers were 
interested in short-term considerations and particularly from 1947,pace Barnett, dollar earning or saving 
priorities. By that time the desire to promote exports dominated decision-making and as the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade said in 1949 ‘distribution of industry principles [are] 
being overridden in case after case because o f production considerations’.90 The government’s policies 
added a labour-intensive, branch plant economy to the industrial structure of the formerly depressed 
areas, employing a large proportion of unskilled labour in factories which were particularly vulnerable to 
a substantial down-tum in economic conditions. The period 1945-51 was thus ‘a lost opportunity’ for 
these areas.91 Even if Sheffield had been included within the scope of the Distribution of Industry Act it 
would thus not actually have helped in the longer term to markedly diversify the City’s economy. 
Regional policy was essentially about preventing further haemorrhaging of decaying local economies 
and not their economic reconstruction. In consequence the problem for Sheffield was postponed. The 
City Council’s response was pragmatic accepting that nothing could be done under existing political 
conditions except to continue lobbying government departments. As Hampton noted diversification 
remained a pre-occupation of the City Council even in the 1960s because the proportion of the city’s 
working population employed in engineering and metals compared with other cities at over 44 per cent 
meant that the city was almost unique in its dependence on one group of industries. Major service sector 
employment did not exist in the city even in 1961.92
2.3 - THE DEBATE OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM
According to Baston:
The Labour Party’s thought, as a national party, has neither been consistently localist 
or centralising, but instrumentalist. The division of power within government has 
traditionally been subordinate to the wider social aims of the party, and the desire to 
give the party the maximum say in the nation’s affairs. This has meant upholding local 
autonomy in periods like the first quarter o f the [twentieth] century, and the 1980s, 
when the party has faced a hostile national climate; and downplaying its role when the 
party has been in power during the 1940s and 1960s - and, so far, during the late 
1990s.93
This is broadly true. During the early 1940s Labour began a debate within the party on the merits of 
regional government as a means of reforming a local government system that many recognised was 
inefficient and unsuited to modem requirements. This obviously had to be a threat to local autonomy 
and the local government status quo - a status quo which had many defenders particularly within the 
Labour local authorities. The latter did not see the point of ‘a leap in the dark’ which would make them 
guinea-pigs in an experiment which might have dire electoral consequences given local attachments and
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pride in towns and cities which might now find themselves swallowed up by an authority no-one felt any 
attachment to and which was less accountable to the local citizen. Ultimately the national party had to 
back down. Tichelar sees this episode as providing evidence that centralisation of power was not an 
inevitable process where local control necessarily gave way to that of the central government and that the 
picture is much more complex with the outcome the necessary result of tension and negotiation between 
the protagonists. He argues that as a consequence Labour councils were influential in diluting the 
Labour Party’s commitment to land nationalisation under a central authority despite the impetus the 
destruction of the Blitz was giving to centralisation as a result o f the need to effectively redevelop areas 
of the damaged towns and the calls for a central planning authority in the Barlow, Uthwatt and Scott 
Reports.94 This section looks at the debate from the point of view of South Yorkshire, as well as looking 
at it from the national perspective, arguing that the personal interests of councillors within the ‘political 
community’ inside the council chamber had some impact since the reduced status of the City Council 
inside the regional authority, it was feared, equally meant reduced personal status for the city councillors 
themselves.
Alexander describes the whole period from 1935 until 1945 as one o f ‘The Acceptance oflmmobilisme'’ 
when it came to local government reform. He sets out some of the reasons given by political, official and 
intellectual sources for their support o f reform yet does not describe the debate on regional government 
during World War Two inside Labour. Alexander notes, however, that the Churchill Coalition did set up 
a committee to look into the post-war needs of local government in 1941 - probably stimulated by the 
need to create a new system of regional administration for better emergency planning. And in 1944 it 
announced in Parliament that there would need to be changes in ‘status, boundaries and areas’ of local 
authorities but ‘within the general framework of the county and county borough system’. This may have 
meant either that ministers and Whitehall departments accepted that since there was no consensus in the 
system on reform, government should take only cautious or marginal initiatives, or that, while root-and- 
branch reform was impossible, cumulative reform could occur under government auspices with local 
authority approval - as between 1945 and 1949 seemed presaged in the work of the Local Government 
Boundary Commission. Alexander points out that conflict was inbuilt in the local government system 
from its origins in the late nineteenth century due to the local government structure that was piecemeal 
created. This structure created discord between the various types o f local authority and the national 
bodies that represented them. These bodies were relatively parochial, fiercely fighting for their members 
interests without worrying about the ultimate functional and structural coherence of the whole system.
Its obsolescence was, however, widely recognised.
Alexander quotes the Barlow Report in this regard. It recognised that conditions were ‘vastly different’ 
from the nineteenth centuiy and that, ‘The important industrial towns have long outgrown their 
boundaries as local government units.’95 The demands of working people for a council roof over their 
heads made territorial extension an urgent priority for Sheffield Council as is explained in Chapter Six. 
William Robson was a Fabian local government expert at the London School of Economics and author of
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The Government and Misgovemment of London. He was also co-editor of the Political Quarterly.96 
Writing during the Blitz he noted that the main impetus to extend was in order ‘to catch the nomadic 
tribes of season-ticket holders and road passengers, who work in the town but escape liability to pay rates 
by living outside. Very often, the town council supplies public utility and other services to the outlying 
districts where these people live.’ He called for reform of local government through the creation of 
directly-elected regional councils. His views and criticisms were similar to those o f James Griffiths 
(below) but he wanted local authorities to become
‘the radiating centre of cultural and creative and recreative activities in the locality or 
region. We need municipal theatres, municipal concerts, lectures, cinemas, pageants, 
cafes. Life without the arts is a dull affair, and man does not live by drains alone.
After the war, local democracy must become bolder, gayer, more colourful.... Let us 
bear in mind that the rebuilding o f Britain is not merely a matter of bricks and 
mortar.97
Griffiths summarised for the NEC the objections Labour had to the existing system during a debate over 
a resolution proposing that Regional Authorities and secondary tier Area Authorities take over from 
existing local government bodies. This occurred at the Labour Party Annual Conference in 1943. The 
resolution embodied the report of the Machinery of Local Government Sub-Committee o f the Central 
Committee on Reconstruction appointed in 1941 to look at the future of local government. Griffiths 
believed there were too many local authorities and too many these had neither the population nor the 
resources to provide the essential services local government should provide. Existing administrative 
arrangements within local government were also out of date bearing little relationship to modem needs. 
Existing boundaries and the local government structure (embodied in Rural and Urban District Councils) 
created a division between town and country opposed to the best interests of the nation. And existing 
financial methods were inadequate and needed fundamental revision. This was ‘far too obvious’ even 
before 1939 and it made local government ‘a defective instrument’ for dealing with post-war 
reconstruction. He feared the system would completely break down once peace returned and it was faced 
with these new tasks. Given Labour’s ‘instrumentalism’ it is not surprising that he stressed that Labour 
needed these reforms in order to adequately enact its reconstruction pledges. To re-house people, plan 
town and country and redistribute industry there needed to be an effective instrument. Labour wanted to 
reorganise health services nationally while the new Education Act would thrust new and greater 
responsibilities on local councils. Thus reform was even more urgent than in 1939.98
The dual system proposed by the NEC represented a compromise made by Charles Latham of the 
London County Council on the Sub-Committee.99 He had wanted to abolish all local government units 
except county councils but believed the compromise reached ‘would avoid complaints about the 
remoteness for administrative purposes of the local authorities, and yet leave the big boroughs without an 
obstructive autonomy in all things.’100 Thus, the latter must be tamed, since if  Conservative-controlled,
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they would damage the wider plans of a Labour central government. A 1946 Labour pamphlet on reform 
noted another difficulty Labour faced:
Councillors [including Labour ones] nearly always think their council is doing a very 
good job, and any change which is going to reduce its powers or, worse still, abolish it, 
rouses all their powers o f resistance. This is understandable and excusable. It would 
be a poor look-out for local councils if their members were not keen on them and 
proud of what they were doing; but it has obvious dangers. Unless we can adjust our 
methods of government to the ever-changing needs o f democratic socialist 
reconstruction the whole system may break down.101
In July 1942 the Sub-Committee issued its provisional proposals to encourage internal party discussion 
and over thirty conferences and consultations took place with Divisional and Local Labour Parties as 
well as Labour Council members.102 This included ones in Doncaster and Sheffield.103 In Sheffield 
opposition to regional government was heartfelt even before due to suspicions that the wartime Regional 
Commissioners and the division of Britain into Civil Defence Regions would be made permanent 
superceding existing local government. Robson saw Regional Commissions as ‘an experiment of the 
highest interest and importance’ and while he wanted them replaced by directly-elected regional councils 
he believed ‘Regionalism had to come. The only question at issue was whether it should come as an 
expression of local government or as an imposition by the central government.’ He viewed the Regional 
Commissions as ‘a complete break with the British constitutional tradition and the principles o f public 
administration that have hitherto prevailed.’ Unfortunately they inspired distrust because, ‘The urgency 
of the war situation, the dangers of procrastination, the futility of legalistic quibbling while London or 
Coventry bums, resulted] in the authority of the Commissioners often greatly exceeding their
,1 0 4powers.
Regional Commissioners were particularly disliked by Sheffield councillors because the wartime 
regional administration was based in Leeds.105 This especially attracted the criticism of the Municipal 
Progressive leader who put down a motion opposing regional government stating that reorganisation on 
such a basis was ‘undemocratic in character, [would] destroy local initiative, reduce local interest, and 
deprive ratepayers through their elected representatives o f the control and responsibility entrusted to 
them.’106 Labour demurred at the wording of the motion and the political philosophy it expressed but not 
its subject. In wartime debates on reform Labour believed that the stress should be not so much on the 
preservation of democratic traditions but on increasing the range and power o f democracy.107 Thus 
Labour in Sheffield in 1943 approved a resolution giving the local government vote to all Parliamentary 
voters despite Municipal Progressive opposition which wanted to keep the local government vote firmly 
in the hands o f ratepayers. That would raise the municipal electorate by at least a quarter. One reason 
the Progressives gave for their opposition was that there was no demand for the change. Labour 
Councillor Ballard believed, however, that it was unfair that the municipal vote should be denied to ex­
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servicemen living in rooms because they could not afford anything better and stated that, ‘If we are to 
have full democracy, [we must] base our franchise not upon property-owning or renting capacity but 
upon human needs and requirements in the conduct of communal life.’ The Progressives denounced 
Labour’s resolution as inspired by the political benefits Labour would gain and feared it would lead to 
the abolition of local government.108
Municipal Progressive opposition is unsurprising. They said they aimed
to organise public opinion in favour of a progressive municipal policy, having for its 
object the development of trade and commerce in the city and the provision of such 
amenities as may be desirable for the public good. The Party believes that municipal 
policy should be governed by local needs and local circumstances, and should be kept 
entirely free from matters which are properly the concern of Parliament.109
So they wanted ‘separate spheres’ of responsibility for local and central government while priding 
themselves on their localism. Although Labour’s national presence and policy was due to the 
convergence of views and organisation of parties based in specific localities which were not simple 
microcosmic expressions of the national party, it did not accept the validity o f ‘separate spheres’ of 
responsibility. It had to intervene. Hence it was attacked by the supposedly ‘non-party’ Municipal 
Progressives for having introduced party politics into local government. Party politics, however, were 
indisputably major features of nineteenth century Conservative and Liberal politics in Sheffield and were 
perhaps even fiercer since there were more elective offices like Vestries, School Boards or Boards of 
Guardians to contest.110 Alderman Jackson’s April 1943 letter to the Telegraph emphasises that 
Progressives saw ‘regionalisation’ as a conspiracy against the independence of local government by 
people with scant knowledge of it and from far outside Sheffield.111 This was a view shared equally by 
Labour Council members like Alderman Caine of Rotherham who commented that, ‘many o f the ideas 
now being propounded on these matters [are] mostly by theorists with no practical experience in local 
government’; however, he was optimistic ‘that the fundamental principles upon which British Local 
Government is founded will remain pretty much as they are to-day, with the necessary modifications to 
meet the new circumstances that will follow the peace.’112 The ratepayer was central to Progressive 
views of what constituted democratic freedom since property gave ‘a stake in society’. According to 
Jackson:
Transport, water and electricity are marked down for administration by large and
unwieldy bodies who will necessarily be out of touch with the local rate-payer. Indeed,
the whole trend of official thought is that the ratepayer who will have to find the
money, does not matter. The very thing that our gallant fighting men are striving for in
all parts of the world to-day, namely, freedom, is the one thing in real danger in this 
1 1'?country.
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Under Labour’s 1943 proposals Regional Authorities would make regional town planning schemes and 
lesser Area Authorities would oversee the operation of planning schemes and consents to erect buildings 
in accordance with them. The Regional Authorities would make the building by-laws while the Area 
Authorities would administer them. Regional Authorities would also be able to undertake major housing 
schemes, slum clearance and development schemes while the Area Authority would undertake local 
housing schemes, including reconditioning buildings. In terms of finance the Area Authorities would 
collect rates while the larger authorities would value property and make precepts. Regional Authorities 
would control hospitals and health centres while the smaller authorities would have lesser services like 
midwifery and maternity and child welfare. Regional Authorities would have the fire services and main 
drainage. The lesser authorities would have sewerage and minor public health duties like refuse 
collection. Public Assistance would be controlled by regional government. Gas, transport and electricity 
would be under national public ownership. Urban and Rural District Councils would be amalgamated 
and the basis of the Area Authority where possible would be a County Borough.114 The existing County 
Boroughs like Sheffield would thus be drastically affected as ‘Current Topics’ pointed out in the 
Telegraph.115
Wartime plans for reorganisation were not, however, just the province of the Machinery of Local 
Government Sub-Committee. The Town Clerks of Rotherham and Sheffield were part o f a Special 
Committee appointed by the Association of Municipal Corporations (representing the County Boroughs) 
which in 1941 issued a memorandum on the subject. New local government areas would be o f such a 
character and status that they would be suitable for the tasks of post-war reconstruction or 
redevelopment. Rural areas would be blended with an urban area so ‘overspill’ and the ‘consequent 
escape of fiscal responsibility’ could be prevented. The congestion and lack of amenities in many areas, 
it was felt, could be overcome by limiting the growth and population of each area by town planning 
restrictions and limitation of space. Obviously this looked to the County Boroughs to be the basis of a 
reformed local government. They wanted a single authority and not a dual system.116 They had some 
support on the Labour Sub-Committee from Susan Lawrence who penned a minority interim report in 
July 1942. She had been MP for East Ham in the 1920s and was also involved in ‘Poplarism’. During 
World War Two ‘she rendered valuable assistance to the Party by undertaking research work in 
connection with the Barlow Report and other war-time social documents.’ She left the Sub-Committee 
in December 1942.117 She also wanted a single authority but made up of a small region believing this 
would overcome ‘the enormous time and energy spent on conflicts between the major and minor local 
authorities in times of peace and the imperfections o f the dual control [s7c] in this time of war.’ She 
feared that division of authority would be ‘a real step backward and ... an obstacle to that unification of 
health services admitted by all to be necessary.’118
The majority interim report formed the basis of the statement The Future of Local Government discussed 
at the 1943 Annual Conference. Replies to the prior consultations had generally tended to show
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opposition, a desire for unitary authorities or just modifications to present local government boundaries 
yet it was decided to publish this statement.119 In Rotherham the Council Labour Group opposed the 
proposals while the malcontents of the Trades Council, who usually opposed National Labour Party 
policy on such things as Communist affiliation to the Labour Party, supported the majority report and 
their amendment was carried after a vote.120
The Provisional Proposals121 published for party consultation and The Future of Local Government both 
asserted in almost identical words that the areas of the Regions envisaged ‘must not be so large that the 
sense of a common interest in their government would be lost, or cause various areas on the outskirts to 
feel that they had too little in common, but must be large enough to permit an adequate area for 
development.’122 But this was exactly what its opponents alleged - that it would be too large to enable 
civic pride to be encouraged. J. W. Sutherland of the United Textile Workers’ Association put down an 
amendment at the Conference calling for withdrawal of the proposals and asserted that, ‘Large units can 
be efficient, but they are not necessarily so. They tend to become impersonal and autocratic. Civic pride 
is entirely absent from the administration of County Councils now, and I am certain it would be entirely 
absent from the administration in Regional Councils.’ The County was to be the basis of the regions if 
large enough so it did not bode well.123 Fred Marshall, MP for Brightside and a former Alderman of 
Sheffield Council, objected to the statement given in the Provisional Proposals that ‘elected 
representatives must retain effective control over the services for the provision and administration of 
which they are made responsible by Parliament.’124 He believed that membership of just two 
Committees on a County Borough Council could take up all o f a councillor’s time and that it was another 
thing entirely to deal with the hundred or more problems of four or five large towns in a region. The 
West Riding County Council, which might form a region, would have Sheffield, Leeds, and up to ten 
other great County Borough Councils. He was concerned for Labour members with limited leisure time 
and believed the democratic basis of such a regional council would be undermined. In many o f the 
County Boroughs which would become Area Authorities, Labour had done its greatest work and had 
made the most progress with many successful experiments in municipal ownership. They would be 
relegated to merely collecting the rates. It would be ‘a humiliating position for those great authorities 
who have been blazing the trail in Labour representation now for a century.’125
When the proposals were put to a card vote almost 40 per cent of the Conference voted against them.
The issue was referred back for more consideration of the question of local finance. Labour Councils 
wanted more funding from central government to cover the cost of national services, the transfer o f all 
local authority debts for education or housing to the centre and capital loans for post-war reconstruction 
and redevelopment which were interest free, but they also wanted enabling legislation to give them a 
freer hand in serving their areas. Recognising this inconsistency Sheffield Council called for a general 
inquiry into local government finance in its entirety. Local authorities, like Sheffield, as we shall see in 
Chapters Three and Six, desperately needed government financial help to redevelop areas like The Moor 
and rebuild major department stores. Reconstruction o f these civic landmarks had enormous symbolic
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importance to Sheffielders. Rate revenue would also flow to the Council and local jobs would be 
created. However, if central government provided most local authority funding then because it paid the 
piper it would want to decide the tune. Ultimately the contradiction could not be solved during the war 
by Labour’s policy-makers or by the Churchill Coalition.126
Opposition to regional government continued in Sheffield after the Conference. Labour and the 
Progressives united to pass a motion in August 1943 stating that they were opposed to any change by 
central government to their powers or functions without a full and impartial inquiry and consultation with 
the bodies representing local authorities. The time was considered opportune because Sheffield was to 
celebrate the centenary of its Municipal Incorporation in 1843. Alderman Thraves, leader of the Labour 
Group, said he had been associated with two committees, experience o f which showed him that it was not 
just the Cabinet Ministers and MPs they had to fear but also ‘the civil servants, who relentlessly pursued 
a policy of digging themselves in, and making themselves important.’ He was upset that ‘we cannot 
[even] do as we like with our own buses and have to consult Leeds, though the public, not realising that, 
criticise us.’127 The motion was endorsed in September by representatives often County Boroughs, nine 
non-county Boroughs, 58 Urban District Councils, 21 Rural District Councils and the West Riding 
County Council at Wakefield and a Standing Committee was appointed to co-ordinate action.128
In February 1944 the Editor of the Telegraph published the replies of Thraves and Jackson to the 
question ‘Should there be a new Sheffield Region ?’ Jackson maintained his total hostility to regional 
administration even if based on Sheffield since those in the present-day local authority areas that it was 
suggested could amalgamate - in Rotherham, Barnsley, Doncaster, Worksop, Retford, Chesterfield, and 
the Hope Valley - would be able to influence Sheffield’s standard of services in Sheffield and no place or 
authority outside Sheffield should be able to legislate for it. Thraves believed there could only be forms 
of regional administration over particular services based on Sheffield by consent of each local authority. 
He wanted to build up an economic region looking to Sheffield while retaining the present system of 
local government within it.129 Alderman Thraves’ view was acted on by Sheffield Council in terms of 
some of the measures it took with regard to post-war reconstruction. For example, Sheffield led in 1944 
a group of local authorities within a thirty mile radius of the City as part of a Government scheme for the 
advance preparation of housing sites. The City Council was to take charge o f road-making and mains 
and sewer construction for the whole lot.130
Labour did at first defend a proposal in the National Health Service White Paper in 1944 to transfer 
municipal health services, including hospitals, to a Joint Authority to cover Sheffield, Doncaster, 
Rotherham, Barnsley, and Chesterfield. The Progressives were entirely opposed as might be expected. 
Howard Hill, the sole Communist, argued that services in Sheffield would be levelled up since Sheffield 
people were waiting for extra beds and there were empty beds in authorities outside the city borders. 
Labour Councillor Dyson bravely remarked that he was not frightened of area authorities or regional 
control and that accepting Alderman Jackson’s advice would cause people to die because they had not
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had proper attention. Labour was in favour because in the past year the Council had had to help local 
voluntary hospitals out so they could continue to function but the voluntary system and especially its 
dependence on charity was seen as out o f date.131 Unfortunately, shortly after, a Special Sub-Committee 
of the Health Committee under Labour Alderman Yorke while welcoming a comprehensive health 
service retreated from the earlier position and opposed transfer of municipal hospitals. An Authority 
with executive powers was regarded as ‘a serious threat to the maintenance o f Local Government on 
democratic lines.’132
By the latter stages of the war it seemed less and less likely that the Churchill Coalition or Labour if it 
won a General Election would introduce regional government. There was from the Government side no 
desire to stir up uncomfortable controversy and it compromised by promising a greater role for local 
government after the war in return for acceptance of a boundary commission to alter the boundaries, 
status and territory of local government units. A White Paper was produced which ended the Regional 
Commissions and advised the strengthening of local authorities so they could deal with post-war 
responsibilities. Labour also supported a boundary commission since it could think of no other way of 
greatly modifying local government areas so they could deal with reconstruction. Local Government 
reform did not feature in Let Us Face The Future in 1945 though a boundary commission was to be 
created.133 Regional government as an idea, however, continued to be discussed inside Labour. Labour 
flirted with regional authorities in the 1960s and 70s and moves to create regional assemblies in England 
have gained impetus from devolution in Scotland, Wales and London in the 1990s.134
2.4 - CONCLUSION
Writing a ‘Municipal Review’ in 1942 Alderman Caine of Rotherham noted that in happier times it 
would have celebrated municipal progress and achievement, particularly the expansion o f public services 
in a dozen different ways which would all have been to the benefit o f the common people o f Rotherham. 
But all hopes and plans had had to take a back seat due to the war emergency. While the experience of 
total war had made a great difference to the work o f the Council he noted that
looking back over the 3 years it is surprising how much o f our pre-war organisation 
and service remains in almost normal operation. Our policy has been to maintain the 
scope and efficiency of the public services at the highest level compatible with the 
drastic reductions in staff and the financial and other restrictions that have been 
imposed on municipalities in the interest of the war effort.135
This Chapter could have been a description of the actual work of wartime local government. I have 
deliberately concentrated on questions of post-war industrial reconstruction rather than the operation of 
services like education or public health or latterly air raid precautions which had so large a role in 
protecting Sheffield’s people and industry in wartime. I have also concentrated on the debate over local
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government reform which Labour local authorities opposed and successfully defeated despite 
government and national party attempts to the contrary. The efforts to maintain municipal services 
during the war, particularly during the Sheffield ‘Blitz’ in December 1940, were heroic and they could 
not have been done without the cross-party co-operation that is evident in the two areas highlighted in 
this Chapter. It is arguable, however, that, as with the case o f local government reform, while the 
members of the City Council were justifiably proud of their achievements in local government and spoke 
of their desire to defend local democracy and to create a wider civic consciousness of Sheffield this co­
operation could not fail to be self-interested as they had a vested interest in preserving the existing City 
Council and retaining its existing powers since this provided them with status and the opportunity to 
make a name for themselves which would have been impossible under regional government. The 
possibility that the seat of regional administration would be in Leeds would also be an affront to local 
pride. The preservation of working-class jobs was part of Labour’s raison d ’etre while preserving local 
firms was the raison d ’etre of the Progressives. Both had a pragmatic interest in defending and 
revitalising the local economy since it helped form the power base of both parties and employed the 
councillors. The ethical socialist rhetoric o f many Labour city councillors did not disguise the real 
constraints on their individual room to manoeuvre caused by party politics within the council chamber. 
The Labour Group was, says Hampton, itself ‘a closed community: exercising a fierce version o f party 
discipline that forbade public expressions o f dissent’.136 A councillor’s first loyalty was to the Group and 
not directly to the constituents who had elected him on one particular day and had then no subsequent 
control over the decisions he took in their name.
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CHAPTER THREE 
NEW JERUSALEM PROPOSED ?
TOWN PLANNING AND HOUSING PROVISION 
IN SOUTH YORKSHIRE, 1939-1945
3.1 - INTRODUCTION
The reshaping and rebuilding of the great City of Sheffield is a vast undertaking: but, 
as a consequence of the war, it is one we must engage in whether we like it or not.
What we have now to decide is: are we to rebuild in conformity with a plan convened 
on bold lines and in the high spirit of social enterprise, of co-operative effort and of 
public service, or are we to rebuild in the main on the old lines with all alterations 
reduced to the essential minimum ?l
Sheffield Replanned and the Town Planning Exhibition held in summer 1945 attempted to give a vision 
of the future Sheffield as embodied in the Collie Plan named after the City Engineer. The latter was the 
culmination of a process that had begun before the Second World War and continued through it. The 
quotation illustrates the dilemma which faced Sheffield and other blitzed cities during the 1940s. The 
result was a compromise between the Labour Party and the needs of local business interests and the 
actual planning hardly involved ordinary citizens directly except that in 1945 they were given the 
privilege of knowing about the result. The wartime local electoral truce was one of a number of factors 
which insulated the decision makers. Labour wanted a modem city with imposing buildings, squares and 
streets because it wanted to make Sheffielders proud of the achievements of Municipal Socialism, to 
foster community and to make them socialists. Similarly in London in 1900 politicians and architects 
wanted a city that would physically reflect its pretensions to a world role as the centre of the British 
Empire so Londoners ‘as if through a process o f osmosis, [could] come to understand what their attitudes 
toward empire and the imperialized peoples should be.’2 Sheffield was the fifth city in the country with 
an international reputation and they wanted a city to match. Sheffield’s leaders were also conscious that 
they sometimes came off worst to Leeds, the great rival, which was the wartime centre o f regional 
administration. As Joe Ashton says, ‘It was Sheffield’s proud boast that it made the weapons of war for 
the troops while Leeds made the WAAF’s knickers. Which was why Goering never bothered bombing 
Leeds.’3
To get an overview of the development of town planning in Sheffield during the 1940s it is instructive to 
compare three Times articles. The first in August 1942 had the headline ‘A Better And A Greater 
Sheffield’ and the sub-title ‘War-Time Spirit of the City of Steel’. It had a patriotic, morale-boosting 
tone and gives an idea of wider perceptions of Sheffield and its folk. It was a set of perceptions 
Sheffielders readily agreed with. They were ‘an outspoken people and they do not suffer fools gladly. 
They work hard and they play hard.’ It commented that:
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[I]t is no secret that the city has fared badly by enemy attacks from the air. Frequently 
there may be seen on a board announcing committee meetings at the town hall, the 
words “Town Planning.” This committee meets regularly. For obvious reasons its 
deliberations are confidential, but it is safe to assume that when the time comes it will 
introduce schemes to rebuild and remould. It is not a long time ago that the Emergency 
Committee issued to members o f the Civil Defence Services some words of praise 
following a particularly trying ordeal during an air-raid on the city - “How shall we 
honour our dead ? That is for the future. When the time comes we shall remember 
them by removing our scars, and in their place we shall build a better and greater 
Sheffield.” Those words can, perhaps, be used to describe the ambition of those who 
are responsible for the future destinies of Sheffield.4
The second appeared in 1943 and was entitled ‘A New Sheffield’ and sub-titled ‘Working Out Ideals’. 
Sheffield’s aim had once been to be merely a successful manufacturing community but now:
With the development of social consciousness has come the realization that there are 
other aims worthy of equal effort. The transformation of the city into a dignified 
expression of its industrial achievements, the scientific zoning of its various industrial 
and business activities, the abolition of its slums, the loosening up of its population 
densities, the provision of houses fit for workers to live in and in happier and 
pleasanter situations which are available, the cultivation of community centres, the 
development of education, of music, and the arts - these are new ideals which are 
gradually taking practical form.
This ‘social consciousness’ had quickened during the inter-war period and much preparatory town- 
planning work had been done. This included the Civic Survey and Plan produced by Patrick 
Abercrombie in the 1920s and the 1939 draft Central Area Scheme. Thus, Sheffield was more prepared 
for reconstruction than other cities and after the air raids many difficulties in the way of creating a 
splendid city had been removed.5
The final article appeared in October 1952. Like the first it presented the gritty, blunt, no-nonsense, 
Northern characteristics of Sheffield folk. It was optimistic about the future o f the City but did not 
minimise the lack of progress that had been made. It said that ‘Sheffield people have a deep distrust of 
the cheap, the showy, and the superficial and none of these qualities finds a place in the scheme for 
replanning their bombed city.’ Sheffield was a ‘hard-headed and feet-on-the-ground community’ which 
looked for ‘practicability’ in its town plans. The air raids had not proved such a straightforward 
opportunity as appeared in 1943: ‘Such a toll of damage, though it demanded a planned reconstruction of 
the city centre, was too scattered and sporadic to assist materially in securing it. To some extent, indeed, 
it made the execution of comprehensive redevelopment more difficult by giving a scarcity value to the
53
properties still remaining.’ The Collie Plan was commended in that it
differed from most plans produced at that time in that it rejected the idea of a fixed 
“master plan” in favour of a flexible scheme which would allow for progressive 
adjustment to accord with current needs and legislation. The severe avoidance of what 
was known at that time as “imaginative planning” ensured that the plan was kept within 
the limits of probable execution in the difficult post-war years.
But it noted that
the city authorities feel that much more might have been done in Sheffield if materials 
had been available in good time. They fear that if trading facilities are not restored 
quickly in the areas where they flourished before the war, neither traders nor the public 
will regain the habit of seeking them there. Thus there will be a permanent loss of 
rateable value, and Sheffield will be denied a shopping centre commensurate with its 
status. The council have made many approaches to the ministries concerned, but 
without success.6
The town-planning profession have been attacked for writing simplistic Whig histories o f their subject. 
Much of it presented itself ‘as an inevitable, unquestionable and heroic story in which all achievements 
are laid to its credit, while adverse factors are attributed to accident or hostile forces.’ Ravetz has 
attempted to produce a more balanced picture claiming that planners had underestimated or ignored the 
influence of important factors and agents by concentrating on the narrow history o f their profession.7 
David Cannadine has also made a distinction between ‘planning history’ whose practitioners have ‘their 
own applied and essentially anachronistic field of historical vision’ and ‘urban history’ as pioneered by 
H. J. Dyos - a much more inter-disciplinary and comprehensive study of the history of cities.8 Nick 
Tiratsoo and Junichi Hasegawa, while making a contribution to planning history, do so in a much more 
critical light than professional town planners. They are more concerned with whether the plans for 
reconstruction were actually realised in particular cities and the reasons for the success or failure. Such 
studies allow a better understanding of Labour Party histoiy at both national and local level and its 
success or failure as a political entity. Tiratsoo has examined the re-planning of Hull9 and in greater 
detail at Coventry.10 In both cases he has attempted to demonstrate that Correlli Barnett’s controversial 
thesis o f ‘Parlours before Plant’ is unhelpful as a description of historical actuality. According to 
Barnett:
It was Britain’s free choice - the choice of governments and electorate alike - to 
relegate the physical re-creation of her industrial base to a veiy poor second place in 
her order of building priorities. Instead of starting with a new workshop so as to 
become rich enough to afford a new family villa, John Bull opted for the villa
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straightaway - even though he happened to be bankrupt at the time.11
This was because in the debates about post-war reconstruction during the Second World War ‘New 
Jerusalemists’ infected with optimism about creating a ‘Brave New World’ after the war triumphed over 
economic realists who put forward the view of the ‘Cruel Real World’ in which Britain had to make a 
living.12 Building houses and hospitals were supposedly put before factories and esoteric visions 
informed town plans that did not find adequate space for factory building and expansion but concentrated 
on zoning for homes. Tiratsoo and Hasegawa do not confirm this picture. Coventry, for example, is 
usually seen as a major success of bold ‘New Jerusalemist’ town planning in the 1940s and, wrongly, as 
typifying, with Plymouth, post-war reconstruction in the blitzed cities. In fact it was atypical. In Hull 
and Southampton the original bold wartime plans were never implemented, despite the Labour councils 
in power, and in Bristol, though the shopping centre was re-located to a new site, local Labour was not as 
enthusiastic as it might have been.13 Hasegawa has also written about Conservative Portsmouth, a city 
where town planners were little regarded or supported and whose plan was also undone.14 Both 
historians show that the supposedly ‘New Jerusalemist’ plans were not realised because industrial 
reconstruction was, pace Barnett, taken extremely seriously at a time when exports were necessary to fill 
the ‘dollar gap’ in order to pay for imports from the United States and to overcome national bankruptcy. 
House-building admittedly was an immediate priority of Labour councils but it always lost out to the 
building of new factories. On the other hand, house-building in areas with industries that did produce 
exports had an economic rationale that Barnett underestimates because it did help increase labour factor 
mobility and so promoted labour flexibility in industry.
Work has been done on the history of town-planning in Sheffield before but it has been largely done by 
professional town-planners. They have also employed for the 1940s generalisations which Tiratsoo and 
Hasegawa question at length. Did the Second World War really see established ‘a [national] political 
consensus to ensure a programme to effect a policy for land use and development in the process of post­
war reconstruction [?] [And] Locally, [did] it engender. . .  an enthusiasm for planning not only as a 
means of reconstructing the blitzed cities but as an act o f faith in the future [?]’15 They argue that 
detailed ‘micro-historical’ studies show that the reality was more complex and much more contradictory 
than these generalisations suggest.
Even Paul Addison, the classic historian of wartime consensus, notes that while the main principles of 
town and country planning were agreed between the two national parties, particularly that there should be 
some kind of central planning authority, yet there was stalemate over whether the new Ministry of Town 
and Country Planning should have the powers over land use recommended by the Uthwatt Committee 
into betterment and compensation.16 The achievements of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 
enacted by Labour in the field of compensation and betterment were short-lived and repealed by the 
Conservatives after 1951 so they were not part of any consensus. While admitting that point, the town- 
planner, H. W. E. Davies, does, however, support the consensus thesis, arguing that the Act’s five basic
55
legislative principles did survive and were enshrined in the Act o f 1990. Even Margaret Thatcher’s 
government, though allegedly antagonistic to everything exemplifying consensus, did not scrap these 
principles but confirmed them.17
Peter Mandler, unlike Davies, sees the planning system created by the 1947 Act as largely dismantled 
and nullified by the Conservatives after 1951. This produced a return to laissez-faire with the result that 
in the 1950s and 1960s city centres were handed over to private developers with usually catastrophic 
results. This contemptuous treatment of historic townscapes, however, has usually been regarded as the 
responsibility of arrogant town planners which explains their negative popular image.18 Alison Ravetz, 
subscribes to this popular view of town-planners arguing that the 1940s generation of town planners were 
exponents o f a ‘clean sweep’ style of planning indiscriminately hating and undervaluing the Victorian 
urban legacy.19 Mandler argues, however, that there was a wider circle of responsibility. And he puts 
some of the blame on the public who made few protests about what was happening at the time because 
they had little interest in town planning.20 Tiratsoo agrees with Mandler on the apathy and conservatism 
of the public on the subject even at its supposed height in World War Two. They both believe the 
planners were limited reformers who tried to work harmoniously with the public and that they should be 
given more credit than is usually the case for what they actually did.21
Tiratsoo with Thompson and Fielding has questioned the Addison thesis of a significant leftward shift in 
popular attitudes in wartime by looking at a variety of wartime developments which have been said to 
have produced social harmony or are taken as evidence of popular radicalism or interest in post-war 
reconstruction, including town planning. They show that the evidence does not simply point in one 
direction and that much of the evidence presented in favour of the thesis is unpersuasive. There was a 
boom in reconstruction literature and a consensus existed among planners and architects that blitzed 
cities presented a great opportunity to create a better planned Britain but the belief that they were 
winning over the general public to their schemes was wishful thinking as demonstrated by wartime 
surveys into popular attitudes to future housing provision. This demonstrated that people wanted houses 
immediately and were much less interested in longer-term town planning principles. They admit that 
there was interest in town planning while the Blitz was actually occurring in particular cities but after 
1941 this faded away as people tired of hearing about a ‘new’ Britain that appeared to be just empty talk 
and the raids became less frequent.22
Beaven and Thoms, looking at the Blitz and civilian morale between 1940 and 1942, based on the 
findings in Mass-Observation reports, have argued that in damaged city centres which retained intact the 
institutions of working-class leisure culture, like cinemas, music halls or public houses, as well as public 
utilities and city centre landmarks, morale was much more easily maintained than in cities where they 
had been destroyed. Mass-Observers tended to regard regional or local characteristics supposedly 
exhibited by the citizens of blitzed cities as responsible for local morale but Beaven and Thoms dismiss 
this 23 We have noted the supposed characteristics o f Sheffield folk. Walton and Lamb in their book on
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the Sheffield Blitz, which is based on information gathered in the aftermath, believed that civilian morale 
was good in Sheffield despite the destruction of the Marples Hotel when seventy people were killed, for 
instance.24 This might be put down to the ‘down-to-earth’ features of the Northern character, but 
thankfully there were, after all, only two major raids on Sheffield, and Sheffield’s forebearance was 
never tested to the extreme extent it was in London. It could be, however, that Walton and Lamb were 
anxious to show that Sheffield could ‘Take It’ just like London and that they had bought into Angus 
Calder’s ‘Myth o f the Blitz’ of stoic Londoners.25 Ministry of Information ‘Advice on the Preparation of 
Broadcasts’ about the conditions in blitzed towns in 1941 said that it was important to ‘shift attention 
from the present to the future’ stressing ‘rebuilding, reconstructing, replanning ... The future will be 
better than the past.’26 But if we accept Beaven and Thoms’ argument it was equally about restoring the 
past so far as citizens were concerned. To civic leaders it was about modernisation and the inculcation 
of civic spirit. Involvement by citizens in town planning was arguably as good a way of inculcating 
community consciousness as the impressive new buildings and lay-out planned at a time when a war was 
being fought for democracy. But town planning’s ‘Brave New World’ rhetoric became less effective 
when, as in Sheffield, it became apparent that nothing was actually being done to create the reality that 
the town plans sketched and that the public, in contradiction to the ideals of democracy, community and 
fairness in which the war was being fought, were not being consulted and deliberations were taking place 
behind closed doors. This is what the Editor of The Star complained of in 1943. He then tried to start 
the debate that the City Council showed no intention o f starting or of wanting in the pages o f his 
newspaper. But central government was also not passing the kind of legislation that would materially 
assist local authorities to buy land easily with a minimum of procedural obstacles to rapid action.
The town-planning schemes advocated in Sheffield during the War were the product of continuity with 
the past rather than the sudden conversion to town-planning principles that occurred after some cities 
were blitzed. Town planning in Sheffield was also noted for its ‘practicability’ due to this experience 
and by 1940 it had already achieved in comparison with other authorities. Town planning in the inter­
war period often focused on the design o f the layout of council estates since it was unable to progress 
with more ambitious plans for comprehensive redevelopment of towns because local authorities could 
not afford to do so given their existing powers. Housing is an essential part of town planning, though it 
is sometimes overlooked, and the Collie Plan saw it as the first priority even over the reconstruction of 
the blitzed city centre. Wartime Sheffield was already suffering an accommodation crisis which was 
predicted to get worse with the return of servicemen after the war ended. The context of the post-war 
crisis is dealt with in this chapter. There was also an ideological dimension to housing centred around 
competing claims made about the efficiency of private or municipal enterprise in building houses and the 
respective advantages and disadvantages of owner-occupation or of tenants renting from the City 
Council. Houses were also regarded as the housewives’ workplace and the issue was in consequence 
seen as peculiarly one affecting women. Housewives were also regarded by Labour as symbolizing the 
norm of womanhood providing an essential element of Labour’s electoral support and through the 
Women’s Sections taking on a variety o f mundane but essential organisational tasks. The pay-off for
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these services was not positions of political power and influence - though locally there were a few 
women councillors - rather the guarantee that working-class living conditions would be improved.
3.2 - TOWN PLANNING IN SHEFFIELD BETWEEN THE WARS
Town planning in South Yorkshire between the Wars and afterwards was not solely confined to Sheffield 
though this might be believed from my concentration within this Chapter on the city. However,
Sheffield was an early pioneer in this area and the 1945 Collie Plan was not a completely novel 
development but the culmination and continuation of a process that had begun before 1914. In this 
Sheffield must be contrasted with the inter-war boom town of Coventry whose town planning schemes 
only really got underway in 1937 with the election of a Labour Council and a year later with the 
appointment of the architect Donald Gibson.27
Professor Patrick Abercrombie described the 1924 Sheffield Civic Survey and Plan (which was the 
precursor of all later Sheffield town plans), the 1922 Doncaster Regional Town Planning Report and the 
Dundee competition plan he made as ‘the foundation of all my town and regional planning work’. He 
also produced a Sheffield regional plan in 1931 and was retained as consultant to the City Council in the 
preparation of the 1939 draft City Centre plan.28 Abercrombie was extremely productive of town plans 
at this period of his life. Lord Holford noted, however, that looking at these plans collectively ‘one is 
made aware of Abercrombie’s immense industry and fertility; but also . . .  that although they were 
persuasive, and beginning to be influential, they were not yet backed by administrative power or by 
economic incentives.’29 That was the frustrating story of inter-war town planning. There was some 
legislative progress. Local authorities could draw up development schemes for any land as a result of the 
Town and Country Planning Act 1932, whereas before town planning was restricted to peripheral areas 
of new development. As late as June 1942, however, only 3 per cent of Britain was covered by such 
schemes.30 A local authority that had made a resolution to prepare or adopt a town planning scheme was 
given powers of interim development control which meant that builders or other persons seeking to build 
on land in the area covered by the scheme had to seek the permission of the local authority for it or else 
the building constructed could be tom down without compensation. Yet this was a purely negative 
power. The Act also forced local authorities to place their schemes before Parliament for approval which 
could take unnecessaiy time.31
Sutcliffe has described Sheffield Labour politics as
curiously conservative, continuing the tradition of civic enterprise from the later 19th 
century, but recognizing the strong identity of interest between labor and its employers 
in the city. In these circumstances, it is no surprise that the main focus of municipal 
activity between the wars should have been on public education and improving the 
environment. And activity in this latter area, in particular, did much to establish the
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context of planning in Sheffield after 1945.32
This is true. The Labour Party joined with active environmentalist elements who favoured town and 
country planning in the local Council for the Preservation of Rural England (CPRE) branch and achieved 
much even before the Second World War. This latter body can be regarded in its make-up as 
representing what Arthur Marwick called ‘middle opinion’ locally.33 The interests of the two, however, 
could not always be guaranteed to converge harmoniously. Sheffield Replanned saw the construction of 
houses as a first priority in 194534 but shortages of labour and materials prevented the rapid realisation of 
this objective in the late 1940s and the City Council clashing with the CPRE. However, the City Council 
was to come increasingly into conflict with the CPRE in the 1950s and 1960s as the provisional green 
belt became the only land available for building homes.35 In 1938, however, it had been the Labour Party 
which in response to the latter’s representations from 1936 introduced proposals for a green belt in the 
face of Municipal Progressive opposition.36 However, it remained a provisional green belt until 1983 
because the City Council refused in the 1950s to establish a permanent one as they were invited to do 
under the Conservative Government’s Circular 50/57.37 Patrick Abercrombie was the Honorary 
Secretary of the national CPRE during the inter-war period and actively campaigned for a similar green 
belt around London.38 Ravetz points out that the movement for countiyside planning led by the CPRE 
was urban in its bias and sought to preserve landscapes as playgrounds for urban people. This is what 
one might expect if only from the composition of the membership of the Sheffield branch. By opposing 
rural industry and by protecting agricultural land from being put to more lucrative uses it turned rural 
areas into museums and prevented rural inhabitants taking up new livelihoods. This was recognised by 
Abercrombie himself.39
The organisation did little to prevent the flight from the rural areas into the towns in the inter-war period 
by helping provide new jobs or to provide affordable homes. The Sheffield and Peak District Branch 
was particularly concerned with controlling industrial and residential expansion in the Peak District.40 It 
was concerned to outlaw, for example, affordable contemporary materials in Peak District houses if they 
interfered with the aesthetics of the house built or its place in the landscape. Like many o f the inter-war 
organisations of ‘middle opinion’, it feared a public uneducated in the what they considered to be the 
proper use of leisure and saw profit as a dirty word. According to Guy Dawber, a former president of the 
Royal Institute of British Architects, writing in the Sheffield Branch’s booklet Housing in the Peak 
District published in 1934:
The beauty of our English countryside is daily disfigured, not only by the 
thoughtlessness of speculative builders, but also through the apathy and indifference of 
the public, for there are today great numbers of people, many in responsible positions, 
who think that the present has no obligations either to the past or to the future, and that 
if a man wants to build a house he need consider only his own convenience or profit, 
and that it may be as ugly and out of place as he chooses to make it.41
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There was a strong whiff of paternalism within the organisation despite the presence of socialists on its 
Executive Committee. Ethel Gallimore (later Haythomthwaite), the Branch Honorary Secretary, was the 
daughter of a Sheffield industrialist, T. W. Ward,42 and her family generously provided funds to purchase 
important pieces of land in the Peak District in the 1930s, often to forestall speculative builders 43 Like 
local Labour politicians they looked to the inculcation of civic consciousness to preserve the countryside. 
To quote Dawber again:
The problem of saving the countiyside cannot be solved by legislation - it is a matter of 
goodwill on the part of the public. Had we taught, fifty years ago, the people of this 
country, adults and children in our elementary, secondary and public schools and 
universities, the value of our beautiful countryside its trees and scenery, its villages, 
churches and old buildings, and objects o f historic interest - civic pride in fact - we 
should not to-day be suffering from this spate of ugliness that is overwhelming the 
whole country.44
This view, however, chimed well with the stated views of Conservative politicians like Stanley Baldwin 
in the inter-war years. In 1924 he had spoken of his nostalgia for:
The sounds of England, the tinkle of the hammer on the anvil in the country smithy, the 
corncrake on a dewy morning, the sound of the scythe against the whetstone, and the 
sight of a plough team coming over the brow of a h ill,. . .  [this is a] sight that has been 
seen in England since England was a land, and may be seen in England long after the 
Empire has perished and every works in England has ceased to function. For centuries, 
the one eternal sight of England.45
The CPRE in Sheffield, however, would have been unable to achieve anything without the willingness of 
Labour in the shape of Alderman Fred Marshall, Chairman of the Special Committee re Town Planning 
and Civic Centres and MP for industrial Brightside, to listen and act on their representations. He had 
joined the Executive Committee of the Branch in 1936 and it was largely due to his efforts that the green 
belt proposal became a reality.46 Labour support is entirely understandable given the ugliness and 
pollution of the Lower Don Valley that working-class people had to daily experience. It was a place 
people would want to escape from if they could.47 The more energetic ones often did so through the 
cheap pastime of rambling. Another influential CPRE executive member was George Herbert Bridges 
Ward who founded the Sheffield Clarion Ramblers Club in 1900 and was the first Secretary o f the 
Labour Representation Committee, the forerunner of the Labour Party in Sheffield.48
Sheffield citizens were first informed of new plans for the City Centre in the local press in July 1937.
The Star noted that the ‘closely-guarded’ plan had been kept secret for years (work began in 1934) and
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was only revealed in the City Council minutes when Marshall made a report of his Special Committee. 
The plan involved an area in the centre of the city of about a third of a mile square with the Town Hall at 
the veiy centre. The Committee had made enquiries of other Council committees as to buildings which 
Sheffield would need in the near future and ought to be sited in the Civic Centre. These included new 
Law Courts and Police Headquarters, a new College of Arts and Crafts, new offices and showrooms for 
the municipal Electricity Department, an extension to the Town Hall to include the local taxation and 
licensing offices and a new Medical Centre. The Municipal Progressive leader, Alderman Jackson, 
supported the plan. He was a member of the Special Committee and wanted a Civic Centre of which 
Sheffield could be proud. Criticism of the plan came mainly from a well-known Sheffield architect on 
the City Council, Alderman W. C. Fenton, who believed the Law Courts were being sited in the wrong 
place and should be made part of a block of existing public buildings in Norfolk Street. The latter would 
then emulate Cardiff city centre. Fenton’s verdict was that, ‘The plan is a very small result for the months 
of labour expended on it’.49 ‘Current Topics’ in the Sheffield Telegraph was also critical that the Special 
Committee was practically asking for a blank cheque to acquire city centre land which could prove very 
costly because the private owners could hold out for virtually whatever price they wanted.50
On 7 July 1937 the City Centre plan was approved subject to capital expenditure being approved by the 
Finance Consultative Committee. Alderman Jackson voted with the Special Committee and several other 
Municipal Progressives also voted in favour. All Labour members supported the plans. The Sheffield, 
South Yorkshire, and District Society of Architects and Surveyors sent a resolution expressing regret that 
‘opportunity has not been taken to plan a wide and dignified approach from the Midland Station to the 
Town Hall’ and called for the re-planning of the Station Square. Marshall stressed the need for a new 
road plan for Sheffield since the main traffic artery, the Moor, was also the main shopping street to ease 
traffic congestion. Sheffield had some impressive City Centre buildings but they were not a harmonious 
group bearing little relation to each other and reflecting their haphazard origins. The Plan was an attempt 
to impose harmony. The Special Committee had wanted a Civic Square similar to that in Cardiff and 
Liverpool around which the civic buildings would be located but had finally decided it would be too 
expensive to create one, though it could not be ruled out in the future. The actual plan put forward 
formed in essence an avenue flanked by impressive buildings.51
The plan was re-submitted to the City Council in February 1938 after estimates o f cost had been finalised 
and was again adopted. The Council, however, sat for nearly seven and a half hours deliberating over the 
Special Committee report. The Scheme presented included the construction of new roads, the 
improvement o f others, and the creation of residential, general business, special business, intermediate 
and industrial zones. The Municipal Progressives were particularly critical of the ‘dictatorial’ powers 
involved in the zoning proposals and put down a series of amendments which were defeated.52 Marshall 
in March 1938 argued that Sheffield had been given an opportunity that might not recur. The extensive 
demolition of slum property had left many cleared spaces in what had been the most congested part of 
Sheffield.53 The Committee proposed to by-pass the Moor, since it was too costly to widen it, and create
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two parallel roads to deal with traffic congestion. There would also be an inner ring road to relieve 
traffic pressure. It was estimated that the various road proposals would cost £4,278,350 gross and 
£2,904,386 net. Various street works would cost an extra £508,000. The Sheffield, South Yorkshire, and 
District Society of Architects and Surveyors commended the plan in principle though it called for 
flexibility in land use zoning and made minor criticisms of the road proposals. The Chamber of 
Commerce made some criticism of the proposed roads, called for protection o f existing industrial 
premises in residential zones and fiercely opposed the suggestion that the City Council should be able to 
buy land adjoining that bought for street widening including business premises compulsorily. It also 
wanted longer leases of municipal land in order to attract industry and warned about the effect of the 
already great outstanding debt in respect of street improvements on the General City Rate. An increase in 
the Rate would not make Sheffield attractive to industry.54
This did not mark the end of controversy. In July 1938 Marshall made a ‘sensational speech’ in 
Parliament which attacked the heavy compensation local authorities had to pay to make their town 
planning schemes a reality including the extortionate prices the City Council would have to pay to 
private owners of slum cleared land in central Sheffield. Marshall said that it was not possible to 
estimate what the plan would finally cost and that it might take as long as twenty-five years to complete. 
Local authorities like Sheffield were not extravagant and already were staggering under a heavy burden 
of expenditure forced upon them by central government with no surplus for the expansion of municipal 
services. The Ministry of Health merely answered that it was aware of Sheffield’s problems.55 The Plan 
was a major issue in the 1938 municipal elections. Progressives criticised the astronomical loan charges 
Sheffield would have to pay to implement the plan, even hinting that if they were returned it would be 
reconsidered.56 The Sheffield Corporation Bill embodying the plan finally came before Parliament for 
approval in 1939.57 By August 1939 it was an Act and the City Council was presented with the draft of 
the Sheffield (Central) Planning Scheme.58 Unfortunately the date when this occurred was 6 September 
1939, three days after the outbreak of the Second World War. Nevertheless, on 9 November 1939 the 
Scheme was adopted and the Scheme and Map were placed on deposit for public inspection with notices 
inviting objections published. There were 219 objections but only 28 objectors specifically challenged 
the Draft Scheme. Despite this, work on town planning virtually ceased during the period prior to 
December 1940. The Planning Officer was released from his duties to serve in His Majesty’s Forces.
The Planning Department continued to exist but almost all the staff were engaged on civil defence work. 
Only one technical officer was left on town planning duties.59
3.3 - A NEW OPPORTUNITY ? TOWN PLANNING 1940-1943
During the Second World War on only two occasions did major air raid damage ensue and by common 
agreement these events make up the Sheffield ‘Blitz’. The two raids were on the nights of 12/13th and 
15/16th December 1940. Professor J. B. S. Haldane, a celebrated scientist who became a Communist in 
1942,60 wrote in his book A. R. P. (1938) that, ‘There is half a square mile of Sheffield which is more
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vital for the production of munitions than any other part of Britain’.61 This area in the East End was the 
target of the attackers. But, while bombs were dropped on industrial Attercliffe during the second raid, 
most bombs fell on the City centre. The area around the Moor, High Street, Ecclesall Road and Psalter 
Lane had a major cluster of bombs and terrible damage was done. Many of Sheffield’s major stores 
were destroyed and were to be rebuilt only in the 1950s. 668 civilians and twenty-five servicemen were 
killed and 92 people were left missing presumed killed by the raids.621,218 commercial and business 
premises were totally destroyed and 2,255 rendered unusable. 1,000 houses were totally demolished,
2,000 were badly damaged but capable of repair and thirty thousand slightly damaged.63 The Blitz was 
regarded, however, by planners and by Council members as a new opportunity to correct the past 
problems of Sheffield’s built environment and to create a city that lived up to its fifth-city status within 
Britain.
The 1951 Government Progress Report on town and country planning blamed the lack of progress of 
development plans on an inability to assemble a big enough area to develop: ‘War damage on the whole 
was scattered, and even where it was most concentrated there were usually a few buildings left standing, 
buildings which were as a rule too useful to be pulled down.’64 This was the case in Sheffield. Another 
obstacle was that war damage gave opportunities for land speculators who could pick up choice bargains 
immediately after heavy air raids and then force local authorities to pay them extortionate prices when 
they came to purchase the land as compensation. One effect of the Blitz was the permanent loss to the 
City Council of rateable value of £164,000 by destruction of property. The temporary loss from 
properties which could not be used immediately was £244,000. For several years the Council lost 
£408,000 annually in rates.65
After the Blitz there were calls for the scrapping of the draft Central Planning Scheme. The Special 
Committee accepted that it would have to be revised but sensibly believed that its ultimate shape could 
not be decided until the threat o f air attack had disappeared. The Committee was mainly interested in 
getting an idea of the Coalition Governments policy with regard to reconstruction.66 A conference of 
local authorities in February 1941had come to the view, which Sheffield agreed with, that the 
Government should accept full responsibility for the losses o f rate income as a result of the destruction of 
property and that it should be regarded as a national liability and financed as part of expenditure on the 
War.67
The Committee was optimistic at this stage that the Government wanted them to take ‘a broad outlook’ in 
the re-planning of the damaged area and not merely put forward a conservative scheme. George Pepler of 
the Ministry of Health visited in April 1941 and inspected Sheffield’s damage:
He intimated that the view of Lord Reith [the Minister of Works and Buildings] was 
that local authorities whose towns had been severely damaged should when preparing 
planning proposals or reviewing their existing planning proposals plan boldly but not
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recklessly. In other words they should consider whether any opportunity had been 
presented to them of making a better town.68
He congratulated them on their draft Scheme which placed Sheffield in a more fortunate position than 
other towns when it came to reconstruction, however, while damage to Sheffield was substantial it had 
not cleared a big enough area for re-development. Alderman Gascoigne, Chairman of the Special 
Committee, argued that the Council was handicapped because it could not borrow money to buy land to 
facilitate redevelopment without Government approval. The Committee were unanimous that plans 
should be completed so work on the rebuilding of Sheffield should start as soon as the war ended69 and 
that nothing should be re-built in a permanent form during the war that would prejudice the final shape of 
the planning proposals. To restore rateable value as quickly as possible retailers were to be allowed to 
put up temporary shops on their former sites.70
In June 1941 it was decided that the City Engineer, Estates Surveyor, Planning Officer and City 
Architect should meet fortnightly with representatives appointed by the Sheffield, South Yorkshire and 
District Society of Architects and Surveyors, including members of the Chamber of Commerce and W.
H. Forsdike of the Builders’ Federation, to discuss town planning.71 The representatives formed an eight- 
man body called the Town Planning Assembly that intermittently issued reports to the City Council. The 
Special Committee did not always take their advice. In December 1941, it did not accept that there 
should be a new inner ring road closer to the city centre than was specified in the draft Scheme.72
Throughout 1941 the focus of the Special Committee was on the question of the payments the War 
Damage Commission would provide to make good war damage.73 If it was economical to repair the 
damage a cost o f works payment could be made and if  not a value payment would be paid. Section 7 o f 
the Act allowed the Commission to specify areas where any person seeking to rebuild a property which 
cost over £1,000 to put right must inform the Commission of the intent to do so. The Commission asked 
the City Council to make suggestions as to the part or parts o f the City that fell under Section 7 but even 
while the City Council was considering the areas to be included, the Commission went ahead and 
scheduled the whole of Sheffield as such an area.74 Alderman Jackson had specifically objected to just 
such comprehensive scheduling.75 There were complaints that the Council had not been allowed to come 
to it’s own judgement.76
The Blitz did produce agreement on the re-planning of Sheffield between Labour and Municipal 
Progressives beyond the Special Committee. Councillor Bearcroft, Secretary of the Progressives, had 
attacked in 1937 the potential huge expenditure of the planning schemes,77 but in January 1942 he said, 
‘Many things we were formerly frightened to do because of the huge cost involved, we can think of now 
quite calmly. Hitler did for us what we dare not do.’ Many mistakes o f the past, he believed, could have 
been avoided if a long view had been taken by those responsible and much good would follow if 
consideration were now given to ‘something better rising out o f the ashes of former deficiencies.’78
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Agreement between the parties was signalled in February 1943 when Alderman Gascoigne declared that 
‘dog-fight debates’ were no longer a feature of Council meetings.79
The Special Committee in July 1942 complained that under interim development control the Council had 
not full control over the re-erection of buildings damaged in air raids on their existing sites. Except in 
certain special circumstances, they were in fact powerless. This would affect the redevelopment of 
Sheffield since factories could be re-erected in an unsuitable residential or general business zone without 
the Council being able to do anything about it. In order to remove it they would be forced to pay full 
compensation to the owner. The Committee wanted to have full control of re-erection of buildings and to 
pay compensation from the date when a resolution was proposed to formulate a town planning scheme.
In January 1941, Lord Reith had set up the Uthwatt committee on compensation and betterment. The 
principle that those who held land which saw betterment should contribute towards the cost of a town 
planning scheme was accepted but no satisfactory way of assessing and securing this for the local 
authority had been worked out. The Special Committee noted that an ideal scheme which covered the 
whole of a built-up area was beyond the financial resources of a local authority. Thus schemes had either 
to be modest or central government would have to fund it. It believed that to get the financial benefits of 
development the City Council must own all the land to be developed.80
Uthwatt’s interim recommendations called for the adoption of a price ceiling for public purchase of land 
as at 31 March 1939, a central planning authority, and defined ‘reconstruction areas’ where there had 
been substantial war damage and the area was likely to be included in a redevelopment scheme. In such 
areas no building would occur except under licence until the scheme had been prepared. Reith 
announced that the government accepted these proposals in principle and in November 1941 he 
produced a draft Town and Country (Reconstruction) Bill for the Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction. 
When the Committee met it focused its attentions on the proposed central planning authority and for the 
first time showed the government’s fatal indecision. In February 1942, Reith announced that the 
Government would set up a central planning authority but Reith was to be sacked just a fortnight later 
due to Churchill’s disapproval o f him and resistance to planning for reconstruction. The central 
government became more and more indecisive.81 The Special Committee recommended a resolution in 
1942 which reflected a fear of the regional planning authorities which would implement the decisions of 
the central planning authority. The Council would co-operate in a National Plan but declared
its opposition to the inclusion in such plan, without the consent of the Local 
Authorities, of functions at present within their jurisdiction, and further declare[d] its 
strong opposition to the exercise by a new external authority of control which is 
restrictive of the maintenance of existing and the establishment of new industry within 
the City, and of the development as building estates of land which is required to 
provide housing accommodation for those persons living in the City in conditions 
which are unsatisfactory.82
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By October 1942 a new plan for the City Centre had been prepared. A wide diagonal road would be 
constructed from the Midland Station to a shopping circus adjoining the existing Moorhead. This would 
give a dignified and direct approach from the railway station and the new bus station to the City centre. 
Shopping arcades and pedestrian subways would be built. There would be a vista towards a new 
spacious square on which the new Law Courts and police headquarters would stand. Another new square 
would be created in Surrey Street.83 It was proposed by the Progressives on the Special Committee that a 
large area in the city centre zoned as part industrial, part general business and part residential be re­
zoned residential, but Labour defeated this proposal.84 In December the plan was approved in principle 
after three and a half hours debate,85 though the Telegraph had noted earlier that neither Council Group 
were unanimous in their support for it. Some wanted a smaller circus which would be less costly as less 
slum property would be demolished, others wanted a rectangle while a few Councillors were opposed to 
all the proposals.86 The Progressives wanted a large residential area because they supported the idea of 
city centre flats which Labour was completely against. ‘Current Topics’ said, however, that ‘we cannot 
help regarding it [the town planning scheme] as largely a waste of breathe and time, and, what is even 
more important, of paper, until we know how the central town planning authority is to be constituted and 
what its powers will be.’87
In January 1943 the Editor of The Star invited his readers to take part in the planning of the new 
Sheffield by calling for their ideas on the subject. He promised that all suggestions would be considered 
seriously and stated that he wanted all citizens to take an interest whether they were professional people, 
art students or ordinary citizens. He said, ‘Judging from snatches of conversations one hears in all sorts 
of odd places about the city, Sheffield is simply teeming with would-be town planners.... Planning is a 
controversial subject at all times but it is being more keenly discussed in Sheffield than ever before.’
This would seem to be evidence that contradicts Tiratsoo’s thesis that the public were apathetic or 
conservative about town planning schemes. Supporting popular participation, the Editor said that,
‘Town planning is a most fascinating study, particularly when it deals with your own city. You know just 
how to correct all the wrongs in the lay-out of your district parks, buildings, markets, and roads.’88 In 
February 1943 he then questioned whether the Council was too modest about its town planning schemes. 
By contrast other badly blitzed cities had been much more forthcoming to their citizens. He gave 
illustrations from Coventry and Bristol. The Editor saw much to commend in the work of the Special 
Committee but did not believe it should hide its light under a bushel. He applauded their scheme’s 
practicality and realism and the cautious attitude it had adopted with regard to finance but the public he 
alleged wanted to know more and were deeply interested in town planning.89
On the other side of the argument The Star in 1944 contained an article which differed markedly in its 
view of popular attitudes on town planning from that of the Editor. Its author was a professional 
architect, Kenneth J. Lindy, who asked:
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How is it that the people who are to live in the towns of post-war Britain have so little 
to say regarding replanning ? Why is it that those of us who desire to know what 
people are thinking on the vital subject of the replanning of our country have to 
organise investigations and conduct far-reaching inquiries ? The man in the street has 
a pretty clear idea of the sort of town in which he wants to live and work: but he says 
little about it. On the other hand, definitely dangerous, out-of-date views on the 
subject receive an immense amount of publicity.90
It remains to look at and sum up the views of some of those who took up the Editor’s invitation to write 
in with ideas about town planning and to evaluate whether they were serious suggestions or simply the 
residue of well-known popular prejudices. Extracts from some of the letters were published on 6 
February 1943. The introduction in The Star described them as giving, ‘Striking proof that Sheffield men 
and women in all walks of life have more than a passing interest in the Sheffield-of-the future’. While, 
‘The large majority o f the suggestions are intelligent and realistic; others are not quite so practical, but 
nevertheless highly interesting, while a few are ultra-futuristic.’ One, for example, wanted to fill in the 
Sheffield canal between Tinsley and the City Centre and turn it into a more direct road into the City to 
replace Attercliffe Road. Another influenced by his cinema-going called for the wider roads and broad 
sidewalks visible in American films. Planners should be cosmopolitan in their ideas which led him to 
call for emulation of the hotels, theatres and administrative buildings of Moscow and other Soviet cities 
as well as the boulevards and esplanades of France and Germany with their open air cafes. He opposed 
blocks of flats and called for more garden cities as well as plenty of playing fields for children and a 
sports stadium to suit fans of boxing.91 A new projected stadium for Sheffield was announced by the 
City Council in March 1943.92
Other suggestions printed were mainly concerned with housing though there was a detailed extract on 
the problem of the Wicker traffic bottleneck. ‘Comfort First’ called for housing to have the first priority 
of the City Council, followed by buildings for educational purposes, then provision for amenities and the 
transport service. Only when this had been done would more enthusiasm be shown for the idea of a Civic 
Centre. This latter extract could be taken to show the apathy of Sheffield citizens to town planning 
despite the introductory remarks of the Star that we have quoted.93 Consciousness of the poor conditions 
working-class families were having to put up with to stay housed was common to the citizens o f wartime 
Sheffield and had more immediacy than aiiy talk of a future up-to-date City. In 1944, for example, it’s 
Vicar94 and the wife o f it’s former Conservative MP95 publicised conditions in Attercliffe and called for 
action. The extracts printed must be considered representative of those letters received but in the final 
analysis they told town planners nothing they did not already know about popular prejudices such as a 
desire for the private and individual over the collective and public, for houses with gardens rather than 
high rise flats and for them to be built at once rather than in an uncertain and distant future.
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3.4 - THE MANZONI AND COLLIE PLANS
The City Centre plan approved in December 1942 was not the final word. The Special Committee 
continued to consider proposals for the planning o f the rest o f the Central Area but the difficulties they 
encountered were so great that the Planning Officer, C. G. Craven, the City Architect, W. G. Davies, the 
City Engineer and Surveyor, J. M. Collie and representatives o f the Sheffield, South Yorkshire and 
District Society of Architects and Surveyors were called on to prepare four separate plans containing 
proposals that could be carried out over the next fifty years. It was decided to submit the plans to an 
outside adjudicator who could evaluate each plan and suggest ways of combining desirable features from 
particular ones as well as advise the Committee. Herbert Manzoni, City Engineer o f Birmingham, was 
picked. The plans were delivered to him on 1 February 1944 and he reported on 9 May with a plan which 
contained elements o f the plans but was based on one designated ‘RED “O’” . Who authored ‘RED “O’” 
was not disclosed. The Committee recommended on 26 May 1944 that the Council accept the plan in 
principle.96
A ‘City Circle’ area 500 yards in diameter was to enclose the main civic buildings. Within this area no 
public transport would ultimately be allowed. A square would be formed of about four acres consisting 
of gardens flanked by the City Hall, Town Hall and Town Hall Extension, municipal buildings, the Law 
Courts and other buildings. Enclosing the City Circle would be a ring road. Part of this would be the 
diagonal road referred to in the December 1942 plan. Roads would radiate outwards from the ring road 
in all directions. Manzoni attempted to overcome traffic congestion in the Wicker bottleneck by 
constructing a two-level viaduct. One level would have outbound traffic and the other inbound traffic. 
Manzoni assumed in his scheme that trams would eventually disappear97 - an eventuality alluded to as 
early as December 1941 in a Report of the Special Committee.98 It actually happened as late as 1960. 
Manzoni said that his plan was produced on the assumption that the priority was to overcome traffic 
congestion and reinstate blitzed shops and commercial premises as soon as possible.99
The Manzoni Plan was adopted in principle by the Council on 7 June 1944 though two Progressives, 
Councillor J. E. Bennett and Alderman W. J. Hunter, criticised it as ‘destructive of rateable value and 
property’. Another, Councillor Cunningham, pleaded for a model to be created saying that the suggested 
‘terrible expense’ of doing so was nothing cpmpared to the cost of the Plan. A printed brochure would 
cover the cost of it and help inform the public. By the time their leader Alderman Jackson spoke, half the 
members had apparently left the chamber for the tea room, but, though he complained about their lack of 
civic pride and imagination, he nevertheless defended the plan. Alderman Gascoigne pointed out that the 
Council did not have to agree to every detail of the plan but needed one ready otherwise Sheffield would 
be left behind when the government provided assistance for rebuilding the blitzed cities.100
Reactions to the Plan beyond the Council Chamber were hostile. ‘Current Topics’ took heart that though 
the vote on the Plan was almost unanimous, ‘enough criticisms had been urged against it in detail to
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make another plan altogether’ and that acceptance ‘in principle’ actually placed no obligations on a 
future Council, particularly when it came to spending money.101 Before the Council meeting, the Editor 
o f The Star had called for more public consultation on the Plan102 and afterwards was critical that the 
Plan had been approved without such wide consultation and argued that it could definitely not go ahead 
until more listening had been done by the Council. The Plan sparked much critical comment on the 
letters page and a critical report was published in The Star by the Sheffield, South Yorkshire and District 
Society of Architects and Surveyors. The Editor’s conclusion was that it was:
‘quite clear that very many citizens refuse to approve the plan. It is urged that the 
portions of the city doomed by it to demolition are not the worst, but the most 
serviceable, and that problems of shopping are increased and not diminished.
Opinions on the scheme have come from citizens of all classes and of many 
occupations, and the general impression one gathers is that the more they look at it, the 
less they like it.’103
The Managing Director of Stewart and Stewart (Sheffield) Ltd. criticized Manzoni for concentrating on 
traffic congestion when the real need was to attract shoppers. Civic buildings would not provide rateable 
value and their concentration in a small area created a dead zone which damaged the existing shopping 
area by dividing it into three.104 Another criticism was that he favoured motorists over pedestrians and 
one letter complained that ‘Sheffield seems to be endeavouring to become a second Brooklands’.105 The 
report of the Society of Architects and Surveyors echoed all these criticisms and attacked the proposed 
Wicker viaduct. It argued that ‘the central area had been considered not as a place in which to live 
agreeably and to transact business but as a place in which all forms o f transport would be able to travel 
from one side to another with rapidity’. And ‘it revealed not only a lack of appreciation of the other 
aspects o f town planning but displayed a very elementary knowledge of the principles of civic design, 
especially of the layout and arrangement of buildings.’106 These were harsh words. It was obvious that 
the Plan was not the end of the town planning process.
In November 1944 the Editor of The Star was again critical: ‘Unfortunately the blueprint for the 
Sheffield to be is not taking shape with anything like the speed and method we should like to see. There 
is, in fact, acute disappointment in many minds about the whole matter. It is impossible to get to know 
anything definite, and if one makes inquiries one gets no further.’ He did not put the responsibility for 
this at any particular door. Planning should not be affected by the excuse that there was a war on and he 
argued that ‘the city of which we are all dreaming will never become anything more than a pleasant 
dream unless retarding influences - some of almost pre-historic outlook - are forced into the background 
and a place in the sun afforded those with imagination and prepared to take a chance.’ He did not blame 
the Council or its Committees but instead the ‘multitude of Ministries [who] are having a gay time 
strangling plans and schemes with their endless red tape.’107
69
In July 1944 the Special Committee had been dissolved and a new Town Planning Committee 
established in its place.108 On 30 November 1944, the Committee discussed proposals for the Central 
Area. It considered three plans prepared by City Engineer, J. M. Collie, which incorporated amendments 
of the Manzoni or ‘M’ Plan and were the results of discussions between Collie and Manzoni on the 
Plan’s detailed application. Plan ‘R’ produced by the Chamber of Commerce with a report attached was 
also placed before the Committee109 though it mainly echoed the criticisms of retailers about the ‘M’ 
Plan. Collie criticized the bases o f the criticisms of the authors o f this ‘R Report’ because it was based 
on press reports of the Manzoni Plan. But the fact that they were not familiar with the ‘Red O’ Plan or 
the report that went with it is surely testimony to the secrecy of the Town Planning Committee which had 
not taken into its confidence such an influential body as the Chamber of Commerce.110 Plans ‘A’ and ‘C’ 
were considered by Manzoni and the Ministry o f War Transport to solve the Central Area’s traffic 
problems including the Wicker bottleneck. Of the three plans prepared by Collie, Plan ‘C’ was 
considered the ideal solution but ‘A’ and ‘C’ were not recommended to the Council because of the 
redevelopment problems and engineering challenges they would create. Plan ‘B’ was recommended 
simply because it offered less drastic alteration and while it was not seen as a permanent solution it 
would improve traffic conditions and cause much less interference with the life of the City. It also 
allowed for the retention of trams for a longer period.111
Plan ‘B’ or the ‘Collie Plan’ was approved by the full Council on 6 December 1944. The Stan 
commenting on the process of town planning up to this point, noted that it had ‘been a complicated 
debate, with numerous aspects - traffic, industry, shopping, and several others; there has [however] been 
general agreement that the city is in need o f reorganisation on a sounder system, but the details have all 
given rise to lively discussion.’ It went on
There have been times [however] when this discussion has not had sufficient regard to 
the question of time; the process o f planning will last many years - few of us, it may be, 
will ever see its complete fulfilment - and [perhaps reassuringly] during all this period 
there will be plenty of opportunity for modification o f details that may not seem to be 
working out right.112
Despite all this, however, criticism was not completely muted. The Society of Architects and Surveyors 
produced ‘[fjriendly criticism’ of its proposals at the end of January 1945 in an ‘exhaustive 
commentaiy’.113 They again reiterated the fears of Sheffield’s retailers about the Civic Centre forming a 
dead area for shoppers. Grandiosely, they said that the central area must ‘be “given the individual unity 
or character which would make as great an appeal to the imagination through the eye as have ancient 
Athens and Rome’” .114 But, despite such criticism, ‘Current Topics’ had had enough. He or she accepted 
there would never be complete unanimity, but argued that if the Society of Architects and Surveyors’ 
criticisms were accepted the whole plan would have to be scrapped: ‘Traders cannot contemplate sudden 
changes of policy by the City Council when they are planning for the next fifty years or one hundred
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years. That is why we favour a final settlement of the main features at the earliest possible moment.’115
It remained for the Committee to take steps to publicise the Plan and try to enlist the support of the 
public for the proposals despite it having played little role in the planning process - if  it had wanted to 
play a role. Ravetz questions how welcoming the town planning profession would have been if the public 
had really wanted to participate and argues that they were largely paying lip service to the idea - they had 
mastered the arcane technicalities o f the subject and as experts expected deference - but it has been 
argued that the people had nothing to teach them and that the popular prejudices on the subject were well 
known.116 The people were, after all, represented by elected members of the Council in the process and 
they were well aware of working-class prejudices about housing and town planning. They had been 
criticised over the Manzoni Plan decision, however, and now they learned some lessons. In February 
1945 the Committee approved a suggestion that a Town Planning Exhibition should be held to inform the 
public o f the Plan.117 It was also decided to publish the illustrated brochure Sheffield Replanned. The 
Exhibition in Graves Art Gallery was opened by the Conservative Minister for Town and Country 
Planning, W. S. Morrison, on 19 July 1945.118 The Exhibition took up nearly all the Gallery space and its 
central exhibit was a model made up in the workshops of the City Engineer’s Department o f the entire 
area from the bottom of The Moor to the Wicker Arches as it would look when the re-planning scheme 
finally came to fruition. There were also models of the completed Cathedral and of modem housing, 
schools and the new hospital envisaged, as well as many maps and diagrams. Film shows were also used 
to put across the fundamental principles of planning to the public. According to the Telegraph the 
‘exhibition clearly demonstrates the supreme importance of housing, the city’s greatest need’ with a 
complete section devoted to it. A fully-built temporary prefabricated house was on show outside in the 
Tudor Street car park and two complete modem kitchens had been built - one having gas fittings and the 
other electrical fittings.119 Collie reported in August that 60,000 people had visited the exhibition and it 
was decided to extend it to the end of August. Obviously the exhibition was a success.120
How soon would the plan be accomplished ? This was addressed in Sheffield Replanned and the 
Council obviously felt great uncertainty on the score. The brochure warned that while:
Much publicity has been given to the subject of planning in recent years and the public 
has been led to regard it as a new science which is to transform our cities and our way 
of life. What is principally new is the suggestion which appears from time to time that 
Planning Authorities may at last be provided both with adequate powers and adequate 
funds to execute really ambitious schemes of replanning. This suggestion in its turn 
arises out of the publicity and the consequent public interest in the subject, for if it is 
once realised what a well designed city might look like the vision is so attractive that it 
is natural to suppose that powers will be forthcoming to bring such a desirable state 
into being. This, however, is far from being the case ye t,. . .  .121
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It noted that the government had not accepted the final Uthwatt proposals though it had produced a 
White Paper, and the precise meaning of the recent legislation, the Town and Country Planning Act,
1944, was unclear. The Act allowed blitzed land to be compulsorily purchased more swiftly in terms of 
procedure than before but the extent of the land this applied to was in doubt. It was clear that the Central 
Area had to be rebuilt, however, as quickly as possible to recover rateable value. The Committee while 
it admitted that the new powers represented progress felt they were not adequate without a solution to the 
problem of betterment.122 The brochure freely admitted that the cost of the Plan would be very great 
particularly when added to the cost of other things like the housing programme and that it would mean 
large-scale borrowing. Under the 1944 Act the central government could provide grants for two years 
which might be extended for another thirteen.123 There would still be some procedural delays due to the 
need to hold public inquiries before getting ministerial approval. There would also be engineering 
problems and problems of obtaining labour and materials.124
3.5 - THE WARTIME CONTEXT OF THE POST-WAR HOUSING PROGRAMME
Backwith makes the important point in his doctoral thesis on the politics of council housing in Sheffield 
and Bristol between 1919 and 1939 that municipal socialism (or more precisely ‘municipal labourism’) 
was founded on an ideology that saw local state welfare as social improvement fo r  and not by the 
working class. Housing management, for example, tended to be characterised by a strict paternalism and 
tenants were expected to regulate their behaviour according to the rules devised by the Estates 
Committee. Tenants were not allowed to participate in, let alone democratically control, the 
management of their estate.125 As Thorpe points out, many of the Labour Group were believers in 
respectability, sobriety and self-improvement and, though they were sympathetic to the working classes, 
they were sufficiently working-class not to idealize working-class habits. Thus, they banned the popular 
working-class hobby of pigeon-keeping on council estates. There was also in the inter-war years a long 
battle over whether any public houses would actually be allowed on them.126
Another feature of municipal labourism was an extreme concentration of decision-making powers in the 
hands of committee chairmen and their officers over long periods.127 In Rotherham, Alderman Caine 
held the Chairmanship o f the Housing Committee for twenty-two years until 1939 and consequently had 
exerted a strong influence on the housing and slum clearance policy of that Council.128 In Caine, it was 
said, ‘Rotherham [had] found a modem Hercules, who has done the cleansing work quite as thoroughly 
as that carried out in the stables of King Augeas.’129 The Chairman of the Sheffield Estates Committee, 
Alderman Gascoigne had almost as long a reign of seventeen years up to 1944. He was also Chairman of 
the Special Committee re Town Planning and Civic Centres from 1941, and of the Town Planning 
Committee from 1944. He was Lord Mayor for 1945/46 and was the first to be the tenant of a 
Corporation house.130
Council house tenants provided a major source of electoral support for the Labour Party - a fact sourly
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noted by Alderman Bearcroft, the Secretary of the Municipal Progressives, in the Sheffield Property 
Owners’ Journal in October 1945, who complained that: ‘In terms of votes there is already a “Pressure 
Group” of about 100,000 Corporation tenants who are susceptible to favours which may be granted to 
them by those in power.’131 It was certainly not in the tenants interests to vote Progressive since they had 
traditionally supported private landlord interests and wanted to increase the numbers in owner- 
occupation. Most of the two million houses built in England without state assistance in the 1930s had 
been built for individual buyers and represented the most importaiit form of middle-class saving and the 
principal middle-class aspiration. Some thought that owner-occupation had actually created a ‘new’ 
middle-class whose unity solely depended on having bought a house since 1920, though there is little 
evidence that such buyers had the socially mixed origins which this presupposes. In Sheffield, an 
overwhelmingly working-class city, ordinaiy citizens were unlikely to have the wherewithal to ever own 
their own home or aspire to do so. The best they could hope for was a secure council tenancy even with 
the restrictions on their freedom this imposed.132
The Municipal Progressives did support a council role in providing housing for the poorest but were 
much more convinced of the superiority of owner-occupation and unveiled a plan in 1944,133 which also 
figured in their 1945 municipal election manifesto, to encourage its wider spread in Sheffield. The 
Corporation would hold on deposit approved securities, like savings certificates, war bonds or post-war 
credits, up to the equivalent of half the stake money required by a lender to buy a house. The government 
would add £100 and the Corporation £50 which would be used solely for buying the house. The value of 
the house must, however, not exceed a fixed sum and the normal earnings of the purchaser not exceed a 
fixed amount. The house-buyer had also to live in the house for a fixed period before he could sell. Ex- 
service people would have their deposit reduced by half with the guarantee for the difference in value 
given by the government and the Corporation. The Progressives took care to stress the advantages of 
owner-occupation over a council house. Among them was that ownership gave a feeling of 
independence and security. An owner-occupier would not have to accept the petty interference of the 
City Council as a council tenant would.134
Despite slum clearance in the inter-war years housing conditions were serious in Sheffield even before 
the Blitz. In November 1939, the Estates Committee recommended that it was ‘essential and in the 
national interest that the erection of houses in Sheffield should continue, at any rate to rehouse persons 
living in unfit houses included in Orders which are operative.’ It was also recommended, ‘That schemes 
should be prepared and all necessary steps taken which would enable the erection of houses to be 
proceeded with immediately the war is over, including the earmarking of future land for development 
when the time arrives.’135 Backwith notes that by 1939 Sheffield had become one of the few local 
authorities to actually exceed its target for slum clearance re-housing as a result of the speeding up of 
house building when Labour took power in 1926. However, he qualifies this statement by commenting 
that the quality of council houses was less good and that as World War Two approached poverty and 
overcrowding were widespread on estates on which former slum residents had been re-housed.136 There
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was also discontent about lack of amenities. We have already referred to the long-running controversy 
over whether public houses should be allowed on municipal estates. There were also protests about lack 
of libraries, parks and community centres. Life on an estate was not to inhabit a paradise despite what 
Progressives might believe about the political favours Labour gave to tenants.137
Housing was actually being built in Sheffield despite wartime conditions until as late as November 1942 
(See Appendix 6.1) but naturally completions of houses and the number of workmen allocated to them 
fluctuated greatly. When building finally stopped, 1,160 houses had been completed since the outbreak 
of war, but after December 1940 completions slumped and not more than twenty were finished in each 
subsequent month.138 Predictions of a wartime housing shortage began in April 1940 when Alderman 
Albert Smith, Deputy Estates Committee Chairman, said that the number of arrivals in Sheffield was 
extraordinary and feared overcrowding in the immediate future unless action was taken. In the Great 
War more than 14,000 people had come into Sheffield and the government had erected wooden huts for 
them in the East End. Smith said that no-one wanted to see another similar development and the Council 
must approach the government to expand the City’s house building programme. This did not happen.139 
A Times correspondent in 1941 noted that the influx of people as a result of this war was not as great as 
during the Great War but that, ‘To-day more labour than can be got is needed and the possibility of 
further withdrawals of skilled men for service with the Forces is causing some concern.’ He believed 
that, ‘Steel more than anything else is the raw material of victory - of aeroplanes, ships, tanks, and guns. 
And South Yorkshire, with its coal and steel, is as vital an area as there could be. Sheffield and steel 
have long been linked, and more than ever before Sheffield to-day is a steel city, famous for its special 
alloy steels.’ He went on: ‘Sheffield and South Yorkshire generally [have] never made a more vital 
contribution than they are doing at this time. . . .  smoking chimneys in scores give promise o f a rich flow 
of the tools needed for victory.’140
Wartime evidence of poor housing conditions in Attercliffe is given by its Vicar, the Reverend Wardle- 
Harper, who wrote to The Star in 1944 demanding that the highest priority in the re-planning of Sheffield 
should be given to the re-housing of the people of the East End. However, allegedly poor in quality 
council housing was far better than what inhabitants of Attercliffe put up with on a daily basis. 
Abercrombie in 1924 had called for residential housing to be removed from the industrial Lower Don 
Valley. It was to be proposed in Sheffield Replanned. Wardle-Harper wrote that:
‘The smoke from the great works and multitudes of domestic chimneys covers the 
district with a vast and murky pall, which the sun can rarely penetrate, and which 
deposits enough dirt to break the heart of any self-respecting housewife; whilst the 
fumes poison the air and nauseate the people.
Huddled round the works lie thousands of tiny houses in many of which a single couple 
with no children, let alone large families, would be cramped.
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With no bath, no hot water, no garden, no indoor sanitation, nowhere for the children 
to play or see any living thing grow, the outlook is bounded by the drab street in front 
and in the rear the courts, whose only features are dustbins and grim rows of outdoor 
lavatories.’141
The Star published in 1942 an Ernest Taylor essay indicating the problems the City faced in housing its 
citizens. He believed that if housing requirements were pegged at 1942 levels then 25,000 new houses 
would be needed after the war. The shortage was, however, daily more acute as an ever-increasing 
number of newly-weds added to the worries of the Housing Committee. The Corporation was the largest 
landlord, owning almost 28,500 houses, yet there was a waiting list o f24,000 and 12,000 slums still 
remained targeted for clearance from pre-war. Before the war the Corporation built about 3,000 houses a 
year and thus it would take a minimum of eight years of peace before the 1942 housing requirements 
would be fulfilled. Taylor believed that Sheffield would get off to a flying start in housing construction 
after the war in spite of his prediction that the building industry would need time to achieve momentum 
and need the flow of men and materials to recover.142 Taylor’s prediction was not to be borne out and 
the attempts of the Council to realise its plans were beset by government delays and red tape.
The Communist City Councillor Howard Hill wrote an article on housing in Sheffield for the March 
1945 issue of the Communist Labour Monthly which gives a detailed picture of the situation o f the City 
Council at the war’s end. About 40,000 people required houses and the Council had drawn up plans to 
build 20,000 within the first three years of peace. A figure of 3,000 houses had been produced as a 
target for the first year. The figure seems optimistic even without knowledge of the difficulties that the 
Council was to face in the immediate post-war period. It was based on the number o f houses produced in 
1938, and when Taylor quoted it in 1942 it is obvious that it was the absolute maximum that might be 
built in one year, yet it remained the basis of Council calculations despite all the predictable problems 
with government and in getting supplies o f labour and materials on time and other expensive 
commitments they must honour like rebuilding the city centre (though housing would have the first 
priority). The Council then optimistically expected to build 17,000 houses in the two following years.143
The figure of 3,000 is remarkable when eveiyone expected a Churchill government to continue long into 
the future and when the actual result of the 1945 General Election appeared extremely unlikely even to 
many Labour Party members given Churchill’s popularity as war leader. The Council was already 
concerned about the delays that dogged its plans in the latter years of the war due to the Coalition 
Government. On 5 April 1944, for example, there were protests in the council chamber about the 
multiplicity o f Government departments concerned with the advance preparation of housing sites. 
Alderman Thraves, Leader of the Council, told councillors that, ‘We need a second Dickens to write of 
the circumlocution as applied to Government departments to-day.’144 Hill wrote in March 1945 that: 
‘The gravest doubts ... exist in the minds o f every Sheffield Councillor at the shortcomings in the
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Government’s housing plans. Whilst, no doubt, it has made considerable progress in producing different 
types of houses, built of materials which lend themselves to rapid construction, and are fairly easy to 
procure, in every other direction its programme is utterly inadequate.’145 In May 1945 the Estates 
Committee passed a resolution:
That, in view of the acute shortage of housing accommodation in the City and the 
considerable progress made by the Corporation in the preparation of sites for 
temporary [pre-fabricated] bungalows . . . ,  the Committee expresses its dissatisfaction 
with the very limited progress made by the Ministry of Works in installing foundations 
upon the sites prepared by the Corporation and at the delay in the delivery of 
bungalows to be erected by the Ministry o f Works upon such foundations, and direct 
that this expression of opinion be conveyed to the Minister of Health and the Minister 
of Works and that they be urged to accelerate the progress of the works.146
In the face of this resolution and, no doubt, in recognition of the nearness of a General Election when the 
housing policies of Churchill’s Government would be scrutinised, the Progressives in June 1945 
defended the Government and any consensus that might have existed rapidly dissolved. The Progressives 
blamed delays on labour and material shortages and on the existence of controls in the building industry 
while Labour responded by asserting that the removal of controls would mean that poorer citizens would 
get no houses at all. The Estates Committee Chairman, Alderman Smith, said that the Council had done 
everything humanly possible to hasten the preparation of the sites for the bungalows and they had 
complied with every suggestion made to them. The Ministries had ‘fallen down’. Alderman Jackson 
said in response that, ‘Although I agree that to some extent there appears to have been delay, I am not 
prepared to put all the blame on the Government or anyone else.’ Despite this, the resolution was duly 
approved and there the matter rested before the 1945 General Election. Just the day before Jackson’s 
assertion, eighteen American-made prefabricated temporary houses bound for Sheffield, the first, were 
finally unloaded from a ship at Liverpool docks.147
3.6 - CONCLUSION
The boom in town planning literature during the war reflected an audience that wanted to be reassured 
and inspired, and ‘planning’ as an everyday term became ubiquitous due to the need for ‘total war’ 
mobilisation. Town planner Thomas Sharp claimed that:
It is no overstatement to say that the simple choice between planning and non­
planning, between order and disorder, is a test-choice for English democracy. In the 
long run even the worst democratic muddle is preferable to a dictator’s dream bought 
at the price of liberty and decency. But the English muddle is nevertheless a matter for 
shame. We shall never get rid of its shamefulness unless we plan our activities. And
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plan we must - not for the sake of our physical environment only, but to save and fulfill 
democracy itself.148
The emphasis on ‘planning’ could only be music to the ears o f the Labour Party since it apparently 
provided a means o f delivering social justice with technical efficiency and overcame the wastefulness 
and anarchy of the free market. Town planning united the utopian impulse evident in the ethical 
socialism of the early Garden City movement to the technocratic desire to abolish working-class poverty 
from above, and it could be more readily assimilated into the democratic socialist ideology o f Labour 
than the ideology of liberal Conservatism with it’s stress on defending economic freedom and 
inequalities. Labour local authorities also tended to be more supportive of planners than their opponents 
as the example of Conservative Portsmouth studied by Hasegawa shows. While the process o f town 
planning and the management and construction of council housing which were such a part of ‘municipal 
labourist’ discourse were fo r  the working classes they did not themselves make the decisions which 
would materially affect either town planning or council housing.
Davies notes, that unlike today, even after the 1947 Act there was no formal requirement for public 
participation in development plans and it was simply a technical matter for planning committees and 
their officers.149 This was also true when housing committees deliberated. Democratic participation 
effectively meant the participation of members of the City Council who had been elected but in Sheffield 
their elections were almost a fait accompli since so few of the Council Wards were marginal seats. 
Labour Aldermen controlled the chairmanships of important committees for very long periods and the 
Aldermanic system itself provided security. Labour members virtually always obeyed party discipline. 
Criticism inevitably came from the Municipal Progressives which cemented that discipline. There was 
some superficial consensus since the City had to rebuilt anyhow following the air raids. Both sides also 
agreed on an interventionist role for the municipality in local politics. In 1944 the The Star noted that 
the Progressives had a long-term plan for the reconstruction of the City which might mean, 
apocalyptically, ‘a virtual obliteration of Sheffield as it exists.’150 If nothing else, that example illustrates 
that planning had become the ‘conventional wisdom’ in wartime Sheffield, despite Progressive rhetoric 
supporting free enterprise. It had, however, to be democratic planning by consent rather than by 
compulsion as in the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany.151
Unfortunately, as Sheffield shows, council secrecy could defeat such pious aspirations. Coventry City 
Council was much more open but it remains debateable which was more representative o f the blitzed 
cities in this respect and of ‘Old Labour’ local administrations. Labour was more secure in Sheffield and 
if anywhere was a significant island of radical fervour in a lukewarm sea of opinion it would be that city 
rather than Coventry, which Mason and Thompson use as their example to show widespread wartime 
apathy beyond the ranks of the politically committed members of the Labour and Communist Parties in a 
city under Labour control.152 While one might agree with their conclusions about mass apathy, apart 
from the possibility that relative apathy both before and after the 1940s was probably even greater in
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comparison, it is unfortunately the case that Sheffield’s Labour Council was equally apathetic in that it 
did not trust its citizens (including on at least one occasion the Chamber of Commerce) with information 
during the planning process. It did not use social surveys but merely councillors’ intuition and the 
random soundings they made among the citizens to ascertain popular wants and needs. Thus, despite the 
genuine humanistic socialism of many councillors, they were still culpable because, whatever good 
intentions they had, they allowed authoritarianism in practice by rubber-stamping the decisions o f the 
committee chairmen. It is, however, arguable how much information individual councillors possessed 
who were not on the housing or town planning committees in order to be able to make an independent 
judgement on either subject had they the bravery to contest the view of a committee chairman. As 
Hampton notes the party groups had no official standing and could not officially ask the chief officer of a 
council department to undertake work on their behalf. Therefore the information they received was 
limited to the report of the committee chairman who could colour it to favour his view. He himself could 
only base his report on departmental information and had no authority to get information from other 
chief departmental officers on Sheffield Council so the wider implications could be considered.153
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE LABOUR PARTY 
IN SOUTH YORKSHIRE,
1939- 1945:
EBB AND RESURGENCE
4.1 - INTRODUCTION
Harvie in 1983 noted that Labour’s extra-parliamentaiy organisation and the way it had developed had 
not been studied by historians and political scientists to the extent it deserved. As a result dogmatic 
assertions passed as conventional wisdom on the subject. Labour activists, for example, were convinced 
that left-wing socialist policies pressed on leaders by activists had won victory for Labour in 1945.
Harvie felt that political scientists had neglected to do this research because they were preoccupied with 
the way policy was made and organisation at the centre.1 This neglect, however, was still a major 
complaint in 2000 when Chris Williams edited a centenary history of the Welsh Labour Party.2
Harvie criticised Addison, whose The Road to 1945.while counteracting the assertions o f the activists 
strengthened what he described as the ‘McKenzie doctrine’ after Professor Robert McKenzie. The latter 
saw the function of local party organisation as being to provide a kind of supporters’ club to sustain 
competing teams of leaders in Parliament from which the electorate would make a choice of rulers in a 
general election.3 McKenzie’s general view of democracy can actually be traced back to Joseph 
Schumpeter in the 1940s and before him to the anti-socialist Max Weber in 1920s Germany.4 Labour 
activists, however, had a role that went well beyond this. This was especially true in the 1940s when 
political campaigning was much more labour-intensive. It was the ability to call on unpaid voluntary 
workers, especially women, that the party capitalised on in elections. But the party because of its fervour 
for democratic values, (and in contrast to how it saw policy being decided among Conservatives) did also 
seriously attempt to put such values into practice within its organisation. There was a great emphasis on 
making socialists through a political education which stressed the values of democratic citizenship.5 
Trade Unions were similarly concerned to stress their commitment to these values. There was a belief, 
for example, that trade union members had to be turned into ‘Trade Unionists’.6 It was recognised that 
there was great political apathy and ignorance among trade unionists and within the party as well as in 
the wider electorate and something had to be done about it. Communist zeal to remedy this was one 
reason why in spite of official Labour policy they were accorded such respect within the Labour 
movement.
Many Labour members, especially in heartlands like South Yorkshire, could not be described as active 
members with a sophisticated socialist ideology though in terms of mentalities they undoubtedly saw 
themselves as socialists. Like working-class Labour voters, they often had an unsophisticated tribal class 
consciousness o f ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ which grew out of the extreme differences in life opportunities 
experienced by middle and working-class people. We noted in Chapter Two very briefly the debate on
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‘Labourism’. Marxist-Leninists regard Labour as marked by a distrust of theory and pragmatism when it 
comes to ideology, rejecting its claims to be considered a socialist party and seeing it as an obstacle to 
socialism. Historians sympathetic to Labour are naturally more sympathetic to its claims to be 
ideologically socialist, as Francis, Tiratsoo, Thompson and Fielding are, even while paying attention to 
the conservatism and apathy of Labour members and working-class voters. Many Labour activists 
regarded themselves as ‘real’ socialists in contrast to un-ideological ‘passengers’ within party branches. 
They were similarly critical about working-class people outside.7 Tiratsoo, Thompson and Fielding make 
the point that social activities, like whist drives and dances, and the running of the branch as a club, were 
often more important to some members than political activity.8 But if activists were to be effective, they 
could not be purists - they had to carry the ‘passengers’ and attract voters.
One consequence of apathy was that a small circle of people, often the first generation of Labour 
activists in the area, exercised undue influence over the party and local government. Such people, and 
they were usually men rather than women, like Alderman George Caine o f Rotherham or Alderman 
Ernest Rowlinson of Sheffield, were regarded with immense respect well outside the Party. Caine was, it 
was said in 1951,‘affectionately regarded as Rotherham’s “Prime Minister” ’. He was the first Socialist 
elected on Rotherham Council in 1906, becoming chairman of the Housing Committee in 1917. He was 
chairman until 1939, did not resign from the Council until 1955, and at one time had the record of 
serving on no fewer than thirty-six of its committees and sub-committees. He thus wielded great 
influence in many matters directly affecting working-class life in Rotherham.9 Obviously such leaders in 
municipal office could not be regarded as the same kind of activist as those of the rank-and-file, 
circumscribed as they were by the need to do the best for their communities as a whole rather than just 
politically committed sections. It is probably a slur to believe that having gained office they were not still 
radicals but this was tempered by responsibility. But office in local government is obviously not the 
same as office in national government and despite the fact that local government, especially in the inter­
war years, had much greater autonomy and powers, ambitions were comparatively modest.
Most of the controversies about democracy between the parties came about because they had differing 
concepts of democracy, concepts classically delineated by Beer.10 In the Labour Party, the extra- 
parliamentaiy party was theoretically sovereign in policy-making through the Annual Conference. The 
Parliamentary Party and the National Executive Committee decided on the time and method by which its 
instructions would be enacted. Resolutions on policy were welcomed from the lowest levels o f the party 
though often presented as composite resolutions, and decisions reached at Conference were thus 
regarded as especially binding, however much in practice they reflected the will of the leadership due to 
the trade union block vote. Labour remained a ‘federal alliance’ or ‘hybrid’ of pressure groups and 
organisations, even though, as at the 1943 Conference, for example, 59 Trade Unions with just 364 
delegates controlled over two million card votes while 444 Labour Parties with 449 delegates had just 
under half a million.11 Tory democracy was democracy where the party members and public opinion 
consented to policy decided at the centre by the Leader alone. The members did not actually give explicit
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instructions on policy to the leadership. This was why the commitment to produce 300,000 houses a year 
forced on the leadership at the 1950 Party Conference was so unprecedented.12 Conferences were ‘more 
about display than policy’.13 There were thus basic differences between the roles of the Party 
Conferences.
In most Labour parties in the 1940s a state of perpetual war with the leadership and amongst themselves 
was not characteristic. Press accounts do often emphasise conflict, however, because this was 
newsworthy and because of their political hostility to Labour. The press was not impartial in cities like 
Sheffield. Thus the value in Labour eyes of having independent local Labour journals like Sheffield 
Forward. A Sheffield newspaper editor told Alderman Rowlinson in the inter-war period that ‘We aren’t 
in the business of giving you free publicity’.14 Sheffield Forward complained in 1946 that:
The local Press gives us a veiy raw deal generally. It does not report Labour Party 
speeches in the Council; it garbles the accounts it gives and it picks irresponsible 
statements made buy our opponents in heavy type in such a way as to suggest 
Alderman Jackson and his friends have said the authoritative word. There is nothing 
we can do about this, except to ask those who are able to attend meetings o f the 
Council, and to take care they do not believe all they see in print.15
From this distance in time what is noticeable about local newspapers, however, is their generosity 
towards opponents despite accusations of Tory bias by Labour activists. This is because they felt they 
had to adhere to a discourse o f ‘Britishness’ which emphasised freedom of expression as against the 
thought control of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in which official Labour was regarded as an ally.
The mundane work of functioning local parties is not glamorous and newsworthy. A list comprising the 
activities undertaken by a typical one might include raising money and selecting candidates for municipal 
and parliamentaiy elections, electing branch officers, organising May Day demonstrations and public 
meetings to publicise government or party policy, setting up advice bureaux to deal with questions and 
issues raised by ordinary members of the public, and passing resolutions for the attention of Annual 
Conference, local MPs, trades councils, municipal councils and the Prime Minister, which might elicit 
some practical action or might indeed be simply flights of rhetorical ultra-left fantasy, but which 
demonstrated democratic involvement in discussion and debate. Parties would elect delegates to 
conferences and send lucky members to One-Day Schools, paying for their scholarships. They would 
take the lead in local campaigns on ‘bread and butter’ working-class issues, introduce new ideas into 
their communities and take part in social events, like dinners, dances, organised outings and whist drives. 
This embodiment of democratic values legitimated Labour government policies and helped people to 
accept policies of austerity which, though perhaps harsh, were necessary and fair. They provided 
valuable feedback. They were also part of a wider movement including the co-operatives and trade 
unions which could provide an alternative to those activities and services provided by capitalist bodies,
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even if they were not on the scale of the pre-1914 German Social Democratic Party. Local activists 
helped to build a sense of community feeling which led people to vote Labour. A 1960 survey of over a 
thousand inhabitants of Wanstead and Woodford, Outer London, found that ‘a close community, the 
extended family, informal and formal collective organisation and socialism are all of a piece’.16
Bale argues that the grip of the leadership on the extra-parliamentary Labour Party was intensified during 
the Second World War.17 The creation of Regional Councils exemplifies this though it could also be 
argued that they were established because of long-felt regional pressure for devolution. But as long as 
local parties obeyed Conference decisions and did not fraternise with proscribed organisations they had 
considerable autonomy.18 The records of local parties show that all kinds of radical resolutions were sent 
to the NEC which did not bring down immediate retribution from Transport House. Wisely, it may have 
considered that the activists who formulated them were simply letting off radical steam. Labour at the 
centre did not want to rock the boat while it was a partner in the wartime Coalition but it believed that it 
had not signed up to a ‘political truce’ that penalised political activity.
The Labour leadership in London during the war years were to make private and unpopular appeals to 
local parties throughout the United Kingdom to support Government candidates at disputed by-elections 
(usually Conservatives) despite the understandable reluctance o f Labour activists, who saw themselves 
unable to capitalise on the obvious shift to the left in popular attitudes which these by-elections 
demonstrated. Labour activists were particularly discontented when, despite their leaders being in 
Government and the claims these leaders had originally made about the opportunities office would bring 
for socialist advance, concrete socialist measures, like nationalisation of the coal industry, were vetoed to 
please Conservatives. This was particularly true of the period before the publication of the Beveridge 
Report but discontent with the Coalition was present throughout the war.19 Active support for Tory 
candidates might be seen as going far beyond any strict electoral truce but the official Labour policy was 
that maintaining national unity meant that any activity which might disturb relations with the 
Conservatives was taboo. An NEC memorandum in 1942, for example, asserted that as long as Labour 
was in the Government, campaigns based on ‘party aggrandisement, inter-party controversies, persistent 
and destructive criticism of the government, naval or military tactics’ must be completely abandoned.20
The view of most secondary sources which deal with wartime party organisation, national as well as 
local, would seem to be that, from the outbreak of war until El Alamein and the publication of the 
Beveridge Report, party organisation was merely clinging to life in the face of wartime disruption. Then 
a new phase started with many, if not all, local organisations beginning to recover. They took new heart 
from the belief that the war’s end was in sight and made proposals and plans to prepare for a future 
general election. Finally, there was the evidence of the success of that recovery embodied in the general 
election performance in 1945. The interpretation is validated by the evidence of individual membership 
figures for constituency parties in South Yorkshire, including the figures for female membership, and by 
the national membership figures (See Appendix 1). Unfortunately, such membership figures in
86
themselves may be greatly inaccurate and the persistent figure o f240 was the minimum that all 
constituency parties were supposed to have to be accepted as such and thus they tell us little. Tanner 
points out that in times of financial hardship constituency parties might affiliate only part of their total 
membership to avoid paying affiliation fees to Head Office.21 Sheffield Central and Hillsborough DLPs 
were both in arrears throughout the war.22 Figures for Doncaster DLP show that actual membership 
during any particular year could be volatile and the abrupt decline in membership o f the Party from 31 
January 1945 with 1038 members to 28 March 1945 with 555 members was simply caused by a sudden 
increase in individual membership fees.23 Much depended on individual activists’ willingness to go out 
and collect subscriptions and personality clashes did occur. For example, Mr. Fishbum, President of 
Sheffield Hallam DLP, in 1941 criticised the ‘unbusinesslike way’ that collections were handed to the 
ward treasurer in one ward by certain collectors. He appealed to ‘Mr. Hancock and Miss Pointer not to 
allow their personal dislikes to interfere with the efficient working of the Party, and when it was 
necessary for them to meet to transact Party business, to treat each other with ordinary civility.’24
The figures for female membership and their proportion of the total membership of local parties do not 
seem to allow a broad wartime trend to be formulated for South Yorkshire as a whole. But as we have 
already indicated individual membership figures are not necessarily either accurate or believable. One 
might, however, have expected to see particularly high figures for 1941 before legislation made all 
women liable for conscription to war work and they disappeared into industry.25 Men had been affected 
first and would not necessarily find it easy to keep in contact with the Party if called up into the Forces or 
forced to work long hours on shifts in essential war industries. Women did keep some local parties 
functioning in this period. Labour Organiser noted in 1940 that ‘SHEFFIELD [PARK] report that a 
good number of offices are now filled by women members’.26 The Hallam DLP Management Committee 
after the war gave a vote of thanks to the way Mrs Roper held the Broomhill Ward Labour Party together 
throughout the conflict and continued to collect membership fees.27 Broomhill Ward was not a Labour 
stronghold and returned three Municipal Progressives in 1945 with a good majority. It was not contested 
by Labour in 1938.28 What we do see is that in wartime women were never in greater numbers than men 
in local parties and that men continued to occupy many offices even if they were older veterans. One 
means of maintaining Labour organisation would have been to organise party cells within industry as the 
Communists did but though this was discussed by the National Executive Committee in 1942 the idea 
was dismissed. This did not prevent the suggestion being taken up in Coventry factories but it did not 
happen in South Yorkshire.29 Wartime disruption may not have been the sole reason for the decline in 
Labour membership. There was also, according to Fielding, a strong anti-party mood in popular 
attitudes throughout the war, though after 1942 it ‘was anti-Conservative rather than anti-Labour because 
it was the Conservatives who were seen more clearly to embody “party” spirit’, being unenthusiastic 
about post-war social reform.30
The formation of the Yorkshire Regional Council in February 1942 must be accounted a significant 
development of the war years, though Harvie quotes McKenzie who believed Regional Councils played
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‘an insignificant part in the life of the party’.31 The Regional Council which covered fifty-one 
constituencies allowed closer supervision of party organisation than was possible for Transport House. It 
was formed when Labour organisation was admittedly at a low ebb but it could be argued that its 
formation was thus all the more necessary. But it was also a natural development of the growth of the 
party machinery in the inter-war years and fulfilled a recognised need.32 It functioned to give advice to 
Constituency Parties on selecting candidates or agents and provided lists of those approved. It gave its 
endorsement to selected candidates and tried to suggest ways of increasing individual membership and 
strengthening party organisation.
Len Williams, the wartime secretary and organiser of the Council, addressing Hallam DLP in 1942, 
commented that the Council had surveyed the state of party organisation and ‘a very strange state of 
affairs was discovered’, with the safest Labour seats having the lowest membership figures.33 But this 
could hardly be a great surprise in South Yorkshire. The constituencies of the South Yorkshire Coalfield 
where miners were a preponderant element of the electorate had a long left-wing tradition. The peculiar 
requirements of industrial organisation and production in the coal industry fostered occupational and 
communal solidarity and gave a desire for better pay and working conditions which it was believed only 
nationalisation could satisfy. A concentration in particular constituencies meant successful interventions 
by miners in parliamentary politics long before it was possible for other unions. Wentworth, Barnsley, 
Rotherham, Rother Valley, Doncaster, Don Valley, Penistone and Hemsworth were all local 
constituencies where miners were extremely powerful politically. However, as was noted in 1938: ‘The
miners vote is solid [But] there are two unsatisfactory features in most of these [mining]
constituencies. In the first place, political, or rather Party, machinery is often of the poorest, or even 
absent altogether, and secondly, individual membership of a good and paying sort is most frequently 
conspicuous by its absence.’34
Railwaymen were also a politically important interest in South Yorkshire. This was because the National 
Union of Railwaymen represented most grades of railway employee, there was much employment (the 
local railway infrastructure was complex and economically extremely important for the transport o f local 
coal, raw materials and finished steel products), and the ‘Plant’ works of the London and North Eastern 
Railway, which built locomotives like the famous record-breaker ‘Mallard’ was sited at Doncaster. The 
railwaymen were very political. The ‘Plant’s’ employees showed remarkable solidarity with the miners 
during the General Strike, for example.35 The rail unions provided influential local MPs like William 
Dobbie of Rotherham. They also provided urban district and county councillors like Maurice Creighton 
of Swinton.36 They produced County Borough councillors and aldermen like Ernest Rowlinson of 
Sheffield and Alderman Ball, secretary of Rotherham Trades Council between 1931 and 1941.37 The rail 
unions, like the miners, actively supported nationalisation and went further as convinced advocates of 
workers’ control after the war.38
Finally, Rotherham, Attercliffe and Brightside were all constituencies where steel workers were
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politically powerful. They and members of the Amalgamated Engineering Union employed in local 
steelworks dominated the composition of Rotherham Council, for instance. The members of the Iron and 
Steel Trades Confederation might be less enthusiastic about nationalisation - they had good industrial 
relations with local companies like United Steel - but they were loyal to Labour and its leaders. James 
Walker, for instance, a Glaswegian who had been the first Labour parliamentary candidate in Rotherham, 
standing unsuccessfully in 1918 and 1922,39 was political secretary o f the union between 1931 and 
193840 and Chairman of the Labour Party in 1940/1. He was a vehement enemy of Harold Laski and the 
Left.41 During the war he was a hard-liner on German war-guilt and attacked those ‘quacking round the 
political pond’ in support o f the Communist-inspired ‘People’s Convention’.42
4.2 - EBB, 1939-1942
The following section looks at the difficulties that local DLPs and Trades and Labour Councils (which 
functioned as Borough Labour Parties in Sheffield, Rotherham and Barnsley) faced in the early years of 
the War in maintaining their organisation until the tide of war turned in late 1942. This period could be 
further sub-divided, as it affected the Labour Party, into the period of ‘Phoney War’ before Labour 
entered the Coalition Government under Churchill, the period from then until Russia’s entry into the War 
in June 1941, and the period up to victory at El Alamein and Stalingrad and the publication o f the 
Beveridge Report. Some of this section examines Labour’s relations with local Communists and looks at 
Labour’s changing views of Soviet Russia before and after June 1941. It also looks at pacifism as a 
current inside Labour and attempts to assess its importance given its major pre-war influence in 
Sheffield.
Pacifism prior to the war had much support in Sheffield43 which had four major figures in the movement 
in Eleanor Barton,44 Arthur Ponsonby,45 Cecil Henry Wilson and Henry George McGhee.46 Wilson who 
was MP for Attercliffe until 1944 was very active during the war and took an independent stance which 
led him into conflict with the Labour leadership. He did not, however, resign from the Labour Party as 
Ponsonby did.47 In the period o f ‘Phoney War’, with Chamberlain still in charge, absolute pacifists could 
still hope that hostilities might rapidly be brought to a conclusion and appeasement yet be made to work. 
Allied with them in the desire for peace were both the Independent Labour Party and the Communist 
Party.
The ILP saw the War as a quarrel between Capitalist states and refused to make a distinction between 
British imperialism and German Nazism. It refused to give support to a Capitalist state and called for 
Socialism and Peace.48 Cecil Wilson was willing in Parliament to support the unpopular stand o f ILP 
MPs like Maxton, Campbell Stephen and McGovern despite the inveterate hostility of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party. He voted with them and with George Lansbury against the Emergency Powers A ct49 He 
also opposed conscription50 and signed a statement in September 1939 urging labour organisations to 
stay independent of Capitalism, despite Hitler, to work for Socialism and Peace.51 He also supported
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‘Stop-the-War’ candidates at two Scottish by-elections.52 He and other Labour MPs who gave their 
support were formally cautioned by the NEC and told to desist.53 In November 1939, he was one of 
twenty Labour MPs who signed a ‘Memorandum on Peace Aims’ - the first declaration of the 
Parliamentary Peace Aims Group. Another signatory was Henry McGhee, the MP for Penistone. Like 
Wilson he had been in the pre-war Parliamentary Pacifist Group and served on its executive committee. 
In November 1939 he called for a secret session o f Parliament to discuss the continuation of the war.54
The Labour Party did see itself as a peace movement but it was pacifistic rather than absolute pacifist in 
intent. The Sheffield Trades Council in its annual report for 1939/40 said it saw war as ‘a tremendous 
evil’ but that it also stood for the collective security o f all nations against an aggressor. It did not 
translate a personal revulsion for war, perhaps on Christian principles, into a desire not to resist whatever 
happened.55 It is not surprising that during the war Alderman Frank Thraves, Labour Leader of the City 
Council between 1942 and 1946, was president o f the Sheffield Branch o f the League of Nations Union 
which campaigned for collective security.56 Labour Party members had mixed views about those who 
refused to fight but after Dunkirk public tolerance of conscientious objectors began to evaporate. At a 
Rotherham Trades Council meeting, with prejudices heightened by the threat of invasion, one member 
was recorded as saying that ‘A man who won’t put on the uniform in the present need and serve his 
countiy should be drowned’; however, he was contradicted by a woman member who said that she 
believed that the true conscientious objector was a brave man and did not think they should be 
persecuted. Another party member regretted that some local authorities, and even members of a trade 
union, had victimised them.57 By July 1940 119 local authorities had decided to dismiss conscientious 
objectors from their employ or to suspend them while the war lasted. Only sixteen councils had ruled 
against doing this and they included the London County Council.58 The Labour Group on Sheffield City 
Council in August 1940 passed a resolution that said they would not penalise genuine conscientious 
objectors in their employ as the 1939 National Service Act had given them legal protection. The 
Municipal Progressives, however, were less sympathetic and tried to get an amendment passed to dismiss 
objectors from City Council employment.59
Turning to the actual experience of local Labour Parties in wartime we can see they faced sobering 
prospects, even in early 1940, though Labour Organiser remained ultimately optimistic. It noted the 
‘serious problems’ created by the ‘“blackout”, the transference of labour, the calling up o f large bodies 
of men for the Armed Forces and the vast amount of overtime being worked in industrial regions, the 
widespread evacuation, [and] the “key” members serving in the ARP’. It also noted the problems
of enrolling sufficient members to collect subscriptions regularly. Finance has always 
been our Party’s problem, but the cut in social and money-raising activities has made 
the problem difficult. Some Parties have had their halls commandeered by the Militaiy 
Authorities, and have suffered financial loss as a result. Propaganda activities have 
also been affected in this way.
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However, it said that ‘only an odd Party here and there . . .  has given up the ghost.’60 Thorpe looking at 
the situation in Sheffield at this time, however, believes that Labour organisation in the city did not fare 
so well under the impact of war. In 1939 three Sheffield constituencies had full-time agents but by 1942 
only Hillsborough had such a full-time official and he was really Co-operative rather than Labour.61 
Also, according to Thorpe, many ward parties were ‘completely inactive’ 62 The source he gives for his 
conclusion about the ward parties is an entiy in the Hallam DLP management committee minute book for 
10 March 1940, and in Hallam Division at least it does appear that that was the case at that stage of the 
war. But in 1938 Crookesmoor Ward had failed to return a Labour candidate and Hallam and Broomhill 
Wards did not see a contest63 so ward organisation might not have been up to its full potential even 
before the war, particularly as the Division had continued to elect Conservative MPs and the area was 
middle-class and affluent. Whether other ward parties outside Hallam Division were ‘completely 
inactive’ is unclear.
Labour Organiser reported in January 1940 that, from evidence given by local Labour Parties in their 
Reports, the position of Parties was excellent in those constituencies which had Labour MPs or 
prospective Parliamentary candidates who regularly visited them to keep up morale. Labour Organiser 
gave Doncaster as one example64 and in the Annual Report for 1940 the DLP Secretary reported that: 
‘My impression [of the Division] is, briefly, one of quiet confidence and some satisfaction. The Division 
is constitutionally sound, financially healthy, and the active keenness of its members keeps it moving.’65 
Labour Organiser also commended it for taking the initiative of setting up an ‘Enquiry Bureau’ to help 
local people with problems due to the War.66 Despite all this the Doncaster Party must have suffered 
badly in terms of morale, and probably direction, from the loss of prominent members of the Party in 
1940 and 1941. Personalities did actually matter. Two Labour Mayors - Councillor Herbert Heaviside, 
who had held the office for three months, and Councillor Andrew Clarke who held it for almost six - died 
in February 194067 and April 1941.68 And on 4 December 1940, the Doncaster MP John Morgan also 
died.69 But it was Heaviside who was the major loss. He had been Secretary o f the DLP and then Agent 
for the Division and was the directing intelligence behind Labour’s organisation in seven Parliamentary 
elections.70 Ernest Gutteridge, who became Labour Party Secretary in 1940, described his loss as ‘a 
tremendous liability’ and said that he was: ‘An old and valued worker in the movement, he had built up 
an intricate but highly efficient machinery of organisation [sic], to which only he had the key.’71
A similar blow to morale came with the death of Alderman Ernest Rowlinson in January 1941. The 
Telegraph described him as the ‘dominant figure in Sheffield municipal politics since 1926’. A 
railwayman, leader of the ASRS Midland Station platform branch before 1914, victimised after the 1911 
railway strike, he became in 1913 president of the Trades and Labour Council. After being gassed in 
World War One he became a councillor in 1921 and chairman of the Labour Group on the City Council 
in 1922. He resigned from the presidency of the Trades Council in 1926 on becoming Leader o f the City 
Council. He managed to turn a ‘rather raw, large party into one which became a model and an inspiration
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to struggling Labour Parties all over the country’. His main interest was in education, and beyond 
Sheffield he was recognised as ‘a great municipal administrator’ by Government departments and local 
government associations. He was agent for Park DLP at his death. Had he chosen, he could easily have 
been a parliamentary candidate, but stayed in local government. He was Lord Mayor in 1937/38 and can 
be described as the ‘Strong Man’ of Sheffield Labour politics, as Heaviside had been in Doncaster, 
Alderman Caine was in Rotherham and Alderman Edward Sheerien was in Barnsley.72
Rowlinson was replaced as Leader by William Asbury, chairman of the City Emergency Committee, and 
nicknamed Sheffield’s No. 1 ARP Volunteer because o f his role in developing the city’s civil defence 
services. He had been forced to refuse the Lord Mayor-ship in 1939 because it would have interfered 
with that work. He had been a councillor since 1924 and had also taken a prominent part in Labour’s rise 
to power. He had been a railway guard until 1930 when he became the agent for Brightside DLP. But he, 
too, proved a casualty of war though not a fatal one. He was replaced as Leader in 1942 because he was 
appointed Deputy Regional Commissioner in the Southern Civil Defence Region.73 His deputy,
Alderman Thraves, took over as Leader, a post he held until 1946. He also replaced Asbury on the 
Emergency Committee. He, however, according to Andrew Thorpe, did not provide the same calibre of 
leadership as his predecessors.74 Thraves had been a tram driver before becoming a trade union official. 
He became a councillor in 1923 and was Lord Mayor in 1935/6. He was also chairman of the Watch 
Committee which oversaw the police and had been president of the Trades Council.75 He relinquished 
the latter role to Councillor James Sterland on becoming Labour Group Leader.76
The electoral truce between the political parties throughout the war was a major issue to Labour activists 
as we have explained. Independence was a prized commodity and there was confusion that the truce 
meant a complete end to political activity which would only play into the hands of a superior and better 
financed Conservative organisation once hostilities ended. Confusion is reflected in the response of 
Hallam DLP in November 1939 to two party circulars. One gave the provisions of the Bill which would 
suspend local government elections and the other urged DLPs to keep their election machinery as well 
oiled as possible and suggested ways of doing so. This was thought paradoxical.77 However, in support 
o f the electoral truce, Rotherham Trades Council refused to help fund the lost deposit of the unsuccessful 
candidate at the Glasgow Pollock by-election in 1940 who opposed it.78 A resolution against the truce 
from a local NUR branch was also defeated in April 1940.79 Other Labour organisations took a different 
position during the ‘Phoney War’. In Sheffield, before the Trades Council was reorganised in 1940, 
Hillsborough DLP produced a resolution opposing the truce,80 and the Trades Council as the Borough 
Party was one of 50 parties who sent similar resolutions to the 1940 Labour Conference.81
Local parties and MPs obeyed the injunction of Labour Organiser, in calling for an advice bureau in 
every party, to ‘Make your Party a refuge for all who are in trouble’.82 They, thus, attempted to 
demonstrate Labour’s socialist values of fellowship and community by practical action. They were seen 
to be doing their best to help suffering people and not just passing resolutions. Thus, while the ‘Enquiry
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Bureau’ that Doncaster DLP set up might not have had a direct electoral pay-off, it was hoped it would 
be remembered after the war with gratitude as showing Labour’s civic spirit. Labour in Sheffield at the 
end of the war similarly refused to take sole credit for civic achievements. One was the Information 
Bureau set up by the Ministry of Information but with much input from the City Council immediately 
after the Blitz. Following this precedent, a permanent Civic Information Service was set up in 1946 by 
Sheffield Council.83 This showed surprising longevity continuing until 2003 by which time it was 
thought to be the oldest surviving service of its type in Britain. The advent of the internet, however, has 
unfortunately given councillors the excuse to axe it.84
Local Labour organisations throughout the war did not lose sight of the need to look after working-class 
living standards even while they practiced civic-mindedness. Women members were to the fore. In 
October 1939, the Women’s Advisory Council of Sheffield Trades Council set up a Food Committee to 
monitor food prices. The Advisory Council’s secretary was elected to the city’s Food Council.85 The 
president of Hallam D LP, Mr. Fishbum, proposed a resolution after the Blitz: ‘That we note with 
appreciation the Yeoman service of the Hallam Women in connection with the Emergency Feeding of 
Bombed Out people of Hallam.’86 The Trades Council’s Executive Committee Report for 1939/40 
spoke of the added prestige for the Trades Council of being on the Hardships Committee, the Advisory 
Committee for Conscientious Objectors, a Committee formed by the Ministry of Information and the 
Food Control Prices Regulation Committee.87 Of course, across the country, as Labour Organiser 
pointed out, representation on wartime committees varied a great deal district to district depending on the 
degree of Party representation on local councils.88 This did not matter much in South Yorkshire where, 
for example, the formation of a Vigilance Committee in Rotherham was seen as unnecessary because 
Labour already had a the majority on all official committees monitoring possible working-class 
grievances.89 The Sheffield Trades Council showed its recognition o f working people’s urgent needs 
when they decided to submit a resolution calling for an expansion of British Restaurants, which had been 
so successful in Sheffield in providing cheap meals, to the 1942 Labour Conference, asking for their 
retention as part o f Labour’s programme of post-war reconstruction.90 Examples of Labour’s interest in 
such welfare work could easily be multiplied.
The entry of the Soviet Union into the war appeared to Britons a symbol of ultimate survival in hitherto 
dark times. Any previous criticism and hostility towards the Soviet Union was dissipated in a flurry of 
enthusiasm for ‘Aid to Russia’ funds and in local expressions of support which went far beyond Labour. 
There was also a popular campaign for a ‘Second Front’ that was not limited simply to Communists, 
though they were the most enthusiastic supporters. It must be said though that while the latter was a 
good slogan it was less easy to make the demand concrete and foolish to tiy before victory could be 
guaranteed as the heavy losses sustained in the Dieppe raid in 1942 seemed to prove. A Rotherham 
Advertiser leader ironically spelled this out just before the raid.91 Increased war production and the 
Second Front were closely inter-connected. It was no coincidence that at a Rotherham Trades Council 
meeting in April 1942 a resolution was approved from one AEU branch calling for the opening o f a
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Second Front while another resolution from another AEU branch called on the Government to make 
production committees compulsory in factories.92 By November, William Dobbie MP was saying, 
however, that further Second Front meetings were superfluous and would not achieve anything much 
more tangible.93 Even before Dieppe, co-operation between Labour and the Communists over the issue 
was not automatic. A letter from the local communists asking for co-operation with Doncaster DLP on 
the subject in July was brushed aside. It explained it could not comply because the vote at Party 
Conference had been opposed.94
Local Communists did increase their individual membership during the war but, even at the peak, the 
total hardly bore comparison with Labour at the lowest point of its wartime fortunes. Fishman provides a 
figure for South Yorkshire o f 1,596 members in March 1942 and this increased to 2,596 by June. This 
contrasts with a figure for the North Midlands as a whole - which included Sheffield, Nottingham, and 
North Derbyshire - of 1,000 members in March 1940.95 Labour leaders hoped that the change of line of 
the British Communists in 1939 from supporting the war to total opposition would destroy their 
membership but the Daily Worker claimed ‘facts tell a different story’. This was, however, perhaps not 
unexpected since many people were groping for some kind of way back to peace at this time for reasons 
close to those of Chamberlain at Munich. They could not understand the point o f going to war for the 
sake of people of whom they were totally ignorant, and especially for semi-fascist Poland which had 
profited materially from Czechoslovakia’s downfall.96 The paper reported in October 1939 that the North 
Midlands district had recruited 82 extra members and Sheffield had added 22.97 The national 
membership rose from 18,000 in September 1939 to 20,000 in March 1940 reaching a peak of about 
60,000 in June 1942.98
A hundred delegates from Sheffield and the North Midlands attended the London ‘People’s Convention’ 
on 12 January 1941." This started life as the People’s Vigilance Committee set up by the disaffiliated 
Hammersmith Labour Party and Trades Council. Its leading figure was Denis Noel Pritt KC,100 the 
Independent Labour MP for Hammersmith North, expelled for pro-Soviet propaganda over the invasion 
of Finland.101 Its objectives were in line with those of the Communist Party before the USSR was 
attacked and it campaigned, according to communists Noreen Branson and Bill Moore, for a ‘People’s 
Government’ that would defeat both the Germans and the ‘Men of Munich’.102 Support for a German 
defeat was the position of some at the Convention like Hewlett Johnson, the Red Dean of Canterbury, but 
according to Sheffielder and former communist, J. T. Murphy, working in a London engineering works 
at the time where three hundred of the workers were Convention supporters, it was ‘an unquestionable 
fact’ that it set back the war effort. Its supporters refused to work overtime, discontent was fomented and 
morale was lowered.103 Tribune denounced the Convention as ‘mischievous, phony, dishonest, a fraud, a 
swindle, snare and delusion from start to finish’ because it was a Communist front. However it admitted 
that it
was a great success as a conference. The hall and overflow meetings were packed. The
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speeches were able. The audiences were enthusiastic, and mostly composed of good, 
honest-to-God workers whose attachment to Socialism, democracy and a decent peace 
and whose loathing of Fascism could not be questioned. Much of what was said was 
the authentic voice of large and growing bodies of opinion, representing genuine 
deeply felt and widespread grievances.104
Most of the so-called ‘delegates’ only represented themselves in reality. The figure of 1.2 million people 
they said they ‘represented’ was fantasy. Yet as Mass-Observation concluded, ‘Perhaps the best way of 
summing up feeling on this subject is that people were “looking for a way out of the present mess”.’105 
An American journalist who attended said that the remarkable thing about the Convention, whether it 
achieved anything or not, was that it was being freely held in a country at war at all. This he saw as the 
triumph of the democratic spirit. He did not believe that it would have been allowed in the United States 
under similar circumstances.106
The Sheffield Trades Council was the subject of a TUC enquiry in February 1940 at which seven full­
time trade union officials and Councillor Alfred Hobson, its secretary, met together and ‘agreed that the 
Trades Council had been going off the rails for a long time and [that] the Trades Union Officials had 
become disgusted with the meetings and the publicity they received. The influence of the Communist 
Party was apparent.’ For instance, the tiny Railway Clerks No. 2 Branch ‘submitted a resolution 
declaring the war to be an imperialist war and demanding the withdrawal of all Labour support to the 
Government and to conducting the prosecution of the war.’ The resolution was referred to 162 affiliated 
organisations but got just twenty-two replies. Of those replies, six only supported it, while sixteen were 
against. It had then been put to a delegate meeting of the Trades Council with 115 delegates present: 39 
voted for it and 38 against. Yet this resolution, despite the tiny margin of support, was exploited by 
German radio propaganda as a result. The Women’s Advisory Council also met and passed a resolution 
supporting peace by negotiation. Fewer than twenty people voted for it but it was reported by the Daily 
Worker and in a Moscow Radio broadcast the next day. The enquiry also found that Trades Council 
rules were out of date, that organisations affiliated on industrial questions often voted on political 
questions and vice versa, and that if delegates were unable to attend they were allowed to produce 
substitutes whose position had not been ratified by their union branch.107
This state of affairs could not continue and thus a conference was held to reorganise the Trades Council. 
New officers and a new Executive Council were set up - ‘and there is every indication now that the 
affairs of the Council are in the hands of loyal people’. Hobson remained secretary. Nine people had 
allegations against them, including Charles Darvill, the Trades Council president. Seven were said to be 
Communists and the others were said to have attended Communist fraction meetings. It was all denied 
but only the stories of three were accepted - the statements of the others, including Darvill, being 
regarded as ‘most unconvincing’.108 Ordinary Sheffielders and many of the party rank-and-file were only 
told of the seriousness of the Trades Council’s difficulties in late April 1940 when a Telegraph and
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Independent reporter was told that matters had reached a crisis by a Trades Council member who was 
also a city councillor.109 Sheffield Trades and Labour Council was not the sole body affected for seven 
Trades Councils in London, all joint bodies with the Labour Party, were also reorganised due to 
‘disruptive activities’, but only Sheffield Trades Council continued as a joint organisation.110
The 1941 TUC Annual Report noted that Mexborough Trades Council was one where ‘[ajction has been 
necessitated... on account o f breaches o f the Model Rules relative to proscribed organisations’ and that 
steps had been taken to remedy the position.111 This must be a reference to the story of its secretary the 
shop-steward, John Mason, who, uniquely for a Communist, was imprisoned without trial under Defence 
Regulation 18B. This regulation was usually used against fascists and Nazi sympathisers. He allegedly 
impeded war production, and, as a shop steward, he was certainly in a position to foment discontent 
among workers against the war. Yet the suspicion of some trade unionists was that he was dealt with for 
speaking for the workers against a bullying management and had been made an example o f pour 
encourager les autres.112 The case was made something of a cause celebre because he had not been 
immediately told why he was being imprisoned, and even when he was told, the explanation appeared to 
left-wing sympathizers incredible because o f his previous record as an active anti-fascist. In truth the 
position of the Communist Party was anti-fascist but it’s efforts were aimed at discrediting the ‘Men of 
Munich’ still in political office rather than being against the Germans who Stalin wished to keep sweet. 
The ‘Men of Munich’ were an easy target of popular ire, having been attacked by Michael Foot and two 
other journalists in July 1940 in the pamphlet Guilty Men for military shortcomings after Dunkirk.113 
They were seen by Communists not as misguided appeasers but as actual fascists.114
By stirring up disaffection with their position in Churchill’s government, however, the Communists were 
undermining the war-effort. Chamberlain was leader of the Conservatives until October 1940, they were 
still the most powerful political factor in the Commons, and Churchill was also a Conservative. Mason 
was arrested on 15 July 1940 on the orders of Sir John Anderson and was only released on 12 June 1941. 
His continued imprisonment, like the suppression of the Daily Worker between January 194 land August 
1942,115 was attributed by some left-wingers to the personal enmity of Herbert Morrison, the Minister of 
Home Security. He was the most anti-Communist of the Labour leaders though even he felt that the 
Communist Party could not be proscribed despite its attitude to the war and the accusations that it was 
spreading disaffection. In a Cabinet memorandum he proposed to intern Communists on the grounds o f 
their individual actions and not because they were Communists.116 Mason fell into this category.
Mason was an Amalgamated Engineering Union shop-steward at the English Steel Corporation in 
Sheffield, aged thirty-seven when arrested. He was convenor o f shop-stewards at Baker and Bessemer’s 
Kilnhurst works before the war and was awarded the Tolpuddle Medal by the TUC. He founded the 
Mexborough Trades Council and was an active Labour Party member in Mexborough before joining the 
Communists at the war’s start. In 1938 he stood as a Labour candidate for Mexborough Urban District 
Council and though not elected got a good vote. He was prominent in raising money for the Spanish
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Republic and fought Blackshirts in 1937 when William Joyce, the later notorious ‘Lord Haw Haw’, 
addressed a Rotherham meeting.117 A ‘John Mason Defence Committee’ was set up and questions were 
asked in Parliament. D. N. Pritt KC, whom we have already met, and Sydney Silverman, maverick 
Labour MP for Nelson and Colne, represented him in court.118 The National Council for Civil Liberties, 
then a Communist front, interested itself in his case. Two protest conferences were held in Mexborough 
in 1940. At the first, one speaker was the chairman of Barnsley Trades and Labour Council.119 At the 
second, there were 65 delegates including representatives of three Labour Party branches, sixteen AEU 
branches, sixteen other union branches and eight Trades Councils. A pamphlet was printed giving 
Mason’s life story with a petition attached which sold for one penny.120 Many Sheffield steelworks 
supported the petition as did a variety of union bodies from the Scottish Brass Moulders’ Union’s 
Executive Committee, to Edinburgh, Eccles and Stockport and Thomaby Trades Councils, and building 
trades workers in the London Co-operative movement.121 The NCCL believed that the immediate reason 
for Mason’s arrest was that he ‘had made some strictures on the war in a private letter which had been 
opened by the authorities.’122
Mason was released just before the invasion of Russia. But at the July 1941 annual meeting of the 
Sheffield Trades Council there was ambivalence over how to regard the latter. Mr. W. Scholey proposed 
a resolution calling on all workers to redouble their efforts to increase production so as to ensure an early 
and complete victory over the Axis Powers. Scholey said that they did not necessarily support everything 
the Soviet Union had done, but that they were standing loyally and unequivocally with Russia, because 
they were fighting the same tyranny. He went on to say that he hoped that the little Stalins o f this country 
were going to amend their ways, and that they would not seek to undermine the influence of every trade 
union leader. This resolution was carried by the meeting but it was criticised by Sidney Dyson of the 
Transport and General Workers Union who suggested that the mover was asking ‘that this Imperialist 
Government of ours shall once again be allowed to dominate Europe and do what it likes when the peace 
arrives.’123
Rotherham Trades Council pledged ‘itself to carry on the struggle [against Nazi aggression] with 
renewed energy in the workshops, mines and armed forces side by side with the forces of the USSR until 
final victory is achieved. Finally we place on record our profound admiration of the magnificent fight 
the Soviet Army, Navy and Air Force are waging against the ruthless invader.’124 At the Trades Council 
meeting in September 1941 a resolution was passed from the local branch of the steel union which called 
for the setting up of an Anglo-Soviet Committee and asked the Trades Council to set up a Council of 
Action ‘to promote all possible help to the Russian people in their titanic struggle against Hitler’.125
At the Sheffield Trades Council meeting in October 1941 the Telegraph commented that the delegates 
were so enthusiastic on hearing the first news of the Trades Council’s “Aid to Russia” scheme that they 
had to be told from the chair that the scheme was only four days old and that the sub-committee 
appointed to deal with it must be given a chance to get into its stride. The sub-committee included
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Councillor Hobson, Albert Ballard representing the Co-operative movement, and the vice-presidents of 
the Trades Council. A special co-ordinating committee was later set up representing DLPs, the Co­
operative Party and the trade unions to raise £5,000.126 By 29th November they had raised almost 
£1,000 with the help of cinemas who provided facilities for collections and appeals.127 Thousands of 
pounds, however, went directly from local trades unionists to the National Council of Labour Fund for 
Russia independently of the Trades Council.128 It was in this enthusiastic mood that the Trades Council 
complained to the TUC General Secretary that it had had only limited contact with a Russian trade union 
delegation at a conference in Sheffield in January 1942 due to the vigilance of the Ministry of 
Information. Its representative never left them unattended and whisked them away by road from the 
meeting as soon as it finished.129 The Executive Committee Report for 1943 reported with pride that by 
the year’s start they had raised £5,200 for the ‘Aid to Russia’ Fund and over £320 for the ‘Aid to China’ 
Fund.130
The enthusiasm for these Funds was not confined to Sheffield. A circular on the subject from the 
National Council of Labour was discussed by Doncaster Labour Party’s Executive Committee in October 
1941 and the secretary reported that he been visited by Dr. Bury about signatures for an Anglo-Soviet 
Unity Campaign.131 At a following meeting on the Campaign at the Mansion House, Councillor 
Cranfield reported that, ‘The attendance was poor. All the evidence shows that Dr. Bury, whilst 
enthusiastic, does not quite realise the tremendous job he has undertaken. It was agreed to ask the 
Mayor-Elect to issue an Appeal and convene a second meeting. Apart from Mrs. Scargall and Dr. Bury 
only Labour Patty representatives were present.’ Miss Sampson who attended a second meeting noted 
that it was more representative. The Mayor was chairman and agreed to launch an appeal. Subversive 
political implications arising from helping Soviet Russia were downplayed and ‘money, whilst essential 
appeared to be the predominant feature of the meeting . . .  propaganda took second place.’132 An 
independent Labour Party Fund was later set up133 but was wound up at the end o f 1942.134 A Flag Day 
in aid of the Mayor’s Fund was proposed for 13 December 1941 and fund raising activities were to be 
held in cinemas.135 It was planned that between 27 April and 3 May 1942 there would be an ‘Aid for 
Russia Week’. By the end of January 1942 the Fund had raised nearly £1,000 and plans for the ‘Aid for 
Russia Week4 were ambitious. On separate days there would be a dance, a Women’s Day, a Lido 
Carnival, a mass meeting which, it was hoped, would be addressed by Sir Stafford Cripps, another Flag 
Day when there would be a special Doncaster Rovers’ match, and on Sunday special church services and 
a collection. This was despite reports of some resistance from church authorities.136
In Rotherham in October 1941, as an expression of sympathy for Russia and the people o f Rostov on the 
Don (‘whose industries are the same as ours’), a book of signatures o f support was begun with the Mayor 
first to sign.137 In a letter to the Advertiser, he appealed for £500 to be contributed within a week for the 
Russian Red Cross Fund. He hoped every citizen would contribute a small sum.138 These contributions 
and their sources were recorded in the Advertiser so we can get some idea of the broad range o f people 
who contributed and what they did to get funds. 3 January 1942 records over £10 each from Allott Bros.
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and Leigh Ltd, from the employees of three Communal Restaurants and from the Park Street Kitchen.
£10 came from “B” Company of the 58th West Riding Home Guard and £5 2s from the joint efforts of 
Bethel Road residents. £3 16s 9d was contributed by the East Dene Social Club - the seventh such 
contribution. £3 10s came from pensioners and customers of Midland Road Post Office. £3 5s 6d was 
raised by the Rotherham Girls Club Carol Party and 15s 6d by Class III of St. Ann’s Girls’ School. The 
published contributions also included tiny amounts by single individuals. By the end o f December 1941 
over £977 had been raised139 and this increased to over £1,323 by April 1942.140 The Trades Council did 
not have an independent fund. Money, like the £50 raised from a dance organised by Councillor Mrs. 
Green for the Women’s Federation of the Labour Party, went to the Mayor’s Fund.141 This continued 
throughout the war. In 1943 the Executive Committee ‘very strongly recommend that all delegates . . .  
give their assistance unstintingly to this veiy worthy cause . . .  we whole-heartedly endorse the action of 
the Secretary in the effort he has taken and the efforts he will make on behalf o f the Labour Party to 
assist the Mayor, the Mayoress and Alderman Dobbie to achieve the target’ which now was £3,000 for 
medical supplies and surgical equipment.142
The funds raised appear very creditable but it should be noted there were many appeals to citizens to 
donate to worthy causes during the war. In Rotherham in 1942 the Russian Red Cross Fund competed 
with other humanitarian funds like the Mayor o f Rotherham’s British Ambulance Fund, the Mayoress’s 
Comforts Fund and the British Red Cross Fund.143 Yet the sums raised appear tiny compared with the 
amounts raised during the National Savings Weeks. Rotherham ‘War Weapons Week’ in 1941 got 
£758,542 and ‘Warship Week’ in 1942 got £785,616.144 The latter had the aim of raising £700,000 to 
get a destroyer built on Clydebank to be adopted by the town as HMS Rotherham. £5,000 was raised by 
Advertiser readers in 1940 to buy a Spitfire or Hurricane for the RAF. £1,400 was raised in the first 
week of the appeal. More than £6,000 was also raised for the same purpose by the Rotherham and 
District Fighter Plane Fund.145
4.3 - RESURGENCE, 1942-1945
The president of Sheffield Trades Council, Councillor Sterland, in 1943 praised Stalingrad’s defenders, 
the determination and self-sacrifice of the Red Army, and that of the Allied armies in Africa: ‘The final 
battle is not yet over. Blood, Sweat and Tears remain only too tragically within our vision, but I do not 
think I shall be accused of undue optimism when I say that there appears on the horizon a brighter Star 
than we have seen during the past three years.’146 The Beveridge Report, published three weeks after El 
Alamein, contributed to this optimism. It gave evidence of light at the end of the tunnel down which the 
British people had been wearily travelling and expectation not merely of victory but of the better 
conditions for working people. The Atlantic Charter had already called on nations to unite in ‘securing 
for all improved labour standards, economic advancement, and social security’ and Beveridge appeared 
to embody those ideals.147 Heartened local Labour parties now believed in the possibility of a future 
general election and planned for it. They were optimistic about Labour forming the next Government for
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opinion polls from June 1943 consistently predicted Labour victory.148 This was in contrast to 1939 or 
1940 when a ‘sea-change’ in popular political attitudes towards Labour and against the Tories seemed 
unrealistic.149 Labour reached a low point in 1942 in terms of individual and trade union national 
membership figures. This was also the case with individual membership figures in South Yorkshire 
(with the exception of Rother Valley DLP) but this was also going to change.
The desire to spell out what Britain was fighting for by making plans for post-war reconstruction was 
evident before December 1942. Clement Attlee, speaking at a regional conference of delegates in 
Sheffield in April 1940, told them that the reconstruction of the country’s economic system was a vital 
necessity and that changes in its economic and social structure must be made to fully realise the kind of 
society they wanted after the war.150 Hallam DLP in January 1940 decided to order two hundred copies 
of the pamphlet What We Are Fighting F o r, a free copy to be sent to each member.151 In October they 
agreed to buy four copies of Labour’s Aims in War and Peace. They wanted Councillor Bingham to put 
copies in city libraries.152 In March 1942 they also decided to buy twelve copies o f The Old World and 
the New Society.153 Over town planning, Labour city councillors were making progress even if criticised 
for secrecy as we saw in Chapter Three. Despite such precedents, however, it was only after Beveridge 
was published that issues of post-war reconstruction came into their own. This affected public 
perceptions of Labour and the Conservatives with dividends in 1945 after the PLP revolted in Parliament 
against its leaders in the government in February 1943.
The Telegraph editorial on 5 December 1942 said that the Report, ‘whatever may be its final outcome, is 
a great State document, and so replete with suggestions that volumes could be written upon it.’ It 
marvelled that such a document could be brought together, published and discussed at the climax of a 
World War and contrasted it with what brutal regimes on the Continent had to offer.154 But in January 
1943 it also warned: ‘Is it wise ... that an increasing number o f people, organisations and other corporate 
bodies should be diverted to the propounding of social and economic schemes, plans and programmes 
which, whatever their merit, and whatever their ultimate benefit at the moment but serve as serious 
distractions from the great task in hand ?’155 The Municipal Progressives also seemed lukewarm but this 
could not be said o f Labour. Even prior to publication the Trades Council told its secretary to buy thirty- 
six copies of the Report.156 Sheffield Fabians in January 1943 offered to send speakers to local 
organisations wishing to discuss it.157 A special conference was held in January 1943 of the Women’s 
Advisory Council at which Clara Adam of Oxford spoke about social security and the Report,158 and a 
major conference was organised for 13 March 1943.159 In the Commons on 18 February 1943, Cecil 
Wilson, Fred Marshall and T. W. Burden of Park Division all abstained on the Labour amendment 
calling for implementation.160 Wilfred Paling o f Wentworth and Tom Williams of Don Valley, both in 
government posts, voted against. Evelyn Walkden of Doncaster 161and William Dobbie supported it. A 
special meeting of Rotherham Labour Party on 16 February had resolved to accept it in principle though 
reserving the right to submit amendments.162 Dobbie said that it was not Socialism but that it would 
uplift the working man, thus any attempt to shelve it by the government would be grounds for calling for
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an election.163
Interest in post-war reconstruction among local Labour parties continued throughout the war. Sterland in 
1944 was confident that ‘There is no doubt that the present order of society is doomed, and that a new 
social order must be established.’ He called for credit and the essential industries to be in the hands of 
the community and for production and distribution to be organised on a co-operative basis, for the 
country’s resources to be used in the interests o f the many and not the few, and for the creation o f a Co­
operative Commonwealth that would not be beholden to the strongholds of high finance.164 The Trade 
Council’s sub-committee on Post-War Reconstruction was making plans and reports which involved 
much discussion and definite progress was being made, it was claimed.165
A variety of subjects came before delegate meetings of the Trade Council in 1943 including Ernest 
Bevin’s Catering Wages Bill, education, women in prison, the health services, housing and town 
planning, British Restaurants, Communist affiliation to the Labour Party, Oswald Mosley, German 
workers and the regionalisation of local government.166 On education, the Trades Council was opposed 
to a system of dual control in schools which allowed children to be religiously indoctrinated by the 
Church, and called for equality of opportunity to be the basis of new legislation. The leaving age should 
also be raised to fifteen at the war’s end and sixteen within three years.167 Ecclesall DLP had a 
resolution accepted which urged that women convicted of crimes be removed from prison before they 
gave birth because of the stigma children bom there would bear for the rest of their lives.168 The Trades 
Council felt honoured by Manchester Trades Council’s request to send representatives to visit Sheffield’s 
British Restaurants. It welcomed the introduction of communal feeding and hoped the Restaurants 
would be transferred to the City Council after the war.169 The Trades Council and the Labour Group 
both opposed regionalisation of the structure of local government as we saw in Chapter Two.170 In 
November 1943 the Trades Council and local Communists called for the re-intemment o f Oswald 
Mosley and his wife.171
In May 1943 the Trades Council voted to oppose Communist affiliation to the Labour Party at the Party 
Conference on the grounds that they were unreliable and unfit to become partners in the great Labour 
movement.172 This contrasted with the tribute paid to the Soviet Union on “Red Army Sunday” in 
February 1943 when Stafford Cripps, Minister of Aircraft Production, spoke in the City Hall.173 The 
‘ceremony was awe-inspiring and was responsible for drawing the largest crowd of people seen in our 
City over a long period of years.’ The Trades Council was represented on the platform.174 Labour in 
Rotherham, however, was more forgiving of the British Communists and willing to believe that the 
liquidation o f the Communist International showed their good faith. In the first half o f 1943 a great 
debate opened within Rotherham Labour Party over Communist affiliation. Three Rotherham branches 
of the AEU had voted in favour by the start of March 1943 175and, while the Rotherham and District 
Joint Committee of the steel union repudiated a claim by the local Communist Party that it supported 
their affiliation,176 the Holmes Mills Branch later did so.177 The Yorkshire Mineworkers Association
101
supported it as did Wentworth and Don Valley DLPs.178 The local Electrical Trades Union and the 
Transport and General Workers’ Union also supported it. The latter believed that affiliation would be an 
extra guarantee of working-class interests being considered fully in the post-war world. The Trades 
Council deferred discussion for a month in February 1943179 and again in March 1943.180 Finally, in 
April 1943 it supported affiliation by a margin of three votes, with eight delegates abstaining. It was a 
decision condemned by the Advertiser.181 Doncaster DLP, on the other hand, was against Communist 
affiliation.182 It was more interested in securing as a ‘vital necessity’ the purchase of the Doncaster 
Trades’ and Friendly Societies’ Club ‘as a permanent home for the Labour and Trade Union 
Movement’.183
In 1944 a similar variety of subjects was debated by the delegates to Sheffield Trades Council to 1943.184 
These included Regulation 18B, Sunday opening of cinemas185, a proposal that Labour councillors 
should retire at 65, a proposal that the Daily Worker should be allowed foreign correspondents, Aid to 
Russia, that a limited liability company be formed to run Sheffield Forward, the Trades Disputes Act 
1927 and Regulation 1AA, education again, environmental protection (they opposed outcrop coal mining 
in Bowden Housestead Wood which was the only ‘green lung’ available to the people o f the East End of 
Sheffield186), Indian self-government187, the situation in Greece188, post-war Germany,189 maternity and 
child welfare and the medical services more generally.190
The period between the end of 1944 and July 1945 was marked in Sheffield by preparations for the 
general election by local Labour, and by calls from the Trades Council that serious steps be taken for 
planning the transition from war to peace.191 Len Williams of the Yorkshire Regional Council told 
members of Hallam DLP in January 1945 that only five of the fifty-one constituencies covered by it had 
not selected parliamentary candidates. This included Hallam. He stressed the importance of fighting 
even seats that were hopeless for Labour for they would keep opposition workers tied to their own 
constituencies and not allow them to get involved in contests in strong Labour seats.192 Hallam called 
for the Trades Council to set up a Central Election Committee with representatives from each Ward and 
Division to plan for the General and Municipal Elections on a joint basis over the whole City. There 
should be a Central Office with a full-time Secretary who would advise on correspondence, speakers and 
meetings, and a Central Pool of Finance created by subscriptions from each DLP based on membership 
which would help the weaker Divisions.193 It rebuffed Communist calls for discussions on electoral 
unity194 but ultimately Communist intervention may have cost Labour the seat. A candidate for Hallam 
was finally chosen on 28 May 1945195 and an Agent formally appointed on 11 June 1945.196
In Rotherham, the Trades and Labour Council in marked contrast to Hallam DLP continued to show 
sympathy with the Communist Party as it had in the campaign for Communist affiliation. In December 
1944, it carried a resolution that it was ‘in favour o f the Communist Party’s suggestion, that progressive 
Party’s fsicl with similar programmes should co-operate to ensure that progressive candidates are 
returned at the coming General Election.’197 This was rescinded at the next meeting but the President’s
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remarks clearly showed him to be sympathetic to the Communist standpoint. He said that he saw nothing 
in the principle of the resolution to which the meeting could not agree.198 The potential embarrassment 
for Labour in its attempts to take on the Tories if it had united with the CPGB was apparent in the fact 
that the latter by 1944-5 had dropped class politics and was calling for a continuing alliance with 
progressive capitalists at the behest of Stalin who wanted a long-term accommodation with the Western 
Allies.199 A proposal to appoint a full-time Election Agent for Rotherham was agreed on 24 April 1945. 
Councillor G. A. Brown, the Secretary of the Trades and Labour Council, was appointed. Alderman 
Dobbie was re-nominated as the prospective parliamentary candidate.200
4.4 - THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1945
The following Tables look at the results in terms of turnout of voters in 1935 and 1945 and votes cast 
both numerically and as a percentage for the various Parties both in terms of the total electorate and the 
number of electors who actually voted based on the thirteen constituencies which make up South 
Yorkshire.201 Appendix 2 gives further tables of election statistics including the swing to Labour in each 
constituency from the Conservatives since 1935 which is calculated by finding the average of the 
percentage Labour gain over 1935 and the percentage Conservative loss added together. The following 
section attempts to explain Labour’s success in South Yorkshire in 1945 where it gained a seat from the 
Conservatives to make eleven out of the thirteen. It also increased its actual vote by 52,536 over 1935 
and took 9.16 per cent more of the potential vote than in 1935. The percentage of actual votes increased 
by 4.74 per cent on an 8.85 per cent higher turnout, despite the electoral register containing 20,121 less 
voters, and despite Labour contesting one less seat. In South Yorkshire as a whole there was a swing to 
Labour since 1935 of 10.84 per cent and a swing to Labour in Sheffield of 13.73 per cent. The latter 
swing is better than the national figure of 12 per cent but across the country there were wide variations. 
Leeds, for example, did better with a swing of 17.5 per cent and the West Riding as a whole had a swing 
of 12 per cent. Glasgow had a swing of just 2.5 per cent while Birmingham’s swing was as much as 23 
per cent.202 Individual constituencies show a great deal o f variety in their percentage swings, from 
Wentworth with just a 1.5 per cent swing to Sheffield Attercliffe with a swing o f 18.6 per cent.
Table A - Potential Electorate, Actual Voters and % Turnout over South Yorkshire
1935 1935 % 1945 1945 %
Total Potential 
Voters
688,962 100 668,841 100
Total Actual Voters 510,862 74.15 555,365 83
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Table B - Total Votes Cast and % of Total Potential Electorate
1935 Votes 1935 % 1945 Votes 1945 %
Labour Party 300,721 43.64 353,257 52.8
Conservative Party 178,160 25.86 139,483 20.85
National Liberal 31,981 4.6 38,207 5.7
Common Wealth -------- ------- 12,045 1.8
Communist 6,368 0.95
Liberal 6,005 0.898
Table C - % of Actual Votes Cast
1935 % 1945 °/o
Labour Party 58.86 63.6
Conservative Party 34.87 25.1
National Liberal 6.2 6.87
Common Wealth 2.16
Communist 1.14
Liberal 1.08
According to a recent account the foundation of Labour’s electoral triumph in 1945 was the hope among 
working-class and middle-class people alike that Labour’s support for welfare reform was not 
disingenuous, and that by implementing the Beveridge Report and dealing with the acute housing 
shortage, it would prevent any return to pre-war poverty and insecurity. It was successful not because of 
its desire to ultimately build a ‘Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain’ or because it advocated 
nationalisation but because the example of the Second World War showed that the Conservatives, while 
concerned to win the war under Churchill, were a party of obstruction in domestic policy.203 The 
Parliamentary Labour Party’s rebellion against the Government over the Beveridge Report had shown 
that, as Herbert Tracey wrote in 1948, it was ‘proved once again that the “condition of the people” 
question was still the fundamental dividing issue between the Labour Party and the other Parties.”204 This 
view is partly accepted by Howell but he is also sympathetic to the argument that the electorate was not 
just apathetic or cynical about the ‘Brave New World’ often promised during the war but actually 
enthusiastic. He uses the phrase ‘bread and butter plus a dream’ to characterise the wishes of the 
electorate in 1945. To Socialists and many ordinary voters the creation of an alternative social order did 
not seem a Utopian pipedream as it might seem today.205 We have also seen in this chapter the great 
enthusiasm for Soviet Russia among both local Socialists and the less politically inclined. This might 
have materially assisted the reception of Labour doctrines like nationalisation among local people given 
the apparent efficiency of a centrally planned socialist economy in winning Russia’s war and its 
similarity to the wartime economy of Britain. Thus the prospect of an alternative socialist order 
appeared more credible and materially contributed to Labour’s victory in 1945. Harold Nicolson had 
lamented in 1942 ‘how sad it is that the British public are wholly unaware of the true state o f Russia, and 
imagine that it is some workers’ Utopia.’206
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We saw in an Chapter Three that over housing and town planning the Coalition Government was 
criticised for procrastination and red tape. It did appeared likely that under a Labour Government the 
apparent obstacles that prevented local authorities being able to make faster progress would be 
overcome. As we have seen the situation was desperate. The White Papers produced by the Coalition 
on issues like housing or town planning were not evidence of a wartime elite consensus based on social 
democratic nostrums. They were merely convenient bandages to plaster over issues on which there was 
fundamental disagreement between the parties. They were a classic fudge when visible public 
disagreement would have greatly damaged the Coalition while it concentrated on winning the war.207 
Jefferys argues that despite this, ‘The balance o f coalition forces produced in effect [however] a series of 
compromises tilted towards Conservative orthodoxy.’208 Conservatives were confident they would win 
in 1945. It was only the profound shock of defeat that forced them to fundamentally reassess their social 
policy.209
Herbert Tracey writing in 1948 describes the Churchill Government as ‘not founded upon a coalition of 
Parties: it was a Government of National Union, and the Parties upon whose support it depended were in 
a curious way at once its friends and its critics’,210 but some historians are sceptical of any sort of 
wartime consensus, whether elite or otherwise.211 According to Tracey, Churchill’s “Four-Year Plan” of 
post-war reconstruction put forward in 1943 was not the programme upon which he fought the election, 
and that in the end Churchill had abandoned his leadership of a united nation in favour o f being Leader 
of the Conservative Party.212 Of course his supporters in South Yorkshire denied that. They described 
themselves as ‘National’ or ‘Government’ candidates because Churchill had made himself the head, with 
no argument, of a ‘Caretaker Government’ once Labour resigned office.
Historians of the inter-war years have made much of the uneven development of Britain in the 1930s, and 
in reaction to the myth of the “Hungry Thirties” have emphasised those areas, in the South-East and 
Midlands which boomed during the period, directly encouraged by the policies o f the National 
Government. They also argue that the quality and quantity of life actually improved for the majority of 
families particularly those in employment.213 In South Yorkshire, the ‘National’ candidates would be 
unwise to describe themselves by that label. Unemployment in the Thirties in Sheffield had reached a 
peak of 58,100 people in 1932214 and a record figure of 14,419 people in Rotherham in March 1931.
The population of Rotherham in 1931 was 69,691 persons, so roughly 21 per cent of the population was 
out of work, or one in five.215 In Sheffield in 1931 there was a population of 511,757 people, so at its 
peak unemployment affected just over 11 per cent of the population. Churchill’s followers believed, or 
professed to believe, that 1945 would be another 1931. But it was also believed, wrongly as it turned out, 
that once peace returned, Britain would again experience a slump and mass unemployment. In 1945 the 
fear of ‘betrayal’ in the past had its effects on the popular psyche. Howell, however, has argued that 
because British voters did not flock to elect Labour in 1935 just after the depths of the depression had 
been reached, the idea of ‘betrayal’ contained in the phrase ‘never again’ had a curiously belated impact
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in 1945. This ignores the fact that voters in 1935 did not believe, and Baldwin encouraged this belief, 
that anything could actually be done to solve unemployment by government means and that the economy 
must find its natural equilibrium level of employment.216 In South Yorkshire, however, with the 
exception of Sheffield Central, Labour did win in 1935 all the constituencies it was to win in 1945.
In mining areas, like South Yorkshire, nationalisation of the coal industry did have a genuine appeal after 
the harsh experience of the inter-war years, and it had been a demand made by the miners of the Labour 
Party for many years. The Yorkshire coal strikes in 1944 also gave a contemporary edge to miners’ 
feelings, embittered locally in 1921 and 1926. Churchill could be held personally responsible for 
vetoing nationalisation of the industry during the war. Steel nationalisation may have had less appeal but 
in the three constituencies where steel workers were predominant - Rotherham, Attercliffe and Brightside 
- there was little sign of rebellion against Labour in 1945, or indeed in 1950 when the Conservatives 
campaigned even harder against steel nationalisation. In fact after Parliament resumed in 1950 the 
Labour MP for Attercliffe, John Hynd, disputed that the Conservative MPs for Hallam and Heeley had 
any right to say they represented steelworkers views on nationalisation even if they were Sheffield MPs, 
and said that the election had been a referendum on the Iron and Steel Act in the three constituencies.217 
The Times of 23 June 1945 said that Labour’s nationalisation plans in Sheffield were being received 
‘with interest if not enthusiasm’ and optimistically noted that:
The suggestion has been made at some of the Conservative meetings that private 
enterprise should be given a chance of showing how it has learned the lessons which 
war-time enterprise has provided. The workers as well as the masters know the 
advances made, and it will take more than vain repetitions of the cry of nationalization 
to convince them that a change o f system is essential and inevitable.218
On 18 June 1945 the Sheffield Telegraph noted that: ‘Few areas in the country can provide a more 
intriguing General Election set-up than Sheffield and the big industrial and agricultural areas surrounding 
it. To the keen student of political affairs the situation in the Sheffield region - covering large parts of 
Yorkshire, Derbyshire, Notts., and Lincs. - teems with interesting and often piquant possibilities.’ In 
Sheffield four out of five workers were involved in some way with the steel industry and her future 
prosperity depended on having people who understood her basic industries at Westminster and who 
would ‘“talk Sheffield” in season or out.’ Unless the ‘wartime shackles’ were thrown off there was 
‘weighty evidence that if we aren’t quick off the mark we shall lose both old and new markets which 
mean millions in trade for Sheffield.’ Housing and pensions were also ‘vital subjects affecting the 
welfare of scores of thousands o f Sheffield people.’ It noted that servicemen were prominent as 
candidates throughout the region with at least one service candidate in each division.219 Appendix 2 
gives the General Election results in 1945 while Appendix 3 gives details of all the candidates so far as 
they can be gleaned from newspapers and other sources.
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The Times noted that: ‘In the Hillsborough division there is something piquant in the challenge to the 
former “ruler of the King’s Navee” [Labour’s Albert Victor Alexander, previously First Lord of the 
Admiralty] from a naval lieutenant [Robert Hampdon Hobart, the one Liberal National candidate in 
Sheffield]. It is one of the products of that British democracy that the foreigner will never understand.’
It went on: ‘Mr. Alexander’s majority was 3,304, which is not too many in an area where there are many 
private traders and when there is this talk of nationalization.’220 In fact Alexander’s majority rose to 
10,556 and he took over 63 per cent of all votes cast, despite his Divisional Labour Party’s low minimum 
individual membership and its arrears in subscriptions to Head Office. But Alexander was the foremost 
figure in the Co-operative Party in the country and had the advantage of the services o f the one full-time 
agent who had worked throughout the war in Sheffield. He was Albert Ballard, who became a city 
councillor in 1942 and was originally a railway footplateman 221 There were 145,000 Co-operative 
members in Sheffield for whom the legendary ‘divi’ would be a powerful incentive to vote Labour.222 
Alexander called for iron and steel nationalization because,
The cost of iron and steel has risen to almost double that of peace time and we are not 
going to compete in the world market unless the situation can be improved. The steel 
industry has reached a point where it cannot operate successfully without 
amalgamating to a great extent. We would rather have public control than control by a 
monopoly.223
Alexander was not exactly a constituency MP in the modem sense. In fact Hattersley describes him as 
an ‘absentee member’ but he was an impressive personage who saw his job not as representing 
Westminster to his electors but his electors to Westminster.224 Hobart, like other service candidates 
standing in Sheffield, had been wounded in action. He lost the sight in one eye in Italy. He said that 
while foreign policy was his real forte his main domestic interest was housing and he was a member of 
the Town and Country Planning Association.225
Sheffield Ecclesall was a three-sided contest in which Labour did not field a candidate. It had always 
been a Conservative stronghold and the victor was Sheffield-born Major Peter Roberts, the barrister son 
of Sir Samuel Roberts, Bt., a previous Conservative MP for the seat. Roberts was a director of 
Wombwell Main Colliery and of the Barnsley District Coking Company so he had a vested interest in 
opposing coal nationalisation. He also had a two thousand acre farm in Norfolk.226 All the candidates in 
Ecclesall were servicemen. Lieutenant Sydney Checkland was the sole Common Wealth Party candidate 
in South Yorkshire and argued in a pamphlet that anyone who would otherwise have voted Labour 
‘should make sure he or she votes for Checkland.’ This led Roberts to describe the statement as 
‘politically dishonest’ since Labour had repudiated Common Wealth in 1943 and membership was 
incompatible with that of the Labour Party.227 Checkland was a Canadian who came to Britain to study 
economics at Birmingham University where he gained a BCom degree with first-class honours in 1941. 
Between 1957 and 1982 he was to be the first Professor of Economic History at Glasgow University. He
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was severely wounded in Normandy.228
The Common Wealth belief in Christian socialism and service to the community without thought for self 
was tailored to appeal to the idealism of public sector professional middle-class people who lived in the 
Division - the appeal had less resonance with the working classes who tended to be cynical about the real 
aims of middle-class people such as Common Wealth leader, Richard Acland, who admitted that he 
talked ‘like a parson’.229 Lieutenant-Colonel P. R. Nightingale was the 48 year old Liberal candidate 
who had been invalided out of the Forces with a tropical skin disease. He had served in World War One 
and been mentioned in despatches. In the Second War he was at Dunkirk and in the Western Desert and 
commanded Indian troops in Burma. He owned a catering firm.230 Roberts achieved a majority o f 6,075 
votes over Checkland but the latter had a moral victory taking almost 36 per cent of the total votes cast.
Hallam Division saw South Yorkshire’s only four-way contest. The victor was the sitting Conservative, 
Roland Jennings, a chartered accountant from County Durham, who had first won the seat in a by- 
election in 1939. Jennings had been wounded in World War One.231 Hallam had a swing to Labour from 
1935 of over 16 per cent but it was not possible for Squadron Leader J. F. Drabble, the Labour 
candidate, to dislodge him. The latter worked in Sheffield before the war as a barrister. He served in 
Africa and Italy.232 Drabble got 38.5 per cent of the vote. Gerald Abrahams, a Liberal barrister, got 7.7 
per cent of the vote. Lieutenant Gordon H. Cree, the Communist, got 6.7 per cent which probably cost 
Drabble the seat. The Hallam branch of Common Wealth had instructed its members to vote Labour.233
It was said to be a blow to the Conservatives that Sir William Whytehead Boulton had decided not to 
contest his seat234 due to ill health, but his majority in Sheffield Central had been a wafer-thin 420 votes. 
Slum clearance and Blitz damage had halved the electorate from 36,709 voters to 18,666 and Labour 
took it with a majority o f2,473 in a straight fight. This was despite Conservative attempts to organise the 
votes of the 1,654 business voters on their behalf.235 Central had the largest number o f such voters in the 
City. Sheffield Park came next but with just 282 such voters.236 The successful Labour candidate was a 
fifty-one year old Jewish barrister, Harry Morris, bom in Sheffield, who had been a Lieutenant-Colonel 
in the army.237 He had previously been a city councillor for Brightside.238 His election address asked 
voters to leam from the bad experiences of the inter-war years and vote Labour.239 The losing 
Conservative candidate was forty year old Sheffield-born solicitor, Lieutenant-Colonel George Vivian 
Hunt. He had done much local philanthropic work and was well known in the political life o f the Hope 
Valley in Derbyshire. He had received the OBE for services in Tunisia while in the army and took part 
in the invasions of Sicily and Italy. He said he was ‘wholeheartedly in favour of Mr Churchill, of a rising 
standard of living, and of homes for all.’240
The other three Sheffield Parliamentaiy constituencies - Attercliffe, Brightside and Park - all elected 
Labour Members just as they had in 1935. In Attercliffe, John Hynd won 81.4 per cent o f votes cast, a 
majority of 18,092. It was greater victory for him than his results in the elections of 1950 or 1951 and
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probably reflected an increase in left-wing popular attitudes among the Attercliffe working classes due to 
the revolution of expectations caused by the war. John’s brother Hariy was also elected in 1945 for 
Hackney Central.241 Both had originally been railway clerks though they became officials o f different 
unions. John was in the National Union of Railwaymen and both were originally from Perth.242 He was 
notable for his sympathetic attitude to the Germans and for his attempts to prevent, despite the triumph of 
‘Socialist Vansittartism’ within the Labour Party during the war,243 ordinary Germans being tarred with 
the same brush as the Nazis for the latter’s crimes.244 The recognition of these sympathies led him to 
being given the post of Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister for German and Austrian 
Affairs in 1945, a position he kept until April 1947245 despite repeated criticism for being too pro- 
German.246 In December 1947, he became vice-chairman of the Europe Group of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party.247 His Conservative opponent was another service candidate. Group Captain Brian 
Paddon had served in Bomber Command and had been a prisoner-of-war.
Fred Marshall, whom we met in Chapter Three, was re-elected in 1945 for Brightside with 61.2 per cent 
of the vote in a three-way contest with Lieutenant-Colonel H. Brian Taylor, the Conservative candidate, 
who got 25.8 percent o f the vote, and Howard Hill, the Communist candidate, with 13 per cent. Taylor 
was a forty-one year old barrister who had served on the headquarters staff of the United States and 
British Planning Staff in Germany.248 Hill was a former electrician and city councillor for Brightside 
whom we also met in Chapter Three. He had been elected originally as a Labour councillor but had been 
expelled from Brightside Labour Party in 1940 for refusing to support national Labour Party policy.249 
Finally, Park Division was won for Labour by Thomas William Burden, a sixty-year old East Ham 
Alderman,250 with 64.9 per cent of the vote and a majority of 13,542 over Wing Commander Geoffrey 
Stevens, the Conservative candidate and a chartered accountant.251 Burden was a Christian socialist. He 
was a Member of the House of Laity of the Church Assembly after the war and Second Church Estate 
Commissioner. He had been a railway goods agent educated by the Workers’ Educational Association 
and the London School of Economics.252
4.5 - CONCLUSION
Outside the Conservative strongholds of Hallam and Ecclesall, Labour had the advantage particularly in 
organisation. The maintenance of Labour’s organisation in wartime despite a supposed ‘political truce’ 
was also given as an explanation by Conservatives for their national defeat in 1945, an explanation 
accepted by Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo, who yet point out that the biggest flaw in this claim is that 
the majority of voters had decided how they would vote before the election. Labour’s superior 
organisation probably just meant that potential Labour voters were more likely to turn out and vote than 
Conservatives 253 This thus has some relevance in explaining the South Yorkshire results, even though 
full-time Labour Agents had been rare during the war years, because in a largely working-class 
population there were likely to be more Labour voters than Conservative. In the first two years o f the 
war in Yorkshire the number of Labour Agents had dropped from thirty-three to eleven.254 The war
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economy had given the trade unions a major role - as Table 1.8 in the appendices shows, the affiliated 
membership and organisations of Doncaster DLP increased dramatically during the war from a low point 
in 1940, following a similar trend to the individual membership. Similar evidence comes from the 1946 
Annual Report of Sheffield Trades and Labour Council which noted that since 1938 they had added 
more than 50 new affiliated societies to their register and the figure had now reached 174. It also 
reported that there had been a 100 per cent increase over 1936’s figure in the finances of the Trades 
Council. It noted that ‘In strength and prestige we have grown from the ordinary to the extraordinary and 
now take our rightful place among the influential public bodies of our City.’255
Labour also had highly respected local leaders who were national figures, like Albert Victor Alexander 
of Hillsborough, a jingoistic First Lord of the Admirality and Churchill fan who, according to his 
biographer, was the war premier’s favourite socialist,256 or Tom Williams of Don Valley, who became 
Attlee’s Minister of Agriculture.257 These men could not easily be caricatured by Conservatives as 
bloodthirsty revolutionaries or as in any sense unpatriotic. They embodied local patriotism and civic 
spirit. The Conservatives also claimed that the media were against them in 1945258 but in Sheffield the 
Telegraph was recognised by Labour Party members as the inspiration of the entire Conservative effort 
in the city. Viscount Kemsley, chairman of The Sheffield Telegraph and Star, Limited, had more of an 
entree into Sheffielders’ homes than Sheffield Forward but they did not take the advice o f the Editors’ of 
either of his two Sheffield newspapers.
The efforts of Labour to provide credible proposals for post-war reconstruction in South Yorkshire, 
including housing, town planning, improved medical services, and to call for a diversified modem 
economy locally, plus the help Labour MPs and parties provided for those who needed it when faced by 
wartime disruption, all added to Labour’s image as a ‘safe’ progressive party. In the light o f the anti­
party popular mood of wartime chronicled by Fielding, it also (unlike the Conservatives) appeared above 
‘party’ in its support for social reforms that the people wanted.259 According to Fielding, Labour 
deliberately presented itself rhetorically as the ‘People’s Party’ rather than simply a party o f the working 
class in order to cement a coalition of the middle and working classes in 1945.260 The tribal appeal to 
social class, if not to class war, however, in a mainly working-class areas of South Yorkshire did have a 
major effect producing a significant rise in numbers voting for Labour even in seats which had always 
been solidly supportive. Communism was less successful perhaps because of its belief in class conflict. 
Its popular image was marked by political somersaults as it sought to follow the Soviet Union’s 
ideological line and its emphasis on war production at all costs actually made it less attractive to war 
weary Britons by 1945. This chapter shows that characterisations of Labour in South Yorkshire during 
the war as a mere puppet of Transport House cannot be sustained. Friendships made in the masculine 
atmosphere of the engineering workshop, steel mill or pit created a solidarity that grew from experience 
of hellish working conditions and the squalid poverty o f everyday life lived in the slums of Sheffield’s 
East End. It grew from the simplified class antagonisms of colliery communities which had to create 
almost everything that makes life bearable by their own effort. All suffered in the world o f the 1930s and
110
1940s from a paucity of opportunities to markedly alter their eveiyday lives for the better but political 
mobilisation through the Labour Party offered at least some hope of transcendence. Joe Ashton’s 
account of childhood in wartime Attercliffe (though exaggerated for comic effect) gives the flavour of 
that world. His home stood
across the street from Jonas and Colver’s steelworks and literally 20 yards from a 
drop-hammer which went crash,bang, wallop 24-hours a day. The row of outside lavs 
in the yard had not worked since 1899, and all o f us walked to the next street to use 
grandma’s. There were at least a thousand cockroaches and maybe a hundred crickets 
(we never counted the bugs) infecting every house, breeding in the heat, soot, sparks 
and smoke from the forge.261
In such conditions one can see the appeal of ‘bread and butter plus a dream’.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
AND THE LABOUR PARTY 
IN SOUTH YORKSHIRE, 1945-1951
5.1 - INTRODUCTION
With the advent of a Labour Government, and an unexampled volume of legislation,
Local Government is definitely ending one important chapter in its history and 
beginning another. Municipalisation of so-called trading and other services has been 
one of the main planks in Labour’s platform. Many of these services are now in 
process of being transferred from municipal management and control to that of 
centralised or regional control. Many functions are being transferred from smaller 
authorities to larger, and in the reshuffle it is not clear what the new pattern will be in 
five years’ time. All that it is possible to say is that Local Government is in process of 
a radical if not revolutionary change. One cycle o f Local Government, and it may well 
be that of democratic government, national and local, has been completed. What the 
thousands of Labour representatives in Local Government desire to know is how far 
local interest and participation in local affairs are to be retained, and if in fact the 
essentials of self-government are incorporated in the new social and political structure 
now being enacted by Parliament.1
These are the words of Wright Robinson, Labour Alderman of Manchester City Council, in 1948. He
went on to query,
... the increasing centralisation, the transfer of function from a body directly 
responsible to, and in contact with an electorate, to an ad hoc body appointed by and 
responsible to a Minister. Assuming that hospitals should be administered over a 
region, why should the Minister Appoint the body, including members of the Local 
Authorities in the area, and insist that such members should not regard themselves as in 
any way representative of the Local Authority. Members of the new regional boards 
will be in no way directly representative or responsible to the public. One of the 
axioms of democracy surely is that each of us is both master and servant, and finally 
answerable to the public. The changes that are taking place are largely the transfer of 
function from elected bodies to non-elective bodies, or less elective than those they 
have superseded.... What is contended is that functional efficiency is one, but not the 
only test, of good government.2
Even Clement Attlee by May 1950 had confessed that, ‘We have taken away too much from Local
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Government.’3 It has been said by Francis that ‘it is both unfair and inaccurate to identify Labour’s 
socialism in the late 1940s exclusively with the centralized state’4 but even he notes that there had been a 
‘considerable shift in the balance of political power from local to central government’ and that it was 
‘significant’ that the 1949 policy statement Labour Believes in Britain promised to maintain democracy 
not just in Parliament but ‘in the council chamber’.5 Tomlinson has argued that the welfare state created 
by Labour was an austerity product of austerity conditions and that Labour was more concerned to 
increase economic efficiency to restore prosperity than throw money at welfare: social justice, pace 
Correlli Barnett, was a secondary priority.6 Local government under Labour was also marked by 
austerity but in that case technical efficiency of service provision was paramount with local democracy 
second.
As we saw in Chapter Two, Labour’s approach to local government was ‘instrumentalist’. Labour 
councils were to be the agents of the centre in order to fulfill the tasks of post-war reconstruction set out 
in Labour4 s election manifesto Let Us Face the Future despite the desire of some Labour leaders like 
Herbert Morrison to defend local government autonomy. And Morrison symbolically failed in his 
attempt to prevent the nationalisation o f local authority hospitals. In 1945, the municipal elections and 
the earlier general election were linked by Labour appeals to the voters. A broadsheet was produced 
reminding them that ‘the Labour Government at Westminster depends upon your council’, while the 
National Agent described local councils as bodies who would ‘administer the socialist legislation the 
Government will put through’. Alongside the changes to local government functions came the 
‘nationalization of local politics’ as local political contests were assimilated into the national two-party 
contest. But it was the Conservatives whose leaders were more willing to become systematically 
involved in local government as a means of taking the fight to Labour while out o f office.7 The 
Municipal Progressives were champions of ‘ratepayer democracy’ and this was also a long-held 
Conservative tradition allowing the latter to pose much more easily as genuine defenders o f local 
interests against abuse of power and centralisation. An official policy statement in 1949 declared, for 
instance: ‘The governing principle of Conservative and Unionist policy on Local Government, is that 
Local Government should be Local, and that it should be Government... Merely to pass on orders from 
the central authorities ... is not Local Government.’ Of course this was played down once the 
Conservatives returned to power, but until 1953 the motto of the party journal The Councillor was 
‘centralisation is the death-blow of public freedom’.8 Unsurprisingly this was the ground of Municipal 
Progressive, and, after 1948, Conservative-Liberal, complaints about the Attlee Government and the 
Sheffield Labour Party. Unlike in Nottingham where consensus between the two major local parties was 
marked by a formal written pact because neither could achieve the requisite majority to take control of 
the City Council, and Chairmanships and Vice-Chairmanships of committees were shared,9 this was not 
the case in Sheffield, Rotherham or Barnsley. In Doncaster matters were, however, less simple and in 
May 1951 Chairmanships and Vice-Chairmanships o f committees had to be shared because the balance 
of power between the parties was too finely drawn.10
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Between 1945 and 1951 controversy over the limits of centralisation and how it would affect ordinary 
people was common within the Sheffield council chamber and in the two main parties’ propaganda. A 
focus of this was the acute housing crisis and the apparent inability of Labour to get the houses built or to 
allow free enterprise to attempt the task. Middle-class people who wanted to own their own homes felt 
particularly hard done by compared with working-class people. Owner-occupation was often seen as the 
defining feature of the middle classes which contributed to recruitment to the Conservative Party in the 
late 1940s.11 The jealousy towards working-class people is manifest in a speech by Alderman Jackson in 
1950 when in the municipal elections he complained that Corporation houses were being occupied not by 
the poor but by people who could easily afford to own their own homes and did own cars and television 
sets.12 To obtain land to put houses on, county borough boundaries had to be extended, which led to the 
promotion of a Sheffield Extension Bill in 1951, which, however, failed to become an Act of Parliament. 
A similar one in Doncaster did become law but most of the land concerned was designated green belt. 
The promotion of these Bills was a consequence of the abolition of the Local Government Boundary 
Commission in 1949. That body had been the most that local government associations would tolerate in 
terms of seeking to reform the structure o f local government. Council housing and education were the 
major responsibilities of local government in this period.
A major reason why Labour was able to treat local government as an instrument was because, despite its 
stated intentions to expand democratic rights, local government, and, symbolically, local government 
elections, were viewed with considerable lack of interest by voters. This was not altered by the extension 
of the municipal franchise at the end of the war. Municipal Progressives, indeed, were fearful that that 
apathy would actually increase as substantial rate-payers felt their views were being swamped by people 
who had no property to deter them from proposing municipal extravagance. Prominent people would 
also be less willing to become Municipal Progressive candidates. The extension of the franchise was 
seen as a party political act by Labour to court the fickle loyalties of the mob. A new cycle o f local 
government had begun but unfortunately for local politics it was also one in which central government 
sought to increase its control of local government through the increased subsidies which local 
government had no option but to accept. Local rates could not provide the necessary finance. Rates 
were easy to collect and assess but it was not an effective means of ensuring that a steady proportion of 
the new local wealth generated in a district entered a particular council’s coffers. This was because it 
was regressive and fell most heavily on those least able to pay who had often not shared in the increase in 
prosperity of the area. In a period of inflationary pressures the rate often had to be increased each year 
because the valuation of rateable value did not reflect an area’s greater wealth, and thus opposition was 
guaranteed to be great in response. Central government refused to reform the rating system which would 
have allowed greater fiscal independence to the local authorities and remove the need for the government 
grants.13
Gyford describes municipal Labour Parties at this time as being ‘municipal labourist’ rather than 
‘municipal socialist’14 (the Sheffield Labour Group Leader, Alderman Bingham, however, was in no
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doubts and did describe what he and his colleagues were doing as ‘Municipal Socialism’). Of course, 
‘municipal socialism’ might have nothing to do with the socialism of the Labour Party, as was recognised 
when the Conservatives in Sheffield took electricity, water, the tramways and the markets into municipal 
ownership in the nineteenth century. That was concerned with providing utility services cheaper for 
business than business could provide for itself due to the economies o f scale that resulted. ‘Municipal 
labourism’ as a phenomenon is especially well demonstrated in the politics of council housing and of 
town planning where the appropriate council committee and the council as a whole were little influenced 
by the general public in the decisions they ultimately reached. Even if we do see the local citizens as 
both conservative and apathetic, it is still true that little was actively done in Sheffield at least to survey 
their reactions, take suggestions from them or even during wartime officially inform them of what was 
being considered. Their potential to contribute was thus not taken seriously by professional local 
government officers who retained a faith in their own ability unaided to find the solution to working- 
class problems or by the amateur Council members who deferred to them. Gyford notes that municipal 
labourism did secure
considerable real improvements in the material conditions of working-class life. On 
occasion however it was prone to two weaknesses. It could display a certain heavy- 
handed paternalism, leading to an insensitivity to the self-expressed interests of 
ordinary people when these seemed to conflict with the plans or the enthusiasms of 
senior councillors or of professionals and other experts; and a certain introverted 
emphasis on political solidarity and discipline could sometimes blind local councillors 
to legitimate outside criticism or could even be exploited for dubious ends. At its best 
municipal labourism matched Herbert Morrison’s aspiration to create in local 
government “an efficient machine for a high moral purpose” and it delivered with 
competence and compassion a wide range of services to those in need. Usually it did 
the right things fo r  people; but sometimes it could do the wrong things to people; and 
only rarely had it previously discussed either of those things with people.15
Finally, in fairness it must be noted that while the Conservatives and some within Labour’s ranks did 
allege that local government was being weakened, others inside the Labour Party, like Morgan Phillips 
saw this as ‘absurdly untrue’. According to Phillips, writing in 1951, ‘some functions have been taken 
over by the State and some transferred to the county councils from the county districts, [but] other 
functions have been added or expanded.’ There were good reasons why some municipal functions, like 
electricity generation or rate valuation, had been taken over by the State. Rate valuation in local hands 
had produced inequitable results: ‘It was commonplace to find houses built at the same time, within a 
short distance of each other, and of the same size and with the same facilities, bearing greatly different 
valuations.’ A uniform nationwide standard of service was necessary for such examples and could only 
be done via the state. As for the new powers given or extended within county or county boroughs 
councils they ‘certainly cannot complain that they have nothing worth while to do.’ He gave as evidence
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the new town planning powers to control development and the expanded personal health services under 
the 1946 National Health Act. Similarly the provisions of the 1944 Education Act were being 
implemented by them and, ‘The level of school building has never been so great.’ Even some powers of 
the borough and district councils with regard to housing, public health, recreation and entertainment had 
been extended since 1945. Phillips particularly stressed the role of local authorities in housing, noting 
that since 1949 houses could be built for all social classes. Eighty per cent of houses built since 1945 
had been built by them. Under the ‘famous’ section 132, local authorities had also wider powers to 
provide entertainment for citizens and many were developing civic restaurants. And, according to 
Phillips, Labour’s equalisation grants were much more helpful to poorer authorities than the old block 
grants as a source of finance. Councillors could also now get allowances for lost wages when serving in 
local government thus potentially enlarging the pool of people who could be attracted to municipal 
office. In sum, ‘No fair-minded person ... can believe that Labour has weakened local government. The 
opposite is true.’ He did, however, emphasis the need for reform in local government ‘to conform with 
modem day requirements’. Labour was ‘waiting with great interest the outcome of the discussions 
between four of the local authority associations. If  agreement is reached between them, then the 
Government will gladly consider legislation.’ Otherwise reform would have to await the return of a new 
Labour Government after 25 October 1951. He ended by declaring that, ‘Whatever proposals are put 
forward, all can rest assured that Labour will preserve the vitality, independence and democratic element 
of local government.’16
5.2 - REFORM OF THE LOCAL STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
The Coalition Government’s White Paper Local Government in England and Wales during the Period of 
Reconstruction published in January 1945 suggested the setting up of a Local Government Boundary 
Commission. On the face of it, a radical overhaul of the structure of local government seemed possible 
with new enlarged county boroughs being created and declining county boroughs being given a more 
appropriate status. Policy statements within the White Paper, however, seemed to augur a much less 
radical approach. The terms of reference of the Boundary Commission excluded the consideration of 
whether the functions of local government units were being effectively carried out. Thus, it could not 
match area, population, resources or functions to create more standard units. It thus made the finding of 
ad hoc solutions the policy of the government, with Joint Boards and Joint Committees as the 
Government’s solution to achieving the better functioning of local councils in an attempt to avoid 
controversy. The Boundary Commission was to complain in 1947 that its ‘present powers and 
instructions do not permit the formation of local government units as effective and convenient as in our 
opinion they should be’, and it quoted Bevan who had said that it was ‘nonsense to talk about functions 
and boundaries separately’.
According to Alexander, the attitude of the Labour Government and Bevan, who was responsible for 
local government, to reform was ‘rather confused’ despite being the first party to link national goal-
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setting,to local implementation, necessitating an effective local government instrument.17 Taylor argues, 
however, that,
Those [constitutional] reforms which were [immediately] required to expedite the 
delivery of social and economic reconstruction - mainly in parliamentary procedure, 
cabinet organisation and, latterly, the Lords - took top billing, whilst those which 
represented the unfinished business of the first two Labour administrations - electoral 
reform and the overhaul of local government - whilst closer to the party’s heart, did not 
get special treatment.18
In 1948-9, Bevan did prepare a radical plan to abolish the existing local government structure and 
replace it with 240 new all-purpose authorities but he did not press it in Cabinet. In March 1949 he 
stated that it was not ‘practicable to introduce comprehensive legislation on local government 
reconstruction in the near future’.19
On 27 June 1949 he then announced that the Boundary Commission would be scrapped. When asked by 
a Labour MP if a Royal Commission could be appointed instead to look into the functions and areas of 
local government units, Bevan replied that it would not be appropriate ‘as a Royal Commission would 
almost certainly reproduce in its personnel all the disagreements in local government circles.’ A review 
of the problem of local government though ‘a constant preoccupation of the Government’ would take up 
considerable time and since there was little consensus in local government Bevan could not ‘tell when 
that review will fructify.’20 Alexander points out that Britain has never had a Ministry or a Cabinet 
Minister solely responsible for local government and that Bevan also had the responsibility for the 
establishment of the National Health Service.21 He was also involved in overseeing the critical housing 
programme. Thus, there were limits to what he could achieve in the time available. Local authorities 
like Sheffield City Council were thus forced to return to the practice of promoting Extension Bills in 
Parliament to achieve extension of their boundaries.
Sir Malcolm Trustram Eve had been Chairman of the Boundary Commission. Writing in July 1951, after 
the Minister of Local Government and Planning had stated in the House of Commons that ‘local 
government reform ... must wait until the next Parliament’, he complained of the difficulties experienced 
by County Boroughs. It was ‘to say the least a remote possibility’ that a county council and a county 
borough would agree on an extension of the county borough’s boundaries and ‘the Government are now 
pledged to “block” any Boundary Extension Bill of a county borough - the only other available 
procedure - if the extension proposed is more than “minor”.’ At the same time, under Section 146 o f the 
Local Government Act 1933 which was revived by the Act abolishing the Boundary Commission, an 
Order could be made from 1 January 1952 by a Minister after a local inquiry to alter the boundaries and 
status of an urban or rural district council. If it was on the border of a county borough and it had been 
made bigger, he complained, it might well prejudice a future extension of that county borough. The
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operation of this power had been postponed until 1952 in the hope that a review of the local government 
structure would have been made and that the Government’s proposals would have overtaken any put 
forward by a local authority. But as Eve pointed out this had led nowhere.22
One of the major problems that county boroughs like Sheffield faced in 1951 was the fear of the 
inhabitants of the rural districts threatened by extension that rates would be sharply increased. Thus they 
were determined to resist it despite the wider range of services potentially on offer to them. The 
construction of council housing estates for the working classes were also seen as a threat to traditional 
rural society.23 On the other hand, even in an Urban District like Rawmarsh, which would have a lower 
rate and a wider range of services if it joined nearby Rotherham, opposition remained fierce to the 
latter’s boundary extension proposals in 1947.24
In the Second Annual Report of the Boundary Commission for 1947 recommendations were made to 
create another County Council area in the south of the West Riding, to be called York South. This can 
be seen as a forerunner in some (but only some) respects of the South Yorkshire County Council set up 
in 1974 for it did not cover the exact same territory. It would be a two-tier County, including the County 
Boroughs of Rotherham, Barnsley and Doncaster as ‘New’ County Boroughs within it. Sheffield would 
be outside as a one-tier County Council area in its own right. York South would include all or part of the 
Rural Districts of Goole, Osgoldcross, Hemsworth, Wakefield and Penistone. Rotherham, Barnsley and 
Doncaster did not agree with these recommendations and just before the Boundary Commission was 
abolished they published a memorandum which set out their joint views. This postulated a position 
analogous to today’s Metropolitan Borough Councils and which dispensed with the whole idea of a 
County Council. For almost all the area of York South there would be four one-tier authorities based on 
themselves plus Sheffield. Each separate area would be a County Council area for the purposes 
recommended by the Commission and each would still be a County Borough Area under the 
Commission’s existing powers. Sheffield was not party to these proposals but it was suggested that 
Wortley Rural District and Stocksbridge Urban District could be incorporated within it since the ‘natural 
development of Sheffield would seem to be largely in the area of the Wortley Rural District.’25
The arrangement the three County Boroughs advocated would not demand a new set of administrative 
and specialist local government officers to be appointed to a County Council and no new offices would 
be needed with ‘the consequent struggle for accommodation with existing and expanding Government 
Departments.’ The four new authorities would be able to absorb many officers employed at present in 
other local authorities and there would be a considerable saving in staff. One-tier authorities would 
avoid the existing duplication of functions resulting from being governed by a District Council and the 
County Council and thus benefit the whole of the ratepayers within the new areas. The size of the 
authority would still encourage the ratepayer to feel close to elected Councillors and the Councillors 
would not have to travel far to the main seat of administration for meetings. Fewer local authorities 
would mean greater administrative efficiency. There had also Tong been a natural community o f interest
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in the areas proposed, and the present County Boroughs are the natural centres of each area for cultural, 
shopping, amusements and administrative purposes. Each is the obvious centre of development or 
anticipated development for the respective areas proposed and is the focus of all major activity.’ Finally, 
all four County Boroughs had, it was claimed, always worked together in harmony on schemes for the 
benefit of their respective inhabitants and it was felt this would only increase if the proposals were 
accepted.26
The Commission Report also highlighted the issue of the rivalry between Sheffield and Rotherham - a 
rivalry probably older than that between Sheffield and Leeds and symbolised by the tradition that 
Sheffield was once humiliatingly described as ‘Sheffield near Rotherham’.27 The Report said that it had 
given particular consideration to Rotherham since it was physically joined to Sheffield:
Many of the factors laid down for our guidance point to the uniting of both into one 
local government unit. The total population, though, would be 600,000 and 
substantially greater if the dormitory areas near to both were added. We do not favour 
the creation of one-tier new counties for populations so large. In recommending that 
Rotherham should be within the area of the new county of York South we realise that 
the existing boundary between Rotherham and Sheffield is not a good county 
boundary.28
Rotherham was not impressed by the idea of amalgamation with Sheffield. The attitudes o f Labour 
members of both councils were shown when Alderman Bingham, Leader of Sheffield City Council, had 
to deny in October 1947, long before the Report was presented to Parliament, that he had suggested to 
representatives of the Commission that it should take place. However, he lamely admitted that he saw 
‘no ultimate alternative to that sort of thing’. Alderman Jackson stirred the pot by confirming what 
Bingham denied in a municipal election meeting. Bingham then elaborated to The Star that though the 
time was not ripe for creating an amalgamated unit, and it needed to get Rotherham’s agreement, 
‘speaking for myself... the ultimate set up of local government must inevitably mean that these areas, 
between which there is little or no distinction, must have some sort of common oversight.’ Speaking for 
Rotherham Labour Party, Councillor George Brown, the Secretary and Agent, described the idea as ‘a 
prime example of unparalleled impertinence.’29 When the Report was finally published, it was reported 
that several Rotherham Councillors said that its proposals ‘while not very satisfactory, are infinitely 
preferable to Rotherham being taken over by Sheffield’.30
These were not the only plans put forward which would have altered the structure of local government. 
Wath Urban District Council in April 1945 had the idea of convening a conference to which the Urban 
District Councils of Conisborough, Deame, Mexborough, Rawmarsh and Swinton would be invited, plus 
the parishes of Brampton and Wentworth, with a view to considering amalgamation into one large unit.31 
The conference met for the first time in July 1945 but its brief was only to stimulate discussion and not
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impose an answer. Wath felt it was better that they reform themselves before they were compelled by 
government. In 1943 when the reorganisation of local government was mooted, larger authorities had 
asked for extended powers while smaller ones simply asked to be left alone. Though there was no 
general desire to radically alter the structure of local government by the Coalition, it had been agreed that 
local government units had to be strengthened for future responsibilities, though local authorities could 
not agree over how this might be done. Still Wath felt a measure of compulsion was inevitable to deal 
with post-war reconstruction. County Councils threatened to be given powers previously held by District 
Councils but if they took matters in hand and voluntarily amalgamated they might recover some of their 
lost powers. Amalgamation was seen as being financially beneficial since it would be easier for central 
Government to distribute grants fairly and evenly if there were fewer authorities. A larger authority 
would have a better fiscal base and would be better able to co-operate with Parliament. It would be 
easier to ensure that the delivery of public services was uniform over the country and the services would 
be more efficient with economies of scale. There was, however, dispute over whether the proposed unit 
would be a County or Non-County Borough and whether it would be based on Mexborough. Fears were 
also expressed that the County Council had greater financial resources to fight their amalgamation. It 
was eventually decided to adjourn the meeting so the various bodies could discuss the proposals before 
they met again.32
Before the Boundary Commission was abolished, however, Mexborough and Conisborough had decided 
to submit proposals for their own amalgamation; Wath, Swinton and Rawmarsh were discussing 
boundary review problems together; and Deame wanted to absorb Hickleton, Bamburgh and part of 
Hooton Pagnall district. Wombwell, Darfield, Hoy land and Brampton had discussed amalgamation and 
South and North Elmsall with Upton and South Kirkby wanted Urban District status.33 These authorities 
were not rushing forward, however, to amalgamate with the County Boroughs as envisaged in the joint 
proposal of June 1949. Barnsley, for example, had produced its own report for the Boundary 
Commission by October 1946, but the Chronicle predicted ‘a mixed reception in the areas affected by its 
proposals.’ It noted that:
We have already heard the first murmurings of the opposition likely to be encountered 
. . .  and several of these small authorities - or, at least, their spokesmen - have declared 
themselves firmly against the encroachments of what has luridly been described as the 
“tentacles of the octopus in the Barnsley Town Hall.” Resolutions have been passed, 
pledges given, in an atmosphere resounding with brave talk about “resisting to the last 
the attempt to swallow us up,” and this has been accompanied in certain cases by 
appeals to the West Riding County Authority for backing. The wooing has not gone 
too well.
Opposition also came from the Citizen Party on Barnsley Council, which argued that the threatened 
authorities were separate entities with their own interests and institutions and that Barnsley itself would
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lose its own distinctiveness by amalgamation. The increase in the administrative staff of the Council 
would also place Barnsley under a ‘dead weight of bureaucracy.’34
Rotherham Council’s motivation for extending its boundaries, at least until 1949, was like Sheffield to 
allow its housing programme to progress. Over six hundred acres within the Borough at Kimberworth 
earmarked for housing had been placed in jeopardy by the National Coal Board which had stated that it 
intended to mine under the area.35 It was only in February 1949 that the NCB decided this coal was not 
worthwhile and handed the land back. The Corporation renewed their intention of building a large 
housing estate.36 Thus, by June 1949 and the abolition of the Boundary Commission, the need to extend 
Rotherham’s boundaries was less critical. It did not promote an Extension Bill like Sheffield and 
Doncaster.37 The reaction to abolition in Rotherham and district was said to be ‘one of relief tempered 
with some resentment at the time wasted.’ In Sheffield, Bingham called for an proper inquiry into the 
whole structure o f local government by a body representing the people and not experts - code for elected 
members of local government bodies.38 This ignored Bevan’s observation that it would only replicate 
the lack of consensus in local government and would get nowhere. But there still remained the 
possibility that if Labour was re-elected in 1950 with a large majority it would once more attempt to 
radically reform the structure of local government, as the Editor of the Sheffield Telegraph suggested?9 
This is probably why the Clerk of Rawmarsh Urban District Council said that abolition was a relief but 
only in a sense explaining ‘We were going to fight to the end, and now we can just sit back and wait as 
before.’40 Obviously at that point the threat had not yet receded far but it was dispelled by Labour’s tiny 
majority after re-election and final defeat in 1951. Whether the Commission’s proposals for a two-tier 
York South would have worked is conjecture, but the County Council created in 1974 had 
environmental and structural planning powers and controlled the police, the fire service and public 
transport. It was centred on Barnsley. Sheffield and the other former County Boroughs lost 
administrative powers to it though they did increase their territory and ended the Rural and Urban 
District Councils existence.41 There were, though, major disagreements between the tiers of local 
government over planning, for example, which were only settled when the County Council was 
abolished.42
5.3 - NATIONALISATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS ?
In a municipal election leaflet for 1947 the Municipal Progressives quoted Alderman Bingham: ‘We [the 
Labour Group] are a body which acts in full consultation with each other, and our purpose is the 
establishment of Municipal Socialism, according to Labour Party principles, allied with the Socialism of 
the larger type which the Government is moving towards.’ This, on the face of it, is a repudiation o f the 
idea that ‘Municipal Socialism’ had been down-played or dropped as an aspiration of the Labour Group, 
and that it was taking steps to put it into practice while co-operating with the nationalisation and welfare 
state measures of the national Labour government. Thus, it agreed with Morgan Phillips’ view that it 
was ‘absurdly untrue’ to imagine that local government had been weakened since it gained other
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responsibilities to make up for it’s losses . This is not how the Progressives saw this, of course. Under 
the sub-title ‘The Meaning of “Municipal Socialism’” , they set out a list of services that had been or 
would be nationalised and predicted the evil consequences for Sheffielders that would follow.43
According to Phillips, ‘The electricity and gas industries were unable to make technical advances beyond 
a certain limit due to the confines of local authority boundaries’ hence the need to take them from 
individual local authority control in the interests of providing a cheaper service nationwide.44 Let Us 
Face The Future said, ‘Public ownership of gas and electricity undertakings will lower charges, prevent 
competitive waste, open the way for co-ordinated research and development, and lead to the reforming of 
uneconomic areas of distribution. Other industries will benefit.’45 The Progressives were more critical 
and from a selfish local perspective it is hard not to sympathize at least on electricity nationalisation, as 
the City Council were not fully compensated and there were problems with the new ‘statutory 
undertaker’, the British Electricity Authority, over emissions from Blackburn Meadows power station 
which they no longer owned.46 It would also now have to negotiate over the proposed city development 
plans with the latter. According to Kenneth O. Morgan: ‘Any opposition to the [nationalisation] bill was 
mollified by the remarkably generous terms of compensation given to private stock-holders, whether 
companies or individuals, and the full reimbursement made to local authorities for their electricity 
undertakings. Yet again, a broad measure of goodwill prevailed.’47 Yet as Hayes notes in Nottingham, 
while its Electricity Department had assets of £9.4 million it was not fully compensated. A net loan debt 
of £3.9 million was cancelled and it got an ex-gratia payment of £80,000. That was all. In 1949, sales of 
electricity had subsidised the rates by £65,000. They also contributed to central establishment charges 
and there were gains from tax relief on the profits. The terms of compensation, even slightly improved, 
‘stretched Labour loyalty’ and provoked persistent outbursts for years by Conservatives who saw it as 
‘legalised theft’.48 Sheffield’s net assets were valued at £11.7 million with £5 million in debts.
Electricity did not subsidise the rates though they contributed £9,000 in central establishment charges 
plus the tax relief on profits. Compensation was again restricted to the debt. The City Treasurer felt it 
was ‘somewhat unfair that an authority which has always transferred electricity profits to the relief of 
rates should be just as well off... as an authority like Sheffield, which has pursued the sound financial 
policy of redeeming existing debt or avoiding borrowing rather then transferring profits to the state 
Fund.’ It was a policy Labour Rotherham had also pursued. Its undertaking was valued at £3 million 
pounds and its debt at under £1 million pounds. It would lose £2 million pounds as a result of the 
changeover.49 It is not surprising that as in Nottingham nationalisation was to be a continuing focus of 
opposition criticism in the future.
The Transport and Electricity Nationalization Acts passed in 1947 did allow councils to continue to get 
the same rates from the now nationalised undertakings as they had before but this altered under the Local 
Government Act 1948. Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo argue that it widened municipal power,50 but it 
contained a provision which to the Chairman of the Rotherham Finance Committee ‘came as a great 
surprise’. Government would make a payment in lieu of rates from the nationalised undertakings to be
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shared among local authorities according to rateable value. The result according to him ‘was to take 
income away from areas where the hereditaments were and to give proportionately large amounts to rural 
areas and residential and seaside towns.’ The losses to urban Labour local authorities could be great. 
Rotherham immediately lost £47,900.51 Barnsley, however, lost just £3,804 for 1949/50.52 In Sheffield 
£190,000 was collected in rates each year from the municipal electricity undertaking before 
nationalisation but government only paid £133,000 in lieu of rates afterwards, losing Sheffield £57,000.53 
It was not the only basis for Rotherham’s disapproval in 1948. It was ‘scurvily treated by the people 
responsible for the appointments to the Area Board and district committees of the British Electrical 
Authority’, claimed Alderman Caine. They had not even been consulted whether there was anybody they 
had who could be appointed.54 Despite this Labour in Rotherham was loyal to national Labour’s 
dictates, even if was not the ‘blind loyalty’ that Thorpe sees as characteristic of Sheffield Labour Group 
over the various nationalisation measures.55 In Sheffield, just a few days after the Electricity Committee 
disbanded itself and handed over the undertaking, a statement that domestic consumers in Sheffield 
would have to pay 30 per cent more for their electricity made in a full Council meeting by a 
Conservative-Liberal went completely unchallenged by Labour.56
Finally, we have already alluded to the problems posed by the change of ownership of Blackburn 
Meadows power station. Unfortunately air pollution in Tinsley was a problem that the Corporation had 
done little about even when they had the power to do something, so it was perhaps hypocritical to blame 
the British Electricity Authority for failing to do anything. The BEA complained to a Council deputation 
that the pollution was due to burning inferior coal, the supply of which was a National Coal Board 
responsibility, over which they had no control.57 This was a municipal election issue in 1949. A 
Conservative-Liberal leaflet headed ‘Tinsley is being poisoned’ was printed, alleging Labour inactivity.
A response came from a Labour Councillor, Reverend Medcraft, who alleged that, ‘The local doctor at 
Tinsley says it is one of the healthiest parts of this city. He ... says the smoke fumes kill the disease 
germs, which seems to me quite a sound sort of argument’. He then testified, irrelevantly, to the Tinsley 
people’s healthy moral character, having known them for twenty-five years,58 despite the fact that when 
they went outside they had to hold handkerchiefs over their eyes due to the smoke pall.59 Next day, he 
was ridiculed by the Conservative-Liberal Parliamentary candidate for Brightside who described 
Medcraft’s belief in the health-giving properties of fumes as ‘a fantastic proposition’. He called for 
better coal to be burnt.60
Gas nationalisation was irrelevant to Sheffield except that it might actually reduce prices because it had 
always been a private monopoly. There had been attempts to bring it under municipal ownership as late 
as 1919 but in order to get an Act of Parliament allowing this, Sheffield City Council would have had to 
pay what was called ‘fair compensation’. Permission at that time would only be granted if the gas 
company shareholders were paid an annuity of 5 per cent on the company’s capital value, but Labour 
Councillors noted that the dividend had been reduced to 3.5 per cent and thus they opposed municipal 
ownership on the terms dictated by the government.61 Alderman Styring, the Electricity Committee
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Chairman and an opponent of Labour, however, had, by contrast, wanted to purchase the undertaking at 
any price at that time.62 When the Nationalisation Bill was receiving its Second Reading Sheffield 
Conservative MPs, Roland Jennings and Peter Roberts, did, however, both speak. Jennings saw 
nationalisation as a doctrinaire political manoeuvre by Labour, while Roberts saw it as a financially 
extravagant gesture when the country was in crisis. The Opposition was more concerned about the effect 
on the export trade of the Bill than on the consequences for municipalities.63 In Rotherham, the 
Corporation did own the gas undertaking having been in municipal ownership as early as 1870.64 It was 
only the first or second company to be acquired by a local authority under an Act of 1869.65 The total 
value of its assets in 1947 was £450,700, with a net loan debt of £148,000, so it was less important in 
terms of prestige than the electricity undertaking.66 Labour made no attempt to prevent or protest against 
nationalisation. The Chairman of the Gas Committee, said he had ‘a little pang of regret. [But] it was 
not because they had changed their minds about the principles of nationalisation, but simply because 
their own particular gas undertaking was going from them.’67
According to Rivett, ‘The NHS was a different type of nationalisation [to, say, electricity or gas], aiming 
for a radically new type of service.’ However, as both he68 and Morgan Phillips point out, 
nationalisation of hospitals was also a way of bypassing troublesome local authority boundaries in the 
provision of care.69 Sheffield City Council had opposed in wartime creating Joint Area Authorities with 
executive rather than advisory powers while welcoming the Government’s stated intention of creating a 
comprehensive health service. It viewed ‘with great concern the proposals that all hospital services now 
provided and administered by Local Authorities should pass out of their jurisdiction’. Regional control 
would be ‘a serious threat to the maintenance of Local Government on democratic lines.’70 Yet, as 
Thorpe points out, Sheffield Labour’s ‘blind loyalty’ overrode such concerns after 1945.71 Herbert 
Morrison, local government’s main defender in Labour ranks, was to point out to Aneurin Bevan that 
hospital nationalisation was not part of Labour’s general election manifesto.72 That simply proclaimed, 
after noting the links between good food and good housing and ill-health, that ‘the best health services 
should be available for all. Money must no longer be the passport to the best treatment.’ And that, ‘In 
the new National Health Service there should be health centres where the people may get the best that 
modem science can offer, more and better hospitals, and proper conditions for our doctors and nurses’.73 
The abortive attempt to create a health centre at Firth Park foundered on general practitioners suspicion 
of it as an attempt to bring them under local authority control, yet the idea of health centres in Sheffield 
was supported by the Municipal Progressives as well as by Labour. They described Sheffield’s health 
services in 1945 as ‘splendid’ but saw lack of health centres as the major deficiency.74 Labour’s 1945 
municipal election manifesto took no hostages, however, when it merely declared that ‘any variation 
imposed upon the existing administration of hospital services should be based upon the principle of 
public ownership and control’, which could mean either hospital nationalisation or control o f all 
hospitals by municipal authorities.75 This statement was repeated in 1946.76 By then the Progressives 
warned that:
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The same danger of inefficiency and lack of sympathy arising out of central or regional 
control threatens the health service. These services were created by Sheffield. They 
should continue as Sheffield’s responsibility. We welcome the proposals for a general 
extension of these services and we hold here again that the surrounding areas should be 
able to take advantage o f them and have a share in their management.77
Labour critics like Herbert Morrison or Wright Robinson made the basis of their arguments the effect on 
local democracy. These regional bodies were un-elected, which conflicted with the desire to base 
socialism on what Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo term the ‘Responsible Society’ - in other words to 
build a sense of community around on an active citizenry keen to participate in local government.78 But, 
this aspiration warred with the desire to create the most technically efficient service. Morrison 
emphasised this:
It is possible to argue that almost every government function, taken by itself, could be 
administered more efficiently in the technical sense under a national system, but if we 
wish local government to thrive - as a school of political and democratic education as 
well as a method of administration - we must consider the general effect on local 
government of each particular proposal. It would be disastrous if we allowed local 
government to languish by whittling away its most constructive and interesting 
functions.79
It is argued by Michael Foot that Bevan had nothing in principle against local authority control of 
hospitals but that he chose hospital nationalisation because he could not wait for reform of the local 
government structure to create areas large enough to make it superfluous.80 The lack of consensus 
within local government, even in a single area like South Yorkshire, has been exhaustively documented 
in Section 5.2. Reform had to wait a generation. That Bevan was ultimately in sympathy with 
Morrison’s views is shown by this quote from an article he wrote entitled ‘Local Government 
Management of Hospitals is Best’ in the Municipal Journal in 1954 which drew on the plans he had 
made for local government reform during the Attlee Government but which had remained just plans:
We should wish to revive and maintain local government as a form of government 
which is truly local and which is so near the people as to ignite and keep their interest.
This interest by the public is important as a spur and refreshment to the governing 
bodies themselves and for the creation of an intelligent and educated democracy 
inspired with civic spirit. Quite apart from its value to the individual citizen, it is of 
incalculable value to the community in any kind of crisis.81
If some in the Sheffield Labour Group might secretly share the view of the Labour Party critics, there
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was, however, the satisfaction that ‘the Socialism of the larger type’ was being enacted and that the 
voluntary hospitals which had refused local authority control, despite often getting some of their funding 
from them, were seriously affronted by being nationalised. Those voluntary hospitals, like the Jessop 
Hospital in Sheffield, which had been very successful, were profoundly upset because they championed 
the voluntary principle. Its Board had argued in 1943 against a free health service:
It would indeed be a disaster if the proposed comprehensive health service should be 
so framed as not to allow for the continued financial support and personal service of 
those who for so long have thus expressed their faith in the voluntary system. No 
scheme which removes the incentive to giving and by personal service to helping one’s 
less fortunate fellows is desirable.82
But it was precisely this principle that was anathema to many within the Labour Party in Sheffield. For 
example, in 1945 Councillor Dyson attacked Trades Council support for the Sheffield Cancer Research 
Committee which wanted to raise funds by voluntary subscriptions. He said that the Trades Council was 
a Socialist body backing the idea of a State Medical Service yet it was also supporting a body on which 
‘captains o f industry’ controlled policy. And he complained that conducting research ‘on a charitable 
basis’ was wrong.83 Similarly there was ‘stormy debate’ at the Trades Council in June 1948 over 
continued support for the Sheffield Hospitals Council’s penny a week scheme for convalescent treatment. 
Councillor Scott, a member of the Sheffield Health Committee, said that: ‘To support a voluntary scheme 
. . .  would be to erect a monument to the system they had fought for years to break down.’ He called for 
the local authority to provide the service.84 This view of the voluntary principle was shared by Bevan:
‘It is repugnant to a civilized community for hospitals to have to rely on private charity... I have always 
felt a shudder of repulsion when I have seen nurses and sisters who ought to be at their work, and 
students who ought to be at theirs, going about the streets collecting money for the hospitals.’85 It is not 
surprising then that the commitment of those who had opposed the National Health Service Act to 
making the NHS work once the Act became law was questioned before it came into being on 5 July 
1948. Labour Alderman Buxton of Rotherham commented:
As will have been noticed, all persons elected or nominated by the Minister of Health 
to ... [the] committees [responsible for carrying out the Act, like the Hospital 
Management Committees,] ...are not of the same political beliefs as most of us, and in 
many cases the associations that they represent have not accepted the Act in very good 
heart, therefore many differences of opinion are likely to arise as the clauses and 
direction under the Act are notified and discussed from time to time.86
Five months after the NHS was set up, he called for yet another committee to be established to ensure 
that ‘there is very close co-operation between the hospitals and the Local Health Authority which is, at 
the present time, non-existent.’87 By 1949, mutual confidence seems to have been arrived at finally and
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he noted that, ‘Co-operation has been secured with the local Hospital Management Committee in many 
directions during the year.’ Despite what had gone before all sides had reached an understanding to 
make the Act work whatever the personal political differences between them. Buxton’s comprehensive 
account of Council health initiatives in the Rotherham Trades Council Report for 1949 shows that the 
local authority, even though it had been divested of its hospital service, was still extremely busy in the 
health field as a result of the responsibilities it had gained under the 1946 Act.88
Less happy was Sheffield City Council’s attempt in 1948 to provide England’s first health centre at Firth 
Park. Local doctors who refused to be involved with the local authority’s scheme were blamed for its 
failure. They were criticised because it was alleged they did not want a better health service for the 
people of Firth Park and feared losing patients to the centre’s better facilities and to doctors who had 
agreed to co-operate with the scheme. Councillor Mrs. Sheard claimed that:
One doctor has even gone so far as to raise as a serious objection, the fact that patients 
waiting in the centre would be able to get a cup of tea from a mobile canteen. “They 
don’t even get cups of tea even in Harley Street,” he said. The same doctor even 
expressed objection to the presence of the Lord Mayor at the opening ceremony - 
presumably on the basis that he might act as a lure to patients.89
The failure to open the Centre upset the local Socialist Medical Association (SMA) which had 
campaigned for it.90 Dr. Somerville Hastings o f the SMA raised the matter in Parliament in May 1951, 
asking why it was not operational but it did not open in the remaining period of Labour Government.91 A 
proposed second centre on the Manor estate had to be cancelled.92 Webster has argued that health 
centres ‘came to symbolise the distinction between socialist and non-socialist conceptions o f the health 
service’. The SMA saw them as the physical embodiment of the new order in health care and the 1946 
Act which set up the NHS made building them a statutory duty of local authorities. Martin Francis 
concludes, however, that Bevan’s refusal to speed up their creation was due to his desire to appease the 
medical profession who linked them to local authority interference and a full-time salaried service that 
would cramp their clinical independence.93 In the sphere of health care, tendencies towards 
centralisation due to hospital nationalisation were balanced by local authorities being given responsibility 
for personal social services but local authority health centres were not given the government backing that 
was needed to make them a success.
5.4 - EDUCATION
No chapter on local government in South Yorkshire could be complete without paying some attention to 
education. As we saw in Chapter Two, it is one o f those public services provision o f which, according to 
many Marxists, along with public housing and health services, characterises the role of local government 
or ‘the local state’ under capitalism which is to reproduce the kind of compliant workers that Capital
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needs in order to efficiently operate and accumulate surplus value within the capitalist mode of 
production.94 Of course, one could argue, as Correlli Barnett has done, that one o f Britain’s defects 
within its education system has been the fact that technical education has not been given the role that it 
warranted if Britain was to stave off economic decline. This is in contrast with other countries like 
Germany or the USA whose economic performance has been much superior. This can be linked to the 
fact that ruthless cut-throat competition in industry was considered ‘un-gentlemanly’. Such conceptions 
can also be seen in prevalent attitudes to competitive sports like tennis.95 The case of tennis illuminates 
attitudes to competition in society generally in the 1940s. Margaret Stacey, in a study of tradition and 
change in Banbury, found that winning competitions was not the main reason (as it might be in newer, 
more ‘class-less’ societies like Australia which produce so many tennis champions today) why most 
people in that town played tennis. The real reason was to promote a middle-class sociability which 
reconciled differences between members of the middle classes who were the main players and promoted 
homogeneous attitudes to the proletarian ‘Others’ who did not. Ross McKibbin notes that the managerial 
style o f many (especially small) firms emphasised social confidence over expertise. Social origin and 
education determined promotion prospects. Many public school boys were employed as managers 
simply because they were good at rugby or cricket. Grammar schools aping the public schools were 
increasingly providing after 1945 a cut-price version of that kind of games-orientated education for the 
poor but socially mobile lower-middle-class and bright working-class child who wanted to get on.96 
Thus, values that taught ‘fair play’ and the importance of playing rather than winning the game continued 
to be promulgated among the rising generation with effects on future attitudes to industry.
A criticism made of the Butler Education Act of 1944, the major legislative achievement of post-war 
reconstruction during the actual war, is that it retarded the momentum to create better technical education 
in Britain.97 Thus, it is arguable that in many areas (though not Sheffield which was going ahead with a 
new College of Technology (see below)) ‘the local state’ was not performing the role that theoretically 
Marxists might predict for it, though education was one o f the areas that Morgan Phillips saw as 
providing evidence of the expansion and addition of functions to (some) local government units. 
According to Correlli Barnett what the Act provided was ‘an open gate to an empty construction site on 
which local authorities might or might not (depending on their zeal and the effectiveness o f the 
Ministry’s nagging) build the technical and further education system that Britain so desperately 
needed.’98
Morgan Phillips also emphasised in 1951 that the old ‘Part III’ education authorities for elementary 
education - the district councils - had been abolished by the Act and transferred to county councils. This 
was because a wider area was needed and greater financial resources to effectively implement such 
education than many district councils possessed. He noted that the average population of a non-county 
borough was 30,000, with an average penny rate yield of £958, while urban and rural districts averaged 
populations of 15,000 and had an average penny rate yield of just £350. On such limited resources the 
best use of the service could not be made and specialised staff would not be able to be employed.99 Prior
135
to the war, secondary education had been the responsibility of county council and county boroughs and, 
as with the reform of the structure of local government, there had often been a lack of co-operation 
between the larger and smaller authorities. Secondary education also had a higher status before the war 
because it was restricted and this also contributed to the dissension.100
Phillips noted in 1951 that, ‘The level of school building has never been so great.’101 According to Lowe 
between 1945 and 1954 the priorities o f central and local government were to preserve pre-war standards 
in education and provide the basis for the achievement of ‘equality of opportunity’. To keep standards 
up, a third of school buildings had to be re-built or repaired nationally due to war damage.102 In 
Sheffield during the ‘Blitz’ on the City, 143 schools and educational buildings were affected by damage. 
In 30 schools damage was so severe that 15,000 school places could not be used, and as late as 31 March 
1948 some 7,000 places were still unavailable. It was reported at this time that:
The deficiency in school accommodation continues to be a most serious problem.
Much has been done to rehabilitate damaged schools and an extensive building 
programme was commenced in 1946 for the provision of pre-fabricated hutments to 
meet the immediate needs, particularly for the accommodation of the additional age 
groups now the school-leaving age has been raised [to fifteen], but the problem is by 
no means solved and a considerable number of new schools is an essential requirement 
for further educational reform.
According to the Education Committee Annual Report, the shortage of teachers was also acute:
... it was only during the year ending 31st March 1947 that the first trickle of new 
teachers from Emergency Training Colleges gave indication of a steady stream of 
recruits to the profession which will enable the size of classes to be reduced to a 
maximum of 30 pupils per class in Secondary Schools and 40 pupils per class in 
Primary Schools as required under Ministry regulations.103
Education was, however, certainly not the first priority as far as total local authority spending was 
concerned. The first priority was housing as the City’s projected expenditure for 1948/49 shows. £2.47 
million was thought to be required for Council housing schemes in that year. Education was second 
with a projected capital expenditure of £386,325. This included £109,000 in order to purchase and 
prepare a site in Pond and Arundel Streets for the new College of Technology but this idea had been 
abandoned for another site in the Devonshire Street district. It also included almost £50,000 to be spent 
on Thombridge Hall and Thombridge Manor which were to be converted into a training college for 
teachers to alleviate the shortage. After education, the next most costly item estimated for expenditure 
was town planning due to the need to purchase sites on The Moor and Angel Street for re­
development.104 An estimate of expenditure for the previous year 1947/48 put £100,000 as the sum that
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would be spent on sites for the educational buildings contemplated by the Sheffield Education 
Committee, with £40,000 to be spent on the building. As much as £23,500 was estimated in that year for 
pre-fabricated hutments at the College of Arts and Crafts, the College of Technology, Salmon Pastures 
Building School, Coleridge Road Club-Institute and the Nether Edge Grammar School.105 These sums 
for educational building were not excessive, which reflected the similar austerity conditions that affected 
council house construction and the redevelopment o f the City Centre.
The Development Plan created by the Education Committee said, however, that, ‘It has been fully 
appreciated for many years that extensive reconstruction and replanning of existing schools are necessary 
in Sheffield and that in many residential areas the present provision must be augmented.’ Almost half 
the schools still in use had been erected in the Victorian era and were in areas scheduled under town 
plans for industrial development while new sites in populous areas were hard to come by. New primary 
schools were to be needed to deal with the bulge in population due to the post-war baby boom between 
1946 and 1948, and 6,000 extra places had to be planned for.106 Alderman Jackson during the 1949 
municipal elections, however, criticised the fact that not one new school had been built in Sheffield and 
that all that had been built were a few pre-fabricated huts. He said that the Labour Party was more 
interested in secondary and adult education than in infants’ and junior schools, and certainly the Labour 
manifesto emphasised, pace Barnett, technical education. According to it, the new College of 
Technology, ‘Opens out the chances for the sons and daughters of the working class to take the highest 
posts in the new nationalised industries.... The best jobs in transport, electricity, mines, gas and steel 
have usually gone to directors’ friends or sons; they should go to the most suitable and best equipped 
people, poor or not.’107 The Conservative-Liberals were still complaining in 1951 at the lack of progress 
in educational building. They said that Sheffield had one per cent of the country’s population and should 
have had five schools already built by now and ten under construction. In fact, only one school had been 
built and there were another four being constructed.108
Thorpe believes that the opposition to Labour had few grounds for criticism on educational matters 
because of the Labour commitment to grammar schools and that its failure to provide adequate nursery 
schools was due to reasons that would have found favour with the pre-1926 Liberal Alderman, Sir 
William Clegg, namely economy.109 In 1944, the leaders of both main parties did commend the tripartite 
system of grammar, secondary modem and technical schools of the Butler Education Act based on the 
report of the Director of Education, Dr. Alexander. There was only one dissident at the meeting of the 
Sheffield Education Committee which approved it. Labour Councillor Mitchell supported the multilateral 
school and said that, ‘The setting up of three types of schools will perpetuate that hateful intellectual 
snobbery which we have suffered from so much in times past.... We should be raising a class of 
intellectual Pharisees who would thank God they were not like those kids in the Modem School nor those 
in the Technical School.’ He himself was a retired secondary school teacher and he predicted that there 
would not be parity of esteem between the different types of school in the public mind. Alderman 
Jackson predictably saw the Alexander report ‘as one of the finest pieces of work ever done in Sheffield.
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... The committee was right in not tying itself to multilateral schools. Schools could be too big and the 
head lost touch with the children.’110
According to Francis, ‘Education policy ... demonstrates the importance of not viewing Labour’s 
[socialist] ideology in 1945-51 with the benefit of hindsight, and the necessity of appreciating the 
contemporary vitality of definitions of socialism which later generations were to find primitive or 
inadequate.’111 Hence, to most in the Labour Party, as in Sheffield, acceptance of the tripartite system in 
education in the 1940s was fully part of what they considered socialism to be, though the comprehensive 
or multilateral school became Labour conventional wisdom from the late 1950s. Most of the 
development plans submitted to the Ministry of Education were clearly tripartite which reflects the lack 
of interest by local Labour Parties in the comprehensive. Only where comprehensives met a specific 
local need as in Southend or Anglesey did they go ahead and then they were supported by Labour’s 
opponents, for both those Local Education Authorities were Tory-controlled. Even in the London 
County Council, which was regarded as the most progressive Labour authority, while its development 
plan included some comprehensives it also intimated that it wanted to preserve grammar schools. Major 
London figures like Herbert Morrison or Margaret Cole opposed multilateral schools in this period, 
though Cole had changed her mind by the mid-1950s.112 Equality of opportunity of all children to 
benefit from a system that had been restricted to the middle-classes was the Labour demand, while ideas 
of equality of outcome and positive discrimination were still distant dreams not yet articulated by 
anyone. It was in that spirit that the decision of the Sheffield Education Committee in 1945 to turn the 
King Edward VII School in Sheffield into a non-fee paying school was broadly welcomed by the Trades 
and Labour Council, for instance, but it was made clear that there would be no change to the curriculum 
or staff and no new way of appointing staff would be introduced.113
The most important figure supporting multilateral schools with jurisdiction in South Yorkshire was the 
Chief Education Officer of the West Riding County Council from 1945, Alec (later Sir Alec) Clegg. 
Peter Darvill compares him with another great educationalist, Hemy Morris, who had been Chief 
Education Officer in Cambridgeshire in the 1930s and had started the village colleges in that county, and 
claims that both
saw schools as a source of social progress which could improve the lives of individuals 
and communities. Neither saw their departments as part of a framework of local 
government devoted solely to the efficient realisation of the policy decisions of elected 
members. Both realised their positions enabled them to influence policy and to 
accelerate, or slow down, those aspects of change which could improve or threaten the 
quality of education in schools or colleges. They lived in, and wrestled with, the 
ambivalence of their jobs. Their ideas had an impact far beyond their own authorities 
for both charted new routes for educational progress.114
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Darvill has described Clegg’s early years in his post, particularly between 1949 and 1952, as resembling 
‘the situation of a builder putting up foundations in stormy weather’, and Clegg himself said in 1949 that, 
‘West Riding education, in my relatively short experience of it, has been very much the subject of fairly 
strident political views.’115 The Development Plan proposed a large number of comprehensives, and 
when the contents of the plan became public, the Conservatives expressed concern at ‘a tendency to 
‘level down’ the grammar schools and ignore the value of their fine traditions in an attempt to equalise 
conditions throughout the area’. The Labour Chairman of the Education Committee was to himself lose 
his seat to a businessman campaigning against multilateral schools. Labour lost control of the County 
Council in 1949 and, while they did not abandon the Development Plan, the Conservatives insisted that 
multilateral schools would only be introduced if local people in particular areas professed a preference 
for them.116 Clegg himself was to be accused o f introducing multilateral schools by the backdoor in the 
school building programme of 1949/50117 but it was not until after 1952 when Labour re-took office that 
any comprehensives were actually built and only two had been begun when Labour again lost power in 
1955.118 Clegg was not convinced that there would be parity of esteem between the various schools 
within the tripartite system and was very sceptical that pupils aptitudes for particular kinds of education 
could be decided at eleven by Cyril Burt’s tests. The Development Plan quoted with approval the views 
of the Advisoiy Council of Education in Scotland ‘that the scheme will end not in tripartite equality but 
in dualism of academic and technical, plus a permanently depressed element’ and that
even if the tripartite scheme were wholly feasible, is it educationally desirable ? If 
education is much more than instruction, is in fact life and preparation for life, can it 
be wisdom thus to segregate the types from an early age ? On the contrary, we hold 
that school becomes colourful, rich and rewarding just in proportion as the boy who 
reads Homer, the boy who makes wireless sets, and the boy without marked aptitude 
for either are within its living unity, a constant stimulus and supplement one to 
another.119
Rotherham had submitted a Development Plan costing £1.8 million120 to the Ministry of Education as 
early as June 1946 but the Ministry did not accept it as it stood and a second Development Plan 
involving capital expenditure of £1.5 million121 was submitted in April 1948. The major stumbling block 
was how Rotherham would make provision for enacting the tripartite system of secondary education. In 
the first Plan the two existing grammar schools would be retained, while the secondaiy modem schools 
would offer a distinct technical bias in the last two or three years of education. There would be no 
separate technical schools. This was unacceptable to the Ministry and as a result separate technical 
schools for boys and girls were to be opened in 1952 and 1953. It was not until 1956 that the first 
indication came that Rotherham Education Committee was thinking of alternatives to the tripartite 
system, and the trend only became public in 1959 with heated debate in the press and among the general 
public. Even in 1960, the two grammar schools retained their selective status in a reorganisation and it 
was 1963 before the Education Committee was directed by the Council to look at implementing total
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comprehensivization of secondary schools. As in Sheffield, what counted in local Labour Party circles 
was that the two grammar schools would no longer be fee-paying.122 When Alderman Sam Hall 
completed twenty-one years as Chairman of the Education Committee in November 1949, looking back, 
he emphasised that in his time the education rate had risen from 3s. 9d. in 1928 to 8s. 5.5d. in 1949. And 
he said that, ‘These figures are in some measure an indication of the evolutionary process that has been 
going on over the years until we are fast approaching the time when the child is no longer fitted to the 
requirements of the school, but the school is required to meet the needs of the child.’
What was happening after 1945 was often actually the catching up with projects that had been prevented 
from being implemented in the inter-war years. Rotherham proposed building an Open-Air School for 
Physically Defective Children in the mid-1930s, and though most of the building was completed by 
1939, it was held up by the war and opened in 1948. Economic retrenchment was, as in Sheffield, to 
slow nursery school provision though the first one in Rotherham was opened in December 1948.123 It 
too had been proposed in the 1930s.124 Austerity conditions meant only gradual new development; it was 
December 1949 before the first post-war primary school was opened.125 A second was opened in July 
1951.126 Overall Rotherham had to be grateful for such small mercies as at least a token of better times 
to come. Like so many other local authorities, including Sheffield, Labour Rotherham willingly accepted 
the tripartite system as fully realising its conception of socialism.
5.5 - CONCLUSION
This Chapter has looked at the various proposals produced to alter the local structure of local 
government, particularly the idea of creating a York South County Council, and has shown the lack of 
consensus even within South Yorkshire about local government reform. The ultimate outcome was 
satisfying to nobody. The county boroughs were largely unable to extend their boundaries to encompass 
more land for council housing, while the West Riding County Council and the district councils felt they 
had only won a pause in the perpetual conflict between local authorities - the county boroughs were 
unlikely to give up their territorial ambitions. Electricity, gas and hospitals were nationalised, taken out 
o f local authority control, and handed over to unaccountable non-elected regional quangos. Despite the 
stated intent of many important figures within the Labour Government about the need to preserve local 
democracy, the actions of that Labour Government belied those intentions. There were contrary trends 
and some extra responsibilities were given to local authorities, but this opposing tendency was weaker 
than the tendency to centralisation and regionalisation. It was in some ways ironic that the 
regionalisation of local government had been fiercely attacked as undermining local democracy but that 
Labour local authorities like those in South Yorkshire could give away important symbols of municipal 
enterprise that had long been accountable to their own citizens and, what is more, in the case of 
electricity and gas, not be adequately remunerated for those municipal enterprises. Is it too cynical a 
suspicion to believe that the latter was acquiesced in because the Labour councillors remained more 
personally powerful and honoured even after nationalization than they would have been under the
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general diminishment of their powers that would have been the case if Sheffield and Rotherham had 
become secondary authorities under a regional government ?
Nationalization of local government services was described as ‘Labour’s great mistake’ in 1987.127 
David Blunkett believed this in the light of his experience as leader of Sheffield Council at a period when 
it was more ideologically left-wing than its predecessors and fighting the Thatcher Government. He saw 
nationalization as the first step on the road to rate-capping and the emasculation of local government by 
Thatcher. Ironically he was to be in 2002 a senior member o f a government that announced even stricter 
control by Whitehall over local government in order to more efficiently deliver public services. It 
remains an open question whether municipal enterprise as an alternative form of socialist public 
enterprise could have fulfilled the goals that led Labour in 1945-51 to push nationalization to the extent 
it did. It is likely that it could not have done so. In electricity, gas and health, an untidy patchwork of 
provision would have continued due to the dilatoriness of Conservative local authorities. Nationalization 
in the form of the Morrisonian public corporation can be seen, however, as being a relatively 
conservative solution and not sufficiently thought out. Public enterprise could conceivably have been 
made competitive with private firms within the same industry to bring down costs instead of existing as 
monopolies that did not aid national economic planning. But this, though a solution put forward in the 
1960s and 1970s, was destined never to be realised.
Under nationalization, each Briton theoretically owned a share in the nationalized industries, though it is 
unlikely they felt any real sense of ownership of such remote bodies and neither did the workers in them. 
Nationalization is often attacked because even in industrial relations, it is said, it did not necessarily 
bring about an atmosphere in which workers would work harder in the interest of the wider community. 
When this is said, the nationalized coal industry and the exaggerated socialist hopes placed on it by the 
Attlee Government is often focused upon. Tory newspapers in 1947 gleefully publicised the un-official 
‘Stint Strike’ begun at Grimethorpe Colliery in South Yorkshire, which was to involve much of the South 
Yorkshire Coalfield in sympathy strikes.128 However, this was equally true of municipal enterprise, even 
had it been a contender as an alternative democratic form of public ownership. Workers were primarily 
concerned about wage packets and differentials with other workers. Despite the appeals of Rotherham 
Council, for example, its transport workers struck on nine successive Sundays in 1946 in order to get 
increased payments of time-and-a-half for working on that day. This was despite a general agreement 
reached among local authorities with the Transport and General Workers’ Union head office to pay only 
time-and-a-quarter.129
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CHAPTER SIX 
NEW JERUSALEM 
POSTPONED?
TOWN PLANNING AND 
HOUSING PROVISION,
1945-1951
6.1 - INTRODUCTION
In 1957, Henry Foster, Sheffield City Engineer, Surveyor and Planning Officer, summed up the 
experience of town planning since 1945 by quoting the poet Robert Browning:
The common problem, yours, mine, everyone ’s 
Is - not to fancy what were fair in life 
Provided it could be, - but, finding first 
What may be, then find  out how to make it fair  
Up to our means.
He went on:
It is this common problem . . .  that the Town Planner is tackling: and it is because he is 
tackling it in this seemingly prosaic way that planning has lost much of its public 
appeal. In the heyday of theoretical planning, after the end of the war, when many 
town and city plans were prepared, most of their authors enjoyed themselves fancying 
what was fair in life, without even stopping to consider whether it could be. This did a 
great dis-service to planning; for it gave the impression that planning was soon to lead 
us from the gloom of the war years into an exciting brave new world. The point was 
made in 1945, in “Sheffield Re-planned,” that “there is no sense in preparing a plan 
which, though ideal in conception we cannot ever hope to cany out.” It is now 
becoming more widely understood that our plans cannot solve our problems overnight; 
that, long in the making, they will be longer in the doing: and so the fire of popular 
enthusiasm which they originally kindled has quickly burned itself out.1
This would seem fair comment, though it has now become legitimate to ask whether popular enthusiasm 
for town planning ever existed in the 1940s, except immediately after the Blitz, given the conservatism 
expressed in insistent demands for building new housing even if it was contrary to the longer term needs 
of communities expressed in their town plans. Foster seems to agree with Barnett about the pernicious 
influence of ‘New Jerusalemist’ attitudes and the need for economic realism, but he does not believe that 
planning in Sheffield even in 1945 can be criticised for not recognising this. The Collie Plan, it was said, 
‘differed from most plans . . .  in that it rejected the idea of a fixed “master plan” in favour of a flexible
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scheme which would allow for progressive adjustment to accord with current needs and legislation.’
This was ‘implicit in the 1947 Town Planning Act, which call[ed] for a “programming” of all 
development plans and for five-yearly revisions in the light of experience of them.’ The ‘conception of 
flexibility and practicability which underlay its plan has since been generally accepted.’ These virtues 
grew out of Sheffield’s long experience of producing plans. However while this had made ‘much 
positive progress possible within the limits of national conditions’ it was ‘felt, however, that more might 
have been done if there had been greater local freedom to build’ and that the City Council was
frankly disappointed at the progress in rebuilding the main shopping centre in The 
Moor and High Street. Two city stores have been partly completed and opened to 
trade, and the first instalments of two more are in progress, but the council, while 
appreciating the difficulties about materials and licences, feel that the city has not 
received the treatment merited by the damage it suffered.2
This feeling was common to many blitzed cities between 1945 and 1951 despite a Labour Government 
being in power and most of them having elected Labour Councils which might have appeared to smooth 
matters. In fact, central government caution and petty interference was just as marked as under the 
wartime Coalition government in both town planning and house construction. In terms of the City 
Council’s housing programme, it can be compared with that of Rotherham County Borough which got 
underway more rapidly and was more efficient in producing permanent houses. As both suffered from 
government red tape and indecision this must be due to the degree of war damage sustained which 
delaying the start of Sheffield’s programme, as well as better co-ordination between the Rotherham 
Council departments. My research tends to support Tiratsoo and Hasegawa’s conclusions about the 
reasons for the slow implementation of town planning, and those of Nicholas Bullock on housing. 
Bullock has looked at Finsbury in London and the success of its post-war housing programme. He 
argues that the critics of Bevan who argued against reliance on local authorities to build houses and 
called instead for a national housing corporation were wrong. Any failings were due to the inadequacy 
of the central planning of the housing programme. There would have been a considerable further time- 
lag in production if a national housing corporation had been handed the job afresh and it is not clear that 
it would have been any more successful in solving the imbalance between the volume of houses 
approved and labour and materials.3
Though municipal elections resumed in 1945 and Labour was again accountable to voters, Labour in 
Sheffield or Rotherham was never in any danger of losing control of policy-making and implementation, 
and the continuity of policy in housing and town planning is very visible. Popular participation in these 
areas of policy was not a formal legal requirement placed on the Council even under a Labour 
Government and it remained a technical matter for Council members and their officers.4 Housing, 
however, was prioritised even over city centre reconstruction. Most 1940s surveys showed that this 
accorded with public opinion, though the two Councils made none of their own, probably considering it
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superfluous. Labour was pledged to get rid of slums because, as Sir Stafford Cripps said, they ‘only too 
often [produced] slum minds and slum habits’ which were barriers to the inculcation of socialist attitudes 
and behaviour in the wider public. There was thus a direct link between the physical environment and 
the creation of social conciousness, which led Labour to support the creation of ‘neighbourhood-units’ to 
attempt to create community-feeling on the new housing estates.5 Social justice was a Labour aspiration 
often expressed, but it is not hard also to find reasons of economic efficency behind the desire to re­
house the inhabitants of Sheffield’s slums particularly in the Lower Don Valley where they occupied 
land long-earmarked for industrial expansion. The views o f some Labour politicians like Herbert 
Morrison on the need for creating an ‘active democracy’ as expressed in a speech in 1948 also imply 
this. Fielding notes that, ‘His vision of active democracy was that of a society in which individuals 
worked harder for their elected representatives. A closer relationship between rulers and ruled meant, in 
this instance, a more efficient work-force: it did not imply a government more open and willing to take 
account of popular initiatives.’ This was expressed in an article in 1991, which also instructively notes 
the unwillingness of Labour in government to employ public relations to ‘sell’ people its message, is 
evidence that Labour did not genuinely accept the legitimacy of popular participation, despite all that 
Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo say in their book of 1995 about its desire to increase participation and 
diminish helplessness among ordinaiy citizens by creating a ‘Responsible Society’.6 Tiratsoo may 
believe that the town planners were mild reformers often frustrated by popular conservatism and apathy 
and that they wanted to work as far as possible in harmony with the citizens they served, but their Labour 
masters, and they themselves too, often, as in Sheffield, failed to involve them directly except in the most 
perfunctory way before the plans had been drawn up.7 On the other hand, it is true that Alderman 
Charles William Gascoigne, chairman of the Town Planning and Estates Committees in 1945 was a 
council house tenant and a gas-fitter whose work had allegedly brought him into thousands o f homes so 
he would directly understand the grievances of Sheffield citizens.8 It is not true that all council tenants 
were not interested in participation either in town planning or in the formal government of their council 
estates, as this proves, though most were probably not bothered. We simply do not know for they were 
not asked.
Labour may have had the universalist philosophy of citizenship classically stated by T. H. Marshall that 
called for the expansion of the social rights that underpinned the welfare state, but it has been criticised 
by many critics, including those of the Left, as fostering a ‘dependency culture’.9 Meller argues that the 
concept of civic citizenship was diminished in the 1940s precisely because of the implementation of the 
equality in social rights characteristic of this ‘bureaucratic welfarism’. Pride in one’s city was no longer 
measured in terms of the deeds enacted by local volunteers and philanthropists as in the nineteenth 
century. They had been directly interested in the betterment of their local communities because they 
lived within them and were affected by the plight of ‘their’ poor. Civic pride was now measured through 
the actions of professional and local government administrators who believed on the basis of technical 
expertise that they knew what should be done when, for example, city centres needed to be rebuilt or 
houses designed.10 Ravetz has argued that they ignored the idea that there was a complex and
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interdependent link between people and their environment, enacting a ‘clean sweep’ style which treated 
the city as a thing whose past urban fabric could simply be jettisoned without any loss to its citizens.11
Tiratsoo12 and Hasegawa13 have done much to show the falsity of the Barnett thesis o f ‘Parlours before 
Plant’. In South Yorkshire, labour shortages meant that housing had to be built around Sheffield for 
steelworkers and in the South Yorkshire Coalfield for miners whose activities were vital to a government 
trying to create an export-led economic recovery. Thus, there was an economic rationale for the local 
housing programmes since they increased labour flexibility. While Barnett does briefly note in 
parenthesis that housing could have economic value when specifically linked to industrial expansion,14 
he never provides an estimate of what he considers should have actually been spent on housing as against 
spending on new factories or infrastructure when making his criticisms. He does not give a figure for 
economically useful housing as against wasteful housing. He also criticises the Labour pledge to build 
four to five million new houses after the war15 as the ‘loveliest dream’ of New Jerusalem,16 but this was 
never achieved while Labour was in office. From 1948 overall numbers of new housing completions 
actually declined year on year from 227,000 in 1948 to 194,000 in 1951, and the Ministry of Health 
which had the responsibility for allocating housing was actually restraining local authorities like 
Sheffield or Rotherham from building all the houses they would have liked to have built.17 The 
economy, not public housing, was the most important priority to the Labour government. Contemporary 
witness from sources like Picture Post18 as well as many secondary accounts of the period note the 
overlapping responsibilities for housing between different Government departments which actually 
prevented effective co-ordination and the overloading of Bevan by his responsibilities for both housing 
and the National Health Service.19 This is seen as a mistake of Attlee which went against the manifesto 
pledge to put housing in a ministry with town planning.20 This, however, also gives the lie to Barnett that 
housing was the number one priority.
6.2 - TOWN PLANNING IN SHEFFIELD, 1945-1951
In October 1945 Collie, the City Engineer, said to Alderman Thraves, Leader of the City Council, of the 
plan to redevelop Glasgow city centre that: ‘The proposals are of a major character, and the scheme, as a 
whole, is perhaps, as imaginative and far-reaching as any I have seen. Certainly it goes much further 
than the present Sheffield proposals, though I think there is much more hope o f the latter being carried 
out.’21 We noted in the Introduction the emphasis on the practicability o f Sheffield’s planning and it thus 
might seem surprising that with all the stress placed on that more was not actually done to advance the 
implementation of town planning in Sheffield than was actually the case. In November 1945, Collie 
wrote to the Regional Planning Officer o f the Ministry of Town and Country Planning to say that he was 
preparing a general development plan for the City and asked for approval of his approach. One reason 
for limited accomplishment by the Council was that he had only had a limited staff to work with. To 
prevent unnecessary work he was concentrating his detailed attention on areas of the city which would be 
developed in the near future and sketching the road pattern and land use zones. He again stressed that
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his detailed work bore ‘clearly in mind the essential concept of practicability’ and asserted that ‘Industry 
is the basis of all our planning’.22
A broad overview of planning aims and strategy was given in a talk for the BBC’s Northern Programme 
in 1946. The planners were referred to as ‘energetic people with a real vision of what can be done with 
this great smoking, toiling city of the industrial North, where half a million people work and live.’ One 
of their problems was
whether the city is to remain busy and prosperous. On that everything else depends.
This is realised by those responsible for the planning of the city. I was greatly 
impressed by the sense of reality with which the problems are being approached. First, 
to decide what kind of city and what size of city was wanted. Afterwards, and only 
when that had been clearly reviewed, to get down to details.23
There is unmistakable deference to the expert here, with the assumption that because he (and it was 
usually he) had the technical expertise, then his professional competence to plan a whole city so as to 
solve all the problems of its citizens and promote economic prosperity went unquestioned. Henry Foster 
was less starry-eyed when he discussed town planning in 1957. He remarked that ‘it has been found 
much easier to state a problem than to provide a solution.’ 24
Amongst the assumptions of the planners were that the city population would remain static at half a 
million and that the city would remain the same size and would not need to swallow up surrounding 
districts.25 The static population assumption, though it proved wrong (for the population had actually 
fallen by 1961), was taken at the time as further evidence of the Sheffield plan’s practicability.26 The 
area of Sheffield remained the same until 196727 and Collie in November 1945 claimed that Sheffield 
presented a problem very different from Leeds, Plymouth or Manchester, having still within its borders 
an undeveloped area sufficiently large to accommodate some 35,000 new houses.28 Part of this land in 
the Handsworth-Woodhouse area had just been compulsorily purchased, and, in its recommendations in 
March 1945, the Town Planning Committee had called for ‘the creation of a new town with a population 
of approximately 80,000, which is considerably larger than some County Boroughs’. This estate 
represented the second and third years of the post-war housing programme.29 Yet at the end o f 1947 the 
Corporation had built only 912 temporary dwellings and land was thus not an immediate practical 
problem. It was a problem of the future.30
The Council, however, then discarded the static area assumption, and their proposals to the Local 
Government Boundary Commission called for the incorporation of areas including Wortley Rural 
District and Stocksbridge Urban District to provide fresh land for future building.31 It cannot be a 
coincidence that in 1947 J. E. Edwards of the Ministry of Labour told the Sheffield Trades Council that 
there were over a thousand vacancies in Sheffield’s steel industry which could not be filled locally and
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proposed a conference of Labour organisations to compile a lodgings list so new recruits could be 
rapidly accommodated. The Ministry appealed to working-class Sheffielders to help as a service they 
could perform for the export drive: ‘I want everybody to be mustered into a drive for lodgings in 
Sheffield, acting as ‘door knockers’ to their neighbours, and getting enthusiasm and a feeling of doing 
the right thing out of a job that is essential at the present time.’32 Conditions of labour shortage 
continued into the 1950s with full employment and a booming local economy, but obviously such short 
term expedients as a lodgings list were not good enough particularly given the existing long waiting list 
for council houses, and there was great need that extra houses be built to improve labour flexibility. The 
Handsworth-Woodhouse project had also run into problems in 1947. The housing programme was 
menaced because the Ministry of Fuel and Power wanted to start open-cast coal extraction on the land. 
‘Current Topics’ was sceptical o f the ability of the Labour Council to stand up for Sheffield’s interests 
against a Labour Government:
We may be certain, however, that whatever Whitehall wants Sheffield will not protest 
as long as the Socialists are in office at the Town Hall. Sheffield’s interests come 
before support of the Socialist Government. Those interests are not being cared for or 
maintained at present. Hospitals, electricity, and transport are all to be handed over to 
remote rulers, and local government itself is being destroyed.33
The Local Government Boundaiy Commission was abolished before Sheffield’s wishes were met and 
the only route left open was a Parliamentary Extension Bill. In September 1949, the Council produced a 
Bill which would extend Sheffield’s area into Wortley and Chesterfield Rural Districts.34 The latter 
proposal meant extending the boundaries into Derbyshire, and Fred Mulley, Labour M.P. for Park, who 
introduced the Bill on its Second Reading in March 1951, amusingly said in favour o f it that it would 
‘extend the area of birth qualification to play for Yorkshire. It may be that another Len Hutton, Hedley 
Verity, Wilfred Rhodes or Herbert Sutcliffe may, in this way, qualify to play for Yorkshire.’ The real 
reasons were that it would provide enough land for the further house building programme which would 
last sue to seven years under existing conditions (though the Council wanted to speed this up) and cut 
procedural delays that arose from the need to get permission from other councils when wanting to build 
houses for Sheffield citizens beyond its borders.
Sheffield MPs all supported the Bill in Parliament but they were opposed by Hemy George McGhee, 
Labour M.P. for Penistone, who made interesting allegations about the Council’s motives. He was 
interested in land reform and had lived in Sheffield for twenty-five years. He alleged that there was 
2,493 acres of building land available in the West End but that the affluent inhabitants did not want 
council houses in their areas though they exploited the working classes for their livelihoods. The 
Council did not want to put houses there as it would decrease the City’s rateable value. He alleged that 
the great hereditary landlords of Sheffield, the Howards and Fitzwilliams, in order to get around the 
provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 which would force them to sell their land at
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present use value if the Council wanted to develop it, so losing them any betterment value, had decided 
not to sell land and to convert it to leasehold. The Council, however, refused to apply compulsory 
purchase orders against the Duke of Norfolk or Earl Fitzwilliam because it was frightened of them, yet it 
was a different story when encroaching on districts outside their boundaries. There it went much further 
with legal action and sought eviction orders against sitting tenants like the small farmers of Wortley 
district who were weaker prey.35
However true these allegations were, the Bill was eventually thrown out by the House of Lords because 
of the large amount of land in Sheffield designated as open space by the planners that could potentially 
be built upon. This led the Council into conflict from 1952 with the Sheffield and Peak District branch 
of the CPRE which favoured a distant satellite town or building on blitzed inner city sites rather than 
encroachment on the provisional green belt which it had campaigned so actively for in the 1930s. At a 
public inquiry in 1952 into the Council’s plans to acquire land in the green belt for housing, the Town 
Clerk said that for the loss of 2.5 per cent of the green belt, 33,000 people on the waiting list would have 
to wait just two extra years to be housed. He then offensively contrasted the membership of the local 
CPRE which was under 1,200 people with the city’s population of over half a million, and summed up 
the issue as ‘The view for the few - or houses for the many’. The latter demonstrates the arrogance of 
Council attitudes and the marked change in them since the green belt had been provisionally delineated 
despite influential Labour Party members like Fred Marshall on the CPRE executive and the use o f the 
countryside for amenity purposes like rambling by local working-class people. Rambling had long been 
a radical left-wing movement, sometimes taking direct action as at the famous Kinder Scout Mass 
Trespass in 1932, and it was a relatively inexpensive hobby.36
In July 1947 Ernest Taylor wrote a Star article entitled ‘Plan For New Sheffield Now Operating’, in 
which he reminded readers who might believe nothing was happening that the Sheffield Plan was 
actually being very slowly implemented. He admitted, however, that there had
been no spectacular developments. And at the risk of being proved wrong, I doubt if 
there will be for years to come. But the fact remains, the plan is taking shape. Those 
who expected a new Moor, Civic Circle, or other major development overnight - it was 
foolish anyway - have been disappointed. On the other hand, have you noticed the 
factories being erected here and there in the city ? Well, they are part and parcel o f the 
ultimate plan. They are being built only in specified areas.
Taylor informed his readers that Sheffield was actually regarded as the leading planning authority in the 
North-Eastern Planning Region despite this lack of progress.37
Housing was still unashamedly the aspiration that had first priority which was no doubt a reason why the 
Council was commended for the ‘practicability’ of its Plan.38 Concentration on this actually provides
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evidence of a refusal to support visionary ‘New Jerusalemism’ in town planning whatever its effect on 
industry. But the needs of the local economy were being met first. The Council Estates Surveyor was 
also its Industrial Development Officer and in 1946 a separate office was set up within his department to 
deal with the large number of firms making inquiries about land for post-war industrial projects. The 
need to rebuild and modernise factories was clearly recognised by the Council and because of the great 
demand for land the Council was forced to buy much more for leasing to industry.39 In 1948 the Council 
information sheet Civic Record noted that:
When the war ended everyone hoped to see a new and finely planned Sheffield arise 
on the ruins of her central streets. The plans are there, and in due course fine, modem 
buildings will replace those destroyed. But the economic crisis, and the shortages of 
labour and materials make it unlikely that any major building schemes - except perhaps 
those concerned with industrial development [emphasis added] - can be completed for 
a long time to come.40
It was feared that Sheffield was being fatally damaged as a shopping centre by the slow progress of 
reconstruction. It was an issue in the municipal elections of 1947. Progressive Councillor Oliver S. 
Holmes argued that if the Labour Council had taken a stronger line with Whitehall then The Moor would 
not still be a desolation of rubble and stagnant water. He alleged that the problem lay in the protracted 
discussions over whether The Moor was to be a main traffic artery or a shopping centre. If  the Council 
had insisted on the latter from the start, good progress could have been made. It was not material 
shortages but an artificial barrier of red tape, forms, permits and restrictions that was holding up 
progress.41
The Council’s own complaints about Government red tape and bureaucracy were set out in a long letter 
by Collie to the Town Clerk in May 1949. He complained that:
The exercise of control by Government Departments has increased greatly during the 
post war years, and there is no doubt that there is greater delay in getting things settled 
than existed pre-war. Generally, I would say that Government Departments concern 
themselves with too much detail. This has the effect of choking their organisation and 
leaving insufficient time to consider the major questions.
Taking the Ministry of Transport as an example, this Ministry has had a Regional 
organisation since its creation, and in pre-war days the Regional Officers concerned 
themselves mostly with the bigger road schemes. Today, the smallest road matter 
exercises their attention and generally requires a personal visit by an officer of the 
Ministry.
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But it was the delays with major works that were particularly inconvenient and he singled out the Tinsley 
Bridges scheme.42 The scheme was first considered in 1928 but work started in 1938 at an estimated 
cost of £120,000. Work was suspended by the Ministry despite the Council’s protests in 1941with 60 
per cent of it completed at a cost of £79,000. As soon as hostilities ceased, the Council agitated for the 
scheme to be restarted. In September 1947, it was estimated that the final cost to complete it would now 
be £182,000 given the scarcity of labour and materials.43 Approval to re-start, however, had only been 
given ‘within the last few weeks.’44
It was, however, The Moor and the adjacent shopping streets that sparked the greatest concern. A public 
inquiry was held in December 1948 and January 1949 over a Declaratory Order to allow the Council to 
compulsorily purchase 198 acres of land in central Sheffield which included these streets. 300 
objections were lodged which had to be dealt with individually.45 Then the Council had to wait for 
approval by the Government which was only given in November 1949 after ten months of delay 46 
Without approval, The Moor could not be redeveloped but ultimately only 92 acres were approved when 
the decision was announced.47 The decision did not please the Sheffield Labour movement. Sheffield 
Forward complained that ‘if we are ever to have any town planning at all here or anywhere else, this kind 
of unconscionable delay has to come to an end. The circumlocutory methods of Government 
departments have to be straightened out and shortened, or the “British way of life” will get a rude shake- 
up.’ It continued,
There can be no Town Planning worth the name, or country planning either, until 
competent authorities have powers to deal with these matters without delay. At present 
local authorities are involved in enormous expense and a fearful waste of time, only to 
result in a crippling of their plans. Even the old Radical Party stood for land 
nationalisation more than fifty years ago, and Socialists must not forget that that is the 
fundamental principle of their policy.48
Central government was equally important in helping to advance or retard re-development through its 
control of financial purse strings. In August 1950, for example, Sheffield was allocated as little as 
£350,000 out of the total of just £4 million pounds authorised by the government in the form of licences 
for rebuilding on bombed sites in eighteen blitzed towns in 1951. This money could not be used for 
buying land, clearing it or laying on roads and services and progress would be reviewed by the Ministry 
of Town and Country Planning who would amend the allocations made if the whole allotment was not 
being used as agreed 49 The Communist Daily Worker said that each town might just be able to ‘get one, 
but no more than two new buildings next year’ and that it was ‘not even pin money’.50 In the period 
1949-51 Sheffield was given a grand total of £802,500 in ‘blitz allocation’ by the Labour government 
and used it to start re-building two flagship city centre stores, Woolworths and John Walsh’s.51
The Town and Country Planning Act 1947 gave planning authorities the power to purchase land before it
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was developed and retain the freehold, but ultimately only the blitzed cities had the means to do this.
Yet as Ravetz points out even where massive landholdings were achieved a new kind of urban order was 
not created.52 This, though, certainly seems to have been what some members of Sheffield Labour Party 
intended:
The Labour Council has sought to acquire land for this [housing] and other purposes 
with the intention of retaining it for all time as public property. Land which was 
common property less than 160 years ago is now having to be purchased for the City’s 
urgent needs at as much as £50 per square yard. What would this have meant to the 
people of Sheffield to-day had we adopted Labour’s policy 100 years ago ? The 
saving in our Town Planning scheme alone is almost immeasurable. It is only common 
sense, then, to suggest that land thus acquired will not be re-sold.53
The 7th Earl Fitzwilliam54 and the Duke of Norfolk55 were presidents of Sheffield Conservative 
Federation in the 1940s and the principal landowners in Sheffield so land purchase by the Council could 
have potential party political overtones. Their ownership of Sheffield land had long been contested and 
in the nineteenth century the Mayor of Sheffield had led opposition to the leasehold system.56 However, 
it was only to be expected that the Fitzwilliams, for example, would have additional personal political 
antagonism to Labour due to the open-casting for coal of Wentworth Park which continued into the early 
1950s. Jones has noted that, ‘To many observers the open-cast operations at Wentworth looked like a 
personal vendetta by Emanuel Shinwell, the Minister of Fuel and Power, against Earl Fitzwilliam, a 
representative of the old order.’57 The tragic death of the 8th Earl in a plane crash in 194858 also meant 
heavy death duties which the Labour government had made more stringent,59and ultimately led to the 
sale of the contents of Wentworth Woodhouse and its conversion into a teacher-training college.60 In 
addition though compensated the Earl’s coal mines had been nationalised in 1947. Of course, it has been 
argued that the aristocracy had little influence in local politics by this time and it could be argued that the 
positions they held in local Conservative Associations were ornamental and honorific but they still had 
widespread local respect.61 Admittedly Sheffield folk, despite Henry McGhee’s allegations about the 
Council referred to earlier, were not always deferential. The Duke of Norfolk was badly heckled at one 
meeting when he tried to speak during the 1945 General Election.62 McGhee acknowledged the failure 
of the 1947 Act to assist development by the Council. The nationalisation of development rights took 
away all incentives for developers to develop land and for landowners to sell it. Labour when criticising 
the Town and Country Planning Act 1944 had believed that councils should be able to undertake their 
own development but with state curbs on spending, the limitations on construction due to building 
licences, and rationing of steel, local authorities, like Sheffield, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, tended 
to limit themselves to statutory obligations like housing provision and expanding education through 
building new schools. To get developers interested in city centre re-development they had to set ground 
rents at levels not beneficial to themselves.
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As Ravetz points out, however, the official mind often refused to accept that it was undermining the 
attempts of local authorities to reconstruct city centres and believed there was a simple physical reason 
for the lack of progress, namely that the areas assembled for re-development were not large enough. The 
government argued that ‘War damage on the whole was scattered, and even where it was most 
concentrated there were usually a few buildings left standing, buildings which were as a rule too useful to 
be pulled down.’63 As we have seen, the Declaratory Order of 1949 cut the area that the Council wished 
to buy compulsorily in central Sheffield in half and was thus a prime reason why a large enough area for 
development was not assembled. Procedural delays, including lengthy public inquiries, were also 
important in retarding progress as was the necessity of getting the permission of other local authorities 
though the 1947 Act drastically cut the number of planning authorities. The 1947 Act for the first time 
forced all planning authorities to begin the work of producing development plans for their areas which 
would be revised every five years. Fresh surveys had to be undertaken in consequence. None begun in 
South Yorkshire, however, were finished before 1951 and both Sheffield64 and Barnsley65 had to ask in 
early 1951 for a longer period to complete the surveys. This placed greater pressure on the limited staffs 
of town planning departments and in Sheffield there was probably sympathy with a comment of Sir 
George Pepler, the Honorary Secretary of the Town Planning Institute, in 1949 that:
Here we are once more carrying out surveys and making plans. We seem to have done 
this before and no doubt we shall do it again and again before we are through. Perhaps 
some of us on our more irritable days, discerning the millennium as far off as ever, feel 
a touch of the chill hand of despair as we struggle on.66
The Sheffield development plan which was submitted in 195267 had to go through another public inquiry 
in 195368 and ministerial approval was only given in 1957.69 The experience of other South Yorkshire 
county borough councils was similar but obviously the potential disruption to those towns was greater 
because they had not been war-damaged.70 Despite the evidence we have mustered which blames the 
Government for much of the slow progress in post-war reconstruction, this is not the general conclusion 
of Hasegawa. He argues that the original ‘boldness of a city centre plan hinged on a city council’s belief 
in radical town planning, the plan, and the planner, and its determination to foster a local pride, if not 
patriotism, about the plan’ but, apart from a few celebrated examples like Coventry and Plymouth, this 
determination was not apparent among many city councils even if Labour was in control. Local Labour 
Parties in most places were keener to prioritise people’s immediate wants such as housing than city 
centres and this was true of Sheffield. For most Labour councils, he argues, the reconstruction of the city 
centres was a vexed question to be avoided not least because they did not want to raise local rates.71 On 
the last point it is the case that in Sheffield the rates rose from 17s 6d in 1945/6 to 20s Od in 1947/8 but 
that the rates were then held at this level until 1952/3.72
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6.3 - HOMES FOR HEROES ?: THE HOUSING CRISIS, 1945-1951
Willmott and Young put their finger on the problem for Labour of attempting to build community 
through altering the built environment:
The physical size of reconstruction is so great that the authorities have been 
understandably intent upon bricks and mortar. Their negative task is to demolish 
slums which fall below the most elementary standards of hygiene, their positive one to 
build new houses and new towns cleaner and more spacious than the old. Yet even 
when the town planners have set themselves to create communities anew as well as 
houses, they have still put their faith in buildings, sometimes speaking as though all 
that was necessary for neighbourliness was a neighbourhood unit, for community spirit 
a community centre. If this were so, then there would be no harm in shifting people 
about the country, for what is lost could soon be regained by skilful architecture and 
design. But there is surely more to a community than that. The sense of loyalty to 
each other amongst the inhabitants of a place like Bethnal Green is not due to 
buildings. It is due far more to ties of kinship and friendship which connect the people 
of one household to the people of another. In such a district community spirit does not 
have to be fostered, it is already there.73
The rich community life of working-class industrial districts like Attercliffe orNewhall in Sheffield in 
the 1940s and the endemic poverty and pollution is well attested in autobiographies like those of 
Ashton74 and Farnsworth.75 Pollard describes the number of Sheffield working class families that were 
politically apathetic as growing between the wars, due to the decline of local political initiative with the 
nationalization of issues like poor relief, housing and education and the dilution of the fervent pre-1914 
socialist groupings by a mass membership, yet he says that they had found their voice and were less 
concerned to solve crying injustices than to gain through their representatives narrower advantages in 
negotiation with employers.76 Working-class Sheffielders may have been apathetic about formal politics, 
and many did vote Labour unthinkingly based on the tight discipline and solidarity of a skilled trade 
unionism located in steelworks and concerned with protecting working conditions and raising wages, but 
their attitude to the practical politics of everyday survival was sometimes enterprising, particularly under 
conditions of austerity. This is clearly shown by the activities of the squatters movement in South 
Yorkshire in 1946.
Unfortunately the initiative that the squatters showed was not encouraged by the Council on their housing 
estates where working-class people were circumscribed by petty regulations. Because the houses were 
given to the neediest, the middle-classes, who might have been more willing to complain about Council 
despotism, were entirely absent. Bevan ultimately wanted council housing to be the tenure of choice for 
all classes and successfully got the 1949 Housing Act to drop the requirement, evident in pre-war
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legislation, that such housing be constructed solely for the working classes. He said ‘that it is essential 
for the full life of a citizen... to see the living tapestry of a mixed community’77 instead of estates 
segregated by social class which was ‘a wholly evil thing ... condemned by anyone who has paid the 
slightest attention to civics and eugenics. It is a monstrous affliction on the essential psychological and 
biological one-ness of the community.’78 However, council housing was unpopular with the middle- 
classes precisely because of the potential intrusion of the local state and they did not wish to live with 
working-class neighbours. To attract the middle-classes, Bevan wanted superior council houses that 
were a cut above those of inter-war Britain, but he also believed that nothing was too good for the 
working classes and was described as ‘a tremendous Tory’ in consequence by those who had never had 
to live in working-class discomfort. He believed that, ‘We shall be judged for a year or two by the 
number of houses we build. We shall be judged in ten years’ time by the type o f houses we build.’ His 
approach was a long-term one. He did not accept that the housing crisis could be solved by a quick 
short-term fix though he could have produced more houses simply by lowering his housing construction 
standards as Dalton and Macmillan were later to do.79
Housing was the first priority as an aspiration of the City Council above that of reconstructing the city 
centre. This showed the Council’s shrewd recognition of practical working-class needs, though whether 
it could be achieved was another thing. Town planning was geared towards housing provision.80 A 
report on the planning of the outer areas of Sheffield in 1946 stated that:
In the proper guidance of the housing drive, through the machinery of planning 
control, lies the greatest power for the ultimate good of the community which local 
authorities can exercise at the present time. The prime object of the General 
Development Plan, therefore, is to provide a framework into which detailed housing 
proposals can be fitted as they mature, in such a way as to provide the possibility of 
satisfactory living conditions for all.81
Sheffield Replanned was frank about the problems of creating new communities, though by accepting the 
‘neighbourhood unit’ concept it accepted that by altering the physical layouts o f estates this could be 
done. Fifteen were to be created at the Handsworth-Woodhouse development. But it declared that,
It would be a great mistake to believe that housing means merely the provision of a 
specific number of houses to meet the needs o f the City’s population; to have a roof 
over one’s head is not enough; for it is man’s nature to be social, and from time 
immemorial this has tended to make him live in social groups, for example the village 
or parish or ward; here he developed and to a large extent controlled, all the various 
social requirements within his group. These social requirements have changed and 
increased, particularly on the educational side; but in essence the need remains the 
same - to provide for the convenience, education, recreation and industry o f the group
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or neighbourhood.
A new neighbourhood would consist of between 5,000 and 10,000 people.82 Sir Charles Reilly who 
pioneered the ‘neighbourhood unit’ idea posited an estate layout consisting ‘o f houses round greens, as 
in pre-industrial Revolution England, and the greens themselves arranged like the petals of a flower 
round a community building, the modem equivalent of the village inn’. 83 The Council report on the 
planning of outer areas in 1946 gave the main principles determining the boundaries and sizes o f such 
neighbourhoods in the City. The primaiy school was to be the main factor. It should be centrally 
located. No child should need to cross a main road to get to school or walk more than half a mile to get 
there. The unit must be surrounded by open space or some other natural barrier like a highway or river 
to physically delineate it from others. At the focal point of each unit, shops, places of amusement and 
other communal facilities should be provided within ten minutes walk of every home to cater for daily 
needs. Industrial plants should be excluded from residential areas but not so far away that they were 
impossible to travel to. No main traffic artery should cut through one of the neighbourhoods. The 
neighbourhoods would be combined into a “community” of up to 80,000 people.84
The units were supported, despite the taint of social engineering, by the Progressives also, who stated 
that, ‘We are opposed to the segregation of people of any class. The older townships contained people 
of all classes and types, and thus became a community in the best sense.’85 Sheffield Replanned noted 
that previous housing estates had ‘not acquired that sense of “continuance” which was one essential of 
village life’ because they were formed of one income group and one type of house. Villages that formed 
gradually were more beautiful, ‘arising out of the individuality and creative instincts of the people who 
built them.’ And in older villages people had the feeling of “running their own show” via the parish or 
village council. Gaining a sense of ‘continuance’ was hard because it was a ‘compact of tradition, 
association, habit and memory, which time alone can give’, but the grouping of shops, houses, and 
schools could create a sense of belonging, it was believed, given time. Unfortunately while, ‘The layout 
plans will be co-ordinated by the Planning Authority . . .  that Authority has no power to insist on the 
building of the necessary centres for social life and activities or on anything more than the minimum 
standards of construction and workmanship in the houses themselves.’ This was to prove the nub of the 
problem given the shortages of building labour, materials, finance and will.86
To foster community feeling and give a sense of ‘running their own show’ the Council established 
Community Associations. There were fourteen by 1948. These were defined as
organisation^] of neighbours based on the idea that the personality of men and women 
can develop to the full only as men and women serve a community which in turn serves 
them and their development. ... [They were] democratic fellowship[s] of individuals 
and organisations bound together by one common purpose - the common good. It 
includes people of all ages and both sexes and embraces all interests which contribute
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to the well-being of the individual or the community.
Their functions were to co-ordinate neighbourhood organisations, to help provide extra social, cultural or 
educational activities demanded by the neighbourhood, to help local authorities provide neighbourhood 
services and, finally, to ‘offer the people of the neighbourhood an opportunity to make their contribution 
to achieving a full and democratic way of life.’87 The Council helped through the provision of 
community centres. The Manor community centre opened in 1933 was the first in England where the 
local authority bore the entire initial cost.88 Alderman Bingham said ‘they were needed if the city, and 
the country as well, was to keep its place in world affairs.’ They thus showed that Sheffield was a 
modem and progressive local authority and that Britain too, if it followed Sheffield, would be in the 
vanguard of progressive movements. Bingham also said they would ‘provide opportunities for 
housewives to air their grievances and put forward their views on all sorts of matters of interest to the 
city’ and provide a similar function for the elderly who at present could only talk things over in huts in 
the parks.89
The Manor centre had actually opened in order to give the unemployed in the Slump somewhere to go. 
Malcolm Mercer gives some idea of the other functions besides airing complaints that such centres could 
offer. In 1934/35 there was a Women’s Adult School discussing Christianity and family topics on an 
unsectarian basis in the Manor centre. An attempt was also made to hold Workers’ Educational 
Association classes. The Manor Men’s Co-operative Guild held gramophone recitals and concerts 
followed by pie and pea suppers. There was a Musical and Dramatic Society putting on plays and 
musicals. Fishing, rambling, boxing, bowls and tennis clubs were affiliated to the centre. There was a 
debating society and the local Ward Labour and Conservative Parties held their meetings there. There 
was also a choir. The Community Association which had grown out of the Manor Garden Guild had an 
annual membership charge of six shillings. This covered a man and his wife, and in 1938 there were 
between 600 and 700 married couples who were members. The Association held its own dances, sing­
songs, whist drives and concerts for members. Patrick Bond writing in the Sheffield Independent in 
1938 said that, ‘It is no exaggeration to say the centre is a model of what its type should be and a credit 
to Sheffield Corporation and the estate’.90 Fielding, Thompson and Tiratsoo use the example of 
community associations to illustrate Labour’s lack of success in building community since they could not 
turn themselves into a successful national movement and remained parochial and uninterested in wider 
issues. Their leaders, they say, were often unrepresentative busybodies drawn from a narrow social 
group and economic conditions meant the community centres could not be built.91 The associations 
certainly did not directly manage the estates or make decisions about rents, for these were responsibilities 
in Sheffield of the Estates Committee and the Council, which employed a housing manager, but it is 
untrue, if the Manor Association can be taken as representative, that they could not build community 
spirit.
Sheffield City Council was optimistic in the latter stages of the war about producing 30,000 houses
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within three years o f peace and began preparing sites for temporary houses before the war ended. It had 
the land it thought it would need at Handsworth-Woodhouse. There was also land at Parson Cross and 
German prisoners of war from Redmires Camp were employed to lay down roads and sewers there92 
after the Housing Sub-Committee agreed to their use in July 1945. This was an expedient that had to be 
undertaken because o f labour shortages. A group o f local authorities led by Sheffield and including 
Rotherham was founded in 1944 by the Ministry of Health to get housing sites prepared in advance 
before the war ended. Representatives o f the authorities all agreed to recommend prisoner-of war labour 
to their Councils because all recognised that otherwise there would be a long delay in getting sites 
prepared.93 Rotherham Housing Committee stated that, ‘It was clear that if maximum progress were to be 
achieved in the present building season, the employment of prisoners was imperative’.94
What is very apparent is the difference in the rate of progress between the neighbouring local authorities, 
Sheffield and Rotherham, in their respective housing programmes. These can also be compared with that 
of Finsbury where rates of completions of permanent houses were even less rapid. Sheffield was 
obviously a much bigger authority than Rotherham and needed to build more houses which may be a 
reason for the slower pace but it would equally have had as high proportionate resources. In June 1944, 
it was estimated that Rotherham had to build 5,000 houses over the next ten to twelve years at a rate of 
500 a year.95 Sheffield wanted to build 3,000 houses in the first year of peace and 17,000 in the 
following two years. Rotherham also needed to find sites for the proposed houses and though it wanted 
to purchase land in May 1943 it needed Ministry of Health and Treasury approval and the Ministry said 
that Rotherham already had enough land for a two-year programme.96 The Council produced a 
resolution in 1943, similar to a Sheffield City Council resolution moved at the same time,97 calling on the 
government to prepare and announce plans so that an adequate supply of land, labour, materials and 
equipment would be available with financial assistance so it could provide houses up to existing 
standards and not above existing rents.98 In February 1944, it told the Ministry that it would erect 350 
houses as the first post-war year’s housing programme at East Herringthorpe." In March a circular was 
received informing the Council that while the government was relaxing its embargo on land purchase it 
still would not sanction purchase of large areas of land for a long term programme. The Council was, 
however, allowed to buy land at East Herringthorpe and Thorpe for the first two years of the 
programme.100 Some 700-800 houses were planned for the first two years of peace with 570 at East 
Herringthorpe and 150 at Thorpe.101
As a result of the Housing (Temporary Accommodation) Act 1944, the wartime government’s attempt to 
deal with the housing crisis, pre-fabricated bungalows (‘prefabs’) were to built from surplus materials in 
aircraft factories.102 At first they were to be steel-built and were named after Wyndham Portal, Minister 
of Works, who said half a million would be built as an emergency measure. However, steel was later in 
short supply so they were built of aluminium.103 Sheffield originally asked for 2,000 in 1944104 while 
Rotherham asked for 500.105 They were supposed to last ten years though the ones actually built after the 
war lasted considerably longer and were veiy popular. Bevan, however, described them as ‘rabbit
161
hutches’ and switched resources to constructing permanent houses once in office.106 Sheffield built 
2,066 (See Appendix 6.2.1) but one was unfortunately lost when a runaway wagon collided with it at the 
bottom of a hill at Arbourthome.107 The first one completed was opened by the Conservative Minister of 
Town and Country Planning, W. S. Morrison, in July 1945 but was built for demonstration purposes as 
part of the Exhibition which informed the public of the Collie Plan.108 The last ten bungalows were 
completed in November 1948.109 It had been decided in 1947 to stop new construction in Sheffield and 
switch it to the mining districts where increased production of coal was vital to the export drive.110 In 
Rotherham, construction of roads and sewers at East Herringthorpe commenced in February 1945, the 
first pre-fabricated bungalow was begun in March, and it was occupied in August. Sixty-nine bungalows 
had been built by November 1945,111 while Sheffield had built fifty-eight.112 Rotherham was to build 
280 in total - all completed by the end of 1947 - though another hundred permanent aluminium houses 
were also later built.113
Sheffield Council itself made efforts during the war to advance experimental ways of house construction 
and permanent pre-fabricated types of houses so the post-war housing crisis could more speedily be 
overcome. In 1943, the City Council took the initiative in non-traditional building when, after the 
Estates Committee inspected experimental housing in Glasgow, it approved £3,600 for research and the 
construction of two experimental permanent prefabricated houses114 by W. Malthouse Ltd., of Sheffield, 
on the Manor Estate. The firm would use ‘foamslag’, a by-product from blast-furnaces, as an aggregate 
for concrete units for floors, roofing and sound-proofing, and it held the patent for a way o f casting 
sections of brickwork into panels to suit the design of houses. Alderman Gascoigne believed that the 
methods used would ‘make a revolution in the production of houses and mean a very short period to 
provide the houses required.’115 The houses were erected in 1947 but an air of secrecy and mystery 
surrounded them as they were being built, as Ernest Taylor reported in The Star, since the houses were 
not open for public inspection and were surrounded by sheets of corrugated iron.116 The houses were 
one-offs though the firm eventually had built 206 permanent prefabricated three bedroom non-parlour 
houses and 110 four bedroom non-parlour houses at Parson Cross by October 1951. Fifty o f the most 
widely produced non-traditional built house, the British Iron and Steel Federation three bedroom non­
parlour house, were also built at Parson Cross by that time.117
Hayes argues that it was formerly believed that the adoption of prefabrication and systems construction 
was not a rational decision by public authorities but the consequence o f the acceptance o f myths put 
about by self-serving interests such as building firms that non-traditional housing expressed modernity 
and efficiency. Hayes argues, however, that many architects, local authorities and other decision takers 
were sceptical about these claims of modernity despite Modernist ideologues among the manufacturers 
and other architects. The actual decisions to build non-traditional housing, he believes, were made as a 
response to an urgent necessity and were conditioned by economic factors, rational views of what 
constituted the national interest and the best advice that was possible. He also says that non-traditional 
housing was produced efficiently, contrary to the claims of earlier historians, and that its production was
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constantly reviewed.118 I agree with part of Hayes argument in the case of the Malthouse experimental 
houses but also accept some of the views of those he disagrees with. The houses were rationally and 
efficiently using an abundant waste product of the local steel industiy in their construction and the 
outcome for the firm was a proven success in that it led to the contracts for the houses built at Parson 
Cross. There was full support from both political parties for the experiment given that it was part of a 
solution to the acute housing problem that the council faced, but the council also saw itself as a 
progressive pioneer and was convinced that use of these methods of construction symbolized its status as 
an up-to-date local authority willing to take a gamble. The later influence of Le Corbusier’s Modernism 
on high-rise flats built by the Corporation at Park Hill and Hyde Park in the 1960s was also undeniable 
and demonstrated the modernity of the Corporation, but equally the decision to construct them was made 
because they were an apparently workable and cheap solution to the persisting urgency of Sheffield’s 
housing problem.119 The Housing Committee as a means of overcoming the housing shortage had 
already begun to consider the feasibility of constructing blocks of flats in 1949 but these were not yet on 
the scale of Park Hill or Hyde Park.120 Their investigations did, however, lead them to look at 
Scandinavian flats in the search for inspiration.121
Despite these initiatives the traditionally-built low density suburban council house, which was pioneered 
between the wars and owed its genesis to the garden city principles set out by the Tudor Walters’ Report, 
remained dominant numerically among the houses built between 1945 and 1951. The chief difference 
with the estates of the inter-war years was set out in the Dudley Report of 1944, which called for estates 
of mixed housing types including flats and maisonettes.122 Rotherham took the lead over Sheffield in 
producing the first completed permanent traditionally-built houses by any local authority in the post-war 
period in December 1945. They had been produced under a apprenticeship scheme for boys promoted 
by the Ministry of Works and the National Joint Council for the Building Industiy.123 Construction of 
the six houses at East Herringthorpe began on 25 April 1945 and Rotherham disputed with Bournemouth 
whether it was the first local authority to start such a scheme.124 The scheme was to be used by other 
local councils as a way of getting new houses built and training the labour to build others. It was an 
answer to the acute labour shortage. The houses were opened by the Minister of Works himself. The 
Mayor put this promising start down to teamwork and the close liaison of the staffs of the Borough 
Engineer and Architect and the supervising local firm.125
In Sheffield, the first tenders for permanent houses were accepted by the City Council subject to 
ministerial approval only in September 1945.126 Ninety-eight war-damaged council houses were re-built 
between February 1946 and July 1947 (see Appendix 6.2.2). The re-building of such houses was an 
immediate priority of Bevan once in office. Sixty thousand were re-built in 1945.127 Rotherham had 
little war-damage so it could immediately start on brand new houses. The first eight new permanent 
houses in Sheffield were completed as late as August 1946. This, however, compares well with 
Finsbury in London where 91 per cent of the total residential housing stock had been damaged in some 
way and 11 percent of the dwellings had been totally destroyed. Thus tenders for new permanent
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housing were approved as late as July 1946 and the first twenty-two were completed in December 1948.
By that date Rotherham had completed eight hundred and Sheffield 2,247 new permanent houses o f all 
128types.
The criticism which the Municipal Progressives/Conservative-Liberals heaped on the heads of Labour in 
Sheffield in the period 1945-51 over the housing issue was much more aggressive than that of the much 
weaker Independents in Rotherham and probably prevented constructive dialogue between the two sides 
on speeding up the programme. They lined up along party political lines on the issue. In December 
1945, the Progressives moved a resolution viewing ‘... with alarm the serious delay in starting its [the 
Council’s] post-war Housing programme caused, mainly, through the lack of decision on the part of the 
Government in important respects.’ Labour responded by voting down the resolution and expressing its 
confidence in the Labour government.129 The Council was usually attacked on the grounds that it was 
the agent of the remote alien power in Whitehall and not standing up for the interests of its citizens. We 
noted this earlier in the response of ‘Current Topics’ to the threat of the Ministry of Fuel and Power to 
open-cast for coal land purchased by the Council for housing at Handsworth-Woodhouse.130
Another reason for Progressive displeasure was the decision of the City Council after the war to revive 
its direct labour Public Works department to build council houses since the department had an advantage 
over private builders in that any losses it made could be underwritten by the rates and it would thus be 
enabled to undercut the latter. Relations with private builders were not made any better by the ultimate 
aspiration of the Council which, according to Alderman Bingham in 1948, was ‘to develop the Public 
Works Department until there is nobody else building houses for us.’131 Rotherham Council, on the 
other hand, refused to form such a department despite the desire of the Trades Council in 1948 to see one 
building houses for Rotherham people.132 There was also criticism from the Progressives over how the 
houses once built would be let and who would have them. The following Table gives an idea of the scale 
of the problem of the Council waiting list:
Table A - The Sheffield City Council Waiting List133
DATE NO. OF PEOPLE ON 
WAITING LIST
JUNE 1942 C.24,000
1946 35,000
JANUARY 1949 28,000
31 MARCH 1949 22,270
31 MARCH 1950 26,511
APRIL 1950 26,537
OCTOBER 1957 35,387
Many of those on the waiting list were former service personnel and the lack of respect shown them by 
the refusal to operate a ‘points’ system of letting houses was a grievance of the Progressives and of 
organisations like the British Legion and the Soldiers’, Sailors’ and Airmen’s Association. The Sheffield
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representative of the last organisation at its annual conference in 1946 declared that the city was,
one of the most ghastly places in the countiy in respect of housing. The Housing 
Committee have 35,000 names on the list. We have taken deputations to the Housing 
Committee over and over again, and they will not give us any priority for fighting men.
All we can get is that out of the prefabricated houses they will share fifty-fifty. They 
thought that was a great concession. In Sheffield they will tell you the servicemen did 
not win the war, it was the munition workers, so we cannot get any priority for 
servicemen as a reward for their services.134
Municipal Progressive Alderman Bearcroft alleged corruption at one typical meeting on housing in the 
Council Chamber in October 1945. He had been ‘in the Housing Manager’s office not long ago when a 
member of the Council rang up giving instructions about a certain person who claimed he had a right to a 
house. Influences were brought to bear and everybody knew it was done.’135 There was a major scandal 
in Barnsley. An ex-Mayor of Barnsley and Labour Alderman, Arthur Jepson, made accusations of 
‘favoritism’ against the Housing Committee which had allowed the Mayor’s Chaplain to let a council 
house after only a few months residence in the town.136 A storm blew up with protest meetings,137 letters 
in the Barnsley Chronicle.138 and controversy in the Council Chamber. Jepson was ostracised for having 
voted against his colleagues and eventually resigned from the Council.139
Alderman Caine in Rotherham persuaded his Labour colleagues to accept a ‘points’ system reversing the 
recommendation of the Housing Committee. He described it as ‘valuable from a psychological 
standpoint’ while Councillor Dickinson for the Independents asked whether this meant the Labour Group 
thought ‘there was some degree of wisdom in the Opposition, because in committee the Opposition were 
in a small minority and were flatly turned down.’140 Such was the dissatisfaction of ex-servicemen in the 
Deame Valley that ‘British Legion Candidates’ with the official sanction of the local Legion stood in the 
Mexborough Urban District Council elections in 1946 and were elected specifically to overturn housing 
policies deemed against their interests.141
But the most important symptom of disquiet was the squatters’ movement of 1946. Hinton sees the 
phenomenon of people taking direct action, by commandeering disused army camps and, in London, 
empty blocks of flats that Conservative councils were not willing to requisition as accommodation, as a 
missed opportunity for the Labour Government. If they had been willing to accept direct action, despite 
it being seen as somehow ‘un-British’ and not respectable by staid Labour leaders, he believes popular 
radicalism would have been encouraged. That was necessary to maintain the momentum of a 
Government menaced by Conservative vested interests and the propaganda of the Tory press. The latter 
viewed the squatters, despite Communist involvement, as exemplifying Conservative individualism, self- 
help and family values in their attempts to find accommodation. Had not the Conservatives emphasised 
the virtues of home-ownership to the middle class ? Labour’s remote and authoritarian bureaucrats and
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planners were unable to produce the vast number of houses required by even the neediest, Conservatives 
said, because of socialist controls and red tape. They were unwilling to allow free enterprise to build 
houses for middle-class families who could pay for them and who would never be allowed a council 
house because they were not seen as needy. Hinton argues that the Communists attempted to implement 
a strategy that allowed the initiative and native enterprise of ordinary working-class people to be tapped 
in the search for solutions to the housing problem instead of waiting for the directions of authority and of 
creating an understanding among desperate people of the problems Labour faced in finding 
accommodation for them given, as was the case in London, the deliberate reluctance of Conservative 
councils to inconvenience rich private landlords. The Communists also successfully drew attention to 
the fact that that the housing crisis was not being given the serious attention it deserved by Labour. The 
actual squatters, however, were not usually very politically motivated. They were ordinary people 
impatient with unacceptably long waiting lists like the one in Sheffield. They wanted a roof over their 
heads now and not in some distant future.142 The squatters’ movement was a revolt against ‘municipal 
labourism’ as we have defined it since in the absence of an adequate supply of council housing there was 
nothing to be lost by needy working-class people in taking direct action and in not accepting the 
instructions of authority, particularly since the latter could only counsel a patience which given the long 
waiting lists was unacceptable. Instead they took their own initiatives.
The first Sheffield squatters took over an anti-aircraft gun-site at Shirecliffe in July 1946 forcing the 
Council to negotiate with the War Office which controlled the site so it could be restored.143 Soon after 
squatters took over a camp at Beighton to the south-east of Sheffield144 and then the gun-site at Manor 
Lane.145 From then on the movement spread across South Yorkshire. In Rotherham squatters took over 
camps at Thrybergh, Brinsworth, Whiston Grange and Wentworth Park. The response of the public was 
positive. As the Advertiser said, most people considered
the step taken by the squatters as a justifiable means to an end. It is felt that the 
squatters are acting in the wrong way, but doing the right thing morally... the readiness 
of the State to take over surplus private accommodation for the benefit of the homeless 
cannot be forgotten, nor that it contrasts strongly with the reluctance to relinquish its
146own.
The Communists rapidly got involved. In Rotherham, John Mason, the Mexborough shop steward who 
was imprisoned during the war under Defence Regulation 18B and was now South Yorkshire Area 
Organiser of the Party, presided over a meeting of squatters organised by Rotherham Communists and 
suggested a joint co-ordinating committee of squatters across Rotherham which would allow them to 
present their case to the local authorities for elementary services. He declared that the Communists were 
not seeking political advantage and simply wished to stand behind the squatters.147 Communists were 
also involved in putting the squatters case for them when those at Manor Lane in Sheffield faced eviction 
and they won a victory in getting those squatter families that had children transferred to a camp at
166
Norton.148 Alderman Albert Smith, Chairman of the Estates Committee, said that he had cut through 
official delay by instructing the Council to take over the camp ‘and damn the consequences.’149
The squatters were anxious to emphasis their non-political views despite Communist help and ‘to make it 
clear that they are concerned solely with getting settled into their new homes ... party politics do not 
come into the question at all’, or so alleged Jane Akrill, a social worker who had dealt with the re­
housing problems of servicemen for a service organisation and who also helped present the squatters’ 
case. She told the Telegraph that the Communists were using the squatters grievances for their own 
ends150 and got the squatters to promise not to attend a Communist Party meeting at Bumgreave to 
discuss Sheffield’s housing problem.151 Finally, in September 1946 with Communist activities in 
London continually splashed across the front pages of the Telegraph, culminating in the headline 
‘Squatters Marked Queen Mary’s London Home’, and with reports of violent clashes with police, there 
was a concerted attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the Communists in local eyes by the newspaper 
with the now real threat to private and royal and not government property brought to the fore.152 
Hinton’s interpretation seems realistic as the Progressives, while attacking Labour for lack of 
decisiveness over the housing programme, including not allowing private builders free rein, asked why 
Alderman Smith had not been willing to ‘damn the consequences’ and commandeer the camps much 
earlier.153
From the Sheffield City Council Minute Books we can gain a definite idea of the progress o f the city’s 
housing programme between 1945 and 1951 (which is set out in Appendix 6), while for Rotherham I 
have had to rely on local newspapers and the contributions of Alderman Harper, Chairman of the 
Housing Committee, in the Trades and Labour Council Annual Reports from 1948. In Sheffield, the 
peak production of permanent houses in any one month was in May 1948 when 205 houses were built. 
This contrasts with February-March 1947 when for the only time due to one of the worst winters on 
record no permanent houses were completed at all (see Appendix 6.2.3). As we said in the Introduction, 
from 1948 the national total of houses produced continually declined and local authorities were held 
back by the government with the number of houses to be built strictly allocated. In May 1949, for 
example, eight hundred extra houses were allocated to Sheffield bringing the 1949 allocation to 1,300 
houses, but that allocation was exhausted by September. As a result, the Council applied for five 
hundred more and got 350.154 Sheffield could have greatly increased its output but for this central 
control. By December 1947 with the inclusion of the 98 war-damaged houses, Sheffield had built 936 
houses, by December 1948 1,409 had been added, and in 1949 only 735. By December 1950 an extra 
1,391 had been built and by December 1951 1,656 more. There was a grand total by 14 December 1951 
of 6,127 houses built since the war’s end. By the end of December 1947, 501 permanent houses had 
been built in Rotherham since the war’s end, another 299 had been built in 1948,234 in 1949,240 in 
1950 and 304 in 1951 making a grand total of 1,578 houses. The following Table shows the number of 
houses produced in the two county boroughs per thousand of population between 1945 and 1951 using 
estimates of population from the Sheffield Telegraph Year Books, the 1951 Census, estimates from the
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Medical Officer of Health Reports for Rotherham and the Rotherham Corporation Year Book 1951/52:-
Table B - Houses Built per Thousand of Population, 1945-51
TIME PERIOD NO. OF HOUSES BUILT 
PER 1000 OF 
POPULATION IN 
SHEFFIELD
NO. OF HOUSES BUILT 
PER 1000 OF 
POPULATION IN 
ROTHERHAM
1945-47 0.65 2.14
1948 2.8 3.67
1949 1.45 2.85
1950 2.7 2.9
1951 3.22 3.69
1945-51 1.77 2.8
In both cases the number of houses built per thousand of population slumped in 1949 due no doubt to the 
continued balance of payments crises nationally and to the curbs on public investment which Bevan had 
to accept from Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Stafford Cripps.155 The number of houses rose in the 
following years but we can see that in eveiy year, and for the period in its entirety, Rotherham was a 
more productive local authority in terms of houses built. Such was its achievement that in 1947, when it 
had built its 600th house, it was visited by the Minister of Health himself.156 One explanation put 
forward for the earlier start in Rotherham was that the various council departments were simply better 
co-ordinated with better teamwork. This probably continued. Rotherham was probably also in better 
standing with local firms of builders since it refused to create a direct labour department. There was less 
vocal opposition in Rotherham Council Chamber with a numerically weaker Opposition. Labour was 
also willing to listen to it, as shown by the acceptance o f a ‘points’ system for letting houses. There was 
more party political point scoring in the Sheffield Council Chamber, which did not allow a consensus to 
be easily reached, and entrenched political positions, due to both sides taking on the stances of their 
Westminster counterparts.
6.4 - CONCLUSION
There is a difference of interpretation about the characteristics of the Labour Party which is personified 
in the views of historians Nick Tiratsoo and James Hinton. Hinton believes that Labour tried to control 
and dampen popular radicalism rather than encourage it. This was because Labour feared the activities 
of the masses who were uneducated about their responsibilities to the rest of society and did not behave 
in a respectable manner. Labour did not produce in reality the ‘Responsible Society’ that Tiratsoo 
speaks of because, whatever it may have said it intended, such as promoting greater civic consciousness 
and an active citizenry. It was actually more interested in the bureaucratic and technocratic solutions to 
working-class problems that the Fabian philosophy had pioneered. This placed a stress on the role of 
the professional middle-class expert and the supremacy of representative rather than direct democracy.
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Michael Young, the director of research for the Labour Party in the late 1940s, was to resign because the 
NEC refused to publish his final report which said that the Party should recognise the needs of women 
and neighbourhood concerns to a far greater extent. As he showed, he was the one figure in the Labour 
Party at this time who really believed in attempting to achieve popular democratic participation in 
decision-making. He was later in 1958 to publish a satirical book The Rise of the Meritocracy which as 
an iconoclastic essay the Fabians had refused to publish. This attacked both equality of opportunity and 
the intellectual aristocracy that it and the Labour Party had helped create in 1945-51.157
Town planning was an answer based on middle-class guilt to working-class problems o f ill-health, 
poverty and an ugly environment but, despite Tiratsoo’s view that planners worked in harmony with the 
expressed needs of the public wherever possible, there is truth in the popular conception of planners’ 
arrogance since town planning was also about maintaining the social order in the interests o f the middle 
classes. Town planners were after all middle-class people with middle-class views of those below them 
in the social structure. They could see the workers as objects of compassion but they could also be 
threats. Working-class people continued to be residentially segregated from the middle classes on 
council estates and thus controlled spatially and socially while their everyday needs were not always met 
since austerity conditions prevented the building of community centres, libraries, health centres and 
shops between 1945 and 1951. We noted, however, in Chapter Two when we looked at the work of 
William Hampton on politics in post-war Sheffield, that the link between communities in the social sense 
and civic consciousness was tenuous, that the greater the social attachment to a working-class 
neighbourhood, the less political awareness existed.
Labour councillors who owed their position to a party rather than a community in which they were bom 
or even resided naturally felt loyalties to the city of which they were the ‘political community’ rather than 
to ordinary people from whose wishes they were isolated by the electoral system, the structure of the 
council and the allegedly collectivist mentalitie created by the trades unions. Labour councillors knew 
enough about their own class not to overestimate its virtues, but town planners like Thomas Sharp, 
president in 1945 of the Town Planning Institute, also felt that the working classes could not be trusted to 
take part in the process of creating plans because of their lack of technical expertise. Town planning was 
regarded as solving technical problems through the allocation of zones on a piece of paper. In Sheffield 
at least, the Council had not surveyed in a detailed way the real needs and wishes of working-class 
people during the war but simply assumed them to be well known. This continued to be the case 
between 1945 and 1951. One reason for not doing this was that it was feared that technical efficiency 
would be compromised and planning would simply take longer to do given a limited planning staff and 
limited budget if such niceties were observed.
But town planning had also been seen in the inter-war years as a way of remedying the deterioration in 
the genetic quality of the ‘white race’ that, according to eugenicists, living in huge cities encouraged. In 
the emphasis placed by town planners on open spaces, well designed buildings and curing traffic
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congestion there is embodied the view that the genetic health of the British race could be enhanced and 
protected. It was also feared, despite the short-term baby boom caused by the Second World War, that 
the population was falling, which would threaten Britain’s military capabilities in a future war. Family 
allowances and the whole apparatus of state welfare were means of encouraging population increase at a 
time when Britain contained proportionately more aged people than ever before and it was feared there 
would be fewer and fewer workers to pay for future welfare provision. But the government was 
concerned with the quality as well as the quantity of the race. Prominent Fabians - Shaw, Wells, the 
Webbs - all supported eugenicism in the inter-war years.158 Harold Laski had supported eugenics and, 
according to his biographers, ‘would forever vacillate between images of the poor as either unfit and 
ignorant or exploited and oppressed.’159 Many Marxists with scientific interests supported the 
movement. Evan Durbin has recently been noted as a wartime supporter.160 This link with socialism is 
hardly surprising for as Sidney Webb noted, ‘No consistent eugenicist can be a laissez-faire individualist 
unless he throws up the game in despair. He must interfere, interfere, interfere.’161 And according to 
Andrew Roberts, ‘racist views were almost universally held until around the end o f the 1950s’. 
Churchill’s speeches during World War Two were full of references to the British Race. He was an 
unashamed white supremacist and Anglo-Saxon triumphalist formed by late Victorian imperialism.162 
Labour’s Hugh Dalton in 1950 similarly saw nothing wrong in referring to the colonies as ‘pullulating 
poverty-stricken, diseased nigger communities’.163 Tiratsoo and Hasegawa do not explore this aspect in 
terms of town planning in the 1940s but race was obviously still relevant. According to Weight speaking 
of World War Two:
The issue of race is rarely confronted in histories of the ‘People’s War’, perhaps 
because it is a reminder that a belief in democracy was not the only thing that bound 
the Scots, Welsh and English together. Much older, darker and contradictory ties of 
racial unity did so too. In a war against fascism it was impolitic for those ties to be 
overtly celebrated, but they existed in millions o f minds nonetheless.164
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE LABOUR PARTY 
IN SOUTH YORKSHIRE,
1945-1951:
IDEOLOGY, CULTURE, ORGANISATION 
AND ELECTORAL SUCCESS
7.1 - INTRODUCTION
Herbert Morrison, contrasting in 1924 the four-fold increase of the Labour vote in London since 1918 
with the poor showing ten years earlier, said that before the war ‘London was the despair o f the Labour 
movement’. London socialists were ‘. . .  a gassy, protesting, quarrelsome, cantankerous crowd, very good 
at cursing the enemy and cursing ourselves, but no good at effective fighting against the well organised 
political parties.’ Even London Labour Party propaganda simply benefited the Liberals. He gave a 
simple explanation for this state of affairs, namely, that no one had been willing to put effort into 
organisation. This had altered and the
. . .  change - approaching a political revolution - has been achieved by hard work, 
constructive education methods and sound organisation from the polling districts 
upwards. Had we followed the advice of our so-called revolutionary counsellors, this 
substantial move toward a political revolution would not have taken place to anything 
like the extent shown by the figures. This is further indication of the fact that the so- 
called revolutionary tactician has in general a reactionary effect.1
In 1949 the Rotherham Advertiser similarly explained Labour’s success in municipal elections in the 
Borough, when it actually gained a seat from its opponents in an inauspicious year, under the heading 
‘Socialists’ Lesson in Organisation’: ‘Those who thought the change of polling days from dismal, dull 
and foggy November to the merry month of May would induce greatly increased numbers of electors to 
exercise their votes have been sadly disappointed.’ Little had altered and ‘a most deplorable feature is 
the indifference of a large number of voters in matters which directly concern their own welfare.’ It 
believed that ‘nothing short of a catastrophe’ would alter their apathy and saw no evidence of ‘the land­
slide from Socialism in other areas’ - indeed ‘in the Rotherham area - borough, urban and rural - there is 
every indication of a strengthened Labour Party.’ It went on:
The secret of the Labour Party’s success in Rotherham is its all-the-year-round work 
and its highly efficient organisation, and whatever one’s political colour may be one is 
bound, in fairness, to admit that the anti-Socialists have a lot to learn from their 
opponents in that sphere of activity. As much as it may hurt the organisers of other 
political parties and associations to say so, they cannot hope to win elections while
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slip-shod methods of campaigning continue and while there is such apathy among their 
own so-called supporters.... We must give credit where it is due - and in organisation 
that credit goes to the Labour Party.2
I have quoted these examples - from a partisan of Labour and from a source which radical Socialists in 
Rotherham saw as opposed to it - to show the emphasis that is placed on organisation as an explanation 
of Labour’s success. The Advertiser makes the traditional complaint about apathy in a local election but 
it cannot avoid explaining the election outcome as a consequence of Labour’s local organisational 
structure and its concentration on the task of winning votes all year round. This particular election saw a 
turnout of 55 per cent - the peak turnout between 1938 and 1952. The low was in 1950 with 31 per cent. 
Thus, perhaps the paper had less right to criticise Rotherham’s electorate for apathy. However, the 1945 
General Election saw a turnout of 76.4 per cent3 which in 1950 rose to 87.3 per cent. It fell to 84.2 per 
cent in 1951.4 The respective national figures were 73, 84 and 83 per cent.5 Thus, there was a difference 
between turnouts in the two kinds of election but, even in the latter, Rotherham voter turnout was higher 
than the national figure, so there was hardly apathy.
The source of the Morrison quote is from Marriott’s important book on Labour in the East End of 
London between the wars which concentrates on West Ham. Marriott has some relevant points to put 
and his insights which derive from an academic Marxist perspective are persuasive and germane to my 
work. Similarly useful and also derived from the Historical Materialist perspective is the work of Savage 
on Labour in Preston between 1880 and 1940,6 and Williams on Labour in the Rhondda valleys between 
1885 and 1951.7 All three have made a pioneering contribution to locality studies as distinct from 
histories that simply concentrate on politics at Westminster or Whitehall. Forester in 1976 said that 
there was ‘a sense in which the achievements and failings of Labourism at the national level are mirrored 
at the local level, a sense in which constituency Labour parties are a microcosm of the national Labour 
Party.’8 Savage, Marriott and Williams all disagree with that belief. According to Savage, the 
‘nationalisation’ o f politics which produced more uniform patterns of working-class political activity was 
due to the convergence of the local in different parts of the country and not imposed from above.9 Hence 
it is the locality that is important and not the national for the development of practical working-class 
politics.10 A possible criticism of these studies are that they are atypical and unrepresentative o f local 
Labour Party development but Williams claims any presumption of typicality would rest on little 
knowledge of actual Labour parties. He does not believe that the average or typical experience is any 
more meaningful than any other, and argues that the atypical experience can cast new light on 
developments which would otherwise be hidden.11 However, Williams does believe that by the 1930s 
and 1940s national and international factors, the rise of European Fascism, the Second World War, the 
reforms o f the Attlee Government and the Cold War, took precedence as stimuli in local politics in the 
Rhondda.12
According to Eric Hobsbawm, ‘the world and culture of the working classes is incomprehensible without
177
the labour movement, which for long periods was its core.’13 This is particularly true of the so-called 
‘traditional’ working class created between the 1880s and 1914 whose culture
probably reached its peak between 1945 and 1951, for this was the period when trade 
union membership (as a percentage o f the labour force), the electoral strength of the 
Labour Party (both in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total electorate), 
attendance at football matches and cinemas, and perhaps also the mass circulation 
newspaper appealing specifically to a proletarian audience, were at their maximum.14
Similarly he speaks of, what he calls, the ‘Andy Capp working class’ as
recognizable not only by its headgear,. . .  but by the physical environment in which 
they lived, by a style of life and leisure, by a certain class consciousness increasingly 
expressed in a secular tendency to join unions and to identify with a class party of 
Labour. It is the working class of cup-finals, fish-and-chip shops, palais-de-dance and 
Labour with a capital L.15
It is thus obvious that any attempt to examine the strength and development of the Labour Party in South 
Yorkshire must look at cultural factors though this is not to say that on their own they completely explain 
such developments. Hobsbawm, however, has been criticised for being overly deterministic in his thesis 
even though he admits the influence of social, political and economic factors in the development of the 
Labour Party. Neville Kirk, writing in 1991, ultimately comes down on Hobsbawm’s side after noting 
the range of critics and criticisms of his thesis, but also criticizes it for being a narrow and deterministic 
interpretation which ‘combined with his underestimation of the appeals of Conservatism and 
‘moderation’, indeed Conservative ‘traditionalism’, within ‘traditional’ working-class communites . . .  
weaken[s] his general case.’16 Among the views which Kirk criticizes are those of Gareth Stedman- 
Jones, who saw ‘traditional’ working-class culture as it developed from the 1880s as resisting middle- 
class attempts to manipulate it but at the same time being politically apathetic and resigned to the 
subordination of the workers to capitalism. The Labour Party was the ‘apotheosis’ of the ‘enclosed and 
defensive world of working-class culture’. ‘The Labour Representation Committee was the 
generalisation of structural role of the trade union into the form of a political party.’17 Thus, we see the 
features of one kind of Marxist critique of the Labour Party referred to in earlier chapters as the critique 
o f ‘Labourism’. Hobsbawm, though a long-term Communist, is much more optimistic about the Labour 
Party in tribute to men like the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain President and Barnsley FC supporter 
Herbert Smith who stood up to the coal-owners and the government in 1926 not because of socialist 
ideology but because of his ‘experience of the miners’ struggle, and . . .  [because] the socialist demanded 
what he thought the miners needed, a legal eight-hour day, a guaranteed minimum wage and better 
safety.’18 There was apathy, indeed, but class-consciousness meant that as Beatrice Webb put it in 1915: 
‘The power of the Movement lies in the massive obstinacy of the rank-and-file, every day more
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representative of the working class. Whenever this massive feeling can be directed for or against some 
particular measure, it becomes almost irresistible. Our English governing class would not dare overtly to 
defy it.’19
Michael Savage would be a critic of Hobsbawm. He believes that concentration on working-class 
culture as a factor in the development of the Labour Party is unhelpful to an analysis of what he calls the 
dynamics of working-class politics, because it is difficult to work out what the precise nature of working- 
class consciousness was in specific historical periods, and because he believes questions of strategy and 
tactics rather than moral issues or perceptions of how society actually worked dictated political practices 
and actions.20 He also would say that Hobsbawm’s thesis is too deterministic believing that ‘People have 
a variety of beliefs about different elements of their lives, and there is no reason to suppose that there is 
any coherence about these beliefs.’21 Thus, it is possible for more than one political response to come 
from very different people arising out of the same cultural phenomenon and culture as a category of 
explanation of political developments is thus incoherent.22
Savage also believes with Antonio Gramsci that ‘common sense’ working-class notions of the world are 
much more closely linked to the material world than to the different elements of a culture (i.e. to the 
economic base than to the cultural superstructure of Marx’s building metaphor), and he quotes Anthony 
Giddens on the differences between practical and discursive consciousness. The first consists of things 
which people know tacitly about social relationships without being able to give direct expression in 
words as to what they mean, while the latter consists of aspects of social life that can be directly 
accounted for by social actors in language. Giddens believes the two forms are not necessarily tied 
together in any social actor. Thus, Patrick Joyce’s view that experience of worker subordination to 
employers in the labour market necessarily leads to a set of deferential belief systems with wider political 
applicability is conceptually misleading. Forms of practical consciousness linked to particular activities 
can often have no wider implications.23 Thus, he does not believe that changes in work practices can 
necessarily be linked to the growing politicisation of the skilled worker after 1900 and to support for the 
Labour Party. Savage believes that particular forms of working-class politics have to be examined 
through study of diverse social practices with their attendant forms of practical consciousness.24
Savage bases his classification of Labour politics on the assumption that particular individuals undertake 
political activity and the forms that go with it on the basis that it will further their interests.25 However, 
he believes that a given set of interests can give rise to divergent political forms.26 He also distinguishes 
‘formal politics’ from ‘practical politics’,27arguing that the former is relatively autonomous while the 
latter develops out of the interest of the working class in reducing the material insecurity inherent in the 
capitalist labour market. Savage posits three kinds of working class practical politics. The first - 
‘Mutualism’ - is the attempt by the working class to develop alternatives to capitalism through provision 
of their own jobs and services, for example Owenite producer co-operatives or the retail co-operatives 
founded by the Rochdale pioneers and expanded by the prospering Co-operative movement in the
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nineteenth and twentieth centuries.28 The second - ‘Economism’ - refers to the attempts of workers to 
improve their conditions within the framework of capitalism through, for example, trade unions and free 
collective wage bargaining.29 Finally, ‘Statism’ - the attempt to enlist the intervention of the central or 
local state in order to remove worker insecurity and to de-commodify labour. This is done through the 
provision of a social wage, whereby various services are provided by the state, paid for to a lesser or 
greater extent by taxation of the wealthy. It can mean direct employment of the working class by the 
local or central state or financial support like a minimum wage.30 At a local everyday level differing 
levels of these three kinds of struggles go on at any one time in any one place and in fact they can be 
interdependent but certain ones can be more dominant in particular locales.31 He uses these to develop 
his study of the detailed development of the Labour Party in Preston.
John Marriott32 and Chris Williams,33are more appreciative of culture as an explanatory factor and are 
also more appreciative too o f the insights that the so-called ‘linguistic turn’ has brought into the 
discipline of history with its emphasis on political language as constitutive of particular political 
formations or coalitions through concepts like ‘class’, ‘the People’ or ‘gender’. They look in their 
respective ‘micro-historical’ studies of West Ham and South Wales at the relative success or failure of 
these differing identities in the mobilisation of support behind Labour in those localities. Amy Black and 
Stephen Brooke similarly seek to show, for example, how a masculinist, producer-oriented ‘Labourist’ 
discourse, despite espousing the welfare state, only viewed women as traditional mothers and wives and 
not as married full-time workers. As a result, a newer language of women’s interests and by implication, 
gender roles, was not understood in Labour discourse and an organisational structure which would have 
given women greater significance within the Labour Party could not be created.34 The result was a 
gender gap in General Elections which the more flexible Conservatives happily exploited in the 1950s 
and 1960s through the conscious construction of a political rhetoric that did appeal to women.35 Black 
and Brooke argue that because party politics is made up of both structure (organisation) and discourse 
then both must be examined. To examine one without the other is insufficient.36 The problem with their 
explanation is that it misses out the role of working-class culture in explaining why this political 
language was not created by Labour.
Emphasis on the role of organisation as the sole explanation of Labour’s rise (as in the earlier quote from 
Herbert Morrison) is too neat and simple for John Marriott as it can lead to Whig interpretations of 
history that assert that given the existence of good organisation it was inevitable that Labour would take 
power. Better organisation, though important, will not lead to inevitable success for Labour if the voters 
are not convinced that they should go out to vote, particularly if Labour is not the incumbent party in 
office. Similarly, poor organisation will not necessarily lose a political party votes as long as it has 
popular support.37 He argues that local Labour parties are part of a political response to local working- 
class experience. This political response he gives as his definition o f ‘Labourism’.38 He distinguishs it 
from both ‘Labour socialism’ and Marxism. Labourism was rarely antagonistic to other classes but saw 
itself as having a corporate interest within capitalism often articulating the politics o f moderate trade
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39unionism.
Chris Williams does not accept either Marxist interpretations of ‘Labourism’ which deny the Labour 
Party any role in promoting socialist consciousness or non-Marxist interpretations of it which see 
Labourism as responsible for the successful development of the Labour Party because the working 
classes are happy with the existing social order and refuse to support militantly socialist political parties 
like the Communists as a result. He does accept the subjective perception or mentalitie of Labour 
activists and voters who saw themselves as ‘socialists’ in the 1930s and 1940s, however vague and 
incoherent that ‘socialism’ was. One should not prejudge the ‘meanings’ in the language, values and 
beliefs of such people but should try to understand them as best one can on their own terms. Working- 
class consciousness has never been ‘pure’ and has always needed careful analysis to tease out its 
complexity.40 It is obvious that Labour Party members in the 1940s must have seen themselves as 
socialists, though this is disputed by Roy Hattersley who says that nobody in Hillsborough Division 
described themselves so. The correct appellation was apparently ‘Labour men’ or ‘Labour women’ 
though that may tell more about Hattersley’s own politics or may be something to do with the strength of 
the Co-operative Party in Hillsborough. ‘Labourism’ as a discourse that places an emphasis on the 
politics of working-class experience always underlay Labour Party members beliefs that they were 
socialists and was more important than a socialism based on ethics or ideology.41 It is telling that 
Duncan Tanner describes the beliefs and values of the Labour rank-and-file as neither Marxism nor 
Liberalism but ‘a socialism rooted in experience’.42 To describe Labour as being simply pragmatic or 
opportunist and having a distaste for all theory is wrong. Labour, unlike the Communists, may not have 
possessed a rigid dogmatic philosophy to give it direction and strength but as Fielding says ‘it is possible 
that ideology has played a greater role in giving shape to Labour’s sense of purpose than has hitherto 
been considered’.43 Hattersley, an important witness to the Sheffield Labour movement, is, as we have 
seen, less convinced about the importance of ideology in the 1940s since the 1945 General Election was 
more a victory for Labour’s ameliorators. He argued in 1987, however, that due to the success of right- 
wing ffee-market Thatcherite ideology a democratic socialist ideology was now indispensable for Labour 
success and tried to construct one out of the remnants of Croslandite revisionism. This was, however, 
not borne out in 1997 or 2001 when the New Labour Modernisers ignored Tony Crosland’s belief in 
positive freedom as a means of greater equality and maintained both the grammar schools that had 
survived, made university the natural province of the wealthy, and continued tax cuts for the very rich.44
7.2 - IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE
Harris believes that those in Labour’s ranks who had some kind of theory about socialism were more 
interested in drafting programmes and policies than in engaging in critical analysis of the structures of 
power within society. Understanding Labour views of the latter can only be gleaned from assumptions 
underlying the former 45 Labour was less influenced by abstract theories and much more by a view which 
saw the state as dominated by unaccountable vested interests who used it as an instrument to achieve
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their own selfish ends. Despite roots in Lib-Labism, many Labour trade unionists held that view which 
echoed the eighteenth century ‘Tory’ philosophy of ‘interests’. Such a viewpoint also had affinities to 
that of Marxists who saw the state as an instrument of the naked force of the dominant class though they 
believed that a violent revolution might have to take place to get power.46 The challenge for Labour was 
to control the state in the interests of workers unjustly denied their rightful place in society by those who 
already controlled it. The state as an institution in itself was considered by Labour to be neutral - all 
Labour had to do was win elections to wrest that control from its opponents. Labour’s discourse was one 
of ‘Class’ but it was also articulated through concepts of ‘the People’ which reflected the legacy of 
nineteenth century struggles against ‘Old Corruption’ as well as concepts of the ‘Nation’. Hoggart has 
shown how the Leeds working classes distinguished between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’; the latter being socially 
undifferentiated and applied to all those in authority.47 This view was reflected among Labour voters and 
party members in South Yorkshire. Hattersley claims that members of Hillsborough DLP did not call 
themselves socialists but ‘Labour men’ and Labour often described itself as the ‘People’s Party’ having 
united under its banner ‘the producers, the consumers, the useful people’.48 Its rhetorical emphasis on 
being the Party of ‘The People’, according to Steven Fielding, united the middle and working classes in 
1945 and had helped win the general election for Labour.49 The working class were also the main body 
of the ‘Nation’ who had fought Hitler in the interests of national survival sacrificing themselves as part of 
a broader community that should reflect the exercise of social consciousness.
Less apparent was a language which reflected the particular views of women outside the home or which 
was sympathetic to homosexuals. Heterosexist male chauvinism was a product of the language of skilled 
trade unionism. This placed great emphasis on the dignity of labour and heroic toil. There was also the 
religious injunction placed on Adam after being thrust out of Eden that men should earn their bread by 
the sweat of their own brows which, combined with the fact that Christ had been a carpenter, made toil 
seem a religious sacrament for those from the nonconformist sects that supplied so many of Labour’s 
leaders. The ‘common sense’ fact that the world was a male world ruled by men (and indeed in most 
respects still is today) naturally influenced how the members of local Labour parties saw the world. The 
language of Labourist politics was buttressed by the ideology o f ‘separate spheres’ for men and women 
which left women confined to the home and dependent on a male bread-winner - though in the home they 
held a position of power and respectability. Homosexual acts were illegal and homosexuals were forced 
underground in order to protect themselves from the authorities. It is true that in 1928 the Sheffield 
Labour Party offered the freedom of the City to Edward Carpenter but it is unlikely that this was as a 
result of his authorship of The Intermediate Sex which had tried to make homosexuality (or being 
‘Uranian’) seem scientific and respectable.50 After Guy Burgess defected to Russia, homosexuals were 
also viewed as potential traitors by the press and right-wing politicians, as their activities left them open 
to blackmail. This was also probably the view of many members of the working classes.
The language of racism, as we said in Chapter Six, was all pervasive in British society in the 1940s, but 
to the credit of local Labour there is evidence of some sympathy for black people even though the black
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people for which sympathy was expressed were overseas in the British Empire. The position might have 
been different had blacks been closer at hand and seen as an apparent threat to jobs, as Italian miners 
were locally in the late 1940s. The response of Labour more widely during the First World War to 
threatened imports of black labour51 and similarly after immigration began in earnest during the 1950s52 
is not reassuring in that respect. Rotherham Labour Party was outraged by attempts to violently suppress 
trade unionism in Trinidad by a British police commissioner, though this probably demonstrates the 
sense of producer solidarity of Labour in Rotherham as much as anti-racism.53 It also attacked racial 
discrimination in South Africa and opposed South Africa’s attempt to annex Basutoland, Swaziland and 
Bechuanaland through a resolution it sent to the 1950 Labour Party Annual Conference. ‘Vulcan’ in the 
Advertiser did not approve showing the condescension that British middle-class people typically had for 
black Africans:
Quite a number of resolutions come from this area and deal with questions which, by 
comparison, range upon the humdrum. Thus, the Penistone Labour Party is concerned 
with management in the steel industry, the Don Valley Labour Party is agitated about 
industrial injuries, and their colleagues in the Deame Valley are busying themselves 
with such commonplace topics as the capital levy and nationalisation of the land. It is 
left to the comrades in Rotherham to lead the delegates from these well-beaten paths to 
the trackless expanses of the Dark Continent.54
Much local ‘socialism’ took an ethical form that reflected the influence of humanitarian impulses and the 
effects of religious doctrines that could be construed as being innately socialist, like Christ’s 
commandment to love thy neighbour. It was not confined to the crudely materialistic considerations that 
led to acceptance of Marxist concepts o f class war. According to Keir Hardie, ‘Socialism makes war 
upon a system, not upon a class’55 and it was believed that rational argument undertaken in a peaceable 
manner as well as appeals to their better nature as human beings could better change the minds of 
employers and rulers than crude insults. Socialism was regarded as a Truth that only the actually evil or 
the mentally sub-normal would fail to grasp. Socialism was regarded as a moral crusade that would 
convert the useful people in the community - the unproductive drones like rentiers who lived without 
effort or those who depended on the old school tie for easy berths did not matter. Again, according to 
Hardie, socialism was ‘a handmaiden of religion, and as such entitled to the support of all who pray for 
the coming of Christ’s Kingdom upon earth.’56 Hence Labour’s socialism also often had pronounced 
Utopian characteristics. There was often little difference between the beliefs and values of many 
nonconformists and many Labour Party members (often one and the same in Sheffield). This is shown 
by their joint abhorrence of certain kinds of exploitative capitalist activity, like providing gambling 
facilities or selling alcohol, on the basis that it depraved or corrupted people and undermined family life. 
Reid argues that in Sheffield by 1900 there had developed an independent working-class culture free of 
the ‘ethic of respectability’ that had united elements of the middle and working classes in the nineteenth 
century against ‘rough’ working-class elements. This new culture was focused around the pleasures of
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the public house, the music-hall and the football ground. It came to be regarded as the ‘traditional’ 
culture of the working class in the 1950s by writers like Richard Hoggart just as it appeared to be being 
eroded by mass affluence. Yet despite Reid’s view, an ‘ethic of respectability’ still seems characteristic 
of Labour councillors in the 1940s, uniting them across the council chamber with their opponents who 
were often similarly active in chapel or church.57 This earnest puritan ethic meant that both believed in 
discipline and conformity to social norms and both frowned on ‘rough’ working-class habits that seemed 
too spontaneous and uncontrolled.
Even the Church of England in Sheffield, despite traditionally being seen as ‘the Conservative Party at 
prayer’, was through the personality and inspiration of Leslie Stannard Hunter, Bishop of Sheffield 
between 1939 and 1962, willing to go a long way to build bridges with organised labour. In fact 
Sheffield was transformed into the most forward looking and progressive diocese in the Anglican 
Church. Hunter surrounded himself with a gifted team of clergymen including Oliver Tomkins and Alan 
Ecclestone who shared his beliefs.58 This was partly an outcome of the strength and rivalry of 
nonconformity in Sheffield,59as well as Hunter’s desire to reach out to those alienated working-class 
people who failed to be moved by any religion. Hunter and his co-workers recognised the need for 
social reforms to ameliorate working-class grievances and to more effectively integrate the working 
classes within society.60 Ecclestone, the most radical local Anglican clergyman in Sheffield, and the 
Vicar of Holy Trinity, Damall, went far beyond this when after being a Labour Party member he joined 
the Communist Party in February 1948. He believed that Labour had ‘made it clear that its concern for 
Socialism at home and abroad was quite dead’.61
Leslie Hunter was president from 1946 of the Sheffield District of the United Nations Association which 
tried to influence public opinion to bring about world peace and understanding. Alderman Frank 
Thraves, Leader of the Labour Group between 1944 and 1946, was president of the Sheffield Branch and 
chairman of the Sheffield District in 1946. His successor as Leader, Alderman Bingham, was honorary 
treasurer of the Association. Many Sheffield clergymen were involved on the Executive.62 Support for 
the Association and its aims was actually part of a cross-party consensus seeking to unite the whole city. 
The Association was very ambitious and organised numerous cultural events to raise funds and recruit 
members throughout the late 1940s. In United Nations Week 1946 it
. . .  obtained the support of the leading figures in the city and of all the larger clubs and 
organisations. Our programme was the most ambitious in the country... [I]t included 
among many other events, a Cathedral Service, a Mass Rally, at which the Lord 
Bishop, the Lord Mayor and five of the City’s Members of Parliament spoke, a 
Meeting for Women’s Organisations, another for Secondary Schools, special plays at 
the Playhouse and the Little Theatre, a performance of the “Threnody for a Soldier 
Killed in Action” by the Halle Orchestra and appropriate documentaries in a large 
number of cinemas.63
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This consensus reflected support for what Ceadel calls pacificism - the belief ‘that war, though 
sometimes necessary is always an irrational and inhumane way to solve disputes, and that its prevention 
should always be an over-riding political priority.’64
The peace movement in 1950, when the Second World Peace Congress was held in Sheffield, was 
increasingly orchestrated by Communists. The Russians had come to see the thrust o f Western policy, 
particularly after the Marshall Plan was announced in 1947, as antagonistic to them and felt the West 
might unilaterally use the atomic bomb to destroy Soviet power. Churchill and even Bertrand Russell, 
later a founder member of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, in 1948 seriously suggested the 
threatened use of atomic weapons before the Soviet Union also gained them to make the latter give up 
their gains in Eastern Europe.65 As pacificists rather than absolute pacifists, Communists wanted to 
prevent the use of atomic weapons by the West, at least until Soviet Russia also possessed them. The 
movement they created to gain time was described as a ‘Peace’ movement thus winning the support of 
absolute pacifists who could not see or ignored the cynical use to which their support was put since the 
Soviet Union would never get rid of its armed forces and was at the time using espionage to gain access 
to Western nuclear secrets. The Congress attracted the support of at least one respected local Labour 
Party member from the absolute pacifist wing of the party who seemingly ignored the contradictory 
motives behind the Communist ‘Peace’ movement. She was the idiosyncratic Lady Mabel Smith, sister 
of the 7th Earl Fitzwilliam and a practicing Christian Socialist and vegetarian.66 She attended St. 
Cecilia’s Church in Sheffield which was staffed by monks from the Anglican monastery of Kilham. 
Though a socialist, she retained the ‘High Anglicanism’ of her aristocratic family.67 Until she retired in 
1949 she was a County Alderman of the West Riding County Council.68 She was well known as a 
lecturer o f the Workers’ Educational Association having joined the movement as early as 1906.69 The 
South Yorkshire Times and Express paid tribute when she died in September 1951:
The death of Lady Mabel Smith leaves the whole of the West Riding the poorer by the 
loss of one who was a gentlewoman in the truest sense of the word. Apart from her 
splendid record of County Council service, particularly in the field of education, she 
was the friend of many homely people in simpler and more intimate circles. Her 
forthright habit of expression won appreciation as well as respect all over the county, 
and especially in the environs of Grenoside where she worked in civil harness with 
many of homelier conviction though of equal integrity of purpose. There has been no- 
one quite like Lady Mabel and there will be none. Her contribution to the social histoiy 
of the district was as unique as her personality.70
On the other hand, not all Anglicans in Sheffield could be considered sympathetic to socialism by any 
means. Reverend E. G. Thorpe, Vicar of Dore in the West End of Sheffield during the 1950 General 
Election, condemned socialism from his pulpit as ‘the most deadly thing in the histoiy of the world’.71
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Albert Victor Alexander, Co-operative and Labour Member of Parliament for Hillsborough Division, 
combined his socialism with nonconformist religion as a Baptist lay-preacher.72 The need for all human 
beings to co-operate in order to further their ends was the essence of the view of the world taken by 
Sheffield’s strong Co-operative movement and it was equally a religious imperative. Alexander told to a 
Sheffield audience during the 1945 General Election that Britain had won the Second World War 
because it had fought ‘according to the example of the two wise donkeys’ - the heroes of a Co-operative 
cartoon. Tied together by a six-foot length of rope they knew that they could not reach the two bales of 
hay which a thoughtless and cruel farmer had set ten feet apart, but synchronising their movements in the 
same direction they could reach each feast in turn.73
His Agent, Albert Ballard, was also a nonconformist, being a Wesleyan lay-preacher, and his life 
exemplifies the desire among some working-class people for respectability and self-improvement.74 One 
of the most important and influential men in the Labour and Co-operative Movement in Sheffield, 
Ballard was bom in Suffolk in 1888 and came to Sheffield when one year old. As The Star commented: 
‘he carved out a career in public service that has few equals’. He left school at thirteen and took only two 
examinations in his life, but rose solely by his own efforts to become nationally known as an authority on 
education.75 When he was made a Freeman of Sheffield the Lord Mayor Alderman Mrs Sheard said: 
‘Those who know Dr Ballard’s erudition have to remind themselves that he, like so many of his 
contemporaries, acquired most of his education through the Workers Education Association and through 
the public libraries.’76 Roy Hattersley adds that he
. . .  was one of those self-educated men who never let their education end, and as well 
as quoting from the Thomas Hardys and George Eliots of his WEA past he could 
produce long passages from the fashionable authors of the day - Hemingway, Waugh,
Huxley, Orwell and, above all, Bernard Shaw - with a facility that the City Grammar’s 
teachers could not match.77
Ballard’s view of education and that of many local socialists can perhaps be gathered from this extract 
from a book on which he collaborated, The Equipment of the Workers by Arnold Freeman,78 published 
in 1919:
The Fabian philosophy would appear to be that the norms of human life and progress 
reside ultimately in physical things like food, clothing, fuel and shelter: Fabians 
contend, in the words of Bernard Shaw already quoted, “What is the matter with the 
poor is poverty” (and by poverty they mean material poverty); and they have half­
convinced the community that the solution of Labour Unrest lies solely in a 
materialistic amelioration of the lot of the four fifths of the nation who are poor. Our 
own contention is that the ultimate sources of human life and progress are in spiritual
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things: that what is the matter with the poor (and the rich) is spiritual poverty and that 
the fundamental solution of the problem ahead of us is education.79
Ballard was the first full-time secretary of the Sheffield Co-operative Party, in office from 1919 until 
1954. He was elected a councillor for Manor Ward in 1942, which seat he held until he became an 
alderman in 1952.80 He was co-opted onto the Education Committee in 1926 and was a member until his 
death. He was chairman of that committee from 1953 until 1967 when he retired from the City Council. 
He was also chairman of Sheffield Fabian Society in the 1940s and secretary of the Sheffield Co­
operative Ramblers. He was Lord Mayor in 1957.81 Ballard was very versatile. He was editor of the 
Sheffield Co-operator, the organ of the Co-operative Party,82 an occasional actor at Arnold Freeman’s 
Little Theatre,83 and thought nothing of writing a pageant ‘A Salute to Co-operation’ as part of 
International Co-operative Day celebrations in 1943. Some 200 children took part representing the 
different nations of the world and it was set to music and presented by Miss Gertie Lewis.84
The Forewords contributed by Joseph Madin, president of the Sheffield Trades and Labour Council and 
vice-chairman of the Sheffield Fabian Society,85 to Trades Council Reports from 1946 onwards give an 
indication of some of the literary influences on one Sheffield Labour leader’s world-view. He quoted 
from the Book of Common Prayer in 194986 and from Leviticus and Exodus in 1950.87 Other influences 
mentioned include Robert Blatchford, William Morris88 and Ralph Waldo Emerson.89 Like Ballard, 
Madin had probably had no more than elementary education and was self-taught or else had taken adult 
education courses with the Workers’ Educational Association or the National Council of Labour 
Colleges.
The world of the autodidact is celebrated by Jonathan Rose in his landmark book The Intellectual Life of 
the British Working Classes. Rose has argued that you can gain an understanding of Labour’s views 
about the structures of power within society from how its members responded to the canon of classic 
nineteenth century literature which functioned for them as a substitute for an ideology like Marxism. 
Literary texts provided members with a starting point for critically considering how society should 
ideally be structured. That explains Labour’s respect for the wider provision of adult education. 
Previously limited to the highest orders of society, education in the classics of literature had given the 
latter their critical mental apparatus and the knowledge to rule. Labour wanted the widest possible 
diffusion of most kinds of knowledge, including English literature, since knowledge was obviously 
power.90 The effect of this populist political aim meant that adult educationalists in the ‘Great Tradition’ 
of the WEA frowned on providing adult education for directly vocational purposes. According to the 
extra-mural lecturer, Richard Hoggart,
almost anathema to us was the idea of certification within liberal adult education. You 
did it for the love of God or the relief of man’s estate. We . . .  often found that what 
people thought we were going to do was give them socialist literature - George
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Bernard Shaw, H. G. Wells, The Ragged Trousered Philanthropists - but though we 
might be of the Left politically, we did not intend to introduce books labelled o f the 
Left. In so far as we were Literature tutors we thought nothing but the best was good 
enough for our students, we gave them Shakespeare and great authors.91
The working-class autodidacts were culturally conservative in this preference for pre-twentieth century 
English literary classics, which they read rather than attempt the Modernist literature that was coming 
from Virginia Woolf and Bloomsbury, for example. The lagged behind the educated middle classes by a 
generation in reading tastes.92 Rose and John Carey argue that Woolf and other Modernists deliberately 
tried to restrict the appeal of their books to the working classes in order to maintain their own status as 
‘high-brow’ intellectuals by making them less easy to understand.93 Copyright restrictions also meant 
their books were less cheap and less accessible than the kind of books pioneered by Everyman’s Library 
for working-class readers.94 Despite this the books that were read by working-class people, even if they 
were not cutting edge literature, did foster political radicalism and had a genuinely liberating effect on 
their minds.
Another local Labour figure about whom we have some evidence as to his intellectual tastes and hence 
his political outlook is the former miner Tom Williams, who was Member of Parliament for Don Valley 
constituency for thirty-seven years between 1922 and 1959, and Minister of Agriculture under Clement 
Attlee. He was bom in 1888 and men of his generation formed some of the more senior Labour leaders in 
South Yorkshire in elected office. Tom was educated to elementary level at Swinton, near Mexborough, 
and as neither of his parents were literate he read to them frequently as a boy.95 This latter activity 
probably had the subversive and liberating effect on him that Rose says it had on J. R. Clynes, whose 
political awakening came from being paid as a boy to read newspapers to three old blind men.96 Williams 
was another autodidact. He extended his education through a correspondence course and by private 
study which gave him the qualifications of a pit deputy, but his intellectual horizons were widened, it is 
said, simply by interaction with the customers of the Wath Working Men’s Club where he was steward 
between 1912 and 1914. The books which influenced him most included Jack London’s Iron Heel.
Robert Blatchford’s Merrie England, and R. B. Suthers’ Mind Your Own Business.97
Blatchford’s 1893 book sold over a million copies, it was claimed, in Britain alone and in a census at one 
northern Labour Club in the 1890s it was found that it had converted forty-nine out of the fifty members 
to socialism.98 Blatchford’s newspaper The Clarion had a circulation of over 80,000 by 1908," before its 
decline due to his rabid anti-German stance during the First World War.100 Like his book, its socialism 
had been un-theoretical, non-dogmatic and non-sectarian. He had started a movement which in its 
various guises tried to pre-figure life under socialism, but it was probably more important to many 
readers for the recreational activities it fostered than for its politics. Blatchford exalted ‘pre-industrial 
values’ having become a socialist after making passionate journalistic exposures of Manchester slum 
life.101 The National Clarion Cycling Club, always the centre of the movement, which continued to exist,
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still operated the Clubhouse at Dore,102 which had been opened in 1920 by the Sheffield Clarion Cycling 
Club.103 There were also Easter Meets at Buxton in Derbyshire in 1944104 and 1950105 but the national 
membership was not above a few thousand and its political influence locally was probably negligible.106 
Merrie England continued to be widely read in the 1940s. When Roy Hattersley read it for the first time 
as a young socialist he ‘thought of Shalesmoor when salmon still swam within walking distance of its 
then unspoilt hillside.’ Shalesmoor was a dilapidated slum district of Sheffield that came to represent for 
Hattersley ‘all that Blake and Cobbett had written about the ravages of the Industrial Revolution, the 
Enclosures and the dispossessed who were driven from rural Yorkshire to cough themselves to death in 
the cutlers’ shops of nineteenth-century Sheffield.’107
The Sheffield Clarion Ramblers probably had a greater if narrow impact on local Labour politics even 
though they were no more than a few hundred strong and their constitution meant that formally they were 
open to people of all political beliefs. Their political activity was focused on getting wider access to the 
natural environment around Sheffield, especially the Peak District, but this involved political 
mobilisation of Labour on their behalf. This was done by their revered founder and leader, George 
Herbert Bridges Ward, who had fingers in many other associational pies. He was the first secretary o f the 
Sheffield Labour Representation Committee, the forerunner of the Labour Party,108 and a life-long 
socialist. He had founded the Ramblers after placing an advertisement in the Clarion in September 1900 
for a ramble around the Kinder Scout plateau in Derbyshire.109 He was also a central figure in the 
creation of the Sheffield, Peak District and South Yorkshire Branch of the Council for the Protection of 
Rural England. He formed the local Youth Hostellers Association and helped create the Ramblers’ 
Association. He lived until 1957,110 presenting his views on the environment and much detailed local 
historical and topographical knowledge in The Clarion Handbook which he edited each year.111 That 
knowledge, particularly of the history of rights of way, was a weapon in the armoury of the access 
movement and was the product of original research in local archives. He was particularly jubilant about 
the creation of the Peak District National Park in 1951,112the product of a much desired Labour 
Government.
The Clarion Ramblers were one part, though a central one, of the Ramblers Association (Sheffield Area) 
of which Ward was Chairman. Ward was influenced by Walt Whitman, Longfellow, Wordsworth113 and 
Edward Carpenter. In a 1939 poem, he related the lack of access to the mountains to the displacement of 
the common people from the land in the early nineteenth century and to the selfish power o f vested 
interests. That power had just been revealed when an Access to Mountains Bill introduced by Labour 
MP, Arthur Creech Jones, had been cynically emasculated by National Government MPs in the 
Commons:114
Access to waste heathlands and to moors,/ Is denied by those selfish, unsocial boors,/
Who turned the cattle and the sheep away;/ And made a Desert where good men should
play,/ And find ‘National Fitness’ on their leisure day./ They stole the tracks where the
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Ancient Britons trod,/ They allowed the braken to kill the green sod;/ And made 
Peakland Moors less useful than/ Before our Victorian factory life began,/ And the 
Common was stolen from the countryman./ How long shall perhaps less than five 
hundred men,/ Who added nought to moorland lore by public pen,/ Say to active folk 
who love both hill and hey,/ “Though millions be your number, you shall stay/ On the 
road, and smell the petrol, on your holiday. ”115
Rambling was an extremely popular activity in Sheffield in the 1930s and 1940s, due in part to cheap 
and accessible transport services provided by the City Council which connected the East End with the 
Peak District. Even many of the local churches organised rambling excursions.116 But there was always 
a radical political edge to the hiking movement in its attempts to give working-class people the freedom 
to roam. However, the access that the Clarion Ramblers wanted always entailed obligations on 
themselves out of respect for the environment which they freely accepted. For example, when access 
was agreed in 1948 between Sheffield Council and the District Ramblers Federation to nine paths across 
Burbage Moor, they accepted the job of wardening the area and protecting the area from fire damage on 
weekends and Bank Holidays.117 Their movement was one of respectable and rational recreation. The 
public should be taught to use leisure wisely and not to think it had a licence to do anything it wanted 
such as drop litter or start fires on the moors. This does not mean, however, that trespassing on the 
moors before the creation of the National Park was necessarily frowned on by them as long as no damage 
was done. It had in fact become a popular sport, adding extra excitement to a ramble. Ward described 
rambling as ‘the gentle art of trespass’ and in 1923 had a writ served on him making him apologise for 
past trespasses on Kinder Scout and to promise not to do it again. This he gleefully described as ‘a 
greater honour than the OBE’.118
Particularly sympathetic to the Clarion Ramblers was Fred Marshall, the first Town Planning Committee 
chairman of Sheffield Council responsible for Sheffield’s provisional green belt.119 MP for industrial 
Brightside between 1935 and 1950, he was Parliamentary Secretary at the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning between 1945 and October 1947.120 He was a special guest at the Ramblers’ Golden Jubilee 
Dinner on 30 September 1950, making a speech at the event, which was attended by 135 members of the 
Club. He was presented with an inscribed barometer-thermometer in recognition of his great services to 
them.121 Marshall was president of the Hallamshire Footpaths Preservation Society of which Ward was 
also secretary122 and a member of the executive of the local CPRE.123 He was not the only Sheffield MP 
to give his support to rambling. A. V. Alexander was president of the Sheffield Co-operative Ramblers 
(founded 1924) and Ballard was secretaiy.124 In the wider Labour movement beyond Sheffield there were 
many who were passionate ramblers like Hugh Dalton who in 1948 became President o f the Ramblers’ 
Association.125 It was ultimately thanks to him when he became Minister for Town and Country 
Planning in 1950 that the Peak District National Park finally came into existence.126
South Yorkshire working-class people did not allow themselves to be ground down by appalling
190
environmental conditions. In 1941 Tom Williams MP had contributed a foreword to a book on the lives 
of the miners in the Don Valley by Dr R. W. L. Ward entitled Old King Coal. Ward favoured coal 
nationalisation of the mines and was sympathetic to the problems created by miners’ living conditions. 
He included descriptions of local mining towns like Swinton, Denaby, Mexborough and Wath. 
Mexborough was described as ‘much maligned’ even though it was an ‘unlovely-looking town’ where 
the ‘houses look frowsy, the streets are narrow and winding, grimy and busy... I cannot recall a single 
fine tree or flower bed within a mile of the town’s dirty centre. Most of the factories look derelict and its 
places of worship short of paint and pride.’ However, he noted that ‘Yet it has a virile population, 
interested in cheap education, drama and other arts, and shops, where you can buy economically and 
well.’127 The Labour Party in South Yorkshire grew out of that ‘virile population’ and its cultural thirst. 
Sheffield Forward in summing up what it saw as Sheffield Labour’s ultimate aims in health care said 
significantly that Labour looked ‘forward, not merely to providing remedies for people who are sick, not 
even merely to the prevention of sickness to a much greater degree, but to a larger measure of health and 
a more abundant life, fu ll o f  vigour andjoy for all [emphasis added].’128 The words in italics state what 
Labour’s socialist ideology was really based around - not the arid debates on Marxist dialectics that 
characterised the theoreticians of the Communist Party, with their references to what Lenin, Stalin, Marx 
or Engels supposedly said. In some ways it was a weakness, for Marxism-Leninism always provided 
answers to questions raised by the faithful and a sense of the line to be followed which comforted most 
Communists. However, that line was often rigid and dogmatically held, only to suddenly force political 
somersaults on those who held it, as the strategic needs of the Soviet Union altered. Labour’s ethical 
socialist ideology, given ballast by the pragmatic philosophy of the moderate trade unions which stressed 
negotiation and compromise in the practice of free collective bargaining, was much more flexible (or as 
Marxists saw it opportunist). Labour believed the means used were every bit as important as the 
ideological ends.
7.3 - ORGANISATION
Recent research on Labour organisation in the 1950s and 60s by Steven Fielding129 and Lawrence 
Black130 give an impression of an inefficient and out-of-date party machine. Harold Wilson’s Report 
into party organisation, a response to the General Election defeat of 1955, observed that ‘compared with 
our opponents, we are still at the penny-farthing stage in a jet-propelled era, and our machine, at that, is 
getting rusty and deteriorating with age.’ An unnamed MP said, ‘When the tide is with us our bad 
organisation relatively to the Tories doesn’t matter: when the tide is against us our bad organisation is 
fatal.’.131 This statement implies that Labour had bad organisation in the 1940s as well as in 1955, and 
Labour Organiser was certainly full of articles on the same worries and problems that were considered in 
the Report. However, it should also be emphasised that there was good or adequate organisation and 
Rotherham is an example. It presented itself as a model from which other parties could take lessons in 
how to win votes.132
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Wilson put forward his view of what constituted Labour’s problem in Paragraph (21). I have italicised 
the part which gives a basis for the idea that there was a culture inside Labour which would obstruct the 
creation of the kind of organisational structure which has latterly been used so ably by New Labour to 
win power:
we do not suggest any attempt to copy the Tory election system. Even if sufficient 
money were available, we are convinced that an attempt to build up a streamlined 
professional machine would be offensive alike to our traditions and our principles.
For half a century our Party has relied on voluntary workers, supplemented and 
assisted by a handful of paid officers. Our problem is not to replace the voluntary 
workers by professionals: it is to provide sufficient help, in terms of staff, finance, 
inspiration and advice as will enable constituency parties once again to mobilise to the 
full the voluntary workers available, and, having mobilised them, to use them more 
effectively.133
A study of Greenwich in 1950 showed that membership of the party was more burdensome for the 
individual member than was Conservative membership. The explanation given was that it was a 
consequence of low party income, yet it was arguably also due to the perception within the party o f its 
ultimate aims. Members working for the ‘Great Cause’ of Socialism through voluntary effort for the 
party learned about fellowship and were educated in a ‘more vital kind of citizenship’. The self-sacrifice 
of party workers showed that Socialism already existed. Giving in to professionalism would be an 
admission that it was not a realistic aspiration.134 Increased membership, one would think, would only 
further the Socialist goal but there was considerable resistance, at least in the 1950s and 1960s, from 
certain elements within local parties, which Black and Fielding document. How far was this equally true 
of South Yorkshire parties in the late 1940s ? One would imagine, given that individual membership 
was increasing over our period that steps were being taken to actively promote local membership. 
However, the figures for attendance at Hallam Ward meetings (Appendix 1.6) show a progressive 
decline in participation in meetings across the period, showing a decline in interest. The figures for 
Doncaster Central Ward (Appendix 1.7), which cover a shorter period, show a peak o f attendance and 
interest around the February 1950 general election which was not, however, reproduced during the 1951 
election campaign, when Labour actually lost Doncaster to the Conservatives. The attempt to increase 
participation in Labour’s organisation was not for want of initiative by the leadership, according to 
Fielding. But it failed due to obstruction by party activists and because of the peculiar culture of branch 
life. Tiratsoo also observes that activists tended to frustrate attempts by the headquarters to make Labour 
more electable among ordinary voters who had little sympathy for Socialism but were willing to support 
Labour.135
My view is that some South Yorkshire Labour Parties were definitely interested in increasing individual 
membership and participation in the party life, but cultural, economic and social factors were all
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involved in deciding which parties were the most enthusiastic exponents. Barnsley in the centre of the 
South Yorkshire Coalfield never registered more than the minimum affiliated individual members of 240 
(see Appendix 1.1.2). Hillsborough, Central and Ecclesall DLPs in Sheffield were almost as bad. 
Hillsborough was also often in arrears in paying affiliation fees to Head Office, as was Central Division. 
Obviously, one might believe that Barnsley and Hillsborough DLPs were bodies where participation was 
not encouraged. The literature on Barnsley Labour Party would encourage this belief. According to 
Trevor Lindley, Alderman Edward Sheerien, Secretary of the Trades and Labour Council, kept a tight 
control of the party. Borough Councillors, for example, were usually picked by Sheerien himself or his 
close associates - not because they would be subservient but because they could win support. Sometimes 
they were not even party members. One respected alderman was collected on the night of his election for 
his first party meeting and selected as candidate at that meeting.136 The portrait presented in Roy 
Hattersley’s autobiography of Hillsborough Division under Albert Ballard, on the other hand, does not 
seem similar to that of the non-participatory Barnsley Labour Party portrayed by Lindley. Hattersley was 
encouraged to develop a passion for the practice of politics from an early age by involvement in the well- 
organised political machine that Ballard had devised for the constituency.137
The Wilson Report echoed what had been said about safe Labour seats like Barnsley many times before. 
It noted that too many such seats with majorities of over 20,000 took little trouble with membership or 
organisation and had little thought for the broader interests of the movement. One problem in the 1955 
General Election was that the Labour Parties in the safe seats around the Tory marginal of Doncaster sent 
fewer party workers to help the local party than the Tory associations in those divisions, costing Labour 
the seat. Tory organisation in safe Labour seats pinned the Labour workers there down and provided 
coach loads of party workers and cars for the marginal seats. This was one of the factors in the loss of 
Doncaster in 1951. You can, of course, understand why parties in safe Labour seats refused to make any 
effort to increase membership. As long as the party elected its own candidate, which was its function 
after all, the creation of a mass membership might seem unnecessary or considered by those who already 
held power as dangerous to their status.138
Wilson was also ‘extremely disturbed’ by the situation of constituency organisation in many cities and 
divided boroughs which were ‘withering-away’ due to a pattern of over-centralisation associated with 
council activities. It was worst where a City Party incorporated the Trades Council. The most extreme 
example was Leicester where for all practical purposes constituency organisation did not exist and all 
organisation was at City or Ward level. At the other extreme was Birmingham, with a vigorous City 
Party and active Constituency Parties. Between these extremes organisations varied in their efficiency.139 
Len Williams, the Regional Organiser, also described the position of Labour Parties in divided boroughs 
across the country as unsatisfactory in 1946, and said that Sheffield as a whole, despite its successes at 
municipal and parliamentary levels, was one of the worst, but this was because of membership rather 
than the division of labour between the different levels of organisation. Out of seven divisions in 
Sheffield, five had taken only the minimum number of membership cards out in 1945. Hallam was the
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only division among the seven to pay its full quota of money to the Election Fund. Some were still in 
arrears in January 1946.140 But constituency organisation was certainly not ‘withering-away’.
Wilson noted that Labour Party members tended ‘to exaggerate the importance of money and large local 
subscriptions’ in Tory success. He argued that, ‘It is . . .  dangerously misleading to think exclusively in 
terms of Tory money and to ignore the efficiency of the voluntary organisation which explains a great 
deal of their success, and which it is not beyond our power to rival.’141 Tory voluntary organisation 
relied as much on women as Labour did and on the close neighbourhood networks of kith and kindred 
that women formed in working-class districts as a necessity for family survival. According to Wilson, it 
was the keeping of a register or card index of previous Conservative voters which produced the success 
of the Tory machine and the keeping of such a register in every marginal division after a full 
identification canvass had been made as a first step was a major recommendations. His main emphasis in 
the reorganisation of the Party was on creating thriving ward organisations and a register was to be part 
of their allotted task between elections. The Conservatives did canvass at election times mainly to work 
up enthusiasm and distribute literature. It was mainly done by women and they did it more than Labour. 
A Gallup Poll taken during the 1951 General Election found that 44 per cent of those questioned said 
they had been canvassed by the Conservatives and only 37 per cent by Labour.142 Most organisational 
work had to be done between elections, as a Gallup Poll taken in 1955, which is equally relevant for the 
later 1940s, shows. It asked, ‘About when did you make up your mind to vote the way you did ?’ and the 
following Table gives the percentage responses:143
Table A - When Did You Decide to Vote the Wav You Did ?
%
FEW DAYS AGO 3
2-3 WEEKS AGO 5
MONTHS AGO 12
YEARS AGO 30
ALWAYS BEEN 50
ALL VOTING 100
Sara Barker, Women’s Organiser for the Yorkshire Regional Council, defended Women’s Sections in 
1947 against suggestions that were no longer of much relevance to the Labour Party. According to 
Barker, Women’s Sections were necessary because they attracted thousands of women who would 
otherwise never have joined the Labour Party and since the Party aimed at mass membership any unit of 
party organisation able to help that membership become a mass movement of trained and alert minds had 
to be worthwhile.144 Their real role, however, was to act as cheap labour.
Besides canvassing and doing most mundane clerical tasks on polling days women were mainly involved 
in raising money to fund branch activities and elections. They organised socials and were felt to be useful 
in collecting weekly or monthly membership subscriptions since they were ‘more methodical than men 
[and] more conscientious in keeping regularly to collecting dates’.145 According to R. T. Phillips in 1948
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who attempted to suggest ways a ‘poor’ Party could raise funds, ‘The first and most important 
requirement is a well-organised, active, interested and informed Women’s section in every ward, or 
every area of a County division. Their co-operation will make a success of all kinds of money-raising 
projects.’146 Doncaster had the largest number of Labour women among the eleven parliamentary 
constituencies covered by the South Yorkshire Labour Women’s Advisory Council in 1949, with eleven 
Women’s Sections - three of which had over 100 members.147 The Advisory Council was formed in 
1924 and celebrated its twenty-first year with a Coming-of-Age Celebration at Bentley near Doncaster on 
1 October 1945 which was attended by over 500 delegates representing the constituent Women‘s 
Sections.148
Despite the importance of women members in doing humdrum organisational tasks they did not achieve 
anything like equality with men in terms of candidatures in safe parliamentary seats or council wards as 
Mary Morris pointed out in Labour Organiser in 1948. Local parties were still too man-minded and only 
chose a woman if she had really outstanding qualifications.149 The following Table B 150 gives the small 
number of Labour women members of County Borough Councils, including Aldermen, in the area 
covered by the Yorkshire Regional Council after the 1945 municipal elections:
Table B - Women Representatives on Yorkshire County Borough Councils
C. B. COUNCIL NO. C. B. COUNCIL NO.
BARNSLEY 2 HULL 7
BRADFORD 2 LEEDS 9
DONCASTER 4 ROTHERHAM 3
HALIFAX 1 SHEFFIELD 4
HUDDERSFIELD 2 WAKEFIELD 1
Appendix 4.8 gives the figures for female candidates, successful and unsuccessful, in Sheffield municipal 
elections between 1938 and 1952. It does not include those council members on the aldermanic bench. 
During the period of the Attlee Government the number of candidates peaked at just eight in 1949 and 
1950. Labour’s peak success was in 1949 when four out of the five candidates it put up for election were 
elected. The Municipal Progressives/Conservative-Liberals never elected more than one but in 1950 
they fielded the peak number of female candidates at six. Between 1941 and 1946, of 57 individuals 
who were Labour Council members six were women. Between 1946 and 1951, of 78 individuals who 
were Labour Council members only seven were women. Hence the proportion of women out of the pool 
of those who at any time were Council members fell from 10.5 per cent of the Council to 9 per cent 
during the 1940s.
Labour’s man-mindedness is shown by the fact that in 1950 and 1951 general election nationally it was 
the Conservatives who led in attracting women’s votes. Numerically this was significant for in 1951 
women made up 51.9 per cent of the population and 53.8 per cent of potential voters. One factor that has 
been used as a means of explaining this lead is to do with female discontent with rationing and other
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consumer issues which was imaginatively seized upon by the Conservatives to discredit the Labour 
Government.151 To Labour women like Mrs Keers of Doncaster at the Women’s Conference in 1947, 
however, the government was doing a good job and should carry on doing it:
In the debate on rationing they were told something about the beautiful things in the 
shops which they could not buy. Before the war the shops were full of beautiful things 
they still could not buy. The working-class had always been rationed by their pockets 
and she would say on behalf of the women of her area to the Government, “You have 
done a good job, you have done it well, cany on with the good work.”152
The typical male Labour response to accusations of man-mindedness was to consider it irrelevant. 
Johnny Fookes told Labour Organiser:
it’s about time for women members . . .  to forget that they are women and concentrate 
on being Socialists.... There is only one good reason for nominating anyone for Party 
or public office - that is because, out of all the possible people with qualifications for 
the job, here is the best candidate. The fact that the candidate might happen to be a 
woman is of no importance at all.153
Ultimately, this unwillingness to alter the situation of women in the party and to deal with the changing 
needs of women as they became involved as full-time professional workers in the economy rather than as 
traditional house-wives was a major organisational handicap for Labour.
In the light of what I have already said, it is not surprising that Labour women who were elected to 
municipal office tended to be married rather than single women and to be interested in social welfare 
issues like education or the health of mothers and children which reflected women’s supposed special 
expertise in the sphere of family life. Concentration on such ‘feminine’ issues provided much of 
Labour’s local support in many areas of Britain before the Second World War. For example, Labour in 
November 1926 won eight out of nine seats contested in the Rotherham municipal elections after it 
accused its opponents of stealing the milk of babies.154 Expenditure on the Assisted Milk Scheme, 
introduced in 1924 in Rotherham to help nursing mothers and their infants, was cut by the Ministry of 
Health while the miners were on strike and this was not popular locally.155 Dealing with mundane issues 
of welfare among all classes of citizen was considered by Rotherham agent Vernon Thornes to be crucial 
to gaining votes. According to him,
There is canvassing and canvassing and it might surprise some people to realise that a 
mass canvas carried out among old people to make sure that they know just what they 
are entitled to in the way of Supplementary Pensions is a better way to gain supporters, 
in all quarters, than the orthodox type of canvassing with loads of literature, hours of
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talking and explaining and dozens of doorstep interviews.
Labour in Rotherham had . .  built up over the years a system of advice and information which ... [was] 
most rewarding, both from a human and a political viewpoint.’156
The profile of male Labour councillors in Rotherham and probably the rest of South Yorkshire was 
defined by their trade union involvement. The Rotherham and District Annuals give fairly detailed 
biographical sketches of the most notable people of the Rotherham area and the occupational profile of 
the Borough Council in 1951 can be for formulated with precision. Rotherham Labour Party prior to the 
1950 General Election placed great stress on steel nationalisation in their programme and a majority of 
councillors were still or had been employed in local steelworks and were members of the Iron and Steel 
Trades Confederation or the Amalgamated Engineering Union. No delegate to the Industrial Committee 
of the Rotherham Trades Council in 1947, to take a year at random, was female. Women delegates to the 
Political Committee were either delegates for their Ward parties or members of the Women’s Central 
Committee. None of the Trades Council officers were women either.157
7.4 - ELECTORAL SUCCESS IN SHEFFIELD
This section looks at the success of the Labour Party in elections for the 25 wards of the Sheffield City 
Council between 1945 and 1952 and for the seven Parliamentary Divisions of Sheffield in the two 
General Elections of 1950 and 1951. Appendices 4 and 2 give the respective election results in detail. 
The electorates of these wards were not equal and could range from, for example, in 1946 Firth Park 
with 30,029 potential voters to, at the other extreme, St. Peter’s with 5,462. In the 1950 General Election 
the mean average size of the electorate of a Sheffield Division was 52,552 electors while in other South 
Yorkshire seats it was 60,427. Redistribution of seat boundaries as a result of the Representation o f the 
People Act 1948 had narrowed the gap between Sheffield Divisions and those in the rest of South 
Yorkshire, since in 1945 the mean potential electorate of a Sheffield Division was 42,726 while in the 
rest of South Yorkshire it was 69,037.
Butler in 1947 noted that a 4 per cent swing in the overall votes at the 1945 General Election or a 4.4 per 
cent swing in the net Labour and Conservative votes would have given the Conservatives the same 
number of votes as Labour. However, such a swing if equal universally across the country would have 
only reduced Labour to 332 seats in Parliament, which was still an absolute majority, and increased the 
Conservatives to just 278 seats. He believed that if this had actually happened there would have been an 
unprecedented outcry against the first-past-the post electoral system. He blamed this anomaly on the 
variations in the size of the electorates. Labour had an electoral advantage in 1945 because a Labour 
constituency had on average 51,000 electors while a Conservative constituency had 57,000. Thus, while 
in 1945 36 per cent of the electorate had Conservative MPs, only 34 per cent o f MPs were 
Conservatives. 61 per cent of the electorate had Labour MPs but 63 per cent of actual MPs were
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Labour.158 In Sheffield in 1945, however, both Conservative Ecclesall and Hallam were well below the 
average mean national Labour figure for 1945, but three Labour seats were even below the number of- 
Hallam and Ecclesall’s electors so there probably was a Labour advantage. It would certainly be easier to 
be elected in Sheffield than in the rest o f South Yorkshire if the sole criterion was size of electorate. In 
1950 the range of constituencies within Sheffield was between Labour Attercliffe with 49,650 voters and 
56,581 in Hillsborough.
In 1950, the percentage turnout ranged from 83.2 in Neepsend Division to 88.1 in Heeley Division while 
average percentage turnout across Sheffield was 86 per cent. In 1951, percentage turnout ranged between
79.5 per cent in Neepsend and 84.9 per cent in Hillsborough. The average turnout was 82.5 per cent. 
Labour’s average percentage of votes cast in the Tory seats of Heeley and Hallam was 32.15 per cent in 
1950 and actually rose to 34.1 per cent in 1951. The average percentage of Labour votes in the five 
Labour seats in 1950 was 68 per cent and 68.44 per cent in 1951. Hence the Labour Party in 1951 was 
actually consolidating its hold on Sheffield in terms of votes while Labour lost power to the 
Conservatives nationally. There was obviously little evidence of a sea-change in electoral fortunes in 
Sheffield. Turnout in the municipal elections over our period was much lower than in the two General 
Elections. In the 1951 City Council elections, for instance, turnout averaged about 39 per cent overall 
and ranged from 25 per cent in Attercliffe Ward to 49 per cent in Norton Ward. Obviously, General 
Elections were considered more important by the mass of the electorate because there was the chance of 
a complete change of national government with far-reaching changes for everyday life. Despite the 
rhetorical emphasis of the anti-Labour Party on the City Council on the importance of local government 
being truly local and deciding issues which directly affected local people, like high rates or the method of 
allocating council houses, municipal elections were not broadly considered as important by the electorate 
and were seen as quite mundane and unglamorous when dealing with issues like sewerage, water supply 
or rubbish disposal.
Labour’s percentage of the total votes cast in municipal elections tended be highest in wards like 
Attercliffe where turnouts were also the lowest (82 per cent) and be least in those wards like Norton 
where turnouts were the highest (16 per cent). This can probably be related to social class and factors 
like educational attainment, occupation and housing tenure though it is impossible given the state of 
information to be really precise for each ward. Hampton in his study of politics in Sheffield which 
mainly looked at the 1960s, noted that historically Sheffield had exceptionally low turnouts in local 
elections. Until ward re-organisation in 1967, polls seldom reached 30 per cent while in some wards it 
was as low as 10 per cent. This statement does not seem to be true for the period of my study, for 
average turnouts in Sheffield varied between 40 per cent in 1946 and 1952, to as high as 53 per cent in 
1947, and at no point was there a turnout as low as 10 per cent in any ward. Neepsend Ward in 1949 
was the lowest turnout in the entire period at 24 per cent. In the entire period, only five times did it dip 
below 30 per cent. According to Hampton there are two main reasons why the turnouts were so low. 
Firstly, the City was predominantly working-class in social composition and it was much more so than
198
the national average or than many other large cities and, secondly, the different social groups were 
rigorously segregated in different areas of the City.159
Pollard says that Sheffield just after the Second World War was, however, increasingly coming to adhere 
to national norms, but despite the inter-war decline of staple trades like cutlery, the rise in incomes, 
shown by much better shopping facilities and other services, the massive house-building and the increase 
of spending on items locally which all reduced differences within the national statistics, as the 1951 
Census showed, Sheffield still had much of the traditional character of an industrial and proletarian 
city.160 The social class distribution of occupied and retired males aged fifteen and over still showed that 
out of a total of 183,204 males only 4,543 could be classed as in Class I - professional occupations or 25 
out of every thousand men. This latter figure was admittedly above that of the West Riding as a whole 
which was 22 out of every thousand men, while Doncaster in South Yorkshire was slightly higher at 26 
males per thousand in professional occupations. By contrast in Class III - skilled occupations, Sheffield 
had 560 per thousand men or 102,687 people. Partly skilled occupations were less than a quarter of the 
skilled figure while unskilled occupations were just under 30 per cent of the skilled total. Some 27.7 per 
cent of the working population were in metal manufacture or engineering and 16.7 per cent were in 
cutlery and tools.161 According to Hampton, working-class people use their vote less frequently than 
middle-class citizens so it is unsurprising to find lower municipal polls in a working class city.
This is accentuated by the distribution of social classes geographically across the City leading to the 
creation of wards almost certain to elect councillors of the same party (and almost certainly social class, 
see the marked occupational class differences in candidates between the parties in a typical year like 
1951 in Appendix 5) year after year. Marginal seats were rare and the incentive to vote was further 
weakened by the perception that the result was a foregone conclusion. Several Sheffield people told 
Hampton’s interviewers that they did not vote because their party always succeeded in winning the seat 
or because it never did.162 Were there many marginal seats in Sheffield in our period ? According to the 
range of Labour’s mean percentage of the total votes cast in all 25 wards it never had less than 48 per 
cent of all votes (1951) or more than 55 per cent (1946) between 1945 and 1951, so it had about half of 
all votes cast. Fourteen wards always returned Labour councillors while six wards always returned 
Municipal Progressives/Conservative-Liberals. That leaves just five wards where there were fluctuations 
of seats.
The election of a Conservative-Liberal in Crookesmoor Ward in 1949, when in all the other contests it 
returned a Labour councillor, can be put down to a costly Labour mistake which also saw it fail to put up 
a candidate in Woodseats in the same year. Both Labour candidates’ nomination papers were not 
received in time giving the Conservative-Liberals unopposed returns.163 Labour had a gain in 
Hillsborough Ward in 1945 which could be put down to left-wing enthusiasm after the war but it was a 
close run thing with a Labour majority of just 250 and a 51 per cent share of the vote. Until 1952 it then 
returned anti-Labour councillors. Heeley had a single Conservative gain in 1951 in an otherwise safe
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Labour ward with a majority of 43 votes. It is obvious that there were only two seats, Sharrow and St. 
Peters, which can be regarded as true marginal wards. Obviously, they had little real influence on the 
composition of the City Council and on the possibility of the Municipal Progressive/ Conservative- 
Liberals taking power from Labour, and so Hampton’s theory is confirmed. This is also probably true of 
the Parliamentary constituencies. Certainly Conservative Hallam Division was made up of Hallam, 
Ecclesall and Broomhill Wards and these were all anti-Labour strongholds.
Between 1945 and April 1949, there were 15 Labour aldermen on Sheffield City Council with 16 
between 1949 and April 1952. The Labour councillors fluctuated between 52 and 44. In this period there 
were between nine or ten anti-Labour aldermen and between 22 and 29 anti-Labour councillors. Given 
the structural reasons that Hampton puts forward for the stability of the City Council composition, it 
might even be considered that the policy of the Labour Party did not matter that much. Despite the 
extreme urgency of the housing issue, its various aspects such as the use of direct labour as against free 
enterprise and the precise method of allocating council houses and the major point which the Municipal 
Progressive/Conservative-Liberals made of it in their various municipal election manifestos, it failed to 
provoke a rebellion amongst the people of Sheffield against Labour. Part of this might be put down to the 
fact that the Labour Council members were as working-class in origin as most o f the City and had direct 
experience of working-class life.
The Municipal Progressives were well aware of the value as clients with votes of the council house 
tenants to Labour. Alderman Bearcroft, secretary of the Party, complained in 1945 that, ‘In terms of 
votes there is already a “Pressure Group” of about 100,000 Corporation tenants who are susceptible to 
favours which may be granted to them by those in power.’164 The only threat to Labour’s hold on the 
tenants came from the Communist Party which defended squatters and fought increases in council house 
rents, but its electoral challenge was minimal. Communists tended to fight in working-class wards. 
Between 1945 and 1952 they fought Brightside under the candidacy of Howard Hill who had been 
Communist councillor of the Ward until 1946.165 Hill got 1,530 votes in 1946, and 903 votes in 1947, 
but his poll had peaked and declined to 211 votes by 1951. Between 1945 and 1950 Bumgreave was 
contested, and Manor between 1946 and 1952, but the Communists did not make any impression. The 
highest total vote they received across Sheffield was 2,806 in 1946, which was 2.1 per cent o f the total 
votes. The next highest was in 1950 with 2,193 votes or 1.5 per cent of votes cast. In 1946, however, 
they had just three candidates, while in 1950 in their most ambitious attempt to challenge Labour locally, 
or perhaps simply to gain publicity for their grievances against the Attlee Government with the 
worsening Cold War, they fielded ten candidates. Thus, in 1946 they got 935.33 votes per candidate and 
only 219.3 votes per candidate in 1950. It was not an impressive showing and was echoed in the General 
Elections of 1950 and 1951. In 1950 four candidates were fielded but all lost their deposits with the 
lowest poll of the election going to Michael Bennett in Hillsborough with 759 votes.166 In 1951, Howard 
Hill alone contested Brightside and got 1,116 votes.
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The Communists did not retrieve any influence on the Trades Council in the later 1940s, which might 
have been electorally damaging for Labour, even though it was certainly concerned about the looming 
Cold War as the following 1947 resolution shows:
That this meeting of the Sheffield Trades and Labour Council sees with regret the gulf 
which threatens to divide the world on the issues o f capitalism versus Socialism and 
Totalitarian versus Democratic Socialism in the struggle of the future. It calls upon the 
Government to implement at all times Socialist Economic Planning without Political 
tyranny, and to act at all times through UNO in having Forces at all dangerous focal 
points throughout the world.167
Councillor Alfred Hobson, secretary of the Trades Council, was not likely to allow Communist 
subversion willingly. Clause 19 of its Rules prohibited Communist or Fascist membership. By the late 
1940s it was true, however, as the secretary of the Trades Councils’ Joint Consultative Committee said, 
that more and more Trades Councils were having to operate such rules. Writing to Hobson to see if the 
rules were being used, he called ‘upon trade unionists to be increasingly vigilant against attempts by the 
Communist Party to undermine our democratic procedures and to introduce alien and dictatorial methods 
within our Movement.’168 The Trades Council file at the Modem Records Centre contains just one piece 
of evidence that this was ever tested in Sheffield.169
The Sheffield Labour movement was given a major opportunity to demonstrate its anti-Communism and 
the respectable nature of its socialism by the Second World Peace Congress which was to be held in 
Sheffield from 13 to 19 November 1950. Attlee said there was no law against holding the Congress and 
only delegates who had specific charges against them would be prevented from obtaining visas to visit 
Britain. However, two-thirds o f the approximately 2,000 delegates were excluded and the Congress had 
to be transferred to Warsaw where it launched a Five-Power Peace Pact Appeal calling for a peace 
settlement between the Western Powers and Russia. Britain apparently collected just under 2.25 million 
signatures for this from Communists, Christians, pacifists, trade unionists, Labour Party members and 
even Labour MPs.170 According to the Communist Basil Barker, the Labour Government was so 
‘embittered ... in their attitude towards the progressive movement that they even preferred to use the 
forces of state to defeat the aims that the peace movement was attempting to achieve. It is a contribution 
that should be to the eternal shame of the labour movement.’171 The president of the Sheffield Trades 
and Labour Council, Joseph Madin, was not a supporter of the Congress and did not share Barker’s 
sentiments. In the 1951 Trades Council Report he gave the opinion that: ‘Our people in the organised 
Labour Movement know that the initiative for peace does not lie in our hands, but in the hands of 
Russia.’172 Ultimately, the Congress, and the spite of fellow-travellers who would deny Churchill in 1951 
the Freedom of the City which the City Council had voted unanimously for during the dark days o f 1943 
(including Howard Hill), was counter-productive for the Communists.173 Alderman Bingham and Madin 
both sat on the same platform as Churchill on 16 April 1951 when he received his Freedom,
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demonstrating the respectability and patriotism of the Labour movement in Sheffield which could do it 
no harm at the polls.174
7.5 - CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown the interdependence of cultural, linguistic, ideological, organisational and 
political factors in explaining the strengths and shortcomings of the South Yorkshire Labour Parties, 
mainly using examples from Sheffield. Labour grew out of working-class culture though it is also true 
that working-class culture could also play its part in potentially generating support for Conservatism.
Roy Hattersley and Joe Ashton were members of the Labour League of Youth but saw no contradiction 
in supporting Sheffield Wednesday FC despite the fact that its chairman in 1946 was William 
Feamehough, Progressive City Councillor for Crookesmoor, and its vice-chairman was James Longden 
who was a defeated Progressive candidate in Hillsborough in 1945 and was elected for Hallam Ward in 
November 1946.175 Wednesday in 1946 was the only club whose players were not in the Players’ Union 
and the Telegraph reported that in some Sheffield factories debates were taking place among football 
fans who were loyal trade unionists about whether they should continue to support non-union labour.176 
There is no indication of this debate in Hattersley’s autobiography. Football matches as an 
overwhelmingly proletarian pastime had been described by the Conservative Telegraph in 1923 as ‘a 
safety-valve against Communism, fanaticism, discontent, and any worse evils there may be’.177
According to Hattersley, the Sheffield Labour Party ‘owed more to Methodism than Marx’. Most of the 
Labour councillors and key party workers were nonconformists who preached on Sundays.178 Certainly 
religion, Anglican as well as nonconformist, gave a potential doctrinal basis to socialism in Sheffield but 
Labour’s opponents like the Progressive Leader Harold Jackson were also often nonconformists (he was 
a Methodist). This gave a shared tone of respectability to the council in alliance against ‘rough’ 
working-class habits. Generally, socialism in Sheffield was the fruit of the desire through education to 
spiritually enhance the working classes and through control of vested interests whether they were owners 
of grouse-moors or industrialists to give working-class people a fuller, more joyous and secure life. 
Unfortunately the culture of Labour Party branch life and the attitudes of activists meant that Labour 
remained an organisation of amateurs dependent on female voluntary labour that hindered wider 
participation. Labour was increasingly in the 1950s and 60s unable nationally to rival a slick and 
professional Conservative electoral machine. Doncaster was the one marginal seat that in 1951 fell to 
the Conservatives due to the better organisation of their local electoral resources.
Fortunately for Labour in Sheffield in the 1940s, despite the emphasis placed on local patriotism as 
against national intrusion and private enterprise against public ownership by their opponents, these 
sentiments did not appeal to the working classes sufficiently to make them vote for the Progressives. The 
working classes were residentially segregated in Sheffield from more affluent middle-class districts. 
Middle-class anti-Labour candidates and councillors often talked an alien political language to their
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working-class counterparts. Though their rhetoric was potentially inclusive of the whole community, in 
practice their language was really slanted towards middle-class aspirations like owner-occupation or 
favoured economy of expenditure on council services to keep rates as low as possible. The affluent 
middle classes bought private services that could be provided for the working classes only through state 
intervention in the free market. Working-class people with little wealth and low incomes and who were 
forced to live in rented accommodation wanted the highest possible quality public services. Council 
house tenants formed a large grouping which had a vested interest in keeping rents low and affordable 
and council houses of the highest quality possible; thus they supported the continuance of Labour in 
office on the City Council.
The lack of marginal council wards and Parliamentary seats in Sheffield meant that political life was 
marked by stability with a Labour City Council, five Labour Parliamentary seats and two Conservative 
seats. The Communist challenge to Labour was easily contained in municipal and general elections. 
Communist stunts like the Second World Peace Congress which occurred in the midst of the Korean 
War when British soldiers were being killed by Communists, were unhelpful for them and could only 
bring further unpopularity. Labour in the 1940s proved itself respectable, patriotic and well organised. 
The Iron and Steel Trades Confederation and the Amalgamated Engineering Union in Sheffield and 
Rotherham led disciplined workforces conscious of their skilled status and with a pride in craftsmanship. 
Iron and steel had a good industrial relations history with few strikes. It was the basis of the Labour 
Party’s support in Sheffield.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION
According to Andrew Thorpe the overwhelming fact about Sheffield’s politics between 1926 when the party 
obtained power and 1951 when the Attlee government fell from office was the city’s consolidation as a 
Labour stronghold.1 My thesis covering a shorter period comes to the same conclusion. Thorpe’s conclusion 
is similarly valid for Rotherham where Labour’s dominance of local politics was if anything even more 
pronounced than in Sheffield after it took control of the County Borough in 1928. In both towns the once 
dominant Liberals were almost extinct as a force by 1951. Much more than Sheffield, Rotherham had been a 
town dominated by the Liberals, with Liberal MPs up to the end of the First World War and a progressive 
Liberal town council that favoured municipal enterprise. Participation in anti-socialist caucuses in Sheffield 
after the First World War, in which they were the junior partner to the more confident Conservatives left the 
Liberals vulnerable to being eventually swallowed up. The Independents, successors to the Liberals in 
Rotherham, were no threat to Labour. They were pushed back to their sole real stronghold, the South Ward, 
in the 1940s, in part because Labour’s organisation was much stronger and better at getting its voters out, in 
part because working-class voters were also genuinely attracted by what Labour promised it would do for 
them. At the same time in Rotherham none of the capitalist parties in the 1940s would give up their 
independence and unite with the others in local or parliamentary elections to fight Labour, leading to 
impotence and mutual recrimination. Fascism never got off the ground before the Second World War in 
either place and the Communists were little more than an irritant in electoral terms in the 1940s, though they 
had strong support in trade unions like the militant Amalgamated Engineering Union. Labour was also lucky 
in the leadership qualities and popularity of the individuals that led the party in South Yorkshire. Chris 
Williams has concluded looking at South Wales that:
It may have been the individual popularity of Labour’s candidates, which often stemmed 
from a much wider range of activities than simply the political, that did most to win party 
support. All studies of local politics and local communities, however restricted in scope, 
stress the importance of individual men and women in driving forward political change and 
social reform.2
Objective conditions such as the overwhelmingly working-class population of both places and strong trade 
union and co-operative movements were also all favourable factors in Labour’s consolidation of its power in 
the 1940s. The continued free market approach of the Municipal Progressives / Conservative-Liberals / 
Independents at this time, despite some wartime gestures like support for the comprehensive re-planning of 
the city of Sheffield after its Blitz in December 1940, meant neither trade unionists nor co-operators were 
much tempted to desert Labour for their opponents. The Second World War greatly strengthened the 
influence and prestige of the trade unions in Sheffield and Rotherham. Up to 1951 the affiliated and
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individual members of many Labour Parties in South Yorkshire increased following national trends though 
participation in branch life was less impressive, with power resting among a small number of individuals. 
Ethnic and religious tensions were minimal in the two overwhelmingly white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant local 
authorities unlike say the position in Liverpool, Glasgow, Belfast or London in the first half of the twentieth 
century. Expansion of the local government franchise in 1945 was supported by Labour and may have 
helped them. Labour in Sheffield appealed for middle-class support and got it in much greater numbers in 
the 1940s despite not actually winning the overwhelmingly middle-class constituencies like Sheffield Hallam 
and Sheffield Heeley.
According to Thorpe, however, all this might have been thrown away in Sheffield if the Labour Party’s 
stewardship of the city had been incompetent and it had made ideological gestures that alienated the 
electorate. Instead it shaped its destiny as far as it could in an extremely positive way. Support was lost 
because of the incompetence of Labour’s national government between 1929 and 1931 but the party in 
Sheffield had a steady hand on the municipal tiller throughout the period.3 Thorpe might say the same about 
Rotherham. However, despite Thorpe’s account, I would conclude their are some problems with this picture 
of Labour competence between the years 1945 and 1951. Electorally, Labour dominance was certainly never 
in danger but the willingness of Labour to support certain actions of the Attlee Government like the 
nationalisation of electricity generation in the city and the potential nationalisation of the transport 
undertaking, while understandable, was not in its own interests or that of the city as a whole. The fall in the 
numbers of people employed by the council threatened part of the coalition of support it built up before the 
Second World War, while the inadequate compensation the City Council received for the electricity 
undertaking meant it deserved Municipal Progressive charges o f mal-administration. On the other hand, it 
can be argued that the City Council was unable to behave in any other way given the circumstances, but its 
resistance was minimal. Hugh Dalton’s 1945 Distribution of Industry Act was a real threat to Sheffield’s 
economy. The threat that new industry that would otherwise go to Sheffield would be directed elsewhere did 
concentrate minds. Sheffield’s economy needed diversification and this would be prevented. Fortunately, it 
was a problem that could be postponed into the longer term due to full employment and full order books in 
the steel industry with the global need for post-war reconstruction. Thus it was not tackled.
The lobbying of Sheffield Council did not get the city scheduled as a Development Area. However, even 
areas that were Development Areas did not undergo major diversification. They were just prevented from 
declining further. For example, coal remained the occupation of 55 percent of the male workforce in the 
Rhondda in 19574 having dropped from 67 percent in 1921.5 It remained vulnerable to depression. Despite 
the threat of losing industry, Labour and local business still supported Dalton’s Bill in 1945. Local business 
only quibbled about the proposed sources of financial aid to new business, for example. I have not been able 
to find out whether industry that had been blitzed did re-locate, though I think not, since the damage to the 
industrial East End in contrast to the pulverizing of the city centre in December 1940 was slight, but new
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industry may have been re-directed. Neither experience of the wartime coalition government’s decision­
making or that of the Attlee government inspired confidence over blitz reconstruction, and the same may 
have been the case in matters directly concerning industry. Allender ascribes Labour’s later failure to 
imaginatively widen the city’s employment and revitalise its economy (apart from a brief period of municipal 
socialism in the early 1980s) as due to the absence of ideology and the lack of a stated purpose. Thus, 
Labour took a purely pragmatic approach. But the Sheffield Labour movement found itself powerless to 
come up with solutions that would effectively defend jobs despite the fact that the interests of labour were 
fundamental to Labour’s raison d ’etre.6 I conclude, however, that the 1940s could not have been a turning 
point in the economic history of Sheffield for the reasons we have noted even if it had been scheduled as a 
Development Area.
A further example of Labour’s pragmatism can be found in the saga of the debates over reform of the local 
structure of local government in the 1940s. Labour presented a non-political appeal that regional 
government was a bad idea since the powers of the Council would be diminished and it would be too remote 
from the citizens of Sheffield for them to adequately affect its decisions about their city. One o f the 
threatened problems was that it would direct new industry away from the city. Labour united with its 
Municipal Progressive opponents and as a result there was no opposing local lobby to argue for regional 
government, despite the fact that after 1945 accountability was taken away from health services and the 
electricity undertaking and given to un-elected regional boards when both were nationalised. Thus, real 
benefits might have accrued to the people of Sheffield through regional government. As it was, electricity 
prices were higher for industrial and domestic consumers and one of the attractions of Sheffield to new 
industry was dissipated. It can be concluded that some at least of the councillors on both sides o f the 
chamber opposed regional government on the grounds that it would have diminished their own personal 
status as members of Sheffield’s powerful ‘political community’ which had its own vested interests. In any 
case, the Labour Group could take the decision to oppose regional government or support electricity 
nationalisation because it was itself a closed community buttressed by the emotional attachments to Labour, 
which according to Allender, prevent rational calculations being made by individuals.7 Ostracism, as 
happened in Barnsley when the Labour Group was opposed by one of its own Alderman, Arthur Jepson, who 
alleged ‘favouritism’ over the allocation of a council house to the Mayor’s Chaplain, was the consequence.8 
Jepson’s position became untenable and he soon resigned from the Borough Council. As Allender points out 
the hierarchical structure of Sheffield City Council paralleled the hierarchical organisation of local firms in 
the steel industry that employed many of the Labour councillors. According to Allender, ‘possibly by 
default, the [Sheffield Labour] movement instilled in ordinary people respect and even reverence for 
hierarchy.’9 It was symptomatic that city councillors, as in industry, had to serve an ‘apprenticeship’, for 
example, before they were fully accepted by their elders.
This respect for hierarchy in turn prevented direct popular participation in decision-making beyond the ranks
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of the City Council which saw itself as possessing the sole authority to make decisions because its powers 
were delegated by Parliament and it had the consent of the electorate through the ballot box. Allender notes 
that even when tenants representatives were appointed to liaise with the Council Housing Department in the 
1980s, real participation was not achieved because the representatives saw themselves as having become part 
of the inner circle of Council decision-making and thus having a position above those they represented.
Thus, they adopted the same manner, the same language and (allegedly) the same briefcases as the council 
officers.10 Thus, there was considerable mistrust between council tenants and council officers that Dave 
Backwith similarly noted in the inter-war years. Mistrust was also a consequence of the huge waiting lists in 
the 1940s and the inadequate supply of new council houses in Sheffield, with Labour councillors possessing 
enormous power to decide who got a new house. As the Jepson episode shows, such power could be used 
tactlessly in a way that caused great indignation among ordinary people.11 There were also at least some 
Municipal Progressive allegations of corruption over housing allocation in Sheffield.12 The validity or 
generality of these charges cannot now be known though they seem relatively rare in the pages of the 
Sheffield Telegraph, despite the fact that it would have been perfectly willing to embarrass the Labour 
Council. They would certainly have appeared plausible to disgruntled citizens waiting for a house that might 
or might not be allocated to them. But the mistrust can also be seen as a healthy and rational reaction to 
excessive bureaucracy and the creation of a ‘dependency culture’ among potential tenants. The local 
squatters’ movement in 1946 could be seen as a similar reaction, with local people taking their destiny in 
their own hands, rather than relying on the local Councils, by seeking shelter within the abandoned army 
camps that dotted the South Yorkshire countryside.
Comparisons can be made between Labour’s pragmatic approach in Sheffield and South Yorkshire in the 
1940s with the similar approach of Labour in the Rhondda and in Coventry described by Chris Williams and 
Nick Tiratsoo.13 In both cases the approach occurred but for differing reasons, which reflects the importance 
of local circumstances in the development of individual Labour Parties. The Rhondda valleys were a society 
overwhelmingly based on coal mining with a large majority of the male workforce employed in coal 
extraction or ancillary employment. Other employment was marginal, largely based on serving the needs of 
the mining population.14 As a result, it wanted industrial diversification even more than was the case in 
South Yorkshire because, based on one industry, it was vulnerable to depression. As a result, it did get 
Development Area status in 1945 and some new industry was introduced which was a particular boon to 
miners’ wives.15 According to Williams the existence of the Attlee government and what it was visibly 
providing for the valleys in terms of industry and employment was the prime factor in seeing off the 
Communist challenge to Labour. This had been far more serious in the inter-war years than was the case in 
South Yorkshire. In fact the Communist Party was Labour’s sole serious competitor for the spoils o f local 
government and parliamentary office and its threat to Labour easily eclipsed that of the Conservatives, 
Liberals or Plaid Cymru until the late 1940s. In consequence, the local Labour Party was very loyal to the 
national leadership, and capitalised on the example of Communist opposition to the Second World War until
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June 1941 and the danger posed by the Soviet Union in the Cold War, to marginalise the Communists 
electorally. As a result the Communists collapsed, losing all their representatives on the Rhondda Urban 
District Council by 1949, losing their individual members, with the cadres remaining rapidly ageing,16 and 
polling a vote below that of the Conservatives in the Rhondda East division in the general election of 1951.17 
In 1945 Harry Pollitt had come within a thousand votes of taking the constituency from Labour.18
Williams sees two strategies at work in the Rhondda Labour movement. There was a pragmatic strategy 
typified by that of the Labour Party in which the aim was to work the system to maximum advantage while 
recognising the limits of power. These limits were imposed by finance, the coercive power of central 
government and their responsibility to those who elected them. There was also a ‘rejectionist’ strategy 
typified by that of the Communist Party which was less tolerant of constraints on policy and in terms of 
rhetoric at least was concerned to carry the fight to central government and to force it in the 1930s to act 
repressively against the democratically-elected council faced as it was by mass-unemployment. However, he 
points out that the dividing line between these two strategies was often blurred and that they should actually 
be seen as poles around which individuals and groups could gather over particular issues, but which might 
change from one issue to the next. Similarly, there might be tactical retreats from one strategy to the other 
when the previous strategy no longer appeared sensible.19 This is a useful way of describing conditions in 
South Yorkshire where the Labour Party contained loyalists and dissidents as well as competing with the 
Communist Party to at least some extent in local elections.
Coventry Labour Party as described by Nick Tiratsoo also took a basically pragmatic approach and as far as 
can be inferred was equally loyal to the Attlee government between 1945 and 1951. According to Tiratsoo, 
‘The party’s commitment [after the war] was not to some amorphous municipal socialism, but rather to a 
fairly precise programme which aimed to right long-standing defects in local welfare provision and urban 
form.’20 Thus, it could be said to exemplify Allender’s thesis and, indeed, Tiratsoo admits that measured by 
the standards of left-wing critics who regard Labour as having attempted to restore a capitalist economy and 
capitalist social relations of production its aims were modest. However, he argues that ‘the party’s 
achievements cannot simply be seen as functional to the continuation of capitalism’ and that many citizens of 
Coventry were more concerned to return to life as it was lived before the war as quickly as possible since 
they placed the concrete provision of houses and jobs for those who wanted them ahead of abstract principles 
like ‘social justice’.21 The destruction of the air-raids on Coventry on 14 November 1940, plus the existence 
of a Labour government, seemed to present an opportunity to create a better planned and more efficient city, 
but unfortunately ‘post-war Coventry remained very much more conservative - indeed Conservative - than 
had seemed likely in 1945.,22 Added to this, the government wanted to expand industrial production of 
exports as far as possible in the city for the most limited outlay on welfare services possible and thus had a 
major impact on the rapidity of reconstruction of the city centre.23 According to Tiratsoo, there were 
relatively few convinced socialists among the population of Coventry24 and Labour’s appeal in 1937 and
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1945 was presented in non-political terms as benefiting the ‘community’ as a whole. Because Labour said it 
was the representative of no one sectional interest but of every citizen, it felt that only it was qualified to 
pursue reconstruction to the extent needed to achieve its aims.25 As in Sheffield, council house tenants were 
part of Labour’s coalition of support and the council estates were (not entirely accurately) seen as ‘Labour 
heartlands’, which undermines the idea that they were ‘apathetic’ dependents of the Labour Council.26 Allied 
to these were less committed voters attracted by Labour’s municipal programme and especially its stance on 
the re-development of the city.27 The coalition was obviously less strong than that of Sheffield despite the 
fact that there was a relatively homogeneous working-class culture in the city, but this was based on escapism 
and consumerism where possible in austerity conditions and impervious to the Labour’s ethical socialist 
appeal.28 The Coventry Labour Party because of its electoral weakness attempted to raise public 
consciousness about the policies of the Council to encourage a better electoral turnout. As Coventry used 
media like the periodical Civic Affairs to do this, so Sheffield for similar reasons used the Civic Record and 
Barnsley the Civic Review. But Coventry went further than Sheffield with consultations with a wide range of 
groups over reconstruction planning, a welcoming attitude among the city councillors to queries by ordinary 
members of the public at the frequent ward area meetings, and the pioneering use by the Council of the 
questionnaire survey to determine the citizens’ wishes.29
As with Coventry, there was a consensus during the Second World War that Sheffield must become a better 
planned, more aesthetically pleasing and less congested city. Sheffield had a longer history of town-planning 
than Coventry, dating back to Patrick Abercrombie’s Civic Survey published in the 1920s, but limited local 
government powers and funding meant little materially had actually been achieved by the time of the Blitz on 
Sheffield in December 1940. Like other blitzed cities, Sheffield took seriously Lord Reith’s call to ‘plan 
boldly’ a new city but the problems of funding reconstruction remained a barrier with the government 
dragging its feet during the war on the issue. ‘Planning’ was the buzzword of the Second World War. 
Naturally this suited Labour, as since the 1930s, the concept had been part of the ‘conventional wisdom’ of 
the party and the electorate was more likely to turn to turn to them to implement planning than to Municipal 
Progressives/Conservatives with their traditional ideological commitment to laissez-faire. Nevertheless, the 
latter did embrace the concept in Sheffield. Unfortunately, ‘Labourist’ discourse influenced by the 
technocratic Fabian philosophy had the effect of denying ordinary people any participatory role in the 
technical process of making plans for city-wide comprehensive re-development. The Town Planning 
Assembly, a body made up of members of the Town Planning Sub-Committee of the Chamber of Commerce 
and the Sheffield, South Yorkshire and District Society of Architects and Surveyors, was involved as 
advisers to the Council, but as individuals rather than as reflecting the interests of the organisations o f which 
they were members. This reflected the Council’s view that it was the sovereign decision maker, and in fact 
when the Manzoni Plan was to be amended by the City Council, the Chamber of Commerce was forced to 
rely on press reports on the earlier Plan as the source of its information before producing its own report and 
formulating its own revised plan to be considered by the Council. The Sheffield Telegraph and The Star
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were also the main informants of the wider public on the town-planning process in the city and the latter 
newspaper was highly critical about what was taking place particularly on the subjects of the secrecy of the 
Council and the procrastination of government departments. The Star wanted public debate and involvement 
in the process of planning.
The Collie Plan, that was eventually presented to the public in 1945, was conceived by the City Engineer 
rather than by a qualified town planner, though these were thin on the ground in local government 
employment. As Tiratsoo notes most civil engineers ‘saw themselves as experts doing an essentially 
technical job’ and were deeply suspicious ‘of planners who were ‘up in the air or in dreamland instead of 
keeping their feet firmly on the ground’.’30 As a consequence, the plan was seen as being both practical and 
achievable and thus different from the kind of visionary plan that other blitzed cities formulated. Thus, the 
influence o f ‘New Jerusalemism’ on town planning in Sheffield at the end of the war was slight. However, 
the Plan was never implemented and the effect of the Lewis Silkin’s Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 
was to force a return to the drawing board. The process of making a new comprehensive development plan 
for Sheffield had not been completed by October 1951. The actual achievement of all this planning in terms 
of implementation was thus slight and it was no different in other blitzed cities, where Tiratsoo describes the 
ultimate result as ‘fairly prosaic’.31 Sheffield was unable to get sufficient allocations of steel for 
reconstruction of the city centre despite being the ‘Steel City’ and the allocations of funds to re-build the 
flagship retail department stores on The Moor destroyed in the Blitz were grossly inadequate. In the Collie 
Plan housing construction was given a higher call on resources than the re-building of the city centre, since 
the need of people for shelter was more of a basic necessity than the need for retail therapy. The needs of 
industry were not forgotten since it was accepted that a prosperous Sheffield was necessary if the new houses 
were to be afforded. Correlli Barnett’s thesis about the baleful influence of ‘New Jerusalemism’ on industrial 
reconstruction as against housing is falsified since the government in Sheffield as in Coventry wanted 
increased production of exports and armaments for the most minimal expenditure of resources on welfare 
provision the population would bear. But as Tiratsoo argues for Coventry, and for very similar reasons, we 
cannot say that the Marxist thesis that Labour was seeking to restore capitalism between 1945 and 1951 is 
validated either. As an example, Labour in Sheffield visualised an ultimate scenario where the City 
Council’s direct labour department would replace the private sector in building all Sheffield’s council houses 
and also put speculative builders out of business. This was hardly an aspiration to restore capitalism. 
Sheffield thus conforms to the interpretation of developments in other blitzed cities that Tiratsoo and 
Hasegawa have advanced in their numerous books and articles.
The concentration on housing as a priority by the early 1950s caused Sheffield City Council to begin to come 
into conflict with the organised local representatives of what David Matless would call ‘recreational 
citizenship’.32 Collaboration between the local branch of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England 
and sympathetic local politicians like Labour’s Fred Marshall had led to the creation of a provisional green
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belt around Sheffield in 1938 with the approval of the City Council, but by 1952 things reached such a pass 
that a public inquiry was opened to acquire land for housing in the green belt. The abolition of the Local 
Government Boundary Commission in 1949 meant that Sheffield had had to seek a Parliamentary Bill to 
expand its territory so it had land for future housing. The Bill, however, failed and as a result the 
conservationists were forced to oppose the planners in Sheffield well before what Lionel Esher describes as 
the ‘moral revolution’ of the 1960s when it became fashionable to excoriate the planners as vandals.33 The 
year 1952 was in a sense the end of an epoch. But the attempts to deal with housing also emphasis the 
pragmatism of the Labour City Council. It was willing to take any expedient to deal with its housing 
shortage. It backed experiments with pre-fabrication to build houses much quicker, for instance, and began 
to look at flat-building to ease the problems it had with land. These were pointers to the future when system- 
built high-rise flats at Hyde Park and Park Hill would be one apparently cheap solution to a housing problem 
that continued into the 1960s. Labour, however, despite the huge waiting lists and the inadequate supply of 
new houses being built (a process slowed down after government began to cut back the local authority house­
building programme from 1948 and to make precise allocations of the number of houses to be built) had 
made a promising start in the 1940s. A change of political party in Sheffield would not have been likely to 
have fulfilled its citizens expectations any faster and would have been forced to introduce similar expedients. 
It is likely, however, that more flats might have been built, and sooner, since this was the traditional anti­
socialist solution put forward in Sheffield to deal with working-class housing needs. Unfortunately for the 
anti-socialists, a change of political party in either Sheffield or Rotherham was remote and in Sheffield the 
stage was set for post-war Labour dominance apart from 1968/9 until 1999 when the Liberal Democrats took 
over. In Rotherham, the dominance of Labour over the town council was even more impressive with a 
continuity of Labour rule that has lasted up to the present, despite the decline of steel making and coal­
mining in the area, both activities which had laid the foundation of Labour dominance years earlier. This, 
however, shows that structural factors like the economy are necessary but not sufficient explanations of why 
Labour did dominate politics in both places.
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APPENDIX 1 
LABOUR PARTY MEMBERSHIP
(1.1) TOTAL INDIVIDUAL MEMBERSHIP
SOURCE: LABOUR PARTY ANNUAL CONFERENCE REPORTS.
NOTE: Membership figures were not collected for the year 1949 due to the effect of the Representation 
of the People Act, 1948, which redistributed the boundaries of the various constituencies. New 
Divisional Labour Parties were created, most retaining the old names and local loyalties.
(1.1.1) SHEFFIELD
D. L. P. 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
ATTERCLIFFE 596 600 240 240 240
BRIGHTSIDE 693 542 362 378 459
CENTRAL 240 240 240 240 240
ECCLESALL 240 240 240 240 240
HALLAM 495 358 309 321 421
HILLSBOROUGH 270 240 240 240 240
PARK 1,525 1,106 616 684 886
SHEFFIELD 4,059 3,326 2,247 2,353 2,726
D. L. P. 1945 1946 1947 1948
ATTERCLIFFE 240 240 400 449
BRIGHTSIDE 559 641 712 602
CENTRAL 240 240 304 240
ECCLESALL 240 240 289 302
HALLAM 415 450 429 377
HILLSBOROUGH 240 240 250 250
PARK 934 958 1,511 1,456
SHEFFIELD 2,874 3,009 3,895 3,676
D. L. P. 1950 1951
ATTERCLIFFE 1,050 930
BRIGHTSIDE 790 913
HALLAM 373 400
HEELEY 607 836
HILLSBOROUGH 269 402
NEEPSEND 549 692
PARK 974 950
SHEFFIELD 4,612 5,123
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(1.1.2) OTHER SOUTH YORKSHIRE CONSTITUENCIES
D. L. P. 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944
BARNSLEY 240 240 240 240 240
DONCASTER 1,214 935 842 838 962
DON VALLEY 681 453 453 471 548
HEMSWORTH 764 786 772 720 840
PENISTONE 631 472 336 385 477
ROTHERHAM 1,000 500 265 462 669
ROTHER VALLEY 1,073 927 1,450 600 508
WENTWORTH 578 383 322 400 423
D. L. P. 1945 1946 1947 1948
BARNSLEY 240 240 240 240
DONCASTER 1,054 1,269 1,370 1,432
DON VALLEY 534 786 1,263 1,166
HEMSWORTH 820 860 1,037 1,003
PENISTONE 644 1,438 1,482 866
ROTHERHAM 800 1,128 1,362 917
ROTHER VALLEY 682 1,100 2,750 1,890
WENTWORTH 547 739 994 1,004
D. L. P. 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 392 370
DEARNE VALLEY 612 632
DONCASTER 928 918
DON VALLEY 1,994 1,730
HEMSWORTH 1,074 1,060
PENISTONE 958 1,284
ROTHERHAM 952 1,244
ROTHER VALLEY 1,212 1,042
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(1.2) FEMALE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS
(1.2.1) SHEFFIELD
D. L. P. 1941 1942 1943 1944
ATTERCLIFFE 300 120 70 100
BRIGHTSIDE 236 153 147 187
CENTRAL 100 120 120 120
ECCLESALL 115 100 100 100
HALLAM 138 110 99 159
HILLSBOROUGH 70 90 80 60
PARK 452 245 233 369
SHEFFIELD 1,4H 938 849 1,095
D. L. P. 1945 1946 1947 1948
ATTERCLIFFE 120 100 200 225
BRIGHTSIDE 225 229 239 196
CENTRAL 120 100 120 120
ECCLESALL 100 95 122 126
HALLAM 111 125 140 117
HILLSBOROUGH 60 60 50 100
PARK 405 425 536 597
SHEFFIELD 1,141 1,134 1,407 1,481
D. L. P. 1950 1951
ATTERCLIFFE 360 260
BRIGHTSIDE 304 370
HALLAM 127 100
HEELEY 297 341
HILLSBOROUGH 94 79
NEEPSEND 199 248
PARK 418 349
SHEFFIELD 1,799 1,747
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(1.2.2) OTHER SOUTH YORKSHIRE CONSTITUENCIES
D. L. P. 1941 1942 1943 1944
BARNSLEY 120 120 120 120
DONCASTER 435 396 384 423
DON VALLEY 204 204 194 222
HEMSWORTH 370 378 360 380
PENISTONE 152 85 100 142
ROTHERHAM 250 103 174 262
ROTHER VALLEY 324 450 200 208
WENTWORTH 138 135 200 164
D. L. P. 1945 1946 1947 1948
BARNSLEY 120 120 120 120
DONCASTER 457 557 629 645
DON VALLEY 237 263 448 399
HEMSWORTH 340 380 418 440
PENISTONE 183 409 449 217
ROTHERHAM 366 324 500 317
ROTHER VALLEY 326 400 700 718
WENTWORTH 168 172 267 323
D. L. P. 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 138 129
DEARNE VALLEY 237 218
DONCASTER 429 416
DON VALLEY 966 812
HEMSWORTH 406 400
PENISTONE 368 452
ROTHERHAM 146 519
ROTHER VALLEY 543 464
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(1.3) % OF FEMALE INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS
(1.3.1) SHEFFIELD
D. L. P. 1941 1942 1943 1944
ATTERCLIFFE 50 50 29 41.5
BRIGHTSIDE 43.5 42.5 39 40.5
CENTRAL 41.5 50 50 50
ECCLESALL 48 41.5 41.5 41.5
HALLAM 38.5 35.5 31 38
HILLSBOROUGH 29 37.5 33.5 25
PARK 41 40 34 41.5
SHEFFIELD 42.5 41.5 36 40
D. L. P. 1945 1946 1947 1948
ATTERCLIFFE 50 41.5 50 50
BRIGHTSIDE 40.5 35.5 33.5 32.5
CENTRAL 50 41.5 39.5 50
ECCLESALL 41.5 39.5 42 41.5
HALLAM 26.5 28 32.5 31
HILLSBOROUGH 25 25 20 40
PARK 43.5 44.5 35.5 41
SHEFFIELD 39.5 37.5 36 40.5
D. L. P. 1950 1951
ATTERCLIFFE 34.5 28
BRIGHTSIDE 38.5 40.5
HALLAM 34 25
HEELEY 49 41
HILLSBOROUGH 35 19.5
NEEPSEND 36 36
PARK 43 36.5
SHEFFIELD 39 34
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(1.3.2) OTHER SOUTH YORKSHIRE CONSTITUENCIES
D. L. P. 1941 1942 1943 1944
BARNSLEY 50 50 50 50
DONCASTER 46.5 47 46 44
DON VALLEY 45 45 41 40.5
HEMSWORTH 47 49 50 45
PENISTONE 32 25.5 26 30
ROTHERHAM 50 39 37.5 39
ROTHER VALLEY 35 31 33.5 41
WENTWORTH 36 42 50 39
D. L.P. 1945 1946 1947 1948
BARNSLEY 50 50 50 50
DONCASTER 43.5 44 46 45
DON VALLEY 44.5 33.5 35.5 34
HEMSWORTH 41.5 44 40.5 44
PENISTONE 28.5 28.5 30.5 25
ROTHERHAM 45.75 28.5 36.5 34.5
ROTHER VALLEY 48 36.5 25.5 38
WENTWORTH 30.5 23.5 27 32
D. L. P. 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 35 35
DEARNE VALLEY 38.5 34.5
DONCASTER 46 45.5
DON VALLEY 48.5 47
HEMSWORTH 38 37.5
PENISTONE 38.5 35
ROTHERHAM 15.5 41.5
ROTHER VALLEY 45 44.5
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(1.4) DONCASTER LABOUR PARTY INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS
NOTE: The Party was wound up on 12 September 1948 consequent on redistribution of boundaries of 
constituencies due to the Representation of the People Act, 1948 and a new Party was formed with its 
first meeting on 14 September 1948. The new Doncaster constituency followed the same boundaries as 
Doncaster County Borough and Adwick-le-Street and Bentley-with-Arksey Urban Districts were 
transferred to Don Valley constituency.
SOURCE: DDLP MINUTE BOOKS
DATE ADWICK-LE- 
STREET U. D.
BENTLEY-WITH- 
ARKSEY U. D.
DONCASTER
COUNTY
BOROUGH
TOTAL
1939 220 176 633 1,029
1940 155 186 519 860
END 1941 NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN 804
21/04/1943 205 154 329 688
07/07/1943 NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN 794
28/07/1943 260 164 419 843
01/09/1943 260 164 431 855
09/09/1943 NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN 875
01/12/1943 NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN 903
29/03/1944 NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN 758
17/05/1944 NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN 814
14/06/1944 235 156 423 814
12/07/1944 NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN 854
18/10/1944 NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN 967
29/11/1944 NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN 997
31/01/1945 305 195 538 1,038
28/03/1945 NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN NOT KNOWN 555
28/04/1945 156 86 422 664
24/07/1945 255 149 516 920
07/11/1945 309 196 636 1,141
28/11/1945 332 203 643 1,178
7/12/1945 339 221 669 1,229
02/01/1946 337 222 664 1,223
10/04/1946 108 123 430 661
29/05/1946 168 157 582 907
30/06/1946 195 173 672 1,040
07/08/1946 206 209 708 1,123
04/09/1946 225 211 707 1,143
09/10/1946 265 230 776 1,271
06/11/1946 265 230 776 1,271
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DATE ADWICK- 
LE- 
STREET 
U. D.
BENTLEY 
-WITH- 
ARKSEY 
U. D.
DONCAS
TER
COUNTY
BOROUG
H
LEAGUE
OF
YOUTH
TOTAL
04/12/1946 279 231 789 1,299
08/01/1947 285 242 816 1,343
19/03/1947 141 177 579 897
23/04/1947 206 162 587 955
21/05/1947 216 210 685 15 1,126
18/06/1947 216 214 711 N/K 1,141
07/1947 234 226 738 18 1,216
20/08/1947 246 226 742 18 1,232
24/09/1947 262 228 756 18 1,264
19/11/1947 266 232 787 20 1,305
11/01/1948 283 246 807 20 1,356
14/03/1948 169 140 488 N/K 797
11/04/1948 195 173 516 N/K 884
12/05/1948 195 175 597 N/K 977
16/06/1948 195 260 634 N/K 1,089
11/07/1948 222 292 656 N/K 1,180
DATE DONCASTER 
CONSTITUEN 
CY LABOUR 
PARTY
26/09/1948 728
14/10/1948 731
11/11/1948 746
09/12/1948 751
13/01/1949 809
10/02/1949 276
10/03/1949 524
07/04/1949 544
19/05/1949 686
16/06/1949 698
14/07/1949 784
15/09/1949 824
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DATE DONCASTER 
CONSTITUEN 
CY LABOUR 
PARTY
13/10/1949 847
14/11/1949 855
10/12/1949 872
12/03/1950 894
14/04/1950 414
15/06/1950 601
16/08/1951 735
NOTE: From 13 July 1950 to 24 July 1951 E. Allison was Secretary/Agent of Doncaster Constituency 
Labour Party. He eventually left under a cloud but during the period of his office no individual 
membership figures were recorded in the 1948-1952 Minute Book (DS7/10/1).
(1.5) HALLAM DLP WARD MEMBERSHIP 
SOURCE: DLP MINUTE BOOK
DATE BROOMH
ILL
WARD
CROOKE
SMOOR
WARD
HALLAM
WARD
WOMEN'
S
SECTION
TOTAL
14/12/1941 43 74 105 10 232
13/12/1942 32 120 108 12 272
12/12/1943 32 139 101 272
08/12/1947 70 86 188 15 359
(1.6) HALLAM WARD MEETING PARTICIPATION 1945-1951 
SOURCE: HALLAM WARD MINUTE BOOK
DATE MEMBER
S
DATE MEMBER
S
05/04/1945 23 04/10/1945 50
07/06/1945 70 12/10/1945 44
02/08/1945 60 08/11/1945 45
06/09/1945 50 06/12/1945 30
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DATE MEMBER
S
DATE MEMBER
S
03/01/1946 30 04/06/1948 14
07/02/1946 25 26/08/1948 15
14/03/1946 19 07/10/1948 16
11/04/1946 27 02/12/1948 22
09/05/1946 16 06/01/1949 10
06/06/1946 10 03/02/1949 24
04/07/1946 28 07/04/1949 16
01/08/1946 16 09/06/1949 10
05/09/1946 16 06/07/1949 11
03/10/1946 18 01/09/1949 25
07/11/1946 18 06/10/1949 16
05/12/1946 10 04/1950 12
09/01/1947 14 19/10/1950 14
06/03/1947 16 02/11/1950 12
03/07/1947 16 07/12/1950 12
04/09/1947 24 04/01/1951 15
02/10/1947 17 01/02/1951 16
06/11/1947 12 01/03/1951 22
04/12/1947 20
05/02/1948 20
01/04/1948 24
(1.7) DONCASTER CENTRAL WARD MEETING PARTICIPATION 1949-1951 
SOURCE: DONCASTER CENTRAL WARD MINUTE BOOK
DATE MEMBER
S
DATE MEMBER
S
14/09/1949 17 23/01/1949 20
05/10/1949 12 02/03/1950 20
02/11/1949 18 30/03/1950 29
07/12/1949 18 01/06/1950 19
04/01/1950 19 06/07/1950 22
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DATE MEMBER
S
DATE MEMBER
S
03/08/1950 16 05/04/1951 14
31/08/1950 21 07/06/1951 12
05/10/1950 19 05/07/1951 12
02/11/1950 14 02/08/1951 14
30/11/1950 11 06/09/1951 14
10/01/1951 12 15/11/1951 14
01/03/1951 11
(1.8) DONCASTER DLP AFFILIATED MEMBERSHIP 
SOURCE: ANNUAL REPORTS
AFFILIATED
MEMBERS
AFFILIATED
ORGANISATI
ONS
1939 6,096 30
1940 5,428 25
1941 6,320 NOT KNOWN
1942 6,184 29
1943 7,030 NOT KNOWN
1944 7,386 33
1945 7,904 35
1946 9,091 39
(1.9) NATIONAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP 
SOURCE: PELLING, Henry and REID, Alastair J. A Short History of the Labour Party. Macmillan, 
1996, p i 98. (*) -Does not include members of the Co-operative Party.
DATE INDIVIDUA
L
TRADES
UNIONS
CO­
OPERATIVE
SOCIETIES
(* )
SOCIALIST
SOCIETIES
ETC.
TOTAL
1939 408,844 2,214,070 37,333 2,820 2,663,067
1940 404,124 2,226,575 37,333 3,131 2,571,163
1941 226,622 2,320,728 25,200 2,908 2,485,458
1942 218,783 2,206,209 25,200 3,740 2,453,932
1943 235,501 2,237,307 25,200 5,232 2,503,240
1944 265,763 2,375,381 25,200 6,501 2,672,845
229
1945 487,047 2,510,369 33,600 7,681 3,038,697
1946 645,345 2,635,346 33,600 8,067 3,322,358
1947 608,487 4,386,074 36,960 8,778 5,040,299
1948 629,025 4,751,030 33,600 8,782 5,422,437
1949 729,624 4,946,207 33,600 7,516 5,716,947
1950 908,161 4,971,911 30,800 9,300 5,920,172
1951 876,275 4,937,427 28,000 7,300 5,849,002
1952 1,014,524 5,071,935 14,000 7,200 6,107,659
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APPENDIX 2
GENERAL ELECTION AND BY-ELECTION RESULTS 1935-1951 
SOURCES: (1) CRAIG, F. W. S. British Parliamentary Election Results 1918-1949. Political 
Reference Publications, 1969; (2) CRAIG, F. W. S. British Parliamentary Election Results 1950-1970. 
Political Reference Publications, 1971.
(2.1) SOUTH YORKSHIRE GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 
(2.1.1) TOTAL ELECTORATES
(2.1.1.1) PRIOR TO REDISTRIBUTION
1935 1945
BARNSLEY 52,077 52,211
DONCASTER 66,925 76,539
DON VALLEY 68,816 76,487
ROTHERHAM 57,382 62,949
ROTHER VALLEY 62,530 78,636
SHEFFIELD, ATTERCLIFFE 40,664 36,316
SHEFFIELD, BRIGHTSIDE 47,251 41,913
SHEFFIELD, CENTRAL 36,709 18,666
SHEFFIELD, ECCLESALL 43,668 44,462
SHEFFIELD, HALLAM 44,140 44,579
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
50,474 51,821
SHEFFIELD, PARK 56,121 61,325
WENTWORTH 62,205 67,399
(2.1.1.2) AFTER REDISTRIBUTION
1950 1951
BARNSLEY 68,905 69,694
DEARNE VALLEY 57,736 58,204
DONCASTER 56,081 57,581
DON VALLEY 61,312 62,345
ROTHERHAM 55,469 56,337
ROTHER VALLEY 63,057 64,243
SHEFFIELD, ATTERCLIFFE 49,650 50,907
SHEFFIELD, BRIGHTSIDE 55,298 55,364
SHEFFIELD, HALLAM 50,051 49,989
SHEFFIELD, HEELEY 53,596 53,807
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
56,581 56,415
SHEFFIELD, NEEPSEND 49,685 49,708
SHEFFIELD, PARK 53,006 54,058
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(2.1.1.3) AVERAGE ELECTORATE OF SHEFFIELD 
AND NON-SHEFFIELD SEATS
1935 1945 1950 1951
SHEFFIELD 45,575 42,726 52,552 52,893
NON-SHEFFIELD 61,655 69,037 60,427 61,401
(2.1.2) % TURNOUT
1935 1945 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 82.6 80.4 88.9 77.2
DEARNE VALLEY 88 85.9
DONCASTER 77.7 74.5 85.6 86.2
DON VALLEY 70 73.2 87.7 85.9
ROTHERHAM 76.7 76.4 87.3 84.2
ROTHER VALLEY 73.8 75.2 87.4 86.3
SHEFFIELD,
ATTERCLIFFE
73 79.4 86.4 82.7
SHEFFIELD,
BRIGHTSIDE
68.7 75.5 84.6 81.4
SHEFFIELD,
CENTRAL
74.2 72
SHEFFIELD,
ECCLESALL
71 75.5
SHEFFIELD,
HALLAM
71.7 75.7 86.4 82
SHEFFIELD,
HEELEY
88.1 84.6
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
76.8 76 87.1 84.9
SHEFFIELD,
NEEPSEND
83.8 79.5
SHEFFIELD, PARK 73.2 73.9 85.2 82.5
WENTWORTH 73.4 78.3
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(2.1.3) TOTAL VOTES FOR LABOUR
Common Wealth Party in bold
1935 1945 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 25,318 30,614 42,008 37,523
DEARNE VALLEY 40,420 39,782
DONCASTER 29,963 40,050 24,449 24,621
DON VALLEY 33,220 40,153 39,789 39,687
ROTHERHAM 29,725 35,654 31,211 31,124
ROTHER VALLEY 33,271 44,499 42,222 41,990
SHEFFIELD,
ATTERCLIFFE
18,663 23,488 30,726 29,958
SHEFFIELD,
BRIGHTSIDE
18,985 19,373 32,542 31,519
SHEFFIELD,
CENTRAL
13,828 7,954
SHEFFIELD,
ECCLESALL
8,173 12,045
SHEFFIELD,
HALLAM
10,346 13,009 11,444 11,988
SHEFFIELD,
HEELEY
17,856 17,729
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
21,025 24,959 28,925 28,274
SHEFFIELD,
NEEPSEND
30,317 28,880
SHEFFIELD, PARK 21,153 29,424 30,558 30,842
WENTWORTH 37,471 44,080
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(2.1.4) LABOUR’S % OF VOTES CAST 
Common Wealth Party in bold
1935 1945 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 58.9 72.9 68.6 69.7
DEARNE VALLEY 79.6 79.6
DONCASTER 61.3 70.2 50.9 49.6
DON VALLEY 68.9 71.7 74 74.1
ROTHERHAM 67.5 74.2 64.4 65.6
ROTHER VALLEY 72 75.2 76.6 75.7
SHEFFIELD,
ATTERCLIFFE
62.8 81.4 71.6 71.1
SHEFFIELD,
BRIGHTSIDE
58.5 61.2 69.6 69.9
SHEFFIELD,
CENTRAL
50.8 59.2
SHEFFIELD,
ECCLESALL
26.4 3 5 .9
SHEFFIELD,
HALLAM
32.7 38.5 26.5 29.2
SHEFFIELD,
HEELEY
37.8 39
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
54.3 63.4 58.7 59
SHEFFIELD,
NEEPSEND
72.8 73
SHEFFIELD, PARK 51.5 64.9 67.7 69.2
WENTWORTH 82.1 83.6
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(2.1.5) TOTAL VOTES FOR CONSERVATIVES/NATIONAL LIBERALS
National Liberal contests are in bold 
National Liberal and Conservative are underlined 
(*) = Parliamentary constituency won. All others had Labour Party victorious.
1935 1945 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 17,683 11,382 8.480 9.296
DEARNE VALLEY 10.365 10,197
DONCASTER 22,011 16,999 23,571 25,005 (*)
DON VALLEY 14,961 15,832 12,982 13,862
ROTHERHAM 14,298 12,420 14,744 16,317
ROTHER VALLEY 12,907 14,669 12,887 13,470
SHEFFIELD,
ATTERCLIFFE
11,034 5,376 12,185 12.161
SHEFFIELD,
BRIGHTSIDE
13,467 8,177 13,136 12,433
SHEFFIELD,
CENTRAL
13,828 (*) 5,481
SHEFFIELD,
ECCLESALL
22,819 (*) 18,120 (*)
SHEFFIELD,
HALLAM
21,298 (*) 15,874 (*) 28,159 (*) 29,016 (*)
SHEFFIELD,
HEELEY
26,560 (*) 27,776 (*)
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
17,721 14,403 19,613 19,617
SHEFFIELD,
NEEPSEND
11,311 10.655
SHEFFIELD, PARK 19,947 15,882 13.678 13.743
WENTWORTH 8,167 8,670
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(2.1.6) CONSERVATIVE/NATIONAL LIBERAL % OF VOTES CAST
1935 1945 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 4 1 .1 27 .1 13 17.3
DEARNE VALLEY 20.4 20.4
DONCASTER 42.4 21.8 49.1 50.4 (*)
DON VALLEY 31.1 28.3 24.1 25.9
ROTHERHAM 32.5 25 .8 30.5 34.4
ROTHER VALLEY 28 24.8 23.4 24.3
SHEFFIELD,
ATTERCLIFFE
37.2 18.6 28.4 28.9
SHEFFIELD,
BRIGHTSIDE
41.5 25.8 28.1 27.6
SHEFFIELD,
CENTRAL
50.8 (*) 40.8
SHEFFIELD,
ECCLESALL
73.6 (*) 54 (*)
SHEFFIELD,
HALLAM
67.3 (*) 61.7 (*) 65.1 (*) 70.8 m
SHEFFIELD,
HEELEY
56.3 (*) 6 1 (* )
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
45.7 36 .6 39.8 41
SHEFFIELD,
NEEPSEND
27.2 27
SHEFFIELD, PARK 48.5 35.1 30.3 30.8
WENTWORTH 17.9 16.4
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(2.1.7) MAJORITY VOTES
Conservative/National Liberal in bold
1935 1945 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 7,635 19,232 31,209 28,227
DEARNE VALLEY 30,055 29,585
DONCASTER 7,952 23,051 878 384
DON VALLEY 18,259 24,321 26,807 25,825
ROTHERHAM 15,427 23,234 16,467 14,807
ROTHER VALLEY 20,364 29,830 29,335 28,520
SHEFFIELD,
ATTERCLIFFE
7,629 18,092 18,541 17,797
SHEFFIELD,
BRIGHTSIDE
5,518 11,196 19,406 19,086
SHEFFIELD,
CENTRAL
420 2,273
SHEFFIELD,
ECCLESALL
14,646 6,075
SHEFFIELD,
HALLAM
10,952 2,865 16,715 17,028
SHEFFIELD,
HEELEY
8,704 10,047
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
3,304 10,556 9,312 8,657
SHEFFIELD,
NEEPSEND
19,006 18,225
SHEFFIELD, PARK 1,206 13,542 16,880 17,099
WENTWORTH 29,304 35,410
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(2.1.8) MAJORITIES AS % OF TOTAL VOTES CAST
1935 1945 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 17.8 45.8 51 52.4
DEARNE VALLEY 59.2 59.2
DONCASTER 15.2 40.4 1.8 0 .8
DON VALLEY 37.8 43.4 49.9 48.2
ROTHERHAM 35 48.4 33.9 31.2
ROTHER VALLEY 44 50.4 53.2 51.4
SHEFFIELD,
ATTERCLIFFE
25.6 62.8 43.2 42.2
SHEFFIELD,
BRIGHTSIDE
17 35.4 41.5 42.3
SHEFFIELD,
CENTRAL
1.6 18.4
SHEFFIELD,
ECCLESALL
4 7 .2 18.1
SHEFFIELD,
HALLAM
34 .6 8 .6 3 8 .6 4 1 .6
SHEFFIELD,
HEELEY
18.5 22
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
8.6 26.8 18.9 18
SHEFFIELD,
NEEPSEND
45.6 46
SHEFFIELD, PARK 3 29.8 37.4 38.4
WENTWORTH 64.2 67.2
238
(2.1.9) SWINGS TO LABOUR
NOTE: (1) Swing is calculated from the average of % Labour gain and % Conservative loss following 
the practice in MCCALLUM, R. B. and RE ADMAN, Alison. The British General Election of 1945. 
Oxford University Press, 1947. Labour figures include Communist and Common Wealth Party votes 
while Conservative figures include Liberal National votes though not Liberal. (2) It is impossible to 
calculate the swing between 1945 and 1950 due to the boundary changes resulting from the 
Representation of the People Act 1948 which altered the constituencies’ make-up.
1945 1951
BARNSLEY 14 -3 .2
DEARNE VALLEY 0
DONCASTER 12.6 -0 .5
DON VALLEY 2.8 - 1.9
ROTHERHAM 6.7 -1 .95
ROTHER VALLEY 3.2 -0 .9
SHEFFIELD,
ATTERCLIFFE
18.6 -0 .5
SHEFFIELD, BRIGHTSIDE 15.7 0.5
SHEFFIELD, CENTRAL 8.4
SHEFFIELD, ECCLESALL 14.55
SHEFFIELD, HALLAM 16.35 1.5
SHEFFIELD, HEELEY -1.75
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
9.1 -1 .2
SHEFFIELD, NEEPSEND 0.2
SHEFFIELD, PARK 13.4 -0 .5
WENTWORTH 1.5
SHEFFIELD 13.73 -0 .25
SOUTH YORKSHIRE 10.84 -0 .78
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(B.1.10) MINOR PARTIES 
(B.l.10.1) COMMUNIST PARTY 
(B.l.10.1.1) TOTAL VOTES
1945 1950 1951
DON VALLEY 1,007
SHEFFIELD, BRIGHTSIDE 4,115 1,081 1,116
SHEFFIELD, HALLAM 2,253
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
759
SHEFFIELD, PARK 909
(2.1.10.1.2) % VOTES CAST
1945 1950 1951
DON VALLEY 1.9
SHEFFIELD, BRIGHTSIDE 13 2.3 2.5
SHEFFIELD, HALLAM 6.7
SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
1.5
SHEFFIELD, PARK 2
(2.1.10.2) LIBERAL PARTY
(2.1.10.2.1) TOTAL VOTES
1945 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 10,799 7,002
ROTHERHAM 2,458
SHEFFIELD, ECCLESALL 3,391
SHEFFIELD, HALLAM 2,614 3,641
SHEFFIELD, HEELEY 2,779
(2.1.10.2.2) % VOTES CAST
1945 1950 1951
BARNSLEY 17.6 13
ROTHERHAM 5.1
SHEFFIELD, ECCLESALL 10.1
SHEFFIELD, HALLAM 7.7 8.4
SHEFFIELD, HEELEY 5.9
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(2.2) BY-ELECTION RESULTS 1935-1951
(*) Unopposed due to wartime electoral truce and all Labour-held seats.
(2.2.1) TOTAL ELECTORATES AND % TURNOUT
DATE TOTAL
POTENTI
AL
ELECTOR
ATE
TURNOU
T
BARNSLEY 16/06/1938 50,376 72.7
DONCASTER 17/11/1938 68,632 75.4
SHEFFIELD, HALLAM 10/05/1939 44,897 57.8
DONCASTER 06/02/1941 (*)
SHEFFIELD, PARK 27/08/1942 (*)
SHEFFIELD,
ATTERCLIFFE
21/02/1944 (*)
SHEFFIELD, NEEPSEND 05/04/1950 49,586 62.9
(2.2.2) RESULTS 
(A) Percentage of votes cast
(2.2.2.1) BARNSLEY 16/06/1938
CANDIDATE PARTY TOTAL
VOTES
(A)
FRANK COLUNDRIDGE LABOUR 23,566 64.4
H. W. S. HOWARD NATIONAL LIBERAL 13,052 35.6
MAJORITY 10,514 28.8
(2.2.2.2) DONCASTER 17/11/1938
JOHN MORGAN LABOUR 31,735 61.3
ALEX MONTEITH NATIONAL LIBERAL 20,027 38.7
MAJORITY 11,708 22.6
(2.2.2.3) SHEFFIELD HALLAM 10/05/1939
ROLAND JENNINGS CONSERVATIVE 16,033 61.7
CHARLES S. DARVILL LABOUR 9,939 38.3
MAJORITY 6,094 23.4
(2.2.2.4) SHEFFIELD NEEPSEND 05/04/1950
SIR FRANK SOSKICE LABOUR 22,080 73
JOHN PHILLIP HUNT NATIONAL LIBERAL & 
CONSERVATIVE
8,365 26.8
E. LESLIE MOORE COMMUNIST 729 2.3
MAJORITY 13,715 44.1
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APPENDIX 3 
CANDIDATES IN SOUTH YORKSHIRE 
GENERAL ELECTIONS
(3.1) NOS. OF CANDIDATES 1935-1951
1935 1945 1950 1951
LABOUR 13 12 13 13
CONSERVATIVE 11 10 4 5
NATIONAL LIBERAL 2 3
LIBERAL 2 4 1
COMMUNIST 2 4 1
COMMONWEALTH 1
NATIONAL LIBERAL 
AND 
CONSERVATIVE
9 8
TOTAL 26 30 34 28
(3.2) 1945 GENERAL ELECTION 
NOTE: Successful candidates are marked in BOLD
(3.2.1) LABOUR CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE RANK SEAT CONTESTED
ALBERT VICTOR 
ALEXANDER
LOCAL GOVT. 
OFFICER
60 SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
THOMAS
WILLIAM
BURDEN
RAILWAY GOODS 
AGENT
60 SHEFFIELD, PARK
FRANK
COLUNDRIDGE
MINER 54 BARNSLEY
WILLIAM DOBBIE RAILWAY COACH 
PAINTER
66 ROTHERHAM
J. F. DRABBLE BARRISTER-AT-LAW SQUADN-LEADER SHEFFIELD,
HALLAM
DAVID
GRIFFITHS
MINER 49 ROTHER VALLEY
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JOHN BURNS 
HYND
RAILWAY CLERK 43 SHEFFIELD,
ATTERCLIFFE
FRED MARSHALL WAGON BUILDER 62 SHEFFIELD,
BRIGHTSIDE
HARRY MORRIS BARRISTER-AT-LAW 51 LT-COLONEL SHEFFIELD,
CENTRAL
WILFRED PALING MINER 62 WENTWORTH
EVELYN
WALKDEN
TRADE UNION 
ORGANISER
51 DONCASTER
TOM WILLIAMS MINER 57 DON VALLEY
(3.2.2) CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE RANK SEAT CONTESTED
JAMES HOWARD 
BULL
SCHOOLTEACHER 34 FLIGHT-LT ROTHER VALLEY
MRS. AIMEE 
LAVENDER 
GONDOR DOWER
ARISTOCRATIC 
WIFE OF TORY MP
37 WENTWORTH
GEORGE VIVIAN 
HUNT
SOLICITOR 40 LT-COLONEL SHEFFIELD,
CENTRAL
ROLAND
JENNINGS
CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANT
51 SHEFFIELD,
HALLAM
BRIAN PADDON RAF REGULAR 37 GROUP-CAPT SHEFFIELD
ATTERCLIFFE
PETER GEOFFREY 
ROBERTS
BARRISTER-AT-LAW 33 MAJOR SHEFFIELD,
ECCLESALL
JAMES J. A. N. 
ROSS
SOLDIER 34 CAPTAIN DON VALLEY
GEOFFREY P. 
STEVENS
CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANT
WING-COMMANDER SHEFFIELD, PARK
H. A. TAYLOR JOURNALIST DONCASTER
H. BRIAN TAYLOR BARRISTER-AT-LAW 41 LT-COLONEL SHEFFIELD,
BRIGHTSIDE
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(3.2.3) NATIONAL LIBERAL CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE RANK SEAT CONTESTED
ROBERT HAMPDON 
HOBART
REGULAR NAVAL 
OFFICER
30 LT SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
EDGAR HEREWARD 
PHILIPS
JOURNALIST 40 ROTHERHAM
RICHARD JOHN 
SOPER
TIMBER MERCHANT 67 BARNSLEY
(3.2.4) LIBERAL CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE RANK SEAT CONTESTED
GERALD ABRAHAMS BARRISTER-AT-LAW SHEFFIELD,
HALLAM
P. R. NIGHTINGALE OWNER OF 
CATERING FIRM
48 LT-COLONEL SHEFFIELD,
ECCLESALL
(3.2.5) COMMUNIST CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE RANK SEAT CONTESTED
GORDON H. CREE LT SHEFFIELD,
HALLAM
HOWARD HILL ELECTRICIAN SHEFFIELD,
BRIGHTSIDE
(3.2.6) COMMON WEALTH CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE RANK SEAT CONTESTED
SYDNEY GEORGE STUDENT 28 LT SHEFFIELD,
CHECKLAND ECCLESALL
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(3.3) 1950 GENERAL ELECTION
(3.3.1) LABOUR CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE SEAT CONTESTED
FRANK COLLINDRIDGE MINER 59 BARNSLEY
GEORGE DARLING JOURNALIST 45 SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
DAVID GRIFFITHS MINER 54 ROTHER VALLEY
RAYMONDJONES 
GUNTER
RAILWAY CLERK 40 DONCASTER
JOHN BURNS HYND RAILWAY CLERK 47 SHEFFIELD, ATTERCLIFFE
ARNOLD HARRY 
JENNINGS
SCHOOLMASTER 34 SHEFFIELD, HEELEY
JOHN HENRY JONES STEEL SMELTER 55 ROTHERHAM
HARRY MORRIS BARRISTER-AT-LAW 56 SHEFFIELD, NEEPSEND
FREDERICK WILLIAM 
MULLEY
UNIVERSITY LECTURER 31 SHEFFIELD, PARK
WILFRED PALING MINER 66 DEARNE VALLEY
HERBERT CHARLES 
SPEARS
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
OFFICER
50 SHEFFIELD, HALLAM
TOM WILLIAMS MINER 61 DON VALLEY
RICHARD EMANUEL 
WINTERBOTTOM
TRADE UNION 
ORGANISER
51 SHEFFIELD, BRIGHTSIDE
(3.3.2) CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE SEAT CONTESTED
ANTHONY P. L. BARBER BARRISTER-AT-LAW 39 DONCASTER
RICHARD FRANK 
STEWART BODY
FARM WORKER 22 ROTHERHAM
W. R. A . BREARE MANAGER OF WEST 
RIDING GROUP OF 
NEWSPAPERS
34 ROTHER VALLEY
DOUGLAS GRAHAM TORY PARTY OFFICIAL 47 DON VALLEY
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(3.3.3) NATIONAL LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE SEAT CONTESTED
ANDREW MCTURK COOK STEEL MANUFACTURER SHEFFIELD, NEEPSEND
MRS AIMEE LAVENDER 
GONDOR DOWER
ARISTOCRATIC WIFE OF 
TORY MP
42 DEARNE VALLEY
SIR KNOWLES EDGE, BT CHEMICALS
MANUFACTURER
SHEFFIELD
HILLSBOROUGH
LIONEL STEPHEN 
EDWARD FARRIS
MD OF LTD COMPANY SHEFFIELD, ATTERCLIFFE
ROLAND JENNINGS CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANT
56 SHEFFIELD, HALLAM
HAROLD PRYCE SPRING MAKER SHEFFIELD, PARK
PETER GEOFFREY 
ROBERTS
BARRISTER-AT-LAW 37 SHEFFIELD, HEELEY
HAROLD STANLEY VIAN 
SMITH
ECONOMIST/JOURNALIST SHEFFIELD, BRIGHTSIDE
C. GORDON-SPENCER BARNSLEY
(3.3.4) LIBERAL CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE SEAT CONTESTED
PHILIP BECKERLEGGE TOOL AND GAUGE MAKER 33 SHEFFIELD, HEELEY
MRS MAY FOSTER GENERAL DEALER 58 ROTHERHAM
ALFRED EDWIN JONES JOINER/T.U. ORGANISER 47 SHEFFIELD, HALLAM
G. HOWARD WALKER BARNSLEY
(3.3.5) COMMUNIST CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE SEAT CONTESTED
MICHAEL BENNETT ORGANISER SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
ARTHUR FULLARD BRICKLAYER SHEFFIELD, PARK
HOWARD HILL ELECTRICIAN/ORGANISER SHEFFIELD, BRIGHTSIDE
SAM TAYLOR MINER DON VALLEY
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(3.4) 1951 GENERAL ELECTION
(3.4.1) LABOUR CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE SEAT CONTESTED
F. W. BEATON SHEFFIELD, HALLAM
GEORGE DARLING JOURNALIST 46 SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
DAVID GRIFFITHS MINER 55 ROTHER VALLEY
RAYMOND JONES 
GUNTER
RAILWAY CLERK 42 DONCASTER
JOHN BURNS HYND RAILWAY CLERK 49 SHEFFIELD, ATTERCLIFFE
ARNOLD HARRY 
JENNINGS
SCHOOLMASTER 35 SHEFFIELD, HEELEY
JOHN HENRY JONES STEEL SMELTER 56 ROTHERHAM
FREDERICK WILLIAM 
MULLEY
UNIVERSITY LECTURER 33 SHEFFIELD, PARK
WILFRED PALING MINER 68 DEARNE VALLEY
SIDNEY SCHOFIELD MINER 40 BARNSLEY
SIR FRANK SOSKICE BARRISTER-AT-LAW 49 SHEFFIELD, NEEPSEND
TOM WILLIAMS MINER 63 DON VALLEY
RICHARD EMANUEL 
WINTERBOTTOM
TRADE UNION 
ORGANISER
52 SHEFFIELD, BRIGHTSIDE
(3.4.2) CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE SEAT CONTESTED
ANTHONY P. L. 
BARBER
BARRISTER-AT-LAW 40 DONCASTER
WILLIAM G. BLAKE ROTHERHAM
RONALD HALL MASTER
PAINTER/DECORATOR
31 ROTHER VALLEY
DAVID S. B. HOPKINS SOLICITOR 27 DON VALLEY
JOHN SIZER MASTER BAKER 30 DEARNE VALLEY
247
(3.4.3) NATIONAL LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE SEAT CONTESTED
ROLAND JENNINGS CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANT
57 SHEFFIELD, HALLAM
HERBERT LAURENCE 
LAMBERT
CONSULTING 
AUTOMOBILE ENGINEER 
AND ASSESSOR
47 SHEFFIELD, ATTERCLIFFE
STANLEY BERTRAM 
RIPPON
SALES MANAGER SHEFFIELD, PARK
PETER GEOFFREY 
ROBERTS
BARRISTER-AT-LAW 39 SHEFFIELD, HEELEY
THOMAS ARTHUR STOBBS DIRECTOR OF LTD 
COMPANY
SHEFFIELD, NEEPSEND
GEORGE WADSWORTH SHEFFIELD,
HILLSBOROUGH
G. WHITAKER BARNSLEY
A. L. WOOD SHEFFIELD, BRIGHTSIDE
(3.4.4) LIBERAL CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE SEAT CONTESTED
G. HOWARD WALKER BARNSLEY
(3.4.5) COMMUNIST CANDIDATES
OCCUPATION AGE SEAT CONTESTED
HOWARD HILL ELECTRICIAN/ORGANISER SHEFFIELD, BRIGHTSIDE
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APPENDIX 4
SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL 
MUNICIPAL ELECTION RESULTS 1938-1952
L = LABOUR PARTY, P = PROGRESSIVE, C = CONS.-LIB., I = IND. CONS. 
SOURCES: SHEFFIELD TELEGRAPH/ STAR
WARD 19
38
19
4 5
19
46
19
47
19
49
19
50
19
51
19
52
ATTERCLIFFE L LL L L L L L L
BRIGHTSIDE L LL L L L L L L
BROOMHILL PP
P
C C C C
BURNGREAVE L LL L LL L L L L
CATHEDRAL L
CROOKESMOOR P L L L C L L L
DARNALL L LL L L L L L L
ECCLESALL P P P C C C C
FIRTH PARK L LL L L L L L L
HALLAM PP C C C C
HANDSWORTH L LL L L L L LL L
HEELEY P L L L L L C LL
HILLSBOROUGH P L P P C C C L
MANOR L LL L L L L L L
MOOR P L L L L L L L
NEEPSEND L L L L L L
NETHER EDGE P C C C C
NETHER SHIRE L
NORTON PP
P
P P C C C C
OWLERTON L L L L L L L L
PARK L L L L L L L LL
ST. PETER'S P L I P C L C
ST. PHILIP'S L L L L L L L
SHARROW P L LL C C C L
SOUTHEY GREEN L
TINSLEY L LL L L L L L L
WALKLEY P L L L L L L L
WOODSEATS P PP P P C C C C
NOTE: (1) Cathedral Ward was an amalgamation of St. Peter’s and St. Philip’s Wards, Nether Shire 
Ward was the result of Firth Park Ward being split in two and Southey Green Ward drew its electorate 
mainly from Neepsend Ward which ceased to exist. (2) * for Firth Park Ward in 1947 column = Labour 
victory in by-election on 26 Februaiy 1948.
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(4.2) % TURNOUT
U = UNOPPOSED
WARD 1937 1938 1945 1946 1947
ATTERCUFFE 32 33 U U 43
BRIGHTSIDE 38 31 34 51
BROOMHILL 40 39 52
BURNGREAVE 41 43 32 27 43
CROOKESMOOR 49 55 44 44 57
DARNALL 49 47 41 40 50
ECCLESALL 50 49 61
FIRTH PARK 39 42 36 35 40
HALLAM 48 48 63
HANDSWORTH 43 53 45 38 52
HEELEY 49 50 48 45 57
HILLSBOROUGH 52 44 47 58
MANOR 35 U 27 40
MOOR 49 50 44 45 54
NEEPSEND 33 U 41
NETHER EDGE 43 43 56
NORTON 49 51 66
OWLERTON 46 48 43 40 57
PARK 45 52 42 39 51
ST. PETER'S 50 45 49 54
ST. PHILIP'S 46 43 U 35 38
SHARROW 45 45 45 42 55
TINSLEY 36 39 U U 49
WALKLEY 46 51 46 43 60
WOODSEATS 50 52 48 51 62
SHEFFIELD 44 46 44 40 53
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WARD 1949 1950 1951 1952
ATTERCLIFFE 43 31 25 33
BRIGHTSIDE 51 35 32 34
BROOMHILL 49 39 40 38
BURNGREAVE 45 35 32 39
CATHEDRAL 36
CROOKESMOOR U 44 40 45
DARNALL 51 34 32 37
ECCLESALL 56 45 45 40
FIRTH PARK 48 34 34 38
HALLAM 57 47 46 44
HANDSWORTH 54 39 36 40
HEELEY 57 46 47 50
HILLSBOROUGH 46 46 44 47
MANOR 46 32 28 37
MOOR 55 42 45 42
NEEPSEND 24 29 27
NETHER EDGE 33 44 46 41
NETHER SHIRE 35
NORTON 60 47 49 43
OWLERTON 55 39 41 39
PARK 54 31 38 38
ST. PETER'S 54 48 42
ST. PHILIP'S 49 40 31
SHARROW 52 44 42 48
SOUTHEY GREEN 34
TINSLEY 52 43 35 38
WALKLEY 57 41 42 45
WOODSEATS U 44 44 44
SHEFFIELD 52 40 39 39
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(4.3) TOTAL ELECTORATES
WARD 1938 1945 1946 1947
ATTERCLIFFE 9,918 11,590 11,632
BRIGHTSIDE 12,245 14,334 14,845 14,924
BROOMHILL 15,350 15,976 16,095
BURNGREAVE 10,573 11,543 12,068 12,025
CROOKESMOOR 9,718 12,617 13,010 13,016
DARNALL 11,303 14,260 14,610 14,601
ECCLESALL 18,753 19,031 18,785
FIRTH PARK 20,850 29,411 30,029 29,822
HALLAM 16,431 16,724 16,480
HANDSWORTH 15,128 22,520 23,294 23,575
HEELEY 10,783 13,524 14,015 13,909
HILLSBOROUGH 12,912 18,953 19,545 19,452
MANOR 14,020 19,999 20,342
MOOR 8,003 6,953 7,532 7,523
NEEPSEND 27,732 28,808 29,247
NETHER EDGE 11,955 12,328 12,300
NORTON 11,221 11,701 11,724
OWLERTON 9,366 12,179 12,570 12,508
PARK 10,596 11,680 12,689 13,321
ST. PETER'S 4,692 4,924 5,462 5,540
ST. PHILIP'S 5,402 5,808 5,812
SHARROW 10,740 12,179 13,864 13,734
TINSLEY 8,643 11,101 11,080
WALKLEY 10,157 12,736 13,067 13,031
WOODSEATS 12,626 16,982 17,357 17,149
SHEFFIELD 207,675 325,553 347,815
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WARD 1949 1950 1951 1952
ATTERCLIFFE 11,576 11,261 11,277 16,587
BRIGHTSIDE 14,814 14,595 14,607 12,719
BROOMHILL 15,888 15,189 15,043 17,040
BURNGREAVE 11,916 11,477 11,300 15,369
CATHEDRAL 15,386
CROOKESMOOR 12,853 12,458 12,329 13,780
DARNALL 14,474 14,338 14,368 18,772
ECCLESALL 18,481 18,634 18, 635 16,360
FIRTH PARK 29,684 29,699 29,801 14,164
HALLAM 16,227 16,660 16,025 15,883
HANDSWORTH 24,054 24,416 24,957 16,572
HEELEY 13,718 13,392 13,335 12,945
HILLSBOROUGH 19,180 19,110 19,103 14,645
MANOR 20,255 19,809 21,268 16,339
MOOR 7,505 6,888 6,802 13,269
NEEPSEND 29,192 28,541 28,397
NETHER EDGE 12,218 11,877 11,677 13,704
NETHER SHIRE 14,609
NORTON 11,576 11,600 11,824 11,906
OWLERTON 12,363 12,095 12,026 13,213
PARK 13,343 12,830 12,698 11,850
ST. PETER'S 5,499 4,321 4,428
ST. PHILIP'S 5,793 5,391 5,361
SHARROW 13,584 13,152 12,978 12,855
SOUTHEY GREEN 18,217
TINSLEY 11,094 10,592 10,539 13,060
WALKLEY 12,976 12,641 12,629 13,667
WOODSEATS 16,914 16,717 16,690 14,623
SHEFFIELD 345,283 367,683 368,095 367,534
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(4.4) LABOUR VOTES
NOTE: BOLD = Labour-held seats.
WARD 1938 1945 1946 1947 1949 1950 1951 1952
ATTERC
LIFFE
2,187 UU U 3,840 3,791 2,837 2,170 4,826
BRIGHT
SIDE
3,413 3 ,939 /
3,790
3,447 4,731 5,388 3,793 3,358 4,081
BROOM
HILL
1,694/
1,638/
1,469
1,730 2,352 1,983 1,299 1,300 1,680
BURNG
REAVE
2,877 3,459 2,736 3 ,335 /
3,306
3,619 2,808 2,371 4 ,614
CATHED
RAL
4,373
CROOK
ESMOO
R
2,517 3,480 3,322 3,809 C-L
UNOPP
OSED
2,912 2,566 4 ,177
DARNAL
L
2,896 4,641 4,246 5,067 5,203 3,748 3,239 5,469
ECCLES
ALL
2,326 1,881 1,645 1,599 1,130 1,027 1,191
FIRTH
PARK
5,445 7 ,775 /
7,590
7,252 8,788 6,195 5,549 3,509
HALLAM 3,125/
3,015
2,770 3,301 2,764 2,283 2,034 2,543
HANDS
WORTH
4,202 7 ,382 /
7,364
5,696 7,498 7,726 5,905 5 ,419 /
5,331
4,906
HEELEY 2,148 3,850 3,517 4,034 4,060 3,310 3,106 4 ,1 4 7 /
4 ,146
HILLSB
OROUG
H
2,094 4,387 4,124 5,033 5,248 4,123 3,336 3,410
MANOR 3,820 UU 4,538 6,048 6,742 4,891 4 ,200 5,210
MOOR 1,918 1,973 1,975 2,064 2,214 1,686 1,688 3,920
NEEPSE
ND
7,327 U 8,442 10,025 5,826 5,255
NETHER
EDGE
1,892 1,607 1,837 1,732 1,196 1,108 2,201
NETHER
SHIRE
3 ,992
NORTO
N
1,876/
1,870
1,520 1,549 1,318 871 775 1,105
OWLER
TON
2,322 3,421 2,934 3,891 3,836 2,697 2,608 3,550
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WARD 1938 1945 1946 1947 1949 1950 1951 1952
PARK 2,869 3,293 3,108 4,200 4,362 3,073 2,822 3 ,8 7 2 /
3,459
ST.
PETER'S
618 1,122 1,176 1,248 1,148 899 822
ST.
PHILIP'
S
1,366 U 1,307 1,643 1,642 1,400 1,087
SHARR
OW
1,800 3,487 3 ,1 3 8 /
3,041
3,496 3,309 2,787 2,365 3,546
SOUTHE
Y
GREEN
5,359
7INSLE
Y
2,329 UU U 3,913 4,222 3,536 2,694 4,322
WALKLE
Y
2,378 3,909 3,424 4,117 4,099 3,213 2,987 4,410
WOODS
EATS
1,607 3,479/
3388
3,275 4,094 CONS-
LIB
UNOPP
OSED
2,074 1,977 2,444
SHEFFI
ELD
48.806 106.43
5
71,764 94.513 94.818 74.492 71,194 100.46
2
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(4.5) MUNICIPAL PROGRESSIVE/ 
CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL VOTES 
NOTE: BOLD = Council seats held by Municipal Progressives/Conservative-Liberals.
WARD 1938 1945 1946 1947 1949 1950 1951 1952
ATTERC
LIFFE
1,166 NOT
CONTES
TED
NOT
CONTES
TED
1,195 1,175 622 645 631
BRIGHT
SIDE
1,185 NOT
CONTES
TED
NOT
CONTES
TED
1,949 1,775 985 1,128 NOT
CONTES
TED
BROOM
HILL
4 ,4 7 5 /
4 ,3 6 2 /
4 ,2 3 4
4 ,4 9 7 5 ,983 5 ,889 4 ,5 9 6 4 ,7 1 5 4 ,1 9 4
BURNG
REAVE
1,607 NOT
CONTES
TED
NOT
CONTES
TED
1,697/
1,499
1,517 1,079 1,197 1,342
CATHED
RAL
1,153
CROOK
ESMOO
R
2,838 2,136 2,460 3,044 U 2,422 2,330 1,908
DARNAL
L
2,482 1,485/
1,253
1,561 2,251 2,117 1,149 1,366 1,543
ECCLES
ALL
7 ,1 5 4 7 ,4 7 8 9 ,9 8 1 8 ,9 8 3 7 ,171 7 ,410 5 ,3 9 2
FIRTH
PARK
3,415 3,283/
3,074
3,162 5,586 3,543 4,050 1,859
HALLAM 4 ,9 2 1 /
4 ,8 2 0
5 ,295 7 ,0 6 8 6 ,547 5 ,259 5 ,2 9 3 4 ,4 3 5
HANDS
WORTH
3,921 2,857/
2,780
2,861 4,833 5,137 3,747 3,648/
3,632
1,666
HEELEY 3,3 0 4 2,651 2,782 3,918 3,795 2,862 3 ,1 4 9 2,363/
2,289
HILLSB
OROUG
H
4 ,6 3 8 4,137 5 ,079 6 ,2 1 9 5 ,906 4 ,7 4 4 5 ,055 3,396
MANOR 1,141 NOT
CONTES
TED
NOT
CONTES
TED
1,498 1,961 1,146 1,440 479
MOOR 2,150 1,116 1,404 1,958 1,928 1,163 1,339 1,696
NEEPSE
ND
NOT
CONTES
TED
NOT
CONTES
TED
3,521 3,590 2,082 2,548
NETHER
EDGE
3,353 3 ,687 5 ,096 4 ,8 1 6 4 ,0 2 9 4 ,2 2 9 3 ,4 6 1
NETHER
SHIRE
827
NORTO
N
4 ,0 1 3 /
3 ,7 9 1 /
3 ,6 8 4
4 ,4 4 9 6 ,1 7 5 5 ,697 4 ,6 2 5 5 ,0 3 2 3 ,9 7 9
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WARD 1938 1945 1946 1947 1949 1950 1951 1952
OWLER
TON
2,242 1,914 1,976 3,214 2,950 1,975 2,371 1,554
PARK 2,724 1,696 1,809 2,612 2,819 1,713 1,988 698/
631
ST.
PETER'S
1,732 1,102 NOT
CONTES
TED
1,758 1,832 NOT
CONTES
TED
1,025
ST.
PHILIP'
S
1,107 NOT
CONTES
TED
733 1,189 1,083 749 598
SHARR
OW
3,033 2,660 2,877/
2,713
4,110 3,780 3,010 3,133 2,547
SOUTHE
Y
GREEN
891
TINSLE
Y
1,074 NOT
CONTES
TED
NOT
CONTES
TED
1,476 1,496 884 972 624
WALKLE
Y
2,810 2,043 2,186 3,174 3,219 2,028 2,309 1,747
WOODS
EATS
5,040 4 ,827 /
4779
5,564 6,565 U 5,336 5,441 4,012
SHEFFI
ELD
47.609 97.709 62.603 91.983 83.598 66.919 76.043 55.317
(4.6) LABOUR % OF VOTES CAST
WARD 1938 1945 1946 1947 1949 1950 1951 1951
ATTERC
LIFFE
65 76 76 82 77 88
BRIGHT
SIDE
72 87 69 62 72 74 71 94
BROOM
HILL
26 28 28 25 22 22 26
BURNG
REAVE
63 90 85 64 68 69 66 77
CATHED
RAL
79
CROOK
ESMOO
R
47 62 57 52 53 52 69
DARNAL
L
54 77 73 69 71 77 70 78
ECCLES
ALL
25 20 14 15 14 12 18
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WARD 1938 1945 1946 1947 1949 1950 1951 1952
FIRTH
PARK
61 71 70 61 61 55 65
HALLAM 39 34 32 30 30 28 36
HANDS
WORTH
52 72 65 73 62 61 60 75
HEELEY 40 59 56 51 52 54 50 64
HILLSB
OROUG
H
31 51 45 45 47 46 40 50
MANOR 77 85 73 73 77 70 87
MOOR 47 64 58 51 53 58 56 70
NEEPSE
ND
78 71 74 70 67
NETHER
EDGE
36 30 26 26 23 21 39
NETHER
SHIRE
60
NORTO
N
23 25 20 19 16 13 22
OWLER
TON
51 64 58 55 57 56 52 70
PARK 51 66 62 62 61 62 59 62
ST.
PETER'S
26 50 44 42 39 48 45
ST.
PHILIP'
S
55 64 58 58 65 65
SHARR
OW
37 57 53 46 47 48 43 58
SOLTTHE
Y
GREEN
86
71NSLE
Y
68 73 74 78 73 87
WALKLE
Y
46 66 61 53 56 61 56 72
WOODS
EATS
24 42 37 38 28 27 38
SHEFFI
ELD
50 51 55 51 53 52 4 8 6 4
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(4.7) MAJORITIES
NOTE: Underlined figures in BOLD = Labour majorities. Ordinary figures = Municipal 
Progressive/Conservative-Liberal majorities.
WARD 1938 1945 1946 1947 1949 1950 1951 1952
ATTERC
LIFFE
1,021 2,645 2,616 2,215 1,525 4,195
BRIGHT
SIDE
2,228 2,735 1,917 2,782 3,613 2,808 2,230 3,835
BROOM
HILL
2,781 2,767 3,631 3,906 3,297 3,415 2,514
BURNG
REAVE
1,270 2,745 2,265 1,638 2,102 1,729 1,174 3,272
CATHED
RAL
3,220
CROOK
ESMOO
R
321 1,344 862 765 490 236 2,269
DARNAL
L
414 3,156 2,685 2,816 3,086 2,599 1,873 3,926
ECCLES
ALL
7,154 5,597 8,336 7,384 6,041 6,383 4,201
FIRTH
PARK
2,030 4,492 4,090 1,424
(*)
3,202 2,652 1,499 1,650
HALLAM 1,796 2,525 3,767 3,783 2,976 3,259 1,892
HANDS
WORTH
281 4,525 2,835 2,665 2,589 2,158 1,771 3,240
HEELEY 1,156 1.199 785 116 265 448 43 1.784
HILLSB
OROUG
H
2,544 250 955 1,186 658 621 1,719 14
MANOR 2.679 3.733 4.550 4.781 3.745 2.760 4.731
MOOR 232 857 571 126 286 523 349 2.124
NEEPSE
ND
5,228 4,921 6,435 3,744 2,707
NETHER
EDGE
1,461 2,080 3,259 3,064 2,833 3,121 1,260
NETHER
SHIRE
3,165
NORTO
N
2,137 3,929 4,626 4,379 3,754 4,257 2,874
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WARD 1938 1945 1946 1947 1949 1950 1951 1952
OWLER
TON
80 1 ,507 9 5 8 677 88 6 72 2 237 1 ,554
PARK 145 1 .597 1 .219 1 .588 1 .5 4 4 1 .360 8 3 4 3 ,1 7 4
ST.
PETER'S
1,114 20 (317) 510 684 125 203
ST.
PHILIP'
S
259 5 7 4 4 5 4 559 651 4 8 9
SHARR
OW
1,233 82 7 261 614 471 223 768 99 9
SOOTHE
Y
GREEN
4 ,4 6 8
71NSLE
Y
1,255 2 ,437 2 ,726 2 ,652 1 ,722 3 ,6 9 8
WALKLE
Y
432 1 ,866 1 ,236 943 880 1,185 67 8 2 ,663
WOODS
EATS
3,433 1,348 2,289 2,471 3,262 3,464 1,568
NOTE: (1) BOLD italic figure in brackets for St. Peter’s Ward in 1946 column = Independent 
Conservative majority. (2) (*) for Firth Park Ward in 1947 column = Labour victory in by-election on 
26 February 1948. (3) Where there is more than one vacancy contested in a Ward the majority of the 
opposing candidates with the highest votes is shown.
(4.8) FEMALE CANDIDATES 
NOTE: BOLD figures in brackets = Number of successful candidates.
LABOUR M.
PROG./C
ONS-LIB
COMMUN
1ST
LIBERAL TOTAL
1938 1 0 0 0 1
1945 3 (1 ) 0 0 0 3 (1 )
1946 4 (1 ) 1 (1 ) 0 0 5 (2 )
1947 2 (1 ) 4 (1 ) 0 0 6 (2 )
1949 5 (4 ) 3 0 0 8 (4 )
1950 1 6 (1 ) 1 0 8 (1 )
1951 2 (1 ) 2 (1 ) 0 0 4 (2 )
1952 5 (3 ) 2 1 1 9 (3 )
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(4.9) MINOR PARTIES
(4.9.1) BRITISH UNION OF FASCISTS IN 1938
WARD VOTES
BRIGHTSIDE 141
BURNGREAVE 67
TOTAL 208
(4.9.2) COMMUNIST PARTY 
NOTE: The Communists did not contest any seats in Sheffield in 1938.
WARD 1945 1946 1947 1949 1950 1951 1952
BRIGHTSI
DE
1,204 1,530 903 335 324 211 246
BROOMHI
LL
813
BURNGRE
AVE
714 471 585 182 176
CROOKES
MOOR
152
FIRTH
PARK
358 410
MANOR 805 775 506 234 388 307
MOOR 54
NEEPSEN
D
395
NETHER
SHIRE
329
OWLERT
ON
131
PARK 180
ST.
PHILIP'S
86
TINSLEY 139
SHEFFIE
LD
2,731 2,806 2,263 1,109 2,193 1,009 882
% OF 
TOTAL 
VOTES 
CAST
1.3 2.1 1.2 0.6 1.5 0.7 0.5
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(4.10) MISCELLANEOUS CANDIDATES
YEAR WARD PARTY VOTES °/o OF 
VOTES 
TOTAL 
CAST IN 
WARD
1945 NEEPSEND EX-SERVICEMEN 2,099 22
1946 HANDSWORTH INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST 238 2.7
1946 OWLERTON MUNICIPAL REFORM 118 2.3
1946 ST. PETER'S INDEPENDENT
CONSERVATIVE
1,493 55.9 (* )
1947 WALKLEY INDEPENDENT LIBERAL 479 6.2
1950 ST. PETER'S INDEPENDENT
CONSERVATIVE
874 46.7
1952 BROOMHILL LIBERAL 631 9.7
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APPENDIX 5
1951 SHEFFIELD MUNICIPAL ELECTION CANDIDATES
SOURCE: SHEFFIELD TELEGRAPH 24/04/1951, p3. 
(*) = RETIRING MEMBER 
BOLD = CANDIDATE ELECTED
(5.1) LABOUR PARTY
OCCUPATION WARD
FRANCIS WILFRED 
ANGELL
RAILWAY TIMEKEEPER HANDSWORTH
ALBERT BALLARD (*) SECRETARY MANOR
CHARLES THOMAS 
BUXTON (*)
STOCK CHECKER HEELEY
GEORGE COOPER CENTRELESS GRINDER WOODSEATS
LEONARD COPE TRAVELLER HANDSWORTH
ARNOLD CROSBY (*) ATTENDANT NEEPSEND
PERCY DINSLEY (*) MEAT AGENT OWLERTON
NORMAN ELDRED CRANE DRIVER BROOMHILL
MRS FRANCIS MARY 
GATHERCOLE
HOUSEWIFE ECCLESALL
GEORGE STEPHEN 
GOODENOUGH (*)
TOOL MAKER &. DIE 
SINKER
ATTERCLIFFE
REV. ALFRED GREEN CONGREGATIONAL
MINISTER
DARNALL
ALFRED ERNEST 
HOBSON (*)
SECRETARY BRIGHTSIDE
HARRY CHARLES LEGGITT T. U. ORGANISER NETHER EDGE
JOHN WILLIAM MILLS ELECTRIC MOTOR 
MAINTENANCE ENGINEER
SHARROW
KENNETH IRWIN 
MITCHELL (*)
SOLICITOR WALKLEY
CHARLES JAMES 
MOSELEY (*)
ENGINEER FIRTH PARK
REGINALD EDWARD 
MUNN
WAGES CLERK NORTON
SYDNEY THOMAS OAKES REPRESENTATIVE HILLSBOROUGH
FREDERICK THOMAS 
LATHAM PHILLIPS
RETIRED STEELWORKS 
FOREMAN
ST. PETER'S
ALBERT EDWARD 
RICHARDSON
BUTCHER MOOR
WILFRED SECKER (*) CABINET CASE FITTER ST. PHILIP'S
MAJOR JOHN SEWELL PHARMACIST HALLAM
JAMES WILFRED 
STERLAND (*)
T. U. ORGANISER PARK
JOHN THORPE (*) T. U. SECRETARY BURNGREAVE
MISS MARIAN VEITCH 
(* )
INSURANCE OFFICIAL TINSLEY
SAMUEL WILSON 
WADE (*)
ENGINEER CROOKESMOOR
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(5.2) CONSERVATIVE-LIBERALS
OCCUPATION WARD
STANLEY CYRIL BELL STEEL WORKS CLERK DARNALL
HORACE BESTALL MANAGER MOOR
ERIC ERNEST BURDALL REPRESENTATIVE ATTERCLIFFE
FRANK DUDLEY CLARKE BUYING MANAGER NEEPSEND
ROBERT COLVER (*) RETIRED STEEL 
MANUFACTURER
BROOMHILL
REGINALD GILL IRONMONGER'S
MANAGER
TINSLEY
MRS LILY ETTA 
GRAHAM (*)
PRIVATE SECRETARY WOODSEATS
OLIVER SPENCER 
HOLMES (*)
CHARTERED
ACCOUNTANT
ECCLESALL
HARRY HOWARD ENGINEER ST. PHILIP'S
HERBERT LAURENCE 
LAMBERT
CONSULTING 
AUTOMOBILE ENGINEER 
& ASSESSOR
BURNGREAVE
FREDERIC LLOYD (*) ENGINEER SHARROW
MRS EVELYN LUCAS HOUSEWIFE PARK
HARRY MERCER NEWSPAPER
REPRESENTATIVE
MANOR
ROBERT NEILL (*) CONSULTING GAS & 
ELECTRICAL ENGINEER
NETHER EDGE
STANLEY BERTRAM 
RIPPON
SALES MANAGER OWLERTON
ARTHUR SIDDALL (*) RETIRED MANAGER HILLSBOROUGH
THOMAS DRURY SMITH CORN MERCHANT HANDSWORTH
REGINALD EDWARD 
STANILAND
MANAGER HEELEY
JOHN CLIFFORD 
STEVENSON
SECRETARY-MANAGER FIRTH PARK
THOMAS ARTHUR 
STOOBS
DIRECTOR OF LTD 
COMPANY
WALKLEY
ERNEST TINDALL (*) ASSISTANT PUBLICITY 
MANAGER
NORTON
RUBEN VINER CUTLERY
MANUFACTURER
BRIGHTSIDE
BENJAMIN THOMAS WEST PAINTING & DECORATING 
CONTRACTOR
CROOKESMOOR
ALFRED VERNON 
WOLSTENHOLME (*)
SALES REPRESENTATIVE HALLAM
JAMES MORDANT 
WRAGG (*)
PROPRIETOR METAL 
REFINER
ST. PETER'S
KENNETH YOUNG BANK CLERK HANDSWORTH
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(5.3) COMMUNIST PARTY
OCCUPATION WARD
STANLEY ROY DAVEY ENGINEER BRIGHTSIDE
ARTHUR FULLARD BRICKLAYER MANOR
HOWARD HILL ORGANISER FIRTH PARK
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APPENDIX 6
COUNCIL HOUSE CONSTRUCTION
IN SHEFFIELD, 1939-1952
SOURCE: SHEFFIELD CITY COUNCIL MINUTE BOOKS.
(6.1) WARTIME HOUSE-BUILDING 
NOTE: Original intended number of houses in scheme for completion = 28,015
DATE TOTAL HOUSES 
COMPLETED
HOUSES 
COMPLETED 
SINCE 2 4 /0 8 /3 9
NO. OF HOUSES 
BUILT EACH 
PERIOD
TOTAL NO. OF 
WORKMEN
24/08/39 26,725 0 1,161
28/09/39 26,851 126 126 453
26/10/39 26,961 236 110 534
23/11/39 27,035 310 74 441
28/12/39 27,181 456 146 452
25/01/40 27,205 480 24 272
22/02/40 27,205 480 0 50
28/03/40 27,223 498 18 324
24/04/40 27,265 540 42 355
22/05/40 27,337 612 72 312
26/06/40 27,472 747 135 278
24/07/40 27,562 837 90 187
28/08/40 27,601 876 39 151
25/09/40 27,629 904 28 120
23/10/40 27,687 962 58 136
27/11/40 27,733 1,008 46 109
18/12/40 27,739 1,014 6 83
22/01/41 27,745 1,020 4 27
26/02/41 27,749 1,024 4 18
26/03/41 27,769 1,044 20 12
23/04/41 27,773 1,048 4 4
28/05/41 27,791 1,066 18 38
25/06/41 27,801 1,076 10 32
23/07/41 27,801 1,076 0 33
27/08/41 27,813 1,088 12 30
24/09/41 27,827 1,102 14 43
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DATE TOTAL HOUSES 
COMPLETED
HOUSES 
COMPLETED 
SINCE 2 4 /0 8 /3 9
NO. OF HOUSES 
BUILT EACH 
PERIOD
TOTAL NO. OF 
WORKMEN
22/10/41 27,833 1,108 6 53
26/11/41 27,843 1,118 10 39
24/12/41 27,851 1,126 8 35
28/01/42 27,865 1,140 14 37
25/02/42 27,865 1,140 0 34
18/03/42 27,865 1,140 0 37
22/04/42 27,871 1,146 6 23
27/05/42 27,877 1,152 6 33
24/06/42 27,877 1,152 0 31
29/07/42 27,877 1,152 0 29
26/08/42 27,877 1,152 0 23
23/09/42 27,877 1,152 0 13
28/10/42 27,877 1,152 0 13
26/11/42 27,885 1,160 8 15
(6.2) POST-WAR HOUSE-BUILDING
(6.2.1) TEMPORARY HOUSING COMPLETIONS
DATE TOTAL
HOUSES
BUILT
HOUSES 
BUILT IN 
PERIOD
08/11/45 58
30/11/45 82 24
12/12/45 152 70
25/01/46 203 51
26/02/46 270 67
28/03/46 280 10
02/04/46 356 76
01/05/46 447 91
14/06/46 558 111
05/07/46 599 41
02/08/46 599 0
04/09/46 715 116
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DATE TOTAL
HOUSES
BUILT
HOUSES 
BUILT IN 
PERIOD
04/10/46 866 151
08/11/46 1,055 189
06/12/46 1,161 106
03/01/47 1,228 67
07/02/47 1,256 28
06/03/47 1,256 0
16/04/47 1,256 0
14/05/47 1,319 63
12/06/47 1,348 29
12/07/47 1,348 0
02/08/47 1,348 0
12/09/47 1,348 0
10/10/47 1,357 9
13/11/47 1,363 6
11/12/47 1,386 23
15/01/48 1,421 35
12/02/48 1,493 72
11/03/48 1,571 78
15/04/48 1,685 114
07/05/48 1,714 29
10/06/48 1,844 130
15/07/48 1,917 73
??/08/48 1,955 38
10/09/48 2,014 59
14/10/48 2,056 42
17/11/48 2,066 10
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(6.2.2) WAR-DAMAGED HOUSES RE-BUILT
DATE HOUSES
COMPLETED
HOUSES 
COMPLETED 
IN PERIOD
HOUSES IN 
HAND
WORKMEN
EMPLOYED
10/10/45 0 0 56 47
24/11/45 0 0 71 105
13/12/45 0 0 73 112
25/01/46 0 0 96 114
26/02/46 8 8 88 167
08/03/46 12 4 84 149
05/04/46 24 12 72 142
04/05/46 40 16 56 120
19/06/46 57 17 41 101
11/07/46 60 3 38 71
08/08/46 60 0 38 74
07/09/46 66 6 32 77
11/10/46 72 6 26 66
12/11/46 78 6 20 52
06/12/46 80 2 18 36
03/01/47 80 0 18 27
07/02/47 82 2 16 7
07/03/47 82 0 16 0
09/04/47 82 0 16 4
14/05/47 90 8 8 11
12/06/47 94 4 4 10
10/07/47 98 4 0 0
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(6.2.3) PERMANENT HOUSING COMPLETIONS
DATE HOUSES
COMPLETED
HOUSES 
COMPLETED 
IN PERIOD
HOUSES IN 
HAND
WORKMEN
EMPLOYED
24/11/45 0 0 6 14
13/12/45 0 0 18 25
25/01/46 0 0 82 67
26/02/46 0 0 186 93
08/03/46 0 0 208 147
05/04/46 0 0 294 252
04/05/46 0 0 332 416
19/06/46 0 0 390 491
11/07/46 0 0 428 548
08/08/46 8 8 466 629
07/09/46 20 12 560 678
11/10/46 56 36 654 898
12/11/46 98 42 902 1,089
06/12/46 152 54 912 1,091
03/01/47 192 40 970 1,245
07/02/47 206 14 1,012 1,080
07/03/47 206 0 1,012 30
09/04/47 212 6 1,070 1,256
14/05/47 276 64 1,132 1,544
12/06/47 342 66 1,304 1,685
10/07/4 7 410 68 1,492 1,722
01/08/47 486 76 1,466 1,278
12/09/47 538 52 1,470 1,724
10/10/47 628 90 1,506 1,739
15/11/47 746 118 1,432 1,705
12/12/47 838 92 1,342 1,687
15/01/48 964 126 1,216 1,582
12/02/48 1,057 93 1,161 1,632
11/03/48 1,167 110 1,051 1,517
15/04/48 1,262 95 1,056 1,471
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DATE HOUSES
COMPLETED
HOUSES 
COMPLETED 
IN PERIOD
HOUSES IN 
HAND
WORKMEN
EMPLOYED
06/05/48 1,343 81 1,085 1,396
10/06/48 1,548 205 934 1,371
15/07/48 1,746 198 742 1,281
16/08/48 1,844 98 698 1,175
10/09/48 1,956 112 750 1,087
16/10/48 2,058 102 718 976
17m m 2,154 96 648 944
15/12/48 2,247 93 659 911
19/01/49 2,322 75 586 858
16/02/49 2,372 50 584 878
16/03/49 2,424 52 716 978
20/04/49 2,484 60 760 863
18/05/49 2,574 90 678 872
15/06/49 2,628 54 714 877
20/07/49 2,668 40 755 912
17/08/49 2,696 28 815 963
21/09/49 2,772 76 1,038 1,128
19/10/49 2,842 70 1,076 1,320
15/11/49 2,914 72 1,026 1,350
21/12/49 2,982 68 1,069 1,458
18/01/50 3,042 60 1,082 1,480
15/02/50 3,116 74 1,117 1,446
15/03/50 3,222 106 1,117 1,623
19/04/50 3,342 120 1,182 1,678
17/05/50 3,488 146 1,288 1,809
21/06/50 3,641 153 1,281 1,723
15/07/50 3,753 112 1,251 1,583
16/08/50 3,847 94 1,323 1,569
20/09/50 3,959 112 1,383 1,609
18/10/50 4,069 110 1,417 1,688
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DATE HOUSES
COMPLETED
HOUSES 
COMPLETED 
IN PERIOD
HOUSES IN 
HAND
WORKMEN
EMPLOYED
15/11/50 4,219 150 1,509 1,691
15/12/50 4,373 154 1,479 1,570
12/01/51 4,437 64 1,521 . 1,518
16/02/51 4,614 177 1,472 1,603
16/03/51 4,735 121 1,499 1,581
13/04/51 4,835 100 1,473 1,600
16/05/51 4,948 113 1,432 1,518
15/06/51 5,150 202 1,248 1,454
13/07/51 5,270 120 1,412 1,450
10/08/51 5,368 98 1,515 1,171
14/09/51 5,522 154 1,529 1,412
12/10/51 5,668 146 1,446 1,421
16/11/51 5,886 218 1,371 1,405
14/12/51 6,029 143 1,534 1,430
11/01/52 6,114 85 1,501 1,400
20/02/52 6,247 133 1,429 1,529
19/03/52 6,362 115 1,434 1,579
04/04/52 6,488 126 1,334 1,563
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